What is a true first cause?

[GreatandWiseTrixie]

You can pick out any event and come up with any number of explanations. That would cause it. And the cause itself may have underlying causes. I believe in plenty of evidence for the event (no matter how simple it looks) and I don't believe in first causes very firmly (the controversial Big Bang is a case in point due to the evidence for it, but it does leave open questions).

PhilX

Why did you edit your post? It was worded well actually, in fact your original edit clarified the absurdity of first causes in a very easy to pick up way for all parties. Possibly it was the best yet I've seen on the matter. Now you've turned it into a word jumble.

[Philosophy Explorer]

Why did you edit your post? It was worded well actually, in fact your original edit clarified the absurdity of first causes in a very easy to pick up way for all parties. Possibly it was the best yet I've seen on the matter. Now you've turned it into a word jumble.

I don't recall editing the post and I don't see a message saying that it was. If you have a copy, you're welcome to put it on and maybe I'll have an answer.

PhilX

[Hobbes' Choice]

We can choose between two options:

1. There was a beginning of everything and this was the first cause.

2. There never was a beginning and therefore there never was any first cause.

Both are difficult to conceive.

If we dismiss the more inconceivable one then we are left with the more probable one, even if we are not quite happy with it.

2. is the only option.
1. Is self refuting, as the choice is based on the assumption that effects have causes.


But there is nothing about how we feel about it that could decide one way or the other.
And since we have no way of finding out - not properly the rest is idle speculation.

[Hobbes' Choice]

You can pick out any event and come up with any number of explanations. That would cause it. And the cause itself may have underlying causes. I believe in plenty of evidence for the event (no matter how simple it looks) and I don't believe in first causes very firmly (the controversial Big Bang is a case in point due to the evidence for it, but it does leave open questions).

PhilX

Hume points out that it might be possible to talk about cause and effect with a system. That is to say out understand of cause and effect and how it works within this universe we experience. However, it is a completely different matter to talk about the system as a whole being caused.

Kant also comes up with an objection to first cause arguments. For Kant the idea of a first cause is nonsensical given the fact that we only have knowledge of the phenomenal world that necessitates time and space explanations. It is not possible to say with any degree of certainty what might or might not exist outside of time and space.

I think he says that as "exist" imply a place and time, then your final sentence is not even meaningful.

[duszek]

So energy cannot be created. It can only be transformed.

The Big Bang was only a huge transformation of energy that was there before and ever had been and ever will be.

Also when the sun stops shining and all of us with our worries and speculations will be transformed into new forms of energy.

[Immanuel Can]

Kant also comes up with an objection to first cause arguments. For Kant the idea of a first cause is nonsensical given the fact that we only have knowledge of the phenomenal world that necessitates time and space explanations. It is not possible to say with any degree of certainty what might or might not exist outside of time and space.

This is an epistemological, not ontological argument -- that is, it is a claim about what-we-know, not a claim about what-is. And surely any "first cause" argument has to be about a "what-is," not merely a "what-we-know." For the claim that "we do not know" what the first cause was," is not the same as the claim "there was no first cause."

Secondly, the there-never-was-a-first-cause argument would have to entail an eternal universe. So then a sort of Pantheism ensues, in which the universe is said to be a self-existent eternal reality -- a God-substitute, if not a God in its own right -- that (inexplicably) spontaneously generated us at some particular point in time. The explication of how that came about then becomes problematic. But even more problematic is that observationally, the universe is expanding, and conceptually, rather elegant mathematical demonstrations exist to disprove the possibility of actual-infiniteness. These can only be overcome by positing a cause outside of the physical universe, one that generates the universe itself. That then would become a "first cause."

[Arising_uk]

... But even more problematic is that observationally, the universe is expanding, and conceptually, rather elegant mathematical demonstrations exist to disprove the possibility of actual-infiniteness. These can only be overcome by positing a cause outside of the physical universe, one that generates the universe itself. That then would become a "first cause."

Not quite as their are some nice mathematical models that prove a bounded infinite space is possible with no need for an 'outside'.

[Immanuel Can]

Not quite as their are some nice mathematical models that prove a bounded infinite space is possible with no need for an 'outside'.

Well, never mind the conceptual problems of the "bounded infinite." The problem is not in the universe per se, but is inherent in the notion of "actual infinite," itself. A conceptual problem of that kind cannot be resolved by empirical speculation, but must be resolved on the conceptual level first.

