Gustav Bjornstrand wrote:Walker wrote:Adding God to the many names of the nameless: I say that man is the measure, and God is the supposition. Man can accurately measure man, but not God, since by most definitions God has access to what man does not know, and man can’t measure what he doesn’t know.
To say that there are many names for a nameless something (though I understand the usage) is, when one looks at it, a troubling statement. It would mean that each and every 'name' (concept of) God, in all cultures, at all times, is more or less the same thing. This is not borne out when one looks more closely into the specifics. For example, the Jewish-Christian god-concept is not really the same as the Hinduesque god-concept, or in any case it is in the differences that the distinctness is found.
Though you might also mean that it can never be 'named' since 'it' must be something far beyond the possibility of definition. This makes sense.
And when you say 'man is the measure' you likely also mean man is the measurer. And the definer. I note in this, or think I do, the '
nominalism' (nomin = name) which has so influenced our thinking today. Man is the measure, man is the measurer, and he assigns a word. And if that is the case there is no universal category to which he refers. Therefor, everything is pushed back on man, his perception, his choices, and his arbitrariness. So yes, in that context, god must certainly be nameless: essentially unnamable. But further: simply a category on man's thinking. Not really existent.
It also occurs to me that - and though I see what you are getting at - it is not impossible that man may not be able to measure man. Just as he is inhibited, say, by the necessary constraints of defining at any universal level (since it could be said to be arbitrary), must it not be assumed that he is similarly constrained at any level of definition? So, he is measureless even by his own self.
To be consistent with what is possible for man to know, and still keep God within the scope of the question, then the emphasis of the enquiry must shift to man, and once the morality of punishment is understood in terms of man, then one has a better chance of second-guessing God.
I don't know your thought well but I note some contradictions here. By your own apparent definitions, and perhaps by those generally accepted, man cannot know much. If that is so, 'God' would by definition be outside his scope. But then if it shifts to man, it shifts even more so to the shaky ground of man, and thus the question becomes circular and unresolvable. It seems to suggest that when man realises he is the measure and the measurer that he will better understand 'god', but it is just as likely that any definition of god will simply fall away as man is incapable of saying anything about god!
But I certainly admit that the notion of a god who punishes, which connotes an angry parent punishing a child, is terribly problematic and hard to sustain.
In shifting the emphasis, the question becomes, Is it moral for man to be punished by God?
Except that man, his existence, and existence itself, must necessarily be described as his punishment. It is this 'punishing reality' that is really being referred to, is it not? If one then speaks of some additional, some ancillary 'punishment', it would be an added or a specific punishment that rises up out of the general punishing reality.
But the notion of punishment of this order becomes problematic. Except that I suppose we function within the understanding to greater or lesser degrees. The idea of 'instant karma' is a curious one. I have often wondered if it is ourself, our own psyche, that creates those events that we then see as 'instant karma'. Jung and the psychology schools have some curious things to say about 'accidents'.
Is it possible for man to know what is good? Yes it is.
This is where I sense contradictions in your position. Man can only arbitrarily decide what is 'good' if he is the sole namer of it. But he cannot describe good as a universal category and thus he cannot really speak about it. In fact, it is just as likely that he cannot know what is 'good' - not ultimately - since he is stuck, limited and captured within his local and limited perspective. He can only gropingly say that thus-and-such seems good or seems bad. He can condemn, say, the most obvious acts of horror and call them 'evil' but then the cosmos itself, every day, every moment, commits destructive acts that pale anything he has done or will ever do.
Good always and only exists within situations. Good can only be found in the present within a situation, where the totality of all that you’ve ever known about the universe is found. Tales of goodness told from changing memory and from hypothetheticals that are used to form strategies of behavior, rely not on the totality of conditions, but rely on select conditions that man’s judgement considers relevant in defining goodness.
Except that you seem to employ or avail yourself of a perspective - philosophical or spiritual - which indicates a stance somewhat outside of the problem, and thus looks like a universalising statement, and in that sense denies your own premise!
What is good and evil does not depend upon one’s personal preferences. Through suffering people know the distinction and ignorance is the cause of not recognizing the distinction within situations.
Again, this seems contradictory to me. The opposite would have to be said. If man is the measure and measurer, and if he is necessarily limited, and only can speak from situations, and from bias, then it does depend on his preferences. And 'suffering' (in the sense that you mean which I take to be Buddhist overall) is simply a part of the platform. But what can a Buddhist ethic do when faced with that? Is the answer that all he can do is control his own reaction? Remain dispassionate? Disconnected? Disinterested? My impression is that Buddhism embodies strategies to minimise suffering by detachment. Perhaps this is the best we can do, speaking realistically. But it can also lead to quietism which is problematical.
The God of personal preference that is PC madness ramps up to define “good,” so people can say: That which offends me is bad, therefore punishment to the offender is good. That which does not offend me is good, and requires no punishment. - Walker
Yet to define, say, an 'anti-PC position', is to approach once again the Question from a meta-perspective. It is as if one says: Local definitions are too limited and will lead to the madness of PC specificity. And perhaps we move from a nominalist perspective once again toward a universalist position?
It is hard really to say what one is speaking about when on refers to the PC. I tend to see what is 'evil' in PC as arising from Marxian impositions, and from a desire to topple hierarchies and level the ground. In its way, then, it is certainly 'anti-naturalism' and is in that sense quite related to Jewish and to Christian 'impositions'. 'PC' these days means almost Maoist!
) then tell me all you Einsteins....who or what is good? Can you bastards pick a fucking thing and stick with it? Or is it beyond your capabilities? 