Knowing how versus Knowing that

[Lev Muishkin]

Let me see if I can cause HH and Lev to cross the abyss into philosophical doubt.

Suppose qualia are that which are perceived in the perceptual process. In other words, perception is a relation between us and something perceived. You have to be aware of multifarious interpretations of this seemingly simple relation. Let's first say that the relation contains two objects: the brain and photons (limiting ourselves to sight only). In such a model, photons cause' the retina to be stimulated, passing information to an area of the brain, which in turn reacts in such a way as to pass back to the retina further electric impulses, causing us to 'see' something.

The problem here is, it is difficult to describe the 'something' we see as anything but a separate kind of thing from photons and nerves. Also, the 'something' we see cannot be a completely 'accurate' representation of the things that the photons are bouncing off of. This follows from the fact that in reacting to the stimuli affecting it, the brain creates an image based on past experiences, such as memories and conceptualizations. As an illustration of what I am speaking of here, consider the following examples from Stephen Hawking and W.V. Quine:

And so the raw data sent to the brain are like a badly pixilated picture with a hole in it. Fortunately, the human brain processes that data, combining the input from both eyes, filling in gaps on the assumption that the visual properties of neighboring locations are similar and interpolating. Moreover, it reads a two-dimensional array of data from the retina and creates from it the impression of three-dimensional space. The brain, in other words, builds a mental picture or model. The brain is so good at model building that if people are fitted with glasses that turn the images in their eyes upside down, their brains, after a time, change the model so that they again see things the right way up. If the glasses are then removed, they see the world upside down for a while, then again adapt. This shows that what one means when one says “I see a chair” is merely that one has used the light scattered by the chair to build a mental image or model of the chair. If the model is upside down, with luck one’s brain will correct it before one tries to sit on the chair.

and Quine (since we were speaking of 'red'):

Hence our readiness to think of color as more subjective than physical shape. But some pull of the same kind occurs even in the case of 'red', insofar as reflections from the environment cause the red object to cast somewhat different tints to different points of view. The objective pull will regiment all the responses still as 'red', by activating myriad corrective cues. These corrective cues are used unconsciously, such is the perfection of our socialization; a painter has even to school himself to set them aside when he tries to reproduce his true retinal intake.

Hence, what appears to us is influenced by, or caused by, both the outside stimulus as well as the interpretive ability of the brain. If we call such a 'something' a quale, then I don't see how the 'Mary' scenario differs at all from the age old philosophical problem of phenomena/noumena or appearance/reality or mind/body (corporeal nature in Descartes' terminology).

So when Lev and HH say that it is absurd to say that we learn to see color, although I might grant you certain limiting cases (such as a flash of blinding light on one side or a mental image on the other), everything we perceive is a mixture of stimuli and interpretation. Think of 'learning' not as a school exercise, but more as adaptation, habituation, conceptualization.

My original post was taking this conceptual framework somewhat for granted and proposing to think of the perceptual model in these terms, and ask what can we 'know' in this model (qualia, or facts about 'real' objects', etc.). I propose that, in the context of qualia, propositional knowledge such as 'x is a red car' comes after knowing how to perceive - i.e. having the ability to process stimuli in a certain manner. I'll stop here (if anyone has read that far) and refer back to my OP.

The terminology you use here is Kantian as borrowed and modified (subverted) from Plato.
So what you are talking about is pretty much straight Kantian thinking that we can never know the thing-in-itself, and is the usual subjectivist spiel: no problem.
So you have not rocked my boat; I'm totally behind all that. No problem. I'm not sure that Quine adds much.
Redness is in the head, and not in the object. Objects reflect differential spectra of light waves, and the retina sends a message which we read as "red".
The point I was making above, is that Mary, when she emerges into the real world still can't tell a blue cup from a red one. And its more than the fact of the conventional truth that such colours are nominated.
What happens is that she gets something totally new with the apprehension of colour, that NO objective information could ever tell her - and that is the redness of the red- a thing that has to be experienced .
On thread, now. There is nothing she needs to do to apprehend colour (to know how to see colour), her evolved physicality gives her that. All she lacks is the information about what to call each colour, she does not "know that" the cup is "red", or "blue".

So on your conclusion. We have no reason to think that babies need to learn how to see colour. But we do know for sure that they have to learn how to communicate that knowledge by learning the conventions as to what they are called. This is the langue, the parole is innate.
I'm not sure why you use the term "propositional", for nominal knowledge, but maybe we are on the same page?