But on the empirical level, the idea of an infinite universe presents additional problems. For example, if entropy has been proceeding at our current, very empirically-measurable rate -- or even if, to make the case even clearer, we gratuitously assign it the lowest possible entropic rate and then inexplicably claim it suddenly somehow sped up to its current rate -- then given the supposition of infinite time, we would already have reached a state of universal heat death, so that no life or even order would exist in the universe, ad we would have reached this state an infinite amount of time ago. So an infinite universe simply does not make sense of what we know of fundamental scientific laws.

[Ginkgo]

This is an epistemological, not ontological argument -- that is, it is a claim about what-we-know, not a claim about what-is. And surely any "first cause" argument has to be about a "what-is," not merely a "what-we-know." For the claim that "we do not know" what the first cause was," is not the same as the claim "there was no first cause."

I didn't say it was an ontological argument. However, the sticking point appears to be the idea there is just one type of ontology. You seem to have a problem with the idea there can be more than one ontology.

Secondly, the there-never-was-a-first-cause argument would have to entail an eternal universe. So then a sort of Pantheism ensues, in which the universe is said to be a self-existent eternal reality -- a God-substitute, if not a God in its own right -- that (inexplicably) spontaneously generated us at some particular point in time.

Not really, the idea that a science denying a first cause somehow must lapse into some type of theism cannot possibly be correct.

The explication of how that came about then becomes problematic. But even more problematic is that observationally, the universe is expanding, and conceptually, rather elegant mathematical demonstrations exist to disprove the possibility of actual-infiniteness. These can only be overcome by positing a cause outside of the physical universe, one that generates the universe itself. That then would become a "first cause."

This is basically correct. Science can make use of infinities in its mathematical explanations for the universe. As you allude, science seeks theories that do away with infinities. While this is true, it is not the case that the default position is a recourse to a first cause. This not how science works. Again, you appear to be trying to fit science into a single ontology. Science doesn't work that way.

I'm not saying science is right. I am just saying science doesn't work that way.

[Ginkgo]

You can pick out any event and come up with any number of explanations. That would cause it. And the cause itself may have underlying causes. I believe in plenty of evidence for the event (no matter how simple it looks) and I don't believe in first causes very firmly (the controversial Big Bang is a case in point due to the evidence for it, but it does leave open questions).

PhilX

Hume points out that it might be possible to talk about cause and effect with a system. That is to say out understand of cause and effect and how it works within this universe we experience. However, it is a completely different matter to talk about the system as a whole being caused.

Kant also comes up with an objection to first cause arguments. For Kant the idea of a first cause is nonsensical given the fact that we only have knowledge of the phenomenal world that necessitates time and space explanations. It is not possible to say with any degree of certainty what might or might not exist outside of time and space.

I think he says that as "exist" imply a place and time, then your final sentence is not even meaningful.

Would you be happy if I left out the words "might not"?

[Immanuel Can]

You seem to have a problem with the idea there can be more than one ontology.

Let me correct that misperception I may have allowed to creep in, then. By "ontology" I mean the broad philosophical category, not a particular "ontological description." In its broadest context, "ontology" simply refers to the study of "what exists." After that, it is possible to further debate "what is."

I'm a little unclear, then, about what you mean by "more than one ontology." It would seem quite self-evident that there is but one "what exists."

the idea that a science denying a first cause somehow must lapse into some type of theism cannot possibly be correct.

I think you're misunderstanding me here too. I am not suggesting that. I am saying that so long as you need reference to a first cause (and I would argue on the basis of scientific evidence, we do) you are either going to have to refer to an unintelligent first cause or an intelligent one. But if one opts for the idea of an unintelligent first cause, then a cascade of additional scientific problems ensue. So we are drawn toward the idea of the intelligent first cause.

And this explains one of the things that got the Atheist set so venomously unhappy about Thomas Nagel's "Mind and Cosmos." They accused him of letting down the team and selling out to the Theists -- a scurrilous charge, of course. An avowed Atheist himself, Nagel simply made the argument that their ontology was inadequate to the phenomena it purported to describe. (And I would agree with Nagel on that. So here I am, a Theist, agreeing with the Atheist.) But Nagel does not think it all has to collapse into Theism. He thinks some new, better, more scientific Atheism can emerge from a more honest assessment of the evidence and recover its prestige. But he thinks that won't happen unless Atheists are willing to face up to the evidence honestly.

I would say, "Maybe such a thing can emerge: but it would take faith to believe in that eventuality, since it admittedly hasn't happened yet."

science seeks theories that do away with infinities.

This misplaces the burden of proof, I think.

"Actual infinity" is a conceptual construct that we can manipulate in a purely mathematical way, but which becomes nonsensical the minute we take it out and apply it to the natural world. For that reason, science does not have to "do away" with anything there: no evidence shows that actual-infinities exist at all, and elegant arguments can be produced to suggest they cannot exist in reference to any empirical world. The Hilbert's Hotel argument is very interesting in that regard. It's worth a look, if you're interested in what anti actual-infinity arguments would look like.

