Critical Reasoning

[orin]

Hi Arising_uk,

Thanks very much, I had given up on getting any sensible answers form this site!

Yes, I was heading towards seeing how this line of reasoning could reach Wittgenstein's conclusion. However, to reach this conclusion you have to realize that all propositions are based on our intuitions about the world. Provided you think these intuitions are inventions then you can see there is no truth, just word games. But this is not what we find. Instead we see that propositions carry real power to make us act correctly or incorrectly. This means our intuitions must be discoveries about real state-of-affairs. In other words, propositions encode information based on our actual experiences of the world.

Now since propositions have power and must be used with care. This means that contrary to HexHammer's posts, Marianne Talbot article on critical reasoning is not a waste of time but an attempt to make sure we know how to control this powerful tool.

[Wyman]

Hi Arising_uk,

Thanks very much, I had given up on getting any sensible answers form this site!

Yes, I was heading towards seeing how this line of reasoning could reach Wittgenstein's conclusion. However, to reach this conclusion you have to realize that all propositions are based on our intuitions about the world. Provided you think these intuitions are inventions then you can see there is no truth, just word games. But this is not what we find. Instead we see that propositions carry real power to make us act correctly or incorrectly. This means our intuitions must be discoveries about real state-of-affairs. In other words, propositions encode information based on our actual experiences of the world.

Now since propositions have power and must be used with care. This means that contrary to HexHammer's posts, Marianne Talbot article on critical reasoning is not a waste of time but an attempt to make sure we know how to control this powerful tool.

But this is not what we find. Instead we see that propositions carry real power to make us act correctly or incorrectly. This means our intuitions must be discoveries about real state-of-affairs.

This is circular reasoning, presupposing in the concept of a 'power' to cause 'correct' action what you set out to prove - that propositions are about 'real' states of affairs.

[orin]

Orin said: But this is not what we find. Instead we see that propositions carry real power to make us act correctly or incorrectly. This means our intuitions must be discoveries about real state-of-affairs.

Wyman Wrote: This is circular reasoning, presupposing in the concept of a 'power' to cause 'correct' action what you set out to prove - that propositions are about 'real' states of affairs.

My way out of the circle is in the phrase 'But this is not what we find'. This is an appeal to what has been called 'the stubborn facticity of the world'. The underlying postulate is that our subjective phenomenal world is derived from (but not equal to) an actual world by way of our inputs felt as sensual experiences. Propositions are statements about our phenomenal worlds and so, however abstract or imaginative, they can be shown to have a basis in this actuality.

[Wyman]

Orin said: But this is not what we find. Instead we see that propositions carry real power to make us act correctly or incorrectly. This means our intuitions must be discoveries about real state-of-affairs.

Wyman Wrote: This is circular reasoning, presupposing in the concept of a 'power' to cause 'correct' action what you set out to prove - that propositions are about 'real' states of affairs.

My way out of the circle is in the phrase 'But this is not what we find'. This is an appeal to what has been called 'the stubborn facticity of the world'. The underlying postulate is that our subjective phenomenal world is derived from (but not equal to) an actual world by way of our inputs felt as sensual experiences. Propositions are statements about our phenomenal worlds and so, however abstract or imaginative, they can be shown to have a basis in this actuality.

Maybe I'm feeling argumentative today, but:

If we grant you your postulate, it still does not follow that 1) 'propositions are statements'; 2) statements are 'about our phenomenal world'; 3) statements 'can be shown to have a basis in this actuality.'

3) For instance, Donald Davidson maintained that the causal connection between the 'real' world and our 'phenomenal' world has no epistemic significance. So your 'basis in this actuality' would merely be a statement regarding causation. There is no guarantee that such a causal connection creates or insures a 'power' to cause correct actions or perceptions.

2) Propositions and statements, especially to a materialist like yourself, are usually seen to be about the real world. In other words, what gives a statement its truth value is its relation to the real world, not to the 'veil of ideas'/phenomenal world. You attempt to bypass this by 3) above, postulating an epistemic relation running from the real world, to the phenomenal world, to the statement. Adding this intermediary step does nothing to improve your position, it only muddies the water.

1) A statement is a series of letters - symbols. Some of which are taken to make assertions that carry truth values (others are commands, jokes, exclamations, etc.). Such assertive statements are sometimes called propositions, which is the abstract concept encompassing 'assertive statements about the world.' The distinction can be seen clearly when you consider that two different 'statements' can state the same proposition - such as statements in two languages or statements using synonyms. Also, one statement can carry multiple senses or meanings, such as 'Bob is an ass.' True if Bob is the name of a donkey and, in America, true if he is a jerk or a rear end - but true, false and false, respectively, in Britain.

[orin]

Hi Wyman:

Thanks for your critique.

If we grant you your postulate, it still does not follow that 1) 'propositions are statements'; 2) statements are 'about our phenomenal world'; 3) statements 'can be shown to have a basis in this actuality.

The postulate is probably better read with the word 'statement' deleted (since it adds nothing to the argument) to become:

• The underlying postulate is that our subjective phenomenal world is derived from (but not equal to) an actual world by way of our inputs felt as sensual experiences. Propositions are about our phenomenal worlds and so, however abstract or imaginative, they can be shown to have a basis in this actuality.

The argument then becomes: 1) the phenomenal world is derived from the actual: 2) propositions are about our phenomenal world: 3) We reason using propositions:
Therefore our reasoning is about the actual world.
(these are all synthetic propositions, so we can argue about their truth value)

This is the 'read' direction, from the actual to the propositional. In order for our reasoning to have power, you have to grant a second postulate that this process is reversible and so it is possible to 'write' the output of reasoning onto the real world.

