Wikimedia says consciousness is a hard bargain? Hardly.

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GreatandWiseTrixie
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Wikimedia says consciousness is a hard bargain? Hardly.

Post by GreatandWiseTrixie »

The hard problem of consciousness http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_probl ... sciousness

Hard problem? Hardly at all. Har.

How do we have sensations of colors and taste? It simply is.

Rewire someones neurons so that they associate the electrical wavelength of purple with the memory of the word "green" and they will swear to you that "purple" is "green" (even though they have inverse positions on the rainbow. It is important to note that their waves lengths are not "inverse", only their position on the rainbow is inverse, as in 50% separated from another, therefore perceived as "opposite".)

This phenomenon is no phenomenon at all. Words have no value. If a bee could talk, if a bee had word capability in it's brain, it would form a language as part of it's honeycomb culture. It would define it's wavelengths as arbitrary combinations of letters (or runes, as they say in certain circles.) It would define the wavelength of 500 as some arbitrary word, like 34b. Is 34b real? It is a pointer to a wavelength, if the brain was rewired it could point to the wrong wavelength, but the wavelength would remain the same.

Therefore, you cannot know reality is real, you could be in the Matrix. But what you see is what you see, the pointer may be wrong, your green may be orange, your blue may be yellow, you may be deluded about it, but it's still there, the green is still there (unless you're color blind.)

Therefore, the hard problem of consciousness is not so much how one percieves color. The more "hard" problem is why I am sentient of myself, and not someone else, the solipists dillemna. Is it because I am the most advanced lifeform in the galaxy? As far as solipy is concerned, I am not a solipist myself, but I'd say that is the harder problem. I'd say that it has to do with time not existing, but even so, do we really experience all the other beings out there? Imagine all the suffering.

As for pain, I'd say consciousness is a 3d, 4d, or 5dimensional matrix. When you cut it, say remove a finger, that slices and divides the matrix. The consciousness matrix doesn't like being split.

The all seeing eye is consciousness itself, floating through space on a pyramid, it's home world destroyed, a sad thing looking for souls to devour.
Ginkgo
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Re: Wikimedia says consciousness is a hard bargain? Hardly.

Post by Ginkgo »

The hard problem of consciousness can be simply expressed as: "Why do humans have experience?"

My computer has a a health button at the bottom left of the screen. If I click on this button a number of graphs will be displaced on the screen. One graph being the operating temperature of the computer, another being the level of charge contained within the battery. There are a couple of other graphs as well.

One could imagine that it is possible to devise a computer programme whereby the computer responds with a voice simulation based on these graphs. For example, if the battery charge is low, my computer might tell me it is feeling very run down today. If the operating temperature is very high it might respond that it is feeling hot and flushed.

One could also imagine a programme could be devised that incorporates all of these factors. For example, if the battery charge is high and the operating temperature is high, the computer might report it is feeling very energetic, but it FEELS as though this level of energy won't be sustained for the whole day. There are of course many possible combinations follow by appropriate responses.

If I were to check the graphs in order to verify my computer's claims, I might be convinced the computer actually does feel hot and bothered, or is going to tire quickly. The physical evidence backs up it's claims. Naturally, my computer EXPERIENCES NOTHING despite the level of sophistication of responses.

Proponents of strong artificial intelligence claim that in the future this "experiencing nothing" in relation to machines will be a meaningless argument. This is because there is no difference between EXPERIENCING hot, for example, and BEHAVING as though one is hot. On this basis they argue there is really no such thing as the hard problem.

Is this what you are getting at?
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GreatandWiseTrixie
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Re: Wikimedia says consciousness is a hard bargain? Hardly.

Post by GreatandWiseTrixie »

Ginkgo wrote:The hard problem of consciousness can be simply expressed as: "Why do humans have experience?"

My computer has a a health button at the bottom left of the screen. If I click on this button a number of graphs will be displaced on the screen. One graph being the operating temperature of the computer, another being the level of charge contained within the battery. There are a couple of other graphs as well.

One could imagine that it is possible to devise a computer programme whereby the computer responds with a voice simulation based on these graphs. For example, if the battery charge is low, my computer might tell me it is feeling very run down today. If the operating temperature is very high it might respond that it is feeling hot and flushed.

