Sally Latham examines the construction of identity through memory.
https://philosophynow.org/issues/110/Shaping_The_Self
Shaping The Self
Re: Shaping The Self
The following is a letter to the editor that I am working on. I post it here in the hope of input before I do:
Dear Editor: While I think it would be wrong to dismiss the role of memory in identity, as described in Sally Latham’s ‘Shaping the Self’ (issue 110), I can’t help but feel it would be equally wrong to dismiss the role played by the fact that we are always a particular point (a perceiving thing) in space and time with an experience of continuity.
To demonstrate the limitations of the memory criterion of identity and the import of the perceiving thing, I would point to an issue that emerges with the Arnold Schwarzenegger movie, The Sixth Day. In it, a corporation has developed the technology to clone individuals and implant their recent memories into them. Their henchmen are killed and then, thanks to capital and technology, basically resurrected. But before I go on, for the sake of our scenario, allow me to make the revision that the implanting of memories would be unnecessary since if the brain was cloned at the time of death, those memories would be imbedded in the clone –that is according to the recent discoveries of neuroscience.
The question we have to ask is if this would necessarily constitute the resurrection of the individual that died. The problem for me is that being killed and brought back as a perfect replication of myself would still involve a major disruption of the continuity of my particular point in space and time. My replicant may be just like me and have my memories. But would it be the ‘me’ that died? And all we would have to do is imagine a different scenario in which my replicant was created while I was still alive. It may be exactly like me with my memories, may even think it is me, but it still wouldn’t be me: the continuous point in space and time that I am.
This leaves the hardcore materialist (or what Raymond Tallis calls neuromaniacs) with a bit of a conundrum. Their commitment to what we experience as mind and identity as being little more than the brain commits them to say haughtily: “Of course, it would be a resurrection of you. Same body, same brain, same you.” But then we could only ask if they would be willing to put their money where their mouth is if that technology existed.
They might, out of desperation, argue that we experience complete losses of continuity during sleep or under anesthesia during surgery. But then they would have to deal with the fact that those disruptions of continuity always end in us emerging back into the same body, the very same point in space and time.
All I’m proposing here is that that particular point in space and time (that perceiving thing) and its experience of continuity, in a feedback loop with memories, is what constitutes identity.
Dear Editor: While I think it would be wrong to dismiss the role of memory in identity, as described in Sally Latham’s ‘Shaping the Self’ (issue 110), I can’t help but feel it would be equally wrong to dismiss the role played by the fact that we are always a particular point (a perceiving thing) in space and time with an experience of continuity.
To demonstrate the limitations of the memory criterion of identity and the import of the perceiving thing, I would point to an issue that emerges with the Arnold Schwarzenegger movie, The Sixth Day. In it, a corporation has developed the technology to clone individuals and implant their recent memories into them. Their henchmen are killed and then, thanks to capital and technology, basically resurrected. But before I go on, for the sake of our scenario, allow me to make the revision that the implanting of memories would be unnecessary since if the brain was cloned at the time of death, those memories would be imbedded in the clone –that is according to the recent discoveries of neuroscience.
The question we have to ask is if this would necessarily constitute the resurrection of the individual that died. The problem for me is that being killed and brought back as a perfect replication of myself would still involve a major disruption of the continuity of my particular point in space and time. My replicant may be just like me and have my memories. But would it be the ‘me’ that died? And all we would have to do is imagine a different scenario in which my replicant was created while I was still alive. It may be exactly like me with my memories, may even think it is me, but it still wouldn’t be me: the continuous point in space and time that I am.
This leaves the hardcore materialist (or what Raymond Tallis calls neuromaniacs) with a bit of a conundrum. Their commitment to what we experience as mind and identity as being little more than the brain commits them to say haughtily: “Of course, it would be a resurrection of you. Same body, same brain, same you.” But then we could only ask if they would be willing to put their money where their mouth is if that technology existed.
They might, out of desperation, argue that we experience complete losses of continuity during sleep or under anesthesia during surgery. But then they would have to deal with the fact that those disruptions of continuity always end in us emerging back into the same body, the very same point in space and time.
All I’m proposing here is that that particular point in space and time (that perceiving thing) and its experience of continuity, in a feedback loop with memories, is what constitutes identity.
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Arising_uk
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Re: Shaping The Self
Space maybe but not time?d63 wrote:... the very same point in space and time. ...
