Lawrence Crocker wrote:You have 10 cookies (or biscuits for speakers of English English) you wish to give away to children, of which cohort 10 show up, all strangers to you. You might question them and ferret out biographical details that would cause you to favor some more than others. But that, of course, would cost you time, especially as some of the little rascals might not be entirely truthful with cookies on the line. And, after all, your time is valuable, and we are only talking about cookies. If you would,under these circumstances, not think that rough fairness pulls in the direction of one cookie each, and you do not dismiss all cookies to the kid with the alphabetically first first name, then you truly do not think that equality ever has a distinct value, but you will probably be in the minority.
"Pragmatic" does not reveal as much about your view as you might want, as it denotes only some kind of practical concern for consequences. "Maximize wealth" is better as that zeroes us in on total utilitarianism, at least if we assume that wealth is a good proxy for the good. (It has, however, the theoretical disadvantage as applied to population issues that it could be satisfied by an enormous population, every member of which was just slightly happy. Average utility seems more attractive in this respect, although aiming for a tiny population of ecstatically happy people may also seem slightly unattractive.)
"Taking care of everybody" suggests some concern with equality. Why not just take care of tall people?
I was very sloppy with my terminology - I generally don't like specifically 'philosophical' terminology, especially since it's been too long since I was anywhere near academia. I just meant pragmatism in its normal, everyday use:
prag·mat·ic
praɡˈmadik/
adjective
dealing with things sensibly and realistically in a way that is based on practical rather than theoretical considerations.
It's the anti-theoretical part that I was targeting. I think you would probably characterize my position as 'utilitarian' as you mentioned above. As my example of Lennie was unfairly skewed away from 'equality,' your example of children and cookies is skewed the other way, since it deals with something that is unnecessary - more of a luxury item - that for some reason 'you want to give away to children.' Wealth is not something you just want to give away without a reason. And the reason will guide the distribution (if you want to make the children equally happy, then give them equal shares; if you want to reward them for good behavior, reward the ones more who behaved the best).
I agree that 'equal' shares makes sense as a fall-back position. I am saying that this is true not on theoretical or ideological or moral grounds, but just because it amounts to a kind of 'no decision.' The other 'no decision' position I can think of is 'we're holding all of it (in escrow) until we all agree on a sensible distribution.' I don't see the latter as 'moral,' but as a preliminary position - I see 'equality' in the same light. Perhaps a good analogy would be dealing everyone the same amount of cards prior to deciding which game we want to play - it saves some time and if I deal each person seven and we later decide to play five card stud, it is easier for everyone to take two cards off the top and throw them back into the deck. Or, we could decide to wait until we decide which game to play before dealing the cards. I see only practical considerations, not moral or theoretical.
I wouldn't 'just take care of tall people' - not because that wouldn't be fair, but because I can't think of a situation where that would make sense. I do think it is a moral decision (which I endorse) to take care of everyone within the community, however. So, if everyone's lives depended on winning basketball games, I would endorse giving tall athletic people some special treatment; just not to the level of harming others (beyond a certain baseline) within the community.