Materialism is logically imposible

[bahman]

Again C is not part of S. It supervene on S.

This is a self contradictory statement. So what does 'supervene' mean to you then?

Supervene: be consequent on the existence of another.

[Terrapin Station]

So materialism is an incomplete system of belief since it cannot explain how matter moves.

Yeah, per what you consider a "complete system of belief," materialism is an incomplete "system" of belief--"system" being in quotation marks because it's not even a system. "Materialism" simply denotes a particular belief: namely, the belief that only material things (and their relations and processes) exist. There's nothing systematic about that.

Another thing to compare this to is atheism. People are always assuming that atheists have particular views about evolution and science in general and all sort of things. None of those other beliefs are implied by atheism though. Atheism only refers to one particular belief: namely, the belief that no gods exist. (Which some atheists will object to characterizing that way, but that's another issue where they're unfamiliar with the basics of epistemology, etc.)

[bahman]

So materialism is an incomplete system of belief since it cannot explain how matter moves.

Yeah, per what you consider a "complete system of belief," materialism is an incomplete "system" of belief--"system" being in quotation marks because it's not even a system. "Materialism" simply denotes a particular belief: namely, the belief that only material things (and their relations and processes) exist. There's nothing systematic about that.

Another thing to compare this to is atheism. People are always assuming that atheists have particular views about evolution and science in general and all sort of things. None of those other beliefs are implied by atheism though. Atheism only refers to one particular belief: namely, the belief that no gods exist. (Which some atheists will object to characterizing that way, but that's another issue where they're unfamiliar with the basics of epistemology, etc.)

But we can be materialist and believe that matter move based on laws of nature (what you call realist)?

[Terrapin Station]

But we can be materialist and believe that matter move based on laws of nature (what you call realist)?

Yes, definitely. Again, that's because there is no logical implication between materialism and stances on physical laws. In other words, you can be a materialist and have any conceivable stance on physical laws. Well, or the only stance that would be excluded would be something like "physical laws are real, non-physical (non-material) things."

[Noax]

Again C is not part of S. It supervene on S.

This is a self contradictory statement. So what does 'supervene' mean to you then?

Supervene: be consequent on the existence of another.

You make it sound like a non-physical mind is somehow created as a result of physical processes. Physicalism asserts that the mind IS physical, and thus part of physical state.

Consider idealism, which says the physical supervenes on the mental. That doesn't mean that a mind independent cup is created by (consequent of) the act of observation. It means the cup has physical properties, but it is still a mental thing, part of mental state. Similarly, a physical mind, being physical, is part of S.

Your instincts are obviously dualistic, given your description of a mind/point-of-view that travels through a determined physical block universe. There is no such thing in a physicalist view, block universe or not.

[bahman]

You make it sound like a non-physical mind is somehow created as a result of physical processes. Physicalism asserts that the mind IS physical, and thus part of physical state...

No, I am asserting that mind is physical and it is result of physical process. The problem is that in most of systems physical process does not lead to mind so the system undergo a change from lets say S to S' without any problem. The problem however arises when a specific process leads to mind. So we have a fork, physical process leads to a change in state of matter, S to S', and in the same time it leads to mind.

[Noax]

No, I am asserting that mind is physical and it is result of physical process.

This seems to conflict with your statement that C is not part of S. S is the entire physical state, and if C is physical, then it is part of that state. If you exclude C from S, then how do you qualify it as still physical?

So we have a fork, physical process leads to a change in state of matter, S to S', and in the same time it leads to mind.

This seems like a description of the creation of a new mind, like you get with a pregnancy. Don't know what you mean by fork.

Your original story had mind already existing at S, and S` is somehow not influenced by intent C because it is not part of S.

