Is Skepticism Ridiculous?

[Conde Lucanor]

The issue that I have with what you said is how you (again) a one-sided dichotomy with associating skepticism and open-ended scrutiny with materialism and mere belief and irrationality with religion and spirituality. This is wrong, because there actually can be a coexistence of a skeptic and scientific point of view with the metaphysical and spiritual ideals.

If natural, empirical sciences were just about "point of views", they would need to be renamed as they were in their origin: natural philosophy. But the rise of modern science meant that there was now something more than "point of views": a quite succesful empirical method. And that's the difference between modern science and metaphysical speculations: the first will produce a substantial amount of tangible evidence, the others none. Modern science exposes its data and methodology for peer review, in other words, invites others to try for themselves and doublecheck if the findings are true or not. Often, they are not, so the process goes on an on, constantly improving the methodology and gaining enough data to be able to assert some facts about reality. Not so in the religious corner, where "facts" are asserted carelessly, as a secret knowledge obtained from doctrinal authorities, which also claim got themselves the secret from an invisible man. This is the "higher knowledge" from which Gnostics, Mystics and other Esoterics drink from, but also all religions based on "divine revelation". From a rational point of view, some religions will connect the dots, but none will expose a highly complex structure of methods and data that make the bridge between the dots. Their structure is purely literary fiction.

Many great knowledge has actually been attained by the spiritual form of science: acupuncture, alchemy, meditation, homeopathy, etc. Along with that, there have been various scientists such as Nikola Tesla, Viktor Schauberger, Goethe, etc., that have came and brought a much broader worldview in science in trying to explain the universe.

If you want to call acupuncture, alchemy, meditation, homeopathy, etc., a form of science, it will be under a terminology that does not meet any standards of designation of modern science. What's the theoretical, methodological research method of acupuncture? Has it ever produced solid empirical evidence of so called "vital energy" or chakras and its supposed relation with patient's lives? Did alchemists ever find the phlogiston or did they ever turn iron into gold? Homeopathy is no better joke. Skeptics get a laugh at it all the time in the internet, although it is a scam that sells millions of worthless remedies.

I think that it's erroneous to camp it in with the idea of unicorns existing. I also think it's erroneous to call it a believer's formula

Can you explain why it would be erroneous?

Near-death experiences relate a lot to spiritual and religious experiences, from surrounding contacts to deities or various entities to being in a place that resembles 'heaven' or 'hell'. Even if 'flesh and bone' individuals are experienced, there is no doubt that the individual experiencing near-death not conscious or 'awake'. If anything, these experiences could mean that consciousness may actually exist outside of our bodies; it's just that further research needs to be done on the subject.

When you talk about "spiritual and religious" experiences you're using vague terminology which conceals the fact that these are just plain human experiences, occurring in living human bodies, in this material, physical world. That's the first, obvious, observable fact. Next, someone might produce a propositional statement that will claim that this mundane experience is intrinsically related to a "spiritual" realm. Do they produce an empirical evidence of this spiritual realm? No. Do they produce a coherent, fact-based theory of how this realm is composed? No. Do they ever explain how this supernatural realm gets to interact with the natural physical world, despite being ontologically opposites? No. And then, after all these failures in supporting the propositional statement being discussed, what can we really assert? First of all, that so far there's no evidence of a spiritual realm. Maybe if they used the scientific method they would find it. Meanwhile, there's plenty of evidence of the physical, material world.

Now you are contradicting yourself; you say that skepticism is about questioning things and that science is supposed to be open to being falsified, and yet you are rejecting the possibility of consciousness and supernatural phenomena just because it doesn't fit into the 'realistic' paradigm.

That's the Ad Ignorantiam fallacy, which I have also labeled above the believer's formula: "if I claim A to exist and it cannot be empirically proven false, then A exists". Anyone can come up with zillions of entities that cannot be empirically proven false (because no one can experience the universe to its limits), but that doesn't make any of them more real. They are just claims that, if want to be seriously considered, will take the burden of proof. And if they want to be regarded as objective, scientific facts, will prove their case with the proper theoretical framework and methods. Meanwhile, it is not the business of science to prove every wild claim as wrong. There's no burden of unproof.

Placebo effects are actually being given serious considerations in clinical research, which goes back to how prayer does have beneficial effects on people. Besides that, judging by your one-sentence response, it seems that you did not look at the studies which were included in that post.