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attofishpi
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Re: Shaping The Self
The wonderful thing about consciousness is that without a point of reference, such as a clock, or a cause and effect continuation of time - where one is actually awake and able to perceive such a thing, time is immaterial or at least irrelevant. Sure the observer might point out 'hey, this is the frame of time now', but it truly remains irrelevant to the frame 'of mind' of the individual in question. (all of life's responsibilities aside!)Arising_uk wrote:Space maybe but not time?d63 wrote:... the very same point in space and time. ...
SLEEP S_leap time. (* where 'S' is the sin wave, and often removable in many words, like quanta.)
PS. sorry d63...Arising nose my 'irrationality' on such things!
Re: Shaping The Self
Thanks guys! For the record, I'm speaking primarily of subjective Time -something I may have to add to the revision. I too subscribe to the Tallis school:
Time doesn't move. Things, on the other hand, do.
Time doesn't move. Things, on the other hand, do.
Re: Shaping The Self
Alright guys: this is it: the one that goes to Rick today. It has been fun actually polishing a piece. But I have another project I need to get back to. I thank you for your input:
Dear Editor: While it would be wrong to dismiss the role of memory in identity, as described in Sally Latham’s ‘Shaping the Self’ (issue 110), I would also point to the role played by the perceiving thing: the fact that we are always a particular point in space and time (that is subjective time so as not to incur the wrath of Tallis) with an experience of continuity. Consider some thought experiments built around the movie The Sixth Day with Arnold Schwarzenegger. In it, a corporation has developed the technology to clone individuals and implant their memories into them. Their henchmen are killed then, thanks to capital and technology, basically resurrected.
Now, first of all, we could, for the sake of scientific accuracy, consider the implanting of memories redundant since, if the brain was cloned at the time of death, those memories would be encoded in its exact replica. However, we can assume that the redundancy is mainly a narrative device meant to suggest that not only are the memories being injected, but the person's identity as well.
Secondly, we have to ask is if this would necessarily constitute the resurrection of the individual that died. The problem for me is that being killed and brought back as a perfect replication of myself would still involve a major disruption in the continuity of my particular point in space and time. My replication may be just like me and have my memories. But would it be the ‘me’ that died? Of course, a rash materialist (Tallis' neuromaniac or Dennett's barefoot behaviorist) might boast: "But of course! Same body; same brain; same you." And we might wonder if they, that is if the technology did exist, would be willing to put their money where their mouth is. Then, being civilized people who don't kill for the sake of knowledge, we might settle for the less drastic measure of another scenario: one in which the replication was created while the original was still alive. Once again: same body, same mental makeup and memories. But in this case, we could confidently say the original identity is not continued through the replication. Nor would the disruption be analogous to the discontinuations we might experience in sleep or under anesthesia since, in those cases, identity is anchored in its return to the same body.
Once again, I am not dismissing Latham's point. It's more like sharing her confusion and uncertainty, and of drawing out what seemed implicit throughout her explorations, that what we are dealing with is not a single criterion, but a feedback loop between mental states, memories of those states (as recorded in a diary), and the perceiving thing: that particular and continual point in space and time that we, as conscious beings (identities), always are.
Dear Editor: While it would be wrong to dismiss the role of memory in identity, as described in Sally Latham’s ‘Shaping the Self’ (issue 110), I would also point to the role played by the perceiving thing: the fact that we are always a particular point in space and time (that is subjective time so as not to incur the wrath of Tallis) with an experience of continuity. Consider some thought experiments built around the movie The Sixth Day with Arnold Schwarzenegger. In it, a corporation has developed the technology to clone individuals and implant their memories into them. Their henchmen are killed then, thanks to capital and technology, basically resurrected.
Now, first of all, we could, for the sake of scientific accuracy, consider the implanting of memories redundant since, if the brain was cloned at the time of death, those memories would be encoded in its exact replica. However, we can assume that the redundancy is mainly a narrative device meant to suggest that not only are the memories being injected, but the person's identity as well.