This reversibility is easily explained if you accept the sort of monism proposed by Whitehead, where the physical and mental are two necessary poles of all actual entities. Dualism finds this reversibility much more difficult to explain and in the worst case results in epiphenomenology where we are unable to act on the world and our reasoning is simply playing.

The appeal is again to the facticity of the world and our ability to alter facts according to the output of our reasoning. It is this explanatory power that makes the process philosophy of Whitehead so appealing.

[David Handeye]

Hi Arising_uk,

Thanks very much, I had given up on getting any sensible answers form this site!

Yes, I was heading towards seeing how this line of reasoning could reach Wittgenstein's conclusion. However, to reach this conclusion you have to realize that all propositions are based on our intuitions about the world. Provided you think these intuitions are inventions then you can see there is no truth, just word games. But this is not what we find. Instead we see that propositions carry real power to make us act correctly or incorrectly. This means our intuitions must be discoveries about real state-of-affairs. In other words, propositions encode information based on our actual experiences of the world.

Now since propositions have power and must be used with care. This means that contrary to HexHammer's posts, Marianne Talbot article on critical reasoning is not a waste of time but an attempt to make sure we know how to control this powerful tool.

What should be Wittgensten's conclusion? «That you can't talk about, you must shut up.» This is it.
Unfortunetly someone before Wittgenstein (De Saussure), was able to assume the absolute indipendence since linguistic sign to thing meant by that sign, the Arbitrariety Linguistic Sign Principle. (actually I know the right name in Italian, my language, I don't know the right translation in English).
But Wittgenstein seems to ignore it.
About Kant, analytics a priori were clearly tautologies. Not sintethycal a priori.

[Wyman]

Hi Wyman:

Thanks for your critique.

If we grant you your postulate, it still does not follow that 1) 'propositions are statements'; 2) statements are 'about our phenomenal world'; 3) statements 'can be shown to have a basis in this actuality.

The postulate is probably better read with the word 'statement' deleted (since it adds nothing to the argument) to become:

• The underlying postulate is that our subjective phenomenal world is derived from (but not equal to) an actual world by way of our inputs felt as sensual experiences. Propositions are about our phenomenal worlds and so, however abstract or imaginative, they can be shown to have a basis in this actuality.

The argument then becomes: 1) the phenomenal world is derived from the actual: 2) propositions are about our phenomenal world: 3) We reason using propositions:
Therefore our reasoning is about the actual world.
(these are all synthetic propositions, so we can argue about their truth value)

This is the 'read' direction, from the actual to the propositional. In order for our reasoning to have power, you have to grant a second postulate that this process is reversible and so it is possible to 'write' the output of reasoning onto the real world.

This reversibility is easily explained if you accept the sort of monism proposed by Whitehead, where the physical and mental are two necessary poles of all actual entities. Dualism finds this reversibility much more difficult to explain and in the worst case results in epiphenomenology where we are unable to act on the world and our reasoning is simply playing.

The appeal is again to the facticity of the world and our ability to alter facts according to the output of our reasoning. It is this explanatory power that makes the process philosophy of Whitehead so appealing.

I have to confess I know nothing about Whitehead except his being co-author of the Principia Mathematica. I'm interested in knowing how the position 'the physical and mental are two necessary poles of all actual entities' is not dualism. I agree that the 'phenomenal' is caused in part by the actual world and in part by subjective interpretations of input. But I see each of these two causes as physical and no need to posit the 'mental' as a 'pole' of actual entities.

[orin]

Wyman wrote:

I have to confess I know nothing about Whitehead except his being co-author of the Principia Mathematica. I'm interested in knowing how the position 'the physical and mental are two necessary poles of all actual entities' is not dualism. I agree that the 'phenomenal' is caused in part by the actual world and in part by subjective interpretations of input. But I see each of these two causes as physical and no need to posit the 'mental' as a 'pole' of actual entities.

The best analogy is to see the poles in terms of a magnet where each pole in a necessary component of the other. (assuming mono-poles actually don't exist!). The mental component of simple and disordered physical systems it trivial, but in complex highly ordered living systems, the mental becomes more and more important. Thus consciousness is not strongly emergent, but can be traced back to these simple systems. His metaphysics Process and Reality' is also titled 'Philosophy of Organism.

The main reason for my post was to get my head around his concept of propositions. Whitehead describes these as 'lures for feeling' with no reference to an actual state-of-affairs and so no truth value. In this form they can to emotionally excite us and we use them in this form to make up stories and poetry. Its only a small sub-set of propositions that refer to a particular state of affairs and these are made into judgements where a truth value can be assigned.

It is interesting how such a master of formal logic and reasoning saw so clearly how a proposition's main purpose is an aesthetic not a logical one!

[Wyman]

That sounds like the later Wittgenstein. He realized that his model of language in the Tractatus represented only a small subset of language which could not be expanded to other areas of language. At least that is my take.

I am interested in that small subset and whether and to what extent such propositions can be assigned truth values. Trouble arises in assigning truth values in formal languages when one realizes that truth only makes sense as a 'meta' concept - i.e. a formal system cannot assign truth values to its own propositions. Tarski formulated a necessary (not sufficient) criteria for truth as being of the form 'Snow is white' if and only if snow is white - where the second statement is a proposition in a metalanguage. It is a weak criteria, but expresses the notion that truth values cannot be assigned within the object language by the object language.

It is interesting that Tarski was developing these ideas in relation to solving the 'liar paradox' - i.e. 'This sentence is false.' He solves it by saying that 'this sentence is false' is a sentence of the object language and if we say ''this sentence is false' is true", we are really saying, in a metalanguage: "'this sentence is false' is true for language O (object language)." This solves the paradox in that the sentence is not both true and false at the same time in either language.

The solution is not satisfying in so far as it creates a hierarchy of metalanguage with no termination point, so that truth is always relative to a metalanguage.