As for Terapin's posts about physicalism not being a complete system, he's right. It is not a grand unified system of everything. It is one (two?) assertion, and does not take a stance on unrelated interpretations like religion, quantum mechanics (interpreted), ethics, nor on theories like big bang, relativity, quantum mechanics (theory), astrology, flood geology, evolution, or string theory.
I hesitate to include religion in that list since so many of them require a dualistic interpretation of mind (and also require/deny several other interpretation and theories in that list), but physicalism does not preclude gods, so it is in there.

So to disprove physicalism, take its assertions (mind is material, and matter is fundamental) and drive that to inconsistency. It not being a grand unified explanation of everything is not an inconsistency. For the record, I don't buy into matter not supervening on anything else, so technically I'm not a physicalist. I don't know what label to use for myself.

[Noax]

I actually understand what you're trying to describe, but the terms are sufficiently messed up it wasn't clear.

You're describing the problem of agency of the dualistic mind in a physical universe of hard determinism.
Block universe is not required for hard determinism, This problem also exists in presentism.
This is also the free will problem for that particular scenario, but not necessarily for other scenarios.

Your mistake is the subject of the thread: This is not a description of physicalism at all, which seems to be what's throwing us all.

The 'fork' you speak of is a change to the physical by the intent (C) of the non-physical mind.

Anyway, it is hardly news that this problem exists, and the primary solution is not to hold a fully deterministic view of the physical. Block universe is out then, except for 'growing block' which seems to keep the problems of both views and solves none of them except the dualistic agency one.

I found a way around the problem of epiphenomenal agency, but actually made empirical predictions, and the test failed.

[bahman]

This seems to conflict with your statement that C is not part of S. S is the entire physical state, and if C is physical, then it is part of that state. If you exclude C from S, then how do you qualify it as still physical?...

No, C is an emergent property which is the result of brain process.

[bahman]

I actually understand what you're trying to describe, but the terms are sufficiently messed up it wasn't clear.

You're describing the problem of agency of the dualistic mind in a physical universe of hard determinism.
Block universe is not required for hard determinism, This problem also exists in presentism.
This is also the free will problem for that particular scenario, but not necessarily for other scenarios.

Your mistake is the subject of the thread: This is not a description of physicalism at all, which seems to be what's throwing us all.

The 'fork' you speak of is a change to the physical by the intent (C) of the non-physical mind.

Anyway, it is hardly news that this problem exists, and the primary solution is not to hold a fully deterministic view of the physical. Block universe is out then, except for 'growing block' which seems to keep the problems of both views and solves none of them except the dualistic agency one.

I found a way around the problem of epiphenomenal agency, but actually made empirical predictions, and the test failed.

No I am discussing the problem an agent who is conscious what could happen as the result of brain process, S->C, in which his body move based on laws of nature, S->S'. You can put C and S' in one category M={C,S'} where M is the state of matter.

[Noax]

This seems to conflict with your statement that C is not part of S. S is the entire physical state, and if C is physical, then it is part of that state. If you exclude C from S, then how do you qualify it as still physical?...

No, C is an emergent property which is the result of brain process.

Not sure which of my options got the 'no'.
C is part of S or it is not. I don't trust what you consider 'emergent' to mean.

You can put C and S' in one category M={C,S'} where M is the state of matter.

So S is not, itself, the state of matter? What is it then?

The OP is vague.

In close form, S'=L(S), where S is the initial state, S' is final state and L is laws of nature.

S is the initial state, but of what? Not matter apparently, since the statement above implies S is only part of the state of matter.

[bahman]

T
This seems to conflict with your statement that C is not part of S. S is the entire physical state, and if C is physical, then it is part of that state. If you exclude C from S, then how do you qualify it as still physical?...

No, C is an emergent property which is the result of brain process.

Not sure which of my options got the 'no'.
C is part of S or it is not. I don't trust what you consider 'emergent' to mean.

You can put C and S' in one category M={C,S'} where M is the state of matter.

So S is not, itself, the state of matter? What is it then?

The OP is vague.

