how (categorized - linguistically, then reacted upon)
untrained reflexive actions may reverse the reaction/categorized order...
-Imp
Red is 'categorized' according to past behaviors learned. Language is a behavior/ability. Do you have to 'do' something see a red apple? I don't. So there's no difference between untrained and trained reflexive actions here.
and the belief that the future will resemble the past remains reflexively unperceived...
how (categorized - linguistically, then reacted upon)
untrained reflexive actions may reverse the reaction/categorized order...
-Imp
How is not an afterthought but a continual process It might follow from a knowing that, and might lead to new knowing that's.
Know how - are we talking about the autonomous aspects of learned behaviour?
E.g. I that where middle C is on a score, and on the piano key. The trick is the "know-how" to automatically hit the key for the right length of time, and the right pressure in the midst of a flourish of other playing without having to think about it.
Same with typing, running catching jumping. But does this sort of know how lie behind the conscious outworking of "knowing that" a lot more than we would like to think?
Obviously there is the completely untried knowledge - not yet put into practice.
But i'm thinking about the area where you seem to rationalise with a process of thinking some response to a query: something that you might already know more that you think.
rationalized inductively from facts not in evidence...
a myriad of pervious instances does not insure a future instance...
how (categorized - linguistically, then reacted upon)
untrained reflexive actions may reverse the reaction/categorized order...
-Imp
How is not an afterthought but a continual process It might follow from a knowing that, and might lead to new knowing that's.
Know how - are we talking about the autonomous aspects of learned behaviour?
E.g. I that where middle C is on a score, and on the piano key. The trick is the "know-how" to automatically hit the key for the right length of time, and the right pressure in the midst of a flourish of other playing without having to think about it.
Same with typing, running catching jumping. But does this sort of know how lie behind the conscious outworking of "knowing that" a lot more than we would like to think?
Obviously there is the completely untried knowledge - not yet put into practice.
But i'm thinking about the area where you seem to rationalise with a process of thinking some response to a query: something that you might already know more that you think.
rationalized inductively from facts not in evidence...
a myriad of pervious instances does not insure a future instance...
Lev Muishkin wrote:
Okay great we are on the same page. Now how does all this hinge on the thread?
I think Wyman has initiated a very good thread and a lot of useful information came out of it, but I don't think I could face going back to the beginning.
how (categorized - linguistically, then reacted upon)
untrained reflexive actions may reverse the reaction/categorized order...
-Imp
I see this as being a different kettle of fish.
Your first question seems to be in relation to how perception is categorized. This is basically one of the core question in relation to consciousness and how we arrive at the first person perspective. I am assuming by "afterthought" you mean the first person perspective.
We are continually bombarded by all sorts of sense data and most of the information that enters the brain goes unnoticed until we decided to attend to it. I think you are right in highlighting the importance of categorization of information. Provided it is imformation we direct out attention towards.. We can use our working memory as a basic framework by which we can know objects in the world such as chairs, tables ,cars and dogs.
Using categories in an abstract fashion allows for a particular perspective of the world. However, it is somewhere between this abstract of categories and the actualization of an object that allows for a first person point of view. Your second proposal is interesting, but it is not directly related to the categorization argument.
how (categorized - linguistically, then reacted upon)
untrained reflexive actions may reverse the reaction/categorized order...
-Imp
I see this as being a different kettle of fish.
Your first question seems to be in relation to how perception is categorized. This is basically one of the core question in relation to consciousness and how we arrive at the first person perspective. I am assuming by "afterthought" you mean the first person perspective.
We are continually bombarded by all sorts of sense data and most of the information that enters the brain goes unnoticed until we decided to attend to it. I think you are right in highlighting the importance of categorization of information. Provided it is imformation we direct out attention towards.. We can use our working memory as a basic framework by which we can know objects in the world such as chairs, tables ,cars and dogs.
Using categories in an abstract fashion allows for a particular perspective of the world. However, it is somewhere between this abstract of categories and the actualization of an object that allows for a first person point of view. Your second proposal is interesting, but it is not directly related to the categorization argument.
the act of categorization itself betrays the uniqueness of each incidental impression...
