Materialism is logically imposible

[Immanuel Can]

You'd be ignoring processes. You can't ignore processes. Different properties obtain with (different) changing relations ("different" because relations are always changing).

"Process" is the problem.

Evolutionism posits development by a "process" which it is then necessary for it to describe -- that is, if it wants to go forward as rational. For unless it can describe the process by which inert matter becomes the stuff of consciousness, or materials become thoughts, it can continue to advance its theory only as an undemonstrated ideology. It must fill in its gaps, because its chief cachet is supposed to be that it describes a coherent natural process that does not require faith. It's supposed to be capable of explaining by using only natural laws.

Of course, that's always been nonsense, but that's what it purports to achieve; and that is clearly why anti-idealists or Atheists love it. So if it can't deliver that...

[Immanuel Can]

For those to whom consciousness seems "mysterious," why wouldn't any arbitrary property of any arbitrary material be "mysterious"?

"Arbitrary" is not a scientific description. So we've departed Evolutionism, if we do that.

Maybe that's okay...but it comes with a cost. It accepts that some phenomena are not ever going to be scientifically explicable, but are instead "arbitrary." That's not much of an incentive to further investigation.

[Immanuel Can]

Didn't see this post until now:

This is the point I doubt.

Some things are capable of being described gradualistically, and some are simply not . . .

You don't seem to doubt this, you seem to be sure that it's an on/off affair.

Yes, it seems that's quite right, so far as I can tell.

You just can not help but regularly be patronizing...

Not intentionally. And if it came across like that, I do apologize.

I am always caught between not explaining enough and giving too much information. However, if you already knew about the "emergence" problem, then I am sorry to come across as patronizing. Since your remarks did not seem to consider it an important objection, I thought it worth mentioning. But it seems you already knew -- am I correct? But you do not consider it useful to the present discussion?

Okay. Then we will leave that. However, I confess I still think it is a helpful line of thought. There's much in there that can at least frame the relevant problems well, I would say.

[Terrapin Station]

Evolutionism posits . . .

Wait--first, why do you keep going back to "evolutionism" as the context for discussing anything?

[Hobbes' Choice]

Well, I think that chemical cause anaesthesia in this case. I don't think that there is any correlation in here but cause.

Well, what we "think" won't be determinative. Only what is true will matter. You need to be certain you are not making a causal fallacy.

Seriously ?? You are playing him on the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy, on such an obvious causal chain repeatable, replicable and performed thousands of times across the globe every minute of the day?

[Hobbes' Choice]

You'd be ignoring processes. You can't ignore processes. Different properties obtain with (different) changing relations ("different" because relations are always changing).

"Process" is the problem.

Evolutionism posits development by a "process" which it is then necessary for it to describe -- that is, if it wants to go forward as rational. For unless it can describe the process by which inert matter becomes the stuff of consciousness, or materials become thoughts, it can continue to advance its theory only as an undemonstrated ideology. It must fill in its gaps, because its chief cachet is supposed to be that it describes a coherent natural process that does not require faith. It's supposed to be capable of explaining by using only natural laws.

Of course, that's always been nonsense, but that's what it purports to achieve; and that is clearly why anti-idealists or Atheists love it. So if it can't deliver that...

Process does not have to be guided, rational or even teleological. It's nothing but a chain of events in a limited range system, which observance tends to lead to outcomes that are not specifically predictable but nonetheless express generalisable principles.
All explanations are only descriptions of process. The fact that you are blind to it, is a serious problem you have probably based on your domestication, where in your childhood you have been taught that everything has a purpose in the habitus.

[bahman]

Yes, this is a major problem. Suppose someone anaesthetizes me so deeply I cease to breathe. Every cell that made up my body is still intact...but something is missing...and we can't figure out how that thing was located. And we don't say I am really "me" anymore, even though my physiology is completely intact. So how is it that we can have the entire physiology, but not the "person" there anymore?

It's strange indeed.

That is a serious problem of dualism. The problem is so serious that I discard dualism as a good framework.

I don't think that follows logically. Now, as I say, I'm not a strict dualist: but if a body, with all its chemical, physical and so forth components is not sufficient to have a total "person" present (i.e.. what we have is a corpse instead), then that would argue for the existence of a non-physical essential component to "personhood." It would support dualism of some kind, not disprove it.

Those are a serious problems and one cannot strive in dualism knowing this. Once again, there is a relational problem (how one mind is related to a body knowing that there are many minds and bodies), the problem of birth, (how a mind could be related to a body), etc.