Never said placebo effects are not important, they are used in medical research to test the active properties of a substance. If the ingredient does not produce an effect better than a placebo, then it is worthless. When prayer is administered to patients, it does no better than placebos, so its "active properties" are worthless. When prayer is invoked as counteraction to physical events (let's say, a storm), it is no better than pure luck.

I'm sorry I only took a glance at your link, but taking another longer read at the brain scan article, I reach the same conclusion. It just shows that when you get involved in an activity, cognitive processes are part of the experience. Nothing more. The same will happen when your team scores a goal. No empirical evidence, no data, about a spiritual, supernatural realm.

No, there has been scientific research into plasma physics and cosmology, with people like Kristian Birkeland and Hannes Alfven, and there was also research done by Anthony Peratt which shows resemblances in plasma interactions and prehistoric hieroglyphics.

Still, these plasma theories are all about a physical, natural world. Nothing to do with supernatural realms. The part where Peratt mixes them with archaeology, that does look like Von Daniken.

[Wyman]

Here is an argument for religion, since Wanderinglands is wandering out in the desert alone with no allies:

Knowledge of God is experienced as revelation. This is a private, immediate experience and its certainty is derived from the same well as 'qualia' or other 'immediate' experiences. So it is in a sense evidence (experience) based. However, it cannot be measured or shared, just like your personal consciousness cannot be experienced by someone else or quantified. So in a sense, your materialism, when based on personal observation, is on just as shaky ground as religion, epistemologically speaking. This is the road Hume traveled to arrive at his skepticism. And if someone experiences God - revelation - who are you to say that they did not have that experience?

Materialism is on firm ground pragmatically, but only as to the 'hard' sciences. Psychology and the social sciences, and economics, are not able to predict future events well at all. An argument could be made, therefore, that religion provides as firm a pragmatic foundation for how to act as modern science (psychology and related 'soft sciences').

Wittgenstein said that in psychology, method and concepts pass each other by. The soft sciences attempt to use scientific methodology, but obtain little in the way of results. In other words, peer reviewed articles (and other aspects of the method) are necessary, but not sufficient conditions for good, pragmatic thinking.

Religion, you are correct, provides nothing useful to the conversation of what there is in the world. But for personal happiness, political activities, dealings with other people - i.e. how to conduct oneself - your argument is flawed.

[Conde Lucanor]

This argument is the easiest one to debunk. I already said why a few posts back. If religion were a unified set of beliefs and practices a case could be made, but all religions stand one against each other. To believe in Cthulhu or Yahve, you must disbelief Allah and Osiris. The best argument against religion is religion itself: the rules of conduct are contradictory between different religions and even inside one religion, so contrary to your statement, they provide nothing useful from a non-relativistic point of view. For doing that, they would need a theory about what is real. And so they go preaching: "my god is real, yours is not". And there, in that theory of reality is where they fail miserably.

[Wyman]

This argument is the easiest one to debunk. I already said why a few posts back. If religion were a unified set of beliefs and practices a case could be made, but all religions stand one against each other. To believe in Cthulhu or Yahve, you must disbelief Allah and Osiris. The best argument against religion is religion itself: the rules of conduct are contradictory between different religions and even inside one religion, so contrary to your statement, they provide nothing useful from a non-relativistic point of view. For doing that, they would need a theory about what is real. And so they go preaching: "my god is real, yours is not". And there, in that theory of reality is where they fail miserably.

I was thinking about the nature of the straw man argument and thought that it is like a low-ball offer in a real estate transaction. It often reflects poorly on both sides of the transaction. First, it may show bad manners and a laziness on the one side who does not take time to properly evaluate the property. Second, it reflects poorly on the seller, who elicits such offers through bad presentation or a perceived defect in his/her character.

CL, I have never heard anyone claim that, taking all religions together as a whole, they produce a logically consistent set of beliefs. I think that Aquinas and the Scholastics may have set about on such a project in the Middle Ages as to Catholicism, but that is not at all what I was proposing.

I attempted to make a distinction between truth and utility. It is interesting to note that you seem to relate consistency with utility in the above post - that to produce something useful, they would need to be consistent and 'would need a theory about what is real." Those two notions are exactly what I am challenging.