Lev Muishkin wrote:
Okay great we are on the same page. Now how does all this hinge on the thread?
I think Wyman has initiated a very good thread and a lot of useful information came out of it, but I don't think I could face going back to the beginning.
Here's the subject of my OP:
1. The New Knowledge-how
Gilbert Ryle (1949, 1971) famously argued that there was a fundamental
distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that. Stanley and
Williamson (henceforth S&W) deny this. To see why, consider a knowledge-how
ascribing sentence, such as:
(1) Mary knows how to ride a bicycle.
As S&W point out, (1) contains an embedded question (i.e. an embedded clause
that is an interrogative). The standard semantics of embedded questions in
linguistics tells us that (1) will be true just in case Mary knows some proposition
that is a legitimate answer to this embedded question. S&W suggest that for
sentences of the form ‘S knows how to F’, any legitimate answer to the
respective embedded question will be a proposition concerning ways for S to F.
1
Accordingly, S&W’s initial account of knowledge-how says that (1) will be true
if and only if Mary knows some proposition concerning a way for her to ride a
bicycle. More generally, the truth conditions of knowledge-how ascribing
sentences conform to the following schema:3
‘S knows how to F’ is true if and only if there is some way w for S to F
such that S stands in the knowledge-that relation to the proposition that w
is a way for S to F.
2
So, according to this initial account a sentence like (1) expresses an existential
generalization over propositions; it says that there exists at least one proposition
of the form ‘w is a way for Mary to F’ such that Mary knows that proposition.
The import of this is that “to say that someone knows how to F is always to
ascribe to them knowledge-that” (ibid: 426).
As stated, however, S&W’s initial account of knowledge-how is
vulnerable to a simple objection. There can be contexts in which, intuitively, (1)
is false and (2) true, even though, according to this initial account, (1) expresses
an existential generalization that is entailed by the proposition expressed by (2):
(1) Mary knows how to ride a bicycle.
(2) Mary knows that that way is a way for her to ride a bicycle
how (categorized - linguistically, then reacted upon)
untrained reflexive actions may reverse the reaction/categorized order...
-Imp
I see this as being a different kettle of fish.
Your first question seems to be in relation to how perception is categorized. This is basically one of the core question in relation to consciousness and how we arrive at the first person perspective. I am assuming by "afterthought" you mean the first person perspective.
We are continually bombarded by all sorts of sense data and most of the information that enters the brain goes unnoticed until we decided to attend to it. I think you are right in highlighting the importance of categorization of information. Provided it is imformation we direct out attention towards.. We can use our working memory as a basic framework by which we can know objects in the world such as chairs, tables ,cars and dogs.
Using categories in an abstract fashion allows for a particular perspective of the world. However, it is somewhere between this abstract of categories and the actualization of an object that allows for a first person point of view. Your second proposal is interesting, but it is not directly related to the categorization argument.
the act of categorization itself betrays the uniqueness of each incidental impression...
esse est percipi
esse est categorized...
-Imp
Each categorization happens sub-consciously and automatically. It is only after this automatic categorization that our attention is focused this way and that. The automatic categorization is conditioned by past experience - I think being conditioned by past experience is knowing how to perceive things.
If Mary, above, were a circus bear riding a unicycle, no one would say that she had knowledge of a proposition about riding.
Wyman wrote:
Each categorization happens sub-consciously and automatically. It is only after this automatic categorization that our attention is focused this way and that. The automatic categorization is conditioned by past experience - I think being conditioned by past experience is knowing how to perceive things.
If Mary, above, were a circus bear riding a unicycle, no one would say that she had knowledge of a proposition about riding.
Obviously proposition knowledge is not needed for practical knowledge in most cases. That is not the same as saying that they always exist apart, or that propositional knowledge can never enhance, or is never needed as a precursor to practical knowledge.
There is an area where there is absolutely no distinction between propositional and practical knowldge; and that is in the act of reasoning, which is an action.
Wyman wrote:
Each categorization happens sub-consciously and automatically. It is only after this automatic categorization that our attention is focused this way and that. The automatic categorization is conditioned by past experience - I think being conditioned by past experience is knowing how to perceive things.