[bahman]

Mind, C, is sort of matter but it is not particle under materialism. So we have a configuration of particles, S, and mind, C.

You need to complete your posts to prevent these hundreds of replies.

So why is what you now seem to be calling 'configuration of particles C' any less able to effect S' than anything else? This is your claim, but your statement above doesn't convey the 'logical impossibility'.

S or S' as it was mentioned are state of matter (configuration of particles) and C or C' are states of mind.

[Noax]

S or S' as it was mentioned are state of matter (configuration of particles) and C or C' are states of mind.

Which is just more matter, so problem solved then. I see no statement of impossibility here.

[Immanuel Can]

Evolutionism posits . . .

Wait--first, why do you keep going back to "evolutionism" as the context for discussing anything?

Because there are only two ways a thing can happen: suddenly, or gradually. Consciousness is a particularly difficult case: it is implausible to think of it in terms of gradualism. Materialism requires gradualism. So the problem of consciousness supports the OP.

[Immanuel Can]

the problem of birth, (how a mind could be related to a body), etc.

Yes, that's another good problem for Materialism: at what point does the "person," "life" or "soul," whatever we want to call the immaterial quality that distinguishes a mere body from a living being, enter a baby? Somehow the explanation has to turn out to be by means of some mere materials, if Materialism is true. And that seems implausible.

[Noax]

S or S' as it was mentioned are state of matter (configuration of particles) and C or C' are states of mind.

The thread title seems to suggest a discussion of materialism, but all your comments seems to assume some kind of substance dualism. So if you're not discussing dualism, where is this C? What matter is part of C but not part of S? It C the entire living body? A brain? Every 4th nucleus of liver cells? What matter are you declaring causally ineffective to the rest of matter?

You seem to be trying to avoid discussion of known things by assigning these letters, and thus skirting other peoples potential definitions. C for instance seems to be defined sometimes as intent or will, but your choice of C seems to suggest you mean consciousness by it. No matter. Answer the where-is-it questions.

[Noax]

Yes, that's another good problem for Materialism: at what point does the "person," "life" or "soul," whatever we want to call the immaterial quality that distinguishes a mere body from a living being, enter a baby? Somehow the explanation has to turn out to be by means of some mere materials, if Materialism is true. And that seems implausible.

Another with no understanding of materialism. It is an assertion that there is no "life, soul, or whatever we want to call the immaterial quality" that needs to enter something. What part of 'immaterial' is confusing? There is no problem of when X enters a body if there is no X.

Not claiming it is the correct view, but you seem to suggest the view requires an answer as to when these dualistic concepts enter into its picture. It would not be materialism if the question made sense.

[Terrapin Station]

Evolutionism posits . . .

Wait--first, why do you keep going back to "evolutionism" as the context for discussing anything?

Because there are only two ways a thing can happen: suddenly, or gradually. Consciousness is a particularly difficult case: it is implausible to think of it in terms of gradualism. Materialism requires gradualism. So the problem of consciousness supports the OP.

The question was about evolutionism. Why do you keep talking about things in terms of "evolutionism?" You keep going back to that as if I'm campaigning for "evolutionism" or something.

"there are only two ways a thing can happen: suddenly, or gradually" --which has what to do with answering why you keep talking about things in terms of "evolutionism?"

[Immanuel Can]

Yes, that's another good problem for Materialism: at what point does the "person," "life" or "soul," whatever we want to call the immaterial quality that distinguishes a mere body from a living being, enter a baby? Somehow the explanation has to turn out to be by means of some mere materials, if Materialism is true. And that seems implausible.

Another with no understanding of materialism. It is an assertion that there is no "life, soul, or whatever we want to call the immaterial quality" that needs to enter something. What part of 'immaterial' is confusing? There is no problem of when X enters a body if there is no X.

Not claiming it is the correct view, but you seem to suggest the view requires an answer as to when these dualistic concepts enter into its picture. It would not be materialism if the question made sense.

All you're saying is that you deny the problem. Of course, one can always do that. But it doesn't go away.

Materialism can't explain how all the "materials" can be present, as in the case of a human body, but no "life," or "soul," or whatever you want to call it -- "vitality," if you prefer -- is present. If Materialism were true, it would have to show what material property was absent from such a situation. But we know of no such materials, so Materialism has to run away from the problem entirely or else question itself.