One could also imagine a programme could be devised that incorporates all of these factors. For example, if the battery charge is high and the operating temperature is high, the computer might report it is feeling very energetic, but it FEELS as though this level of energy won't be sustained for the whole day. There are of course many possible combinations follow by appropriate responses.

If I were to check the graphs in order to verify my computer's claims, I might be convinced the computer actually does feel hot and bothered, or is going to tire quickly. The physical evidence backs up it's claims. Naturally, my computer EXPERIENCES NOTHING despite the level of sophistication of responses.

Proponents of strong artificial intelligence claim that in the future this "experiencing nothing" in relation to machines will be a meaningless argument. This is because there is no difference between EXPERIENCING hot, for example, and BEHAVING as though one is hot. On this basis they argue there is really no such thing as the hard problem.

Is this what you are getting at?
This is exactly what I said earlier. Pro tip, pain is the same as happiness, the only reason happiness succeeds is that true pleasure is in non-existence. Pain usually causes hyper awareness. Hyper awareness is pain. If a pain does not cause hyper awareness, it is not pain. Therefore, people cling to ignorance. And if that doesn't work, they cut their bodies so they can decrease the pain of swirling thoughts (usually guilt or some form of hyper awareness.)

But I'll humor you. Let's assume, that there is a such thing, called pain, "p".

If a robot were to experience "p", then it would signal it as "pain". Or it would signal it as "pleasure". Or it would fail to signal it entirely.

Oh wait, this robot is no different than the average human being.

If this robot were out of alignment, it would continue to seek "pain" "p" out of bad programming.

Oh wait, this robot is no different than the average human being.

Some of these robots think themselves clever, because they seek hyper awareness, hyper knowledge, but since hyper awareness is "p" pain too, well...

Oops.

Oh wait, this robot is no different than the average human being.

Therefore, neither a human nor robot seems to be able to comprehend the qualia of pain, which is a universal property. The human, like the robot, seeks to prolong their existence, to extend their pain, unable to label or understand the nature of their own existence.
Last edited by GreatandWiseTrixie on Sun Mar 01, 2015 4:30 am, edited 1 time in total.
Ginkgo
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Re: Wikimedia says consciousness is a hard bargain? Hardly.

Post by Ginkgo »

GreatandWiseTrixie wrote:
Ginkgo wrote:The hard problem of consciousness can be simply expressed as: "Why do humans have experience?"

My computer has a a health button at the bottom left of the screen. If I click on this button a number of graphs will be displaced on the screen. One graph being the operating temperature of the computer, another being the level of charge contained within the battery. There are a couple of other graphs as well.

One could imagine that it is possible to devise a computer programme whereby the computer responds with a voice simulation based on these graphs. For example, if the battery charge is low, my computer might tell me it is feeling very run down today. If the operating temperature is very high it might respond that it is feeling hot and flushed.

One could also imagine a programme could be devised that incorporates all of these factors. For example, if the battery charge is high and the operating temperature is high, the computer might report it is feeling very energetic, but it FEELS as though this level of energy won't be sustained for the whole day. There are of course many possible combinations follow by appropriate responses.

If I were to check the graphs in order to verify my computer's claims, I might be convinced the computer actually does feel hot and bothered, or is going to tire quickly. The physical evidence backs up it's claims. Naturally, my computer EXPERIENCES NOTHING despite the level of sophistication of responses.

Proponents of strong artificial intelligence claim that in the future this "experiencing nothing" in relation to machines will be a meaningless argument. This is because there is no difference between EXPERIENCING hot, for example, and BEHAVING as though one is hot. On this basis they argue there is really no such thing as the hard problem.

Is this what you are getting at?
This is exactly what I said earlier. Pro tip, pain is the same as happiness, the only reason happiness succeeds is that true pleasure is in non-existence. Pain usually causes hyper awareness. Therefore, people cling to ignorance.

But I'll humor you. Let's assume, that there is a such thing, called pain, "p".

If a robot were to experience "p", then it would signal it as "pain". Or it would signal it as "pleasure". Or it would fail to signal it entirely.

Oh wait, this robot is no different than the average human being.
How the computer/robot responds to a particular stimulus is entirely up to the person programming the machine. Upon hitting it with a hammer you could elicit a rendition of " New York, New York". It's up to the programmer.
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GreatandWiseTrixie
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Re: Wikimedia says consciousness is a hard bargain? Hardly.