But science does not have to rouse itself to disprove what cannot be made at all intelligible in the first place, and actual-infinities very much seem to fall into that category. But an actual-infinity would be required if we ever posited a universe without a beginning, and hence a universe with no first cause.

[hammock]

You can pick out any event and come up with any number of explanations. That would cause it. And the cause itself may have underlying causes. I believe in plenty of evidence for the event (no matter how simple it looks) and I don't believe in first causes very firmly (the controversial Big Bang is a case in point due to the evidence for it, but it does leave open questions).

Well, one certainly wouldn't want the origin of the whole sequence of cause-effect relations in a mechanistic reality to be found in that chain itself, if the concept of causality entails "everything having a cause", or the human psyche is compelled to infer / seek such a perpetual progression / inquiry due to its native thought-forms. One would want a primary "cause" (ultimate provenance would be better) which is not grounded in space and its time-ordered framework of events being responsible for other events. IOW, a transcendent relation to a principle which is "responsible" for that entire sequence of the universe's existence, rather than just pursuing a potentially futile first cause (start) in that sequence antecedent to a first effect.

This transcendent provenance could even be construed as the concept of causality itself, with all the particular cause-effect instances of the world's timeline subsumed under it or outputted by it. Since humans (for whatever reason) seem to reflexively desire it to be primal to everything else, anyway. [Finely exhibited in the contradiction of asking "What created or caused God?", when the latter is defined as being either omnipotent or hierarchically prior to everything else (which includes ideas like causation).]

[jackles]

In the begining there was nonlocality and there still is nonlocality . But then there was locality . And locality equals event. So locality is just a form in nonlocality.

[Ginkgo]

Let me correct that misperception I may have allowed to creep in, then. By "ontology" I mean the broad philosophical category, not a particular "ontological description." In its broadest context, "ontology" simply refers to the study of "what exists." After that, it is possible to further debate "what is."

I couldn't agree more. However, the point I am making is that ontology from a scientific point of view has a narrower definition. It is this narrow definition that defines science from non-science. But again, I am not saying science is correct in this respect.

I'm a little unclear, then, about what you mean by "more than one ontology." It would seem quite self-evident that there is but one "what exists."

Fair enough. However, as I said in my above quote there is more than one explanation for "what exists". This is the whole point.

P.S. I have the utmost respect for Thomas Nagel.

http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientific_realism

I think you're misunderstanding me here too. I am not suggesting that. I am saying that so long as you need reference to a first cause (and I would argue on the basis of scientific evidence, we do) you are either going to have to refer to an unintelligent first cause or an intelligent one. But if one opts for the idea of an unintelligent first cause, then a cascade of additional scientific problems ensue. So we are drawn toward the idea of the intelligent first cause.

I think you have raise a very good point. When it comes to the question as to whether the universe was constructed with the the use of "a skyhook" or "a crane", science comes down emphatically on the side of a "ground up explanation". No room for a first cause or God designing from above. One may be tempted to say that science is in a state of denial over first cause, but this is not the case. Quite simply there is no methodology within science that allows for a first cause.

Personally I think that the universe was designed from above and from below at the same time , but that's just me.

And this explains one of the things that got the Atheist set so venomously unhappy about Thomas Nagel's "Mind and Cosmos." They accused him of letting down the team and selling out to the Theists -- a scurrilous charge, of course. An avowed Atheist himself, Nagel simply made the argument that their ontology was inadequate to the phenomena it purported to describe. (And I would agree with Nagel on that.

I would also agree. However, I have outlined this problem above. It is all very well for us to agree, but can we come up with a way of bridging the two ontologies? No, not at this stage of our understanding. Pseudo-science has definitely NOT bridged this gap.

I have read Nagel's book and I agree with what he is saying. So, ok, how do we bridge the gap? As I said, no one has been able to provide a credible theory, least of all Nagel. The bottom line is that to date no one has been able to do this.

So here I am, a Theist, agreeing with the Atheist.) But Nagel does not think it all has to collapse into Theism. He thinks some new, better, more scientific Atheism can emerge from a more honest assessment of the evidence and recover its prestige. But he thinks that won't happen unless Atheists are willing to face up to the evidence honestly.

I am also sitting here waiting as anxious as anyone. So, where is Nagel's bridging theory?

"Actual infinity" is a conceptual construct that we can manipulate in a purely mathematical way, but which becomes nonsensical the minute we take it out and apply it to the natural world.