First: Consistency

I read one of Stephen Hawkins books recently where he compared contemporary physics with a two dimensional map of the Earth. Such maps can accurately reflect some of the Earth, but become distorted as one moves out towards the edges. When this happens, a new map may be made, centering on a different area - i.e. with a different set of rules. These maps will overlap in some areas, but contradict one another in other areas. The test on which map to use is one of utility. Even in the very best science - physics - physicists do not insist on consistency. If quantum mechanics and general relativity (and other models) contradict each other in some areas, so be it, we'll use the one that gets the job done.

So I do not think that logical consistency is a necessary condition of religion or morality - i.e. inconsistency is not a reductio ad absurdum. Or at least, this is an assumption that requires further justification from you. Nietszche, for one, quite explicitly and effectively argues against it.

Second: Theories of Reality

The post is about skepticism, which brings to mind Descartes and Hume. Philosophy used to be about the search for truth with a capital 'T.' I would use the term 'certainty,' since now we talk in terms of degrees of truth or accuracy. If you asked most philosophers - take uwot or gingko or arising as examples, and they can of course correct me where I'm wrong - they would claim certainty, if at all, only as to some form of Descartes' cogito ergo sum. They would claim that they are certain that they see their hand in front of them, or that they are certain that they seem to see their hand in front of them. They may call their experience 'qualia' or 'phenomena' or 'consciousness.' But they would claim certainty as to nothing else.

Hume (and most undergraduate phil. students - I think Hume gets way too much credit, although he is the traditional torch bearer) showed the barrenness of this approach to obtaining certainty. As he, and thousands of undergrads, realized, this one certainty (cogito ergo sum) bears no fruit. It leads to no other certainties or useful information. Truth with a capital 'T' is now dead. As for logical positivism, that is another long story, with the same results.

The rest of my argument has two prongs - religion is on just as solid epistemological grounds as any other belief, as far as certainty goes. And two, religion, in some spheres of human life, may also be as useful as science.

Epistemology:

I venture to guess that you will think this a trivial matter, but at least try to have an open mind. Many individuals claim to have had a 'revelation' concerning God and/or an afterlife or a higher purpose in life. These experiences produce a certainty in them that is every bit as 'clear and distinct' and enlivened by the 'natural light' (Descartes' criteria for certainty) as 'cogito ergo sum.'
You may believe that these experiences are explained better in terms of delusions, dreams or hallucinations. But your explanation will be in terms of what it is better to believe - i.e. you cannot prove that they are false, with a capital 'F.' You will say that they might as well claim experiences of unicorns. So be it; they will say that they have different experiences upon which to rest their beliefs. You will go your way and they will go theirs(and the one or two people who claim to see unicorns, if history is a guide, will go to an appropriate institution), but you will not have proven that science rests on certainty or Truth or explains Reality - only that science is more useful in some areas of thought. Which gets us to:

Usefulness - pragmatism

Most will concede that physics, chemistry, biology - the hard sciences - far surpass religion in terms of useful descriptions of the world. However, many people are concerned with how to conduct their lives, how to achieve happiness, whether there is a higher purpose to life than pleasure seeking (for instance). The usefulness of science in these and related areas is highly debatable, it seems to me. If a group of people can base a system of beliefs upon their personal experiences of God or some spirituality (or that combined with the cogito, as Descartes proposed), then as to whether a particular (not all human religions, as your straw man argument proposed) religion can deliver better results than modern science - the proof is in the pudding. The test is: does it work? The test is very much not: Is it true, is it consistent, or does it provide a theory of reality?

[Conde Lucanor]

CL, I have never heard anyone claim that, taking all religions together as a whole, they produce a logically consistent set of beliefs. I think that Aquinas and the Scholastics may have set about on such a project in the Middle Ages as to Catholicism, but that is not at all what I was proposing.

Talking about straw man arguments...I never said you were proposing that religion was a unified set of beliefs, nor that they were logical consistent, nor I have ever said that anyone has claimed that. I stated a fact, a fact in which you and me can agree, that religions cannot conform an unified set of logical, consistent beliefs. Religion is a general category into which we subsume all the different particular religious cults and practices, most of which not only contradict each other, but exclude each other. You could have challenged this proposition, but I have seen that you chose not to. You even said that it would be a straw man argument if your position were represented as opposing this notion. So it adds more ground to my assumption that you accept this as a fact. Capito?