A thought puzzle every child plays with their peers is the thought that we all might see completely different colours; if you see blue when I see red and vice versa, you could never tell, because we learn the names of colour by convention. Kids reach a subjective realisation (7-9yo) which some are smart enough to carry with them through their lives, whilst others reject it a seek the comfort of objectivism.
The objectivists are then prey to the machinations of religion and authority, the subjective ones figure out that morality is subject to mitigation and relativism.

[Lev Muishkin]

Wyman

Thought experiments are not philosophy as it serves no purpose to mental masturbate, it is not "love of wisdom". Specially not when you start out limiting reality for no apparent reason other than to fit your ends.
So it ends up being the usual nonsense and babble we find here on various cozy chat fora please stop it, it's really stooping down philosophy to irrelevance.

What is 'wisdom' - knowing how or knowing that or neither?

I'm still waiting for you to define those terms.

Wisdom is knowing that just because is, is not reason for ought; It's using know how and knowledge to find the best path with the minimum of trampling and effort, and being able to accept that whilst failure can be an option, lessons can be learned for next time.

[HexHammer]

Wisdom = valuable refined knowledge.

[Wyman]

Let me see if I can cause HH and Lev to cross the abyss into philosophical doubt.

Suppose qualia are that which are perceived in the perceptual process. In other words, perception is a relation between us and something perceived. You have to be aware of multifarious interpretations of this seemingly simple relation. Let's first say that the relation contains two objects: the brain and photons (limiting ourselves to sight only). In such a model, photons cause' the retina to be stimulated, passing information to an area of the brain, which in turn reacts in such a way as to pass back to the retina further electric impulses, causing us to 'see' something.

The problem here is, it is difficult to describe the 'something' we see as anything but a separate kind of thing from photons and nerves. Also, the 'something' we see cannot be a completely 'accurate' representation of the things that the photons are bouncing off of. This follows from the fact that in reacting to the stimuli affecting it, the brain creates an image based on past experiences, such as memories and conceptualizations. As an illustration of what I am speaking of here, consider the following examples from Stephen Hawking and W.V. Quine:

And so the raw data sent to the brain are like a badly pixilated picture with a hole in it. Fortunately, the human brain processes that data, combining the input from both eyes, filling in gaps on the assumption that the visual properties of neighboring locations are similar and interpolating. Moreover, it reads a two-dimensional array of data from the retina and creates from it the impression of three-dimensional space. The brain, in other words, builds a mental picture or model. The brain is so good at model building that if people are fitted with glasses that turn the images in their eyes upside down, their brains, after a time, change the model so that they again see things the right way up. If the glasses are then removed, they see the world upside down for a while, then again adapt. This shows that what one means when one says “I see a chair” is merely that one has used the light scattered by the chair to build a mental image or model of the chair. If the model is upside down, with luck one’s brain will correct it before one tries to sit on the chair.

and Quine (since we were speaking of 'red'):

Hence our readiness to think of color as more subjective than physical shape. But some pull of the same kind occurs even in the case of 'red', insofar as reflections from the environment cause the red object to cast somewhat different tints to different points of view. The objective pull will regiment all the responses still as 'red', by activating myriad corrective cues. These corrective cues are used unconsciously, such is the perfection of our socialization; a painter has even to school himself to set them aside when he tries to reproduce his true retinal intake.

Hence, what appears to us is influenced by, or caused by, both the outside stimulus as well as the interpretive ability of the brain. If we call such a 'something' a quale, then I don't see how the 'Mary' scenario differs at all from the age old philosophical problem of phenomena/noumena or appearance/reality or mind/body (corporeal nature in Descartes' terminology).

So when Lev and HH say that it is absurd to say that we learn to see color, although I might grant you certain limiting cases (such as a flash of blinding light on one side or a mental image on the other), everything we perceive is a mixture of stimuli and interpretation. Think of 'learning' not as a school exercise, but more as adaptation, habituation, conceptualization.

My original post was taking this conceptual framework somewhat for granted and proposing to think of the perceptual model in these terms, and ask what can we 'know' in this model (qualia, or facts about 'real' objects', etc.). I propose that, in the context of qualia, propositional knowledge such as 'x is a red car' comes after knowing how to perceive - i.e. having the ability to process stimuli in a certain manner. I'll stop here (if anyone has read that far) and refer back to my OP.

The terminology you use here is Kantian as borrowed and modified (subverted) from Plato.
So what you are talking about is pretty much straight Kantian thinking that we can never know the thing-in-itself, and is the usual subjectivist spiel: no problem.
So you have not rocked my boat; I'm totally behind all that. No problem. I'm not sure that Quine adds much.
Redness is in the head, and not in the object. Objects reflect differential spectra of light waves, and the retina sends a message which we read as "red".
The point I was making above, is that Mary, when she emerges into the real world still can't tell a blue cup from a red one. And its more than the fact of the conventional truth that such colours are nominated.
What happens is that she gets something totally new with the apprehension of colour, that NO objective information could ever tell her - and that is the redness of the red- a thing that has to be experienced .
On thread, now. There is nothing she needs to do to apprehend colour (to know how to see colour), her evolved physicality gives her that. All she lacks is the information about what to call each colour, she does not "know that" the cup is "red", or "blue".