Could not have said it better myself

For that reason, science does not have to "do away" with anything there: no evidence shows that actual-infinities exist at all, and elegant arguments can be produced to suggest they cannot exist in reference to any empirical world. The Hilbert's Hotel argument is very interesting in that regard. It's worth a look, if you're interested in what anti actual-infinity arguments would look like.

I am familiar with Hilbert and subsequent philosophers of mathematics.
I don't see Hibert's work in relation to infinities as being relevant to this discussion. Unless you can convince me otherwise.

But science does not have to rouse itself to disprove what cannot be made at all intelligible in the first place, and actual-infinities very much seem to fall into that category. But an actual-infinity would be required if we ever posited a universe without a beginning, and hence a universe with no first cause.

I have already argued as to why this is not the case. Would you like me to go over it again?

[Immanuel Can]

Well, we do persist in disagreeing on some points, but I think we're on the same page in others. Let's start with where we're a distance apart.

Quite simply there is no methodology within science that allows for a first cause.

This seems manifestly untrue to me. I understand your resistance to the idea of "first cause," because it can proceed from personal motivations, or from the unnecessary anxiety that the idea of God may somehow undermine science (though I think historically the situation is quite opposite). But what's manifestly incorrect, in my view, is the idea that "first cause" is somehow "unscientific."
Science clearly favours causes of all kinds. Furthermore, it depends on sequentiality and the concept of time (this happened, then that happened, and did so repeatedly and under varying conditions, therefore hypothetically, this caused that). Since science requires causality and depends on time, how can it evade the concept of first cause, save by positing that impossible idea of an eternal universe?

I don't see Hibert's work in relation to infinities as being relevant to this discussion. Unless you can convince me otherwise.

May I try? Hilbert shows that when we attempt to apply real conditions, empirical conditions, to the concept of infinity we instantly get unmeasurable nonsense, like hotels that are simultaneously infinitely full but can contain an infinite string of new arrivals. The very conditions we depend upon to do science, such as objects occupying particular space, fall apart at infinity. So positing infinity as the start-condition of the universe is merely to posit, literally "non-sense": nothing of which we, or science, can make sense.

I have already argued as to why this is not the case. Would you like me to go over it again?

Not necessary. See Hilbert. But as a matter of fact, I was actually strengthening your point for you, accepting that you needed no additional support for it, since the burden of proof is in science's favour there. I was conceding that science does not need to defend itself against something so irrational as infinite beginnings. I'm surprised you don't concur.

Now let's get to where we agree:

I would also agree. However, I have outlined this problem above. It is all very well for us to agree, but can we come up with a way of bridging the two ontologies? No, not at this stage of our understanding. Pseudo-science has definitely NOT bridged this gap.

Again, I would suggest there is but one "ontology": but indeed, there are two problems -- they are articulated in the fact/value divide. In a world composed entirely of empirical facts, how does one suddenly import a conception like value? That is Hume's question, actually. There are no resources in science to perform the alchemy of turning a fact into a value.

I have read Nagel's book and I agree with what he is saying.

As have I. And I like most of what he says. But like you, my hesitancy came with his conclusions. They seem to me entirely discordant with his hard-headed factuality earlier on, and smack of utopian dreaming. I see you felt the same about that, since you see the "gap" too.

So, ok, how do we bridge the gap? As I said, no one has been able to provide a credible theory, least of all Nagel. The bottom line is that to date no one has been able to do this.

Well, if Hume is right, we're barking up the wrong tree. We're expecting to derive values from empirical observations. And though we cannot generate them now, we keep hoping that additional empirical observations will somehow create legitimations for value judgments. Yet historically, as Hume knew, this has never been the case; and we have no reason to think it will now.

A different kind of modus operandi is required, I suggest. Science can tell us what is the case: it cannot tell us why we should care, or what we should or should not do with our knowledge, or even that we ought to continue to exist. Nagel's indictments are quite accurate there, I think. Something else is needed.

But is it possible that our failing is asking science to do too much for us? Is it possible that science is a truly excellent tool, but one that is simply not adapted to working on any questions of value? Are we trying to use a hammer to install screws there? Would we be best to accept science as excellent for its purposes but incapable of helping us with value questions? And in continually looking to science to do what it simply does not try to do, and cannot do, are we in danger of creating pseudosciences-of-value like Marxism, Social Darwinism or Nazism?

Clearly we must not operate contrary to good science in avoiding such outcomes. If science yields us a result, and that result is reliable, we must accept it. But, on the other hand, why should our need for existential values permit us to mangle science by making it yield them to us? Maybe we can give science its rightful place, but still look to other rational ways of knowing to help us with values. I seen no likelihood that anything good will come out of persisting to imagine we'll eventually get science to create them for us.