sthitapragya wrote:Whether a moral code higher than the Supreme Being Himself exists or not is not the question. The question is from your perspective. The supreme being is above judgement in your eyes, in the sense that no moral code applies to him so he cannot commit any sin, according to you. But in YOUR eyes, from YOUR perspective, in YOUR opinion, if a woman has a miscarriage due to a genetic condition, did God commit murder?
Well, you only answered my second question. In which case, I will deal with it.
I have to point out to you that your characterization of Christianity is, at most, an extreme minority one. Most are not hypercalvinists, and so they believe that neither human beings nor all natural processes in the fallen world are expressions of the will and action of God. So your question would evaporate, except for hypercalvinists: of which I am not one.
So the answer to your question would be "No": for things
other than God can be responsible for that.
But to be fair, I'll tackle both of my two questions, if I may. So on to your comment on your response above, that pertains only to the second. To frame your question at all, you need me to accept that there is a code higher than God. But if He's the Supreme Being, then you know what I must believe: that nothing can be higher than Him.
I apologize, but to cover my bases I must now get a bit technical and add a
caveat, anticipating the usual objection. That objection goes as follows: Does this, then, leave me open to the "Euthyphro" objection," namely that it would imply God can do immoral things?
But the Euthryphro objection is founded on a false dichotomy: it posits (and Socrates was quite explicit about this) the existence of
more than one god, so that, as Socrates says, Euthyphro must believe that morality is
different from the character of God, not
coextensive with it. He says this because, as he points out, multiple gods can and do (allegedly) disagree about what is "right"; so they can't all be channelling the uniquely moral position in their preferences.
However, there is no necessity that a singular God must In fact, it would be odd to think He sustained a "disagreement" with Himself. Thus "morality" and "the Nature of God" are better seen as two descriptions of precisely the same phenomenon. That which is moral
is both moral
and pleases God, being according to His character. There is no more sense in thinking they have to be different things than there is in assuming that as "boy" and "son" cannot be equivalent terms, or "cat" and "domestic feline" cannot be.
And so, absent any code higher than God, and absent any division between God and morality, your question can be answered in total:
God is neither (of necessity) the responsible agent of a woman's miscarriage, nor in any way culpable if she miscarries.
Igitur, God cannot be a "murderer," by definition.