Qualia

[raw_thought]

There is no intentionality without qualia.

No, there are no qualia at all. Though what you speak of does exist, but by another(other) name(s). You speak of programming (learning) which is memory + recall; the essence of a recording. Of course it is also to do with associations thus permutation. And yet more even, as it's to do with a unique set of experiences, where for each of us they differ, in their order, intensity, and thus our resolve. Of course all of that is physical in nature, (material) as outlined by the physics of the universe. You know, electrons, protons, neutrons, the four forces, etc. In your mind, what ever you visualize, is a representation created by physical means
.
[ I never said that the brain does not facilitate qualia.So my visualized triangle is the physical form of a triangle in my brain. When I visualize green my brain turns green. I disagree]

There is no discernible ghost in the machine. Though just like gods and beons, anyone can argue that the illusory does in fact exist in their minds, and feel good about being right. Why? Because just like those that believe in them, no one can prove otherwise.

[I have said over and over that I cannot prove to you that I am visualizing a triangle. Qualia is private. However, do an empirical experiment (observe,) If you can visualize a triangle that is a private experience. Unless you claim that someone looking into your brain can see a triangle and that is silly]

And that's a fine way for some to believe they're original, that they're capable, that they're smarter than others. It's a fine pacifier.

The problem with your ghost (qualia), beons or gods that you/others say is inside of you, is that you are also then trying to thrust them into me, and all other humans as well. And you're going to get some major resistance then because no one wants you putting imaginary things in their head. Keep your hands out of my head will you? I don't want anyone thrusting, gods, beons or qualia into my head. It's my head I tell you! And since your type is so hell bent on placing things in our heads, we all have to wonder what the hell is in your head? That is that you can't understand that we don't want your hands in there.

Keep it up and I'll try and put leprechauns, and pots of gold in your head.

No, not really, because I couldn't stand my self for trying to do something so absurd. Or I'd at least sincerely listen to your argument knowing how I was invading your space. That would be the least I could do, right?

[raw_thought]

I am using a tablet.
My comments are within brackets [ ]. I am not altering your quote brackets mean that one has added to your quote. It is a common and accepted practice.
One can immediately tell what was added.

[Ginkgo]

As much as Dennett lies, at least he knows* that acknowledging feelings destroys materialism. Epiphenomonolists lack the honesty of a con man!
* With all his disingenuousness!

Dennett would actually reject epiphenomenalism.

[raw_thought]

Agreed!
Maybe we should talk about Dennett 1 and Dennett 2! Dennett 1 denies qualia (feelings). However Dennett 2 does not!!!
My point is that at least eliminative materialists are consistent. Epiphenomonolists are not.

[Ginkgo]

Google," cognitive qualia" or "cognitive phenomenology ".
Meaning makes no sense without subjective experience. For example, "1+1=2" is only an ink pattern until understood by consciousness. I gave the sites. Scroll back.

I did mention this very early on in this thread. This is why the debate rages about the types of mental states, and how they may or may not be explained in terms of qualia.

Intentional states can interpreted as mental states that allow us to represent what something does. Intentionality is the "aboutness" when it comes to objects of perception. In other words, there is a casual connection between the term used and the types of objects that exist out there in the world. In this respect I see Dennett using a functionalist explanation for his cognitive phenomenology. Referencing theory may be of interest here.

[raw_thought]

"Aboutness" applies to every word, not just feelings. Matter does not refer (is about) anything. It simply is.
An eliminative materialist (if he is consistent ) must say that the ink pattern " eliminative materialism " refers to nothing.
Therefore, if he is consistent he must say that eliminative materialism is meaningless!

[Ginkgo]

Agreed!
Maybe we should talk about Dennett 1 and Dennett 2! Dennett 1 denies qualia (feelings). However Dennett 2 does not!!!
My point is that at least eliminative materialists are consistent. Epiphenomonolists are not.

You are aware that some proponents of qualia are epiphenomonolists.