Secondly, we have to ask is if this would necessarily constitute the resurrection of the individual that died. The problem for me is that being killed and brought back as a perfect replication of myself would still involve a major disruption in the continuity of my particular point in space and time. My replication may be just like me and have my memories. But would it be the ‘me’ that died? Of course, a rash materialist (Tallis' neuromaniac or Dennett's barefoot behaviorist) might boast: "But of course! Same body; same brain; same you." And we might wonder if they, that is if the technology did exist, would be willing to put their money where their mouth is. Then, being civilized people who don't kill for the sake of knowledge, we might settle for the less drastic measure of another scenario: one in which the replication was created while the original was still alive. Once again: same body, same mental makeup and memories. But in this case, we could confidently say the original identity is not continued through the replication. Nor would the disruption be analogous to the discontinuations we might experience in sleep or under anesthesia since, in those cases, identity is anchored in its return to the same body.
Once again, I am not dismissing Latham's point. It's more like sharing her confusion and uncertainty, and of drawing out what seemed implicit throughout her explorations, that what we are dealing with is not a single criterion, but a feedback loop between mental states, memories of those states (as recorded in a diary), and the perceiving thing: that particular and continual point in space and time that we, as conscious beings (identities), always are.
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attofishpi
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Re: Shaping The Self
Our only perception of the 'past' is via our memory. (diaries\video aside)Sally Latham wrote: Self-Identity Through Memory
The above is old ground, and most people would agree that memory is an important part of our identity, whether or not they would go so far as to say it is either sufficient or necessary for it. But my question now is, how much influence can we have in shaping our identity and self-perception through memory?
Having the ability to 'recall' those memories for me, does not make my identity.
If my memory was totally wiped and i woke up in hospital with no recollection of my past, im pretty certain that my identity remains intact. So here we need to clarify what we mean by our 'identity'. The first entry in my dictionary distinguishes it as our 'personality'.
So again i believe i am correct in my above statement in that my 'identity' or 'personality' will remain intact without any recollection of my past. Im fairly certain that i would remain calm and positive with my sense of humour intact the main thing that has supported me in my true past through many of lifes more harrowing situations.
So although those memories are gone, they did (whatever they were) create the 'me', the identity, the personality that i still have at the current point in time.
I think ones identity\personality is created via social conditioning, and just how intelligent one is whilst being 'conditioned', meaning, the way we decide to condition ourselves is what utlimatley creates our identity.
Again, memories are just what we perceive as the past of ourselves. Sure they can, if we still have them, continue to condition who we are, at the present point in time when we reflect upon them, but are not responsible for our personality our identity. Our intelligence was always responsible for who we are, the way we analysed our past inputs and collated the data into our memory banks!
PS. I didn't like the authors suggestion of 'future memory' - absurd. One can speculate about the future, but memory is only ever the past.
Re: Shaping The Self
It reminds me of the Ship of Theseus, that has over the years every part replaced with a new part, is it the same ship, etc. Also Lincoln's Axe, has had both handle and axe-head replaced, is it still the same axe or what.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ship_of_Theseus
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ship_of_Theseus
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attofishpi
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Re: Shaping The Self
This was the best vid i could find of Trigger on u tube cos it gets it from the start of the scene... it still doesnt do the original any justice, in fact i think its fucked by your average (bigotry removed) that never quite got it. (Only Fools and Horses.)Pluto wrote:It reminds me of the Ship of Theseus, that has over the years every part replaced with a new part, is it the same ship, etc. Also Lincoln's Axe, has had both handle and axe-head replaced, is it still the same axe or what.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ship_of_Theseus
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s1VNNbSYdt0
Re: Shaping The Self
Some good points guys. But I can't help but run them back to my point about a particular point in space and time -out of personal bias, not the presumption (the intellectual arrogance (of having any kind of dominant position. I really like the angle that Pluto brings into it:
"It reminds me of the Ship of Theseus, that has over the years every part replaced with a new part, is it the same ship, etc. Also Lincoln's Ax, has had both handle and ax-head replaced, is it still the same ax or what."
It just seems to me that the Sixth Day paradox is an accelerated version of this very issue, closer in terms of time, to Lincoln's ax than Theseus' ship.
"If my memory was totally wiped and i woke up in hospital with no recollection of my past, im pretty certain that my identity remains intact. So here we need to clarify what we mean by our 'identity'. The first entry in my dictionary distinguishes it as our 'personality'."