From that common base, I took off to challenge the logical inconsistency of your proposition that "religion provides as firm a pragmatic foundation for how to act as modern science (psychology and related 'soft sciences')" and something useful "for personal happiness, political activities, dealings with other people - i.e. how to conduct oneself...

You are talking here about practical knowledge as a base for moral action to counteract my argument about the effectivenes of science in obtaining practical knowledge, which accordingly produces effectiveness of action (the ability to predict and control the results, so that the world is transformed as desired). So you intend to say that religion is inherently prescriptive about moral conduct, while science is not. Religion being on "pragmatic foundations" I guess means for you that religion effectively leads to some actions. My point is, however, that effectively leading to some actions does not mean those actions effectively achieve the desired results. In other words, religion as a general category might be effectively prescriptive on moral issues, but ineffectively descriptive on those same issues, because of being ineffective on methodological issues of knowledge (it's a failed epistemology). Science, on the other hand, is quite effective on methodological issues of knowledge, in fact it is prescriptive about those issues.

But is it religion as a general category really effectively prescriptive on moral issues? It is not. Since doctrines dealing with moral subjects are different from religion to religion, since they are necessarily relativistic, religion as a whole does not stand on firm, objective, universal grounds. As a general category it does not guarantee a distinction between right and wrong. What I'm talking here is not about logical consistency, but about moral consistency. When choosing how to conduct yourself, you will have a myriad of doctrines to choose from, none of them any better than the other in terms of the actions, but also in terms of moral consequences, of their desired results (setting aside whether the actions are actually linked to the results). The desired effect might be (and often is) to counteract and discredit other religions and their rules of conduct. This lack of unity, this heterogeneous set of beliefs, rituals and moral codes is completely ineffective, as there is no definite set of moral rules to guide your actions.

Nevertheless, particular religions pontificate on moral issues, they are effectively prescriptive, as noted above. But in order to legitimize themselves as authorative sources of doctrine, they must claim the posession of universal truths, in other words, must claim to be effectively descriptive. Now here I do talk about logical consistency as it relates to actions linked to results. We all know religions do more than guide your actions, they sponsor worldviews, conceptions of what reality is made of, what are the causes of beings. All this becomes their framework for understanding and dealing with reality, a sort of universal pragmatics in which subjects make sense of their actions.

In this, religions obviously clash with science, since it also pretends to make sense of the world, finding the objective, universal truths, the necessary and sufficient conditions for things and causes. But as I explained above, science does have the method and tools to achieve a high degree of certainty, tools and methods that religion lacks of.

First: Consistency

I read one of Stephen Hawkins books recently where he compared contemporary physics with a two dimensional map of the Earth. Such maps can accurately reflect some of the Earth, but become distorted as one moves out towards the edges. When this happens, a new map may be made, centering on a different area - i.e. with a different set of rules. These maps will overlap in some areas, but contradict one another in other areas. The test on which map to use is one of utility. Even in the very best science - physics - physicists do not insist on consistency. If quantum mechanics and general relativity (and other models) contradict each other in some areas, so be it, we'll use the one that gets the job done.

So I do not think that logical consistency is a necessary condition of religion or morality - i.e. inconsistency is not a reductio ad absurdum. Or at least, this is an assumption that requires further justification from you. Nietszche, for one, quite explicitly and effectively argues against it.

What you are actually implying is that if science is inconsistent in its descriptive effectiveness, religion can be too and we are even. But you are missing the point that science does get prescriptive about the methods that will ensure descriptive effectiveness, even if this last one is not always attained completely. I previously stated that:

If there were presuppositions in a scientific, materialistic, natural view of reality, they would be completely different than presuppositions of common, plain "belief systems". What we could call scientific presuppositions (i.e. the universality and necessity of causal regularities) are substantiated, methodological and preliminary principles, ready to be dismissed as knowledge advances. Religious presuppositions are unsubstantiated, arbitrary, conclusive and dogmatic principles.

Second: Theories of Reality

The post is about skepticism, which brings to mind Descartes and Hume. Philosophy used to be about the search for truth with a capital 'T.' I would use the term 'certainty,' since now we talk in terms of degrees of truth or accuracy. If you asked most philosophers - take uwot or gingko or arising as examples, and they can of course correct me where I'm wrong - they would claim certainty, if at all, only as to some form of Descartes' cogito ergo sum. They would claim that they are certain that they see their hand in front of them, or that they are certain that they seem to see their hand in front of them. They may call their experience 'qualia' or 'phenomena' or 'consciousness.' But they would claim certainty as to nothing else.