[raw_thought]

Yes.
One fight at a time!
As I said, maybe another thread that takes on the Epiphenomonolists!
Of course Epiphenomonolists believe in qualia. However, they confuse "cause" with "definition ". My throwing a vase may cause it to break. However, the definition of "broken vase " is not "throwing a vase". Similarly, brain states may cause pain (a feeling). But the definition of "a particular brain state" is not "pain".

[Ginkgo]

"Aboutness" applies to every word, not just feelings. Matter does not refer (is about) anything. It simply is.
An eliminative materialist (if he is consistent ) must say that the ink pattern " eliminative materialism " refers to nothing.
Therefore, if he is consistent he must say that eliminative materialism is meaningless!

Perhaps, but this is why I also mentioned very early on why we need to be careful when we claim that all mental states are qualia states. We end up falling for the same type of eliminative methodology.

[Ginkgo]

"Aboutness" applies to every word, not just feelings. Matter does not refer (is about) anything. It simply is.
An eliminative materialist (if he is consistent ) must say that the ink pattern " eliminative materialism " refers to nothing.
Therefore, if he is consistent he must say that eliminative materialism is meaningless!

Perhaps, but this is why I also mentioned very early on why we need to be careful when we claim that all mental states are qualia states. We end up falling for the same type of eliminative methodology.

P.S. I'm not really here for a fight, just a discussion.

I did read your above post so we can put this one aside for the moment if you like.

[raw_thought]

Who knows whatDennett is saying? I am sure he does not either. He says that we have no feelings (qualia) and then that we do. He says that we have "free will" and then that we do not.
Ironically, I like con men. But I do not like Dennett.

Well I do. As far as free will is concerned Dennett is a compatibilist.

Did you see his ridiculous argument at the link I gave?
As a materialist he must believe in cause and effect. All our decisions are the result of matter.
It is simply Dennett embracing a position (free will) even tho it conflicts with his cherished materialism because he knows that "free will" is a popular proposition and he wants to be popular.
PS: Quantum mechanics does not facilitate free will. We do not will quantum randomness.

[raw_thought]

I was not picking a fight with you. I was saying that I am willing to debate the proposition, " Qualia are caused by brain states ( I actually can agree with that)
.They are therefore physical." Like I said, they confuse definition with cause.

[raw_thought]

Dennett disingenuously takes an eliminative materialist stance and then an Epiphenomonolist stance.

[Ginkgo]

Who knows whatDennett is saying? I am sure he does not either. He says that we have no feelings (qualia) and then that we do. He says that we have "free will" and then that we do not.
Ironically, I like con men. But I do not like Dennett.

Well I do. As far as free will is concerned Dennett is a compatibilist.

Did you see his ridiculous argument at the link I gave?
As a materialist he must believe in cause and effect. All our decisions are the result of matter.
It is simply Dennett embracing a position (free will) even tho it conflicts with his cherished materialism because he knows that "free will" is a popular proposition and he wants to be popular.
PS: Quantum mechanics does not facilitate free will. We do not will quantum randomness.

You are a hard man to keep up with raw thought.

Rather then go into a discussion in relation to determinism and free will, perhaps we can say there is noting unusual about the compatibilist position. Saying it is a widely accepted theory doesn't make it true. Being a materialist doesn't mean you cannot be a compatibilist.

You don't think you dislike for Dennett is preventing you from examining his arguments in an objective fashion?

[raw_thought]

I have examined his arguments in an objective fashion. *Besides if I am objective or not has nothing to do with my argument.
If I am debating a fundamentalist, it is not a legitimate argument to say,"you are wrong because you are a fundamentalist. "
I strongly disagree with fundamentalism. However, I would never make such a silly "argument".
Similarly, Sphere's "argument " is that I am wrong because I believe in ghosts and God. Not only do I not believe in God and/or ghosts, it has nothing to do with an actual debate.
* Trust me,at university one must make objective arguments (like my seminar paper) for one's position. It is not wrong to have a position. It is only wrong if your position is not based on validity and truth.