First of all: hence the reason we cannot always trust the dictionary as a final authority on the definition of a term. That said, what we might also consider here is someone with alzheimers. We have to ask if just because they lose their memories they necessarily lose their identity since they are still the same perceiving thing: that continous point in space and subjective time. Simply applying it to personality (while useful at a nominal, blue collar level (does us no good at the philosophical level which recognizes there must be foundation to personality that works through the symbolic filters (to use a term of Hofstadter's (and is common among all perceiving things.
This is especially interesting to me now because as I finish my Modern Scholar lectures on Evolutionary Psychology, I find an alternative version of the perceiving thing as a mental module that hovers above all the various drives and impulses and creates a narrative in order to make sense of the activities of various mental modules. It just seems to me that there is a kind of operationalism at work here that assumes the scientific perspective that I think we really need to deal with here.
"It reminds me of the Ship of Theseus, that has over the years every part replaced with a new part, is it the same ship, etc. Also Lincoln's Ax, has had both handle and ax-head replaced, is it still the same ax or what."
It just seems to me that the Sixth Day paradox is an accelerated version of this very issue, closer in terms of time, to Lincoln's ax than Theseus' ship.
"If my memory was totally wiped and i woke up in hospital with no recollection of my past, im pretty certain that my identity remains intact. So here we need to clarify what we mean by our 'identity'. The first entry in my dictionary distinguishes it as our 'personality'."
First of all: hence the reason we cannot always trust the dictionary as a final authority on the definition of a term. That said, what we might also consider here is someone with alzheimers. We have to ask if just because they lose their memories they necessarily lose their identity since they are still the same perceiving thing: that continous point in space and subjective time. Simply applying it to personality (while useful at a nominal, blue collar level (does us no good at the philosophical level which recognizes there must be foundation to personality that works through the symbolic filters (to use a term of Hofstadter's (and is common among all perceiving things.
This is especially interesting to me now because as I finish my Modern Scholar lectures on Evolutionary Psychology, I find an alternative version of the perceiving thing as a mental module that hovers above all the various drives and impulses and creates a narrative in order to make sense of the activities of various mental modules. It just seems to me that there is a kind of operationalism at work here that assumes the scientific perspective that I think we really need to deal with here.
Re: Shaping The Self
Oops!!!!
Last edited by d63 on Sun Nov 15, 2015 3:07 am, edited 1 time in total.
Re: Shaping The Self
“This is especially interesting to me now because as I finish my Modern Scholar lectures on Evolutionary Psychology, I find an alternative version of the perceiving thing as a mental module that hovers above all the various drives and impulses [while describing it as acting within] and creates a narrative in order to make sense of the activities of various mental modules. It just seems to me that there is a kind of operationalism at work here that assumes the scientific perspective that I think we really need to deal with here.”
In other words, what the science of evolutionary psychology is arguing is that our sense of identity is merely one kind of mental activity (one mental module (among others. However, I would argue that this comes from the same scientific arrogance that dismisses free-will (that is when we should be talking about a participating self since “free-will” was lost with Cartesian Dualism (through the circular reasoning that was demonstrated throughout the last 2 lectures: that which assumes that everything must work within scientific perimeters in order to be considered legitimate.
(More on this later.)
Our mission, should we choose to accept it, is to establish that our identity (that which creates an ordered narrative for our multiple drives and impulses (is not just one mechanism in the brain, but rather a result of the fact that we have a brain which is attached to a body that constitutes a particular point in space and subjective time.
In other words, as many of you have argued, we cannot think of the self (identity (as just one kind of mental module among others. We should, rather, think of it as the foundation of all modules described by evolutionary psychology.
In other words, what the science of evolutionary psychology is arguing is that our sense of identity is merely one kind of mental activity (one mental module (among others. However, I would argue that this comes from the same scientific arrogance that dismisses free-will (that is when we should be talking about a participating self since “free-will” was lost with Cartesian Dualism (through the circular reasoning that was demonstrated throughout the last 2 lectures: that which assumes that everything must work within scientific perimeters in order to be considered legitimate.
Our mission, should we choose to accept it, is to establish that our identity (that which creates an ordered narrative for our multiple drives and impulses (is not just one mechanism in the brain, but rather a result of the fact that we have a brain which is attached to a body that constitutes a particular point in space and subjective time.
In other words, as many of you have argued, we cannot think of the self (identity (as just one kind of mental module among others. We should, rather, think of it as the foundation of all modules described by evolutionary psychology.