Hume (and most undergraduate phil. students - I think Hume gets way too much credit, although he is the traditional torch bearer) showed the barrenness of this approach to obtaining certainty. As he, and thousands of undergrads, realized, this one certainty (cogito ergo sum) bears no fruit. It leads to no other certainties or useful information. Truth with a capital 'T' is now dead. As for logical positivism, that is another long story, with the same results.

There seems to be an universal trend in all defense of religion to resort to solipsism, for doing away with science, even if religion has to be flushed down the toilet, too. But if truth is not attainable, if it were dead, if there were no certainties, Hume and undergraduate students could not realize anything, as that realization would be a certainty, too. You could not assess whether logical consistency is necessary for religion and morality.

However, religion believers and philosophers do get in a playing field where they assert truths. They want the offside rule to be applied against the opposite team, but not against them. They get more than readily to assert the real connections behind constant conjunctions, the necessity and sufficiency of conditions of universality and causal regularities, a natural world, etc., all of which are necessary, a priori conditions, to make claims about a supernatural world. They don't doubt that god's actions have an effect on the natural world or that events in a supernatural realm have a logical consistency, where sense-data is reliable and empirical assesment can be made (you are supposed to sense and experience heaven, for example).

[Impenitent]

is faith in the belief of some truth a necessary connection?

-Imp

[Wyman]

Conde Lucanor:

When you say

The best argument against religion is religion itself: the rules of conduct are contradictory between different religions and even inside one religion, so contrary to your statement, they provide nothing useful from a non-relativistic point of view.

This sounds an awful lot like saying that logical consistency is a prerequisite of usefulness. And yet you seem to deny it in your latest post and accuse me of a gross misunderstanding on that point. At any rate, yes, I agree with your 'fact' that religious beliefs do not form a logically consistent whole.

From that common base, I took off to challenge the logical inconsistency of your proposition that "religion provides as firm a pragmatic foundation for how to act as modern science (psychology and related 'soft sciences')" and something useful "for personal happiness, political activities, dealings with other people - i.e. how to conduct oneself...

I can't find where you tried to do that, other than a flat claim that in order to find a firm foundation for how act, one needs a theory of reality. Is this supposed to be obvious? And I guess you mean a logically consistent theory of reality.

So you intend to say that religion is inherently prescriptive about moral conduct, while science is not. Religion being on "pragmatic foundations" I guess means for you that religion effectively leads to some actions. My point is, however, that effectively leading to some actions does not mean those actions effectively achieve the desired results. In other words, religion as a general category might be effectively prescriptive on moral issues, but ineffectively descriptive on those same issues, because of being ineffective on methodological issues of knowledge (it's a failed epistemology). Science, on the other hand, is quite effective on methodological issues of knowledge, in fact it is prescriptive about those issues.

I don't know what 'inherently prescriptive' means, so no, I didn't mean that. Yes, religion is a failed epistemology in describing the natural world. However, so is science when it comes to the social sciences.

I am saying that science is not effective in regards to how to act. Religion may be effective - not all religions. In both cases, I am speaking of results, not merely actions. The argument as to whether science or religion is more effective in this arena would require scientific studies, perhaps - suicide rates, wealth, family structures - whatever measures of happiness you choose. I wouldn't want to get into that argument with you, as it would just be a string of anecdotal evidence.

I know that science is prescriptive with regard to method - that's why I said previously that method itself is not a sufficient condition for knowledge - psychology fails for other reasons.

What I'm talking here is not about logical consistency, but about moral consistency. When choosing how to conduct yourself, you will have a myriad of doctrines to choose from, none of them any better than the other in terms of the actions, but also in terms of moral consequences, of their desired results

That's fair enough. You are rightly forcing me to choose a 'good' religion that has effective moral codes and to choose how I would define 'effective.' As I indicate above, I would use the scientific method - some sort of study - to determine effectiveness - not only as between social sciences and religion, but between religions.

In this, religions obviously clash with science, since it also pretends to make sense of the world, finding the objective, universal truths, the necessary and sufficient conditions for things and causes. But as I explained above, science does have the method and tools to achieve a high degree of certainty, tools and methods that religion lacks of.