In close form, S'=L(S), where S is the initial state, S' is final state and L is laws of nature.

S is the initial state, but of what? Not matter apparently, since the statement above implies S is only part of the state of matter.

Let me use another notation. M is the complete state of matter which include S state of matter and C expectation of what happen at the given point. In simple world we have M={S,C}. In the next step we have M' which is constitute of S' and C, M'={S',C'}, where S'=L(S) and C'=P(S). This means that C' is expectation that S' happen and S' is what happen.

I hope that I am clear enough now.

[Noax]

Let me use another notation. M is the complete state of matter which include S state of matter and C expectation of what happen at the given point. In simple world we have M={S,C}. In the next step we have M' which is constitute of S' and C, M'={S',C'}, where S'=L(S) and C'=P(S). This means that C' is expectation that S' happen and S' is what happen.

I hope that I am clear enough now.

Sorry, I'm not. What is the difference between the M complete state of matter and S, the 'state of matter'. The wording implies S is not complete, but after half a dozen askings of that question, you will not state that. Exactly what is S the state of if not matter? If S is not complete, then S' is not a function only of S. So S'=L(S) is wrong. S'=L(M) would be better.

[bahman]

Let me use another notation. M is the complete state of matter which include S state of matter and C expectation of what happen at the given point. In simple world we have M={S,C}. In the next step we have M' which is constitute of S' and C, M'={S',C'}, where S'=L(S) and C'=P(S). This means that C' is expectation that S' happen and S' is what happen.

I hope that I am clear enough now.

Sorry, I'm not. What is the difference between the M complete state of matter and S, the 'state of matter'. The wording implies S is not complete, but after half a dozen askings of that question, you will not state that. Exactly what is S the state of if not matter? If S is not complete, then S' is not a function only of S. So S'=L(S) is wrong. S'=L(M) would be better.

I just divide state of matter, a person for example, into two parts, namely body, S, and mind, C. Let me know if things is clear now.

[Conde Lucanor]

There are many different systems, with their internal rules or regularities. The fact that they are all material systems does not imply that they are all determined by the same set of causes and effects. The set of rules that apply in a fluid system will not apply in an electric system. A study of the movement of inanimate objects will not suffice to explain the migration of birds. And yet, they are all material systems.

You are wrong. The same set of laws explain fluid as it can explain solid. That is why it is called laws of nature.

Nope. This does not work like Moses coming down from the mountain saying: "here they are, the laws of nature". There are general laws that apply to the world as a whole, but in order to understand the causes of specific events in nature, scientists most come up with specific principles related to those systems, even though many principles can be derived from others. Knowing your Pascal's law of fluid mechanics won't be of much help when designing an electrical circuit, where Ohm's law becomes handy. And none of them will be of much help when studying the mating habits of butterflies, as many other variables come in place and make the systems more complex. In general, mechanical systems are more closed and deterministic, therefore more predictable. Biological systems are more open and less deterministic, therefore less predictable. All those complexities of causes and effects in the world can be put under the general concept of "laws of nature", but that's about it, a general concept, not one general law.

You fail to take into account which kind of system is that where human agency applies. You also fail to take into account that there are open and close systems and the determination of outcomes is very different from one to another. Minerals don't "behave" with willfulness and even the behavior of biological entities will depend on multiple variables, including context, chance, etc. And finally you also fail to take into account that human expectations will be based both on deductive and inductive learning of how all these different systems work, that is, their internal rules or regularities and the contingent aspects of the world. So human expectations are hypothesis of how the world will be, what will most likely happen, given the different possibilities of material causes. That there might be no relation between our hypothesis and what actually happens does not cancel the material properties of the world.

We are discussion human which of course have mind. Human is not a close system because s/he experience, etc.

Indeed, humans belong to a specific biological system, where both determinism and indeterminism applies. Humans experience the world and make choices about courses of actions. That is not against the notion of the world and we being material, physical entities.