Philosophy as Paradox

[jason_m]

Hello,

I have spent years studying philosophy. At some point, I became acquainted with Wittgenstein's philosophy that philosophical problems are really "language games"; "mere idle curiosities." This made a lot of sense, because, as I studied the history of philosophy, I became aware of how little progress there is - I cannot think of one philosophical problem that has been solved by philosophers. In other words, maybe the explanation as to why there is so little progress in philosophy is because the problems are not "real" problems, and the explanation as to why they are not real problems is because they are really "language games." This made a lot of intuitive sense, and stuck with me for some time.

However, after doing more reading, I became acquainted with the "Heap paradox." The notion is that several grains of sand do not make a heap, but several thousand do. Where, then, in between those quantities does what is just "sand" turn into a "heap?" There doesn't seem to be any clear answer. My solution is that the notions of "sand", "heap", etc. are just imprecise conventions we came up with to explain certain phenomena. Therefore, while we have a convention that 1000 grains of sand make up a heap, we do not have any convention as to what precise quantities of sand constitute a heap. Hence, we could have had any answer, from a heap starting at 100 grains of sand, to any quantity of sand being a "heap," to having no concept of heap at all. Therefore, by convention, the answer is completely undefined.

Anyway, after reading about this paradox, I suddenly realized how many philosophical problems have the same "structure" as the heap paradox (not necessarily the same answer, though...) Just off the top of my head, there is the issue of where consciousness begins, where animals have rights, where we draw the line between science and pseudo-science, where mental illness begins, etc. Right then and there, a thought occurred to me: couldn't these all have the same structure because they are all paradoxes? Even further, maybe most philosophical problems are really paradoxes in disguise, and that's why they don't have answers, because paradoxes are essentially questions without real answers... After thinking about it for some time, I started applying the concept to different philosophical problems. I started with a precise definition paradox; I learned that it is either something that is both true and false at the same time, or something that sounds true that clashes with our sense of reality (http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/paradox). Doesn't that sound like almost every philosophical problem that has been posed? Look, for instance at the mind-brain debate: the issue is that mind and brain are both the same and different at the same time - that would imply something that is both true and false at the same time... Or, another example: Peter Singer's views on animal rights. He comes up with a convincing argument that animals have rights, and so we should avoid consuming all animal products. With respect to the definition of paradox again, isn't this an example of something that sounds true that clashes with our expectations? It seems that any philosophical problem I've looked at fits one of these two definitions...

Therefore, what does this imply? It of course implies that philosophical problems might be paradoxes. And if they are paradoxes, this implies that maybe we should start treating them more the way we would treat paradoxes. For instance, we don't look at the liar's paradox and take sides or come up with arguments as to why it is either true or false - there is clearly something going awry with the statement that demands an explanation from the outside. Further, I assume that because of this approach, there has been some progress in the history of paradoxes. Therefore, this begs the question: should we treat philosophy the same way? I leave the answer to you.

[HexHammer]

Wittgenstein's philosophy has as much relevance as a dog chasing it's own tail, one has to be reasonable stupid to see any relevance in him.

[Arising_uk]

Relevance to what?

Have you read Wittgenstein?

[Jaded Sage]

You didn't even demonstrate the paradox of the heap paradox. I suspect Wittgenstein meant something more sophisticated than what you think he meant.

[jason_m]

You didn't even demonstrate the paradox of the heap paradox.

I didn't? I thought the problem was that I didn't present it sequentially. Let's hear what is missing then...

I suspect Wittgenstein meant something more sophisticated than what you think he meant.

This would be the time for you to elucidate more clearly as well... (I.e., explain what Wittgenstein "meant.")

[Jaded Sage]

The paradox is not that it's an arbitrary distinction or that the concepts are imprecise—those aren't paradoxes. The paradox is that the pile of sand never becomes a heap.

As for Wittgenstein, I have yet to read him. I've only taken one class on language and reality and I barely remember the paper I skimmed where he tried to prove 1+1=2. So on him I (probably) misquote, "Where we cannot speak, there we must be silent."