I guess it comes down to how much faith you have in the social sciences. If you have faith that the hard sciences will someday subsume the soft sciences, then that is the day that science will effectively guide human actions. I believe they are fumbling around in the dark at present - method and concepts pass one another by as I said earlier.

I don't appeal to solipsism to throw everything down the toilet and I am not asking for the offsides rule to apply to one team only. I am saying that certainty, consistency, and Truth are not the touchstones of knowledge. Usefulness is - that's pragmatism. I used skepticism (the possibility of solipsism) to make that point. You may be surprised how many scientists, besides Hawking, are pragmatists. Some are even religious (you don't have to believe that 'god's actions have an effect on the natural world' to believe in God).

Where we differ most pointedly is in your supposition that the soft sciences differ only in degree from the hard sciences. This makes my stance as to the usefulness of religion (since it is false as to describing the world, it cannot be true as to anything else) seem trivial or just plain stupid. I think it may be a difference in kind, as hard science does not treat 'humans as wholes' as objects in its ontology. How can one expect an effective moral theory to arise out of prescriptions on how collections of atoms 'ought' to behave?

[Conde Lucanor]

This sounds an awful lot like saying that logical consistency is a prerequisite of usefulness.

If my short post didn't make clear what I meant, I did go through the job of clarifying my position in a longer post. So why do you need to go back to the first post?

And yet you seem to deny it in your latest post and accuse me of a gross misunderstanding on that point.

First, the only reference in my text to a gross misunderstanding from your part was stated with explicit detail:

Talking about straw man arguments...I never said you were proposing that religion was a unified set of beliefs, nor that they were logical consistent, nor I have ever said that anyone has claimed that.

So I have not accused you of anything you said I have accused you of.

Secondly, "logical consistency as a prerequisite of usefulness" is your wording, not mine, but instead of accusing you of a "gross misunderstanding" I went on to explain the type of consistency I was talking about and dealt with your concept of "usefulness" making the distinction between descriptive effectiveness (which could also be called explanatory effectiveness) and prescriptive effectiveness (which could also be called normative effectiveness).

From that common base, I took off to challenge the logical inconsistency of your proposition that "religion provides as firm a pragmatic foundation for how to act as modern science (psychology and related 'soft sciences')" and something useful "for personal happiness, political activities, dealings with other people - i.e. how to conduct oneself...

I can't find where you tried to do that, other than a flat claim that in order to find a firm foundation for how act, one needs a theory of reality. Is this supposed to be obvious? And I guess you mean a logically consistent theory of reality.

You had made an argument about "foundations for how to act and useful rules of conduct". To that I replied:

"the rules of conduct are contradictory between different religions and even inside one religion, so contrary to your statement, they provide nothing useful from a non-relativistic point of view.

That was my obvious intent to prove the logical inconsistency of your argument, by showing that moral relativism denies to religion a firm foundation. So I don't see why you said I didn't try as I said I did.

I don't know what 'inherently prescriptive' means, so no, I didn't mean that.

That doesn't make sense. If you don't know what "inherently prescriptive" means, you cannot say you are sure that you didn't mean it. You could say that only if you knew what "inherently prescriptive" meant, so that you could compare both meanings and realize they don't match.

Yes, religion is a failed epistemology in describing the natural world. However, so is science when it comes to the social sciences.

I have explained this other times. It's a flagrant mistake to confuse two different fields of study as one and the same epistemology (and its implied methodology). While the natural world responds to the regular, deterministic laws of physics, the social world does not, because of the simple fact that it involves human agency, which is not deterministic. It is ultimately grounded on physical laws, as all biological systems, but it is an open system that not only evolves according to natural mechanisms, but also evolves culturally under historical circumstances (material production, kinship, linguistic contexts, etc.). Still, social sciences have an explanatory power that religion lacks of, because it stands on the firm base of hard sciences. Social sciences will not work if they dismiss the facts obtained from biology, and biology will not work if it dismisses chemistry and other natural factors.

So, we can agree that our certainties about social issues are not as firm as those of natural issues, but its level of descriptive effectiveness cannot be even compared to that of religion, which lacks all I have explained before. Descriptive effectiveness in social science difers from that of natural sciences in that it is less predictive, it can only say what, why and how social phenomena is produced, as a basis for future human decisions, but it cannot predict to a high degree of certainty what decisions and actions will be taken and which social phenomena they will produce.