So on your conclusion. We have no reason to think that babies need to learn how to see colour. But we do know for sure that they have to learn how to communicate that knowledge by learning the conventions as to what they are called. This is the langue, the parole is innate.
I'm not sure why you use the term "propositional", for nominal knowledge, but maybe we are on the same page?

A thought puzzle every child plays with their peers is the thought that we all might see completely different colours; if you see blue when I see red and vice versa, you could never tell, because we learn the names of colour by convention. Kids reach a subjective realisation (7-9yo) which some are smart enough to carry with them through their lives, whilst others reject it a seek the comfort of objectivism.
The objectivists are then prey to the machinations of religion and authority, the subjective ones figure out that morality is subject to mitigation and relativism.

I had a college prof. who used to accuse me of being a Kantian. Never read the full Critique. All philosophers talk about the same problems. So I'm not expecting to rock any boats. And I haven't said we can't know the 'thing in itself.'

On babies, here is a quote from the net (a Hopkins Doctor):

It used to be we thought that newborns could see very little during the first few months of life. However, better and more sophisticated testing techniques have proven these assumptions wrong. In fact, newborns are able to see and distinguish objects within the first few weeks. Their eyes are not great at focusing, so optimum distance for seeing an object is between eight to 15 inches. This is fortunate since this corresponds to the distance between the mother and child's face while breastfeeding. More accurately, this ideal distance most likely evolved because of breastfeeding.

It turns out distinction between colors is probably not very good until at least three months of age. This is the reason newborns tend to have the most attraction to contrasts of dark and light rather than brightly colored objects. It is this fascination of contrasts that have made the black-and-white newborn mobiles and toys so popular. Another interesting aspect of a newborn's vision is that it allows for preference of human faces. In fact, there is a portion of the brain that seems to be dedicated to allowing for this facial recognition. Newborn babies are naturally attracted even to rough sketches of human faces. This specific recognition mechanism helps facilitate bonding between the mother and child, particularly during breastfeeding.

Remember, I am not saying that the stimuli incoming to the eyes produce no effect prior to conceptualizing, or that I know precisely what an infant sees. But I know that in adulthood, most of what we see is influenced heavily by the interpretation of the brain. I don't think that this too controversial a point, actually.

You say:

The point I was making above, is that Mary, when she emerges into the real world still can't tell a blue cup from a red one.

And maybe this is because she hasn't learned how yet, by sight alone. She can distinguish between two differently colored cups if allowed to use a spectrometer, for instance, or ask someone. And I'm not being flip here - that is the nature of propositional knowledge, it lives in the use of language - whether she can name the cups 'red' and 'blue' correctly. Having an ability is independent of language(except for the ability to use language).

What happens when you see a new color - one you haven't seen before? Actually, it happens at nearly every moment of your life as the light never strikes the retina in exactly the same way. You only notice it when you turn your attention to it, because you have mastered the ability to discern and compare colors.

[Wyman]

Wisdom = valuable refined knowledge.

What is knowledge? Otherwise this is just a circular definition.

[Lev Muishkin]

The point I was making above, is that Mary, when she emerges into the real world still can't tell a blue cup from a red one.

And maybe this is because she hasn't learned how yet, by sight alone. She can distinguish between two differently colored cups if allowed to use a spectrometer, for instance, or ask someone. And I'm not being flip here - that is the nature of propositional knowledge, it lives in the use of language - whether she can name the cups 'red' and 'blue' correctly. Having an ability is independent of language(except for the ability to use language).

What happens when you see a new color - one you haven't seen before? Actually, it happens at nearly every moment of your life as the light never strikes the retina in exactly the same way. You only notice it when you turn your attention to it, because you have mastered the ability to discern and compare colors.

For the most part you seem to be repeating what I said; so iIt seems we are all in agreement.

Oh - you sort of have said you cannot see the thing-in-itself.

[Lev Muishkin]

Wisdom = valuable refined knowledge.

What is knowledge? Otherwise this is just a circular definition.

Hex has described a good text book. I do not think this is a useful definition of wisdom.

[SpheresOfBalance]

Gingko posted the following essay on another thread: http://philrsss.anu.edu.au/people-defau ... h/ABKH.pdf.

