Thanks for that Ginkgo. I always appreciate your commentary.Ginkgo wrote:A philosophical zombie cannot have experience, therefore it cannot feel pain. If you poke it with a pin it would say, "Ouch" and then behave in an aggressive manner. It would probably say,"How dare you do that to me". This is all just an act or programmed response. The philosophical zombie doesn't really feel pain and it doesn't really feel angry. The argument is that if the behaviour and reporting of information matches the scenario then this is all that matters in terms of experience.raw_thought wrote:1. If pain is only c fibers firing (there is nothing pain feels like) then there is nothing wrong with torture, if it doesnt result in physical damage. Why would anyone care if c fibers fire up?
At face values this seems like a trite argument, but it does have importance when it come s to qualia. How can one tell what a phenomenological experience actually is if of all we have to go on is what the person reports and how they behave in a particular situation. We just assume that there is a quality of experience attached to an unfortunate individual who gets a pin stuck into them.
Those who reject the qualia argument would quickly say that can be imagined and explained with resorting to a subjective account of such shapes.raw_thought wrote: 2. Visualize a triangle. Anti- qualia people ( if they are consistent) must say that it is impossible to visualize a triangle. I know that I can visualize a triangle. I trust my empirical data.
There is no objective visualized triangle. My neurons do not fire in a triangular shape. If I visualize green, no part of my brain turns green.
Since no one can see my visualized triangle, an anti qualia person must say that it doesnt exist. In other words I cannot visualize a triangle.True, I cannot prove that I am visualizing a triangle. However, I am absolutely certain that I can visualize a triangle.
Visualize a triangle. If you can you have just proved to yourself that qualia exist!
SpheresofBalance wrote: Actually you've just proven that someone told you that, "this is a triangle," so you believed it. If from day one I showed a child a square, telling him it was a triangle, and he believed me, would he experience the qualia of a triangle if he visualized a square?
Probably, because qualia is a quality. of expereince. If there is "something it is like" to experience a shape of any kind then this would probably be the case. On the other hand, when it comes to mistaking a triangle for a square then we would say the experience is systematically different and can undergo a correction based on weight of opinion.
The thing about qualia is the phenomenological aspect of the experience. So it's not so much the "greenness" of the object, but the quality of experience associated with viewing a coloured object. It doesn't really matter if we are mistaken in terms of identifying the colour, it is the quality of experience associated with the identification. The possibility of qualia being a property of objects is a different sort of argument.SpheresofBalance wrote:
The same is true of color. We could both see a green light, and go as we were taught to do, it's the light in the position that it's in, and each of us sees what each of us sees. But in fact we could each see totally different things, and we would never know it. Because our particular visual sensors always picked up what we saw, that others pointed to calling it green. Such that what we saw, even though completely different from what another saw, would be green. No one would ever be the wiser, because no one can see through anothers visual sensory system. Then where does that leave the qualia of green? Nowhere to be found.
It's an illusion as we each believe, usually without question, that we all see the same thing, without possibly knowing whether it's true or not. Qualia?
Sometimes I get the impression that some philosophers are grabbing for straws, trying to split hairs with these, what I believe to be, unnecessary theories. I know this will probably frustrate those that believe in such things. I have a more scientific view of the universe.
Wikipedia gave these examples: "Examples of qualia are the pain of a headache, the taste of wine, or the perceived redness of an evening sky." And Dennett apparently said that qualia are "the ways things seem to us." To me physics and biochemistry explain each and every example stated above, so I see no need for qualia whatsoever. To me, even the word sounds ridiculous. The way things seem to us???? They're simply physical/electrochemical responses. Physics, and biochemistry hold all the answers in this case.
I mean, are these guys really that desperate to secure their tenure, get some sort of prize, money or recognition that they come up with, what I believe are, absurd notions? Qualia seem to be born of mysticism.
Of course I'm all for philosophy always asking questions, but sometimes they go too far, IMHO!
I guess I'm just a science geek, with a sprinkling of philosophy!