If Mary, above, were a circus bear riding a unicycle, no one would say that she had knowledge of a proposition about riding.
Obviously proposition knowledge is not needed for practical knowledge in most cases. That is not the same as saying that they always exist apart, or that propositional knowledge can never enhance, or is never needed as a precursor to practical knowledge.
There is an area where there is absolutely no distinction between propositional and practical knowledge; and that is in the act of reasoning, which is an action.
As to reasoning involving no distinction between the two: you may say 'Given a triangle with one right angle, the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares of the other two sides.' That is a true proposition in geometry. It is much different to know how to prove that theorem from the postulates.
You may say that the postulates are propositions and that is where we start. However, a lot goes in to choosing axioms.
Having said all that, I did not say that propositional knowledge can 'never enhance or is not [useful] as a precursor to practical knowledge.'
how (categorized - linguistically, then reacted upon)
untrained reflexive actions may reverse the reaction/categorized order...
-Imp
I see this as being a different kettle of fish.
Your first question seems to be in relation to how perception is categorized. This is basically one of the core question in relation to consciousness and how we arrive at the first person perspective. I am assuming by "afterthought" you mean the first person perspective.
We are continually bombarded by all sorts of sense data and most of the information that enters the brain goes unnoticed until we decided to attend to it. I think you are right in highlighting the importance of categorization of information. Provided it is imformation we direct out attention towards.. We can use our working memory as a basic framework by which we can know objects in the world such as chairs, tables ,cars and dogs.
Using categories in an abstract fashion allows for a particular perspective of the world. However, it is somewhere between this abstract of categories and the actualization of an object that allows for a first person point of view. Your second proposal is interesting, but it is not directly related to the categorization argument.
the act of categorization itself betrays the uniqueness of each incidental impression...
esse est percipi
esse est categorized...
-Imp
Yes, but only if we believe that categorization is uniquely referencing the external world. In other words, the categories are waiting to be discovered.
Wyman wrote:
Each categorization happens sub-consciously and automatically. It is only after this automatic categorization that our attention is focused this way and that. The automatic categorization is conditioned by past experience - I think being conditioned by past experience is knowing how to perceive things.
If Mary, above, were a circus bear riding a unicycle, no one would say that she had knowledge of a proposition about riding.
Impenitent wrote:
the act of categorization itself betrays the uniqueness of each incidental impression...
esse est percipi
esse est categorized...
-Imp
Yes, but only if we believe that categorization is uniquely referencing the external world. In other words, the categories are waiting to be discovered.
I wasn't actually suggesting this.
are you saying you do not perceive the impression (of the thing-in-itself) but rather its category?
Wyman wrote:
Each categorization happens sub-consciously and automatically. It is only after this automatic categorization that our attention is focused this way and that. The automatic categorization is conditioned by past experience - I think being conditioned by past experience is knowing how to perceive things.
If Mary, above, were a circus bear riding a unicycle, no one would say that she had knowledge of a proposition about riding.
Obviously proposition knowledge is not needed for practical knowledge in most cases. That is not the same as saying that they always exist apart, or that propositional knowledge can never enhance, or is never needed as a precursor to practical knowledge.
There is an area where there is absolutely no distinction between propositional and practical knowledge; and that is in the act of reasoning, which is an action.
As to reasoning involving no distinction between the two: you may say 'Given a triangle with one right angle, the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares of the other two sides.' That is a true proposition in geometry. It is much different to know how to prove that theorem from the postulates.
You may say that the postulates are propositions and that is where we start. However, a lot goes in to choosing axioms.
Having said all that, I did not say that propositional knowledge can 'never enhance or is not [useful] as a precursor to practical knowledge.'
Impenitent wrote:
are you saying you do not perceive the impression (of the thing-in-itself) but rather its category?
-Imp
Yes. In philosophy this has become widely known as "Referencing" All terms are considered to have reference points out there in the world. There is a casual connection between the things out there and the way we can refer to them. In other words, we can reduce meaning to information in order to solve problems. Something computers do very well.
However, in relation to philosophy of mind I am saying this is not the complete picture. Far from it.