I often use the distinction between knowing how and knowing that in my thinking. For instance, on another thread, I maintained that living morally involves knowing 'how' to live, rather than buying into a system of propositional knowledge.

Does knowing how translate into, or reduce to, or imply, knowing that? Or is the converse true, or neither?

My intuition is that knowing how is primary and knowing that (propositional knowledge) somehow reduces to a description of knowing how.

In the context of the 'Mary's room' scenerio, Mary has a huge set of (ahem) true propositions about perceiving the color red. But she is locked in a room consisting of only black and white (or she is color blind, I forget which). The question is, given that she knows every true proposition about perceiving red, is she still missing something, having never actually experienced red?

'Perceiving' can be thought of as an ability, an activity, a 'knowing how.' We could say that Mary does not know how to 'recognize' the color red, for instance. Does this distinction between two types of knowledge hold up under scrutiny, or does every instance of 'knowing how' reduce to a set of 'knowing that' propositions?

This dichotomy seems to me similar, and perhaps reducible to, the distinction between 'know that' and 'knowing what it's like to be a bat' from Nagel.

Neither one is as important as "knowing why." Or so I surely believe.

[HexHammer]

Wisdom = valuable refined knowledge.

What is knowledge? Otherwise this is just a circular definition.

Hex has described a good text book. I do not think this is a useful definition of wisdom.

I don't read books, I've made it up myself. But thanks.

Whyman do you even know what circular arguments are?

[Ginkgo]

Those are not the philosophical qualia. Maybe you think Homer Simpsons is a reincarnation of the ancient Greek Homer?

You take care of your thinking and I'll take care of the thinking on my side...Deal?

[Ginkgo]

How so?
And what, in relation to colour, does qualia "represent".

They represent feelings. Upon re-reading Jackson's argument it seems to me he is an epiphenomenalist when it comes to qualia. That is to say, qualia from Jackson's point of view are a by-product of physical processes taking part in the brain. As such they are non=physical and therefore lack physical characteristics. Jackson is probably a property dualist.

[HexHammer]

Those are not the philosophical qualia. Maybe you think Homer Simpsons is a reincarnation of the ancient Greek Homer?

You take care of your thinking and I'll take care of the thinking on my side...Deal?

No deal! This is a philosophy forum, not a babble forum!

[Lev Muishkin]

How so?
And what, in relation to colour, does qualia "represent".

They represent feelings. Upon re-reading Jackson's argument it seems to me he is an epiphenomenalist when it comes to qualia. That is to say, qualia from Jackson's point of view are a by-product of physical processes taking part in the brain. As such they are non=physical and therefore lack physical characteristics. Jackson is probably a property dualist.

Obviously: and a dualism is nothing more than a fudge.
That's why I asked You, and not Jackson.
Shall I ask again, or will you just quote someone else?

I was not particularly interested in the epistemological basis, but just a basic meaning, to see if we are talking about the same thing.

[Ginkgo]

How so?
And what, in relation to colour, does qualia "represent".

They represent feelings. Upon re-reading Jackson's argument it seems to me he is an epiphenomenalist when it comes to qualia. That is to say, qualia from Jackson's point of view are a by-product of physical processes taking part in the brain. As such they are non=physical and therefore lack physical characteristics. Jackson is probably a property dualist.

Obviously: and a dualism is nothing more than a fudge.
That's why I asked You, and not Jackson.
Shall I ask again, or will you just quote someone else?

I was not particularly interested in the epistemological basis, but just a basic meaning, to see if we are talking about the same thing.

I could give you my answer, but there are people far more qualified than myself who can supply answers to such questions.

[Wyman]

Wisdom = valuable refined knowledge.

What is knowledge? Otherwise this is just a circular definition.

Whyman do you even know what circular arguments are?

I give you credit, HH, unlike some others around here. You are on the ball. I thought when I wrote that that you had claimed that knowledge was wisdom. Then, that wisdom was valuable knowledge. You said only that philosophy was the search for wisdom. So you weren't being circular.

I'm surprised you don't like my emphasis on knowing how over knowing that. I would treat knowing how to build a bridge, program a computer, solve a mathematical problem as fundamental examples of knowledge. I would call the propositions about these subject matters closer to descriptions of the process and arising out of the prior ability or expertise. I would say that whether knowledge is 'valuable' depends primarily on whether it is useful - which is close to your definition of wisdom.

Knowledge as ability, among other things, accounts for how pre-linguistic humans could be said to have knowledge, as well as animals. The real sticky part is how to describe language itself as a knowing how or ability(and as I am attempting in the OP, perception as such) - this is the subject matter of the philosophy of language - I'm especially referring to Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, which I think you ought to read.