Post by GreatandWiseTrixie »

Ginkgo wrote:
GreatandWiseTrixie wrote:
Ginkgo wrote:The hard problem of consciousness can be simply expressed as: "Why do humans have experience?"

My computer has a a health button at the bottom left of the screen. If I click on this button a number of graphs will be displaced on the screen. One graph being the operating temperature of the computer, another being the level of charge contained within the battery. There are a couple of other graphs as well.

One could imagine that it is possible to devise a computer programme whereby the computer responds with a voice simulation based on these graphs. For example, if the battery charge is low, my computer might tell me it is feeling very run down today. If the operating temperature is very high it might respond that it is feeling hot and flushed.

One could also imagine a programme could be devised that incorporates all of these factors. For example, if the battery charge is high and the operating temperature is high, the computer might report it is feeling very energetic, but it FEELS as though this level of energy won't be sustained for the whole day. There are of course many possible combinations follow by appropriate responses.

If I were to check the graphs in order to verify my computer's claims, I might be convinced the computer actually does feel hot and bothered, or is going to tire quickly. The physical evidence backs up it's claims. Naturally, my computer EXPERIENCES NOTHING despite the level of sophistication of responses.

Proponents of strong artificial intelligence claim that in the future this "experiencing nothing" in relation to machines will be a meaningless argument. This is because there is no difference between EXPERIENCING hot, for example, and BEHAVING as though one is hot. On this basis they argue there is really no such thing as the hard problem.

Is this what you are getting at?
This is exactly what I said earlier. Pro tip, pain is the same as happiness, the only reason happiness succeeds is that true pleasure is in non-existence. Pain usually causes hyper awareness. Therefore, people cling to ignorance.

But I'll humor you. Let's assume, that there is a such thing, called pain, "p".

If a robot were to experience "p", then it would signal it as "pain". Or it would signal it as "pleasure". Or it would fail to signal it entirely.

Oh wait, this robot is no different than the average human being.
How the computer/robot responds to a particular stimulus is entirely up to the person programming the machine. Upon hitting it with a hammer you could elicit a rendition of " New York, New York". It's up to the programmer.
Yes, please re read my post I added some key points not included in your quote. It explains how humans are no better than labeling their qualia than a cheap AI. Therefore, it is no hard problem at all, but a problem rooted in delusion and belief in common human delusions. (The human delusion is a certain set of delusional beliefs taught to other humans at an early age.)

I'll rephrase, if the earlier post wasn't clear enough.

If pain is a certain configuration...
It doesn't matter if a robot cannot identify what pain is, because humans seem unable to identify pain and seek it out.

Pain is, simply, hyper awareness.
One could cause an AI pain, but like a human, they probably wouldn't identify it as such. It is no hard problem at all.

Though I won't deny, there is still a hard-problem of consciousness, as in the locality of it, and why I am spectating one mind but not another. Knowing what consciousness is, a matrix, beon, in congruence with ancient spirits, that there are multiple consciousness matrixes, with short term memory, still doesnt explain why all are sentient at the same time. And if they truly are, my what a suffering. Truly the creator be damned.
Ginkgo
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Re: Wikimedia says consciousness is a hard bargain? Hardly.

Post by Ginkgo »

Yes,think you are referring to the Inverted Spectrum Hypothesis.

This will take up a fair bit of time and space. I'll get back to you tomorrow on this one.
Ginkgo
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Re: Wikimedia says consciousness is a hard bargain? Hardly.

Post by Ginkgo »

GreatandWiseTrixie wrote:The hard problem of consciousness http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_probl ... sciousness

Rewire someones neurons so that they associate the electrical wavelength of purple with the memory of the word "green" and they will swear to you that "purple" is "green" (even though they have inverse positions on the rainbow. It is important to note that their waves lengths are not "inverse", only their position on the rainbow is inverse, as in 50% separated from another, therefore perceived as "opposite".)
I didn't forget to get back to you on this one. You appear to have the basis for a very interesting thought experiment. The inverted spectrum is usually associated with a "rewiring" of the optics, whereas you are suggesting a "rewiring" of brain neurons. This points to an inverted memory type of argument- somewhat different.
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