I am saying that science is not effective in regards to how to act.

It does not pretend so. It is effective in regards to how to gain knowledge of the facts of the world. Having knowledge of the facts of the world then can inform your decisions. I propose that a well informed decision is better than an ill-informed decision.

Religion may be effective - not all religions. In both cases, I am speaking of results, not merely actions.

Effectiveness of results includes Islamic State militants chopping the head of so called infidels, according to what their religious doctrine advocates. If that's the good of religion that you're defending here, its motivational power, so be it, I disagree on moral grounds, but I won't get into such discussion now. But if what you're defending is its effectiveness of good, moral, ethical results, you're already using an a priori understanding of rightfulness or wrongfulness, which you then apply to religion. In other words, you would have a normative base not grounded on religion. Something else will be telling you what ought to be and then you go to check if religion fulfills that purpose. If so, you will be destroying your own argument about the particular usefulness of religion.

[Wyman]

It's a flagrant mistake to confuse two different fields of study as one and the same epistemology (and its implied methodology). While the natural world responds to the regular, deterministic laws of physics, the social world does not, because of the simple fact that it involves human agency, which is not deterministic.

That's also one of the points I was trying to make. So we agree.

Still, social sciences have an explanatory power that religion lacks of, because it stands on the firm base of hard sciences. Social sciences will not work if they dismiss the facts obtained from biology, and biology will not work if it dismisses chemistry and other natural factors.

That's where I disagree. There is hard science, or approaching it, in some areas, but not in anything like ethical duties or obtaining happiness and/or meaning from life. I think it is empty.

It is effective in regards to how to gain knowledge of the facts of the world. Having knowledge of the facts of the world then can inform your decisions. I propose that a well informed decision is better than an ill-informed decision.

Not if the information obtained by science has nothing to do with the questions one is asking and the solutions one is seeking.

But if what you're defending is its effectiveness of good, moral, ethical results, you're already using an a priori understanding of rightfulness or wrongfulness, which you then apply to religion. In other words, you would have a normative base not grounded on religion. Something else will be telling you what ought to be and then you go to check if religion fulfills that purpose. If so, you will be destroying your own argument about the particular usefulness of religion.

Yes, there's the rub. The same goes for social science. I'm not so sure about 'a priori,' but it is certainly presupposed. I would say that your faith in social science is wishful thinking based upon the natural analogy one draws between it and the hard sciences and your habit of still maintaining that the hard sciences are close to the Truth and Reality, rather than useful.

What I'm proposing is less than you think, since you think that I am religious or am apologizing for all religions and religious people (such as Muslims chopping off heads). I'm not. I am carving out a rational basis for those who believe in God to draw from that belief, along with long religious traditions and customs, to create or adopt an effective moral code. It is based on their 'truth' that God exists and that certain things follow from that truth, such as that there is a higher purpose in life. And it draws on the collective wisdom of others within their culture and religion who have crafted moral codes over the centuries. Although relying on such collective wisdom is not proper scientific method, as I've said, I think scientific method is empty in this area. Drawing from the knowledge of people one trusts and admires, such as Buddha or Jesus or Confucius (not to mention older and wiser contemporaries), is a valid and effective method, I think.

So it do put it on par, epistemologically and pragmatically, with science. I like to challenge the assumptions of secular humanists just like you like to challenge the assumptions of religious advocates. Again, such assumptions include the false analogy between hard science and soft science based on similarity of methods and the continued belief that hard science is progressing towards a description of Reality (or Truth).

[Conde Lucanor]

That's where I disagree. There is hard science, or approaching it, in some areas, but not in anything like ethical duties or obtaining happiness and/or meaning from life. I think it is empty.

You are bringing back the argument that religion is better than science in its effectiveness to drive to actions related to human wellbeing. But as I said before, there are two types of efectiveness at stake here:

1) Moving you to action: being compelled to do X and Y to find happiness, meaning from life, etc.
2) Getting the job done: your actions (X and Y) actually leading you to happiness, meaning from life, etc.

In the first case, it's obvious that religion motivates people to act in a certain way. But there's no point in arguing that it is more effective than modern science in doing so, because it is not even something that science tries to do, it is not science's business. It would be like saying that Madonna is less effective than the Pope in carrying people to mass. Well, sure, but what will be the point? My guess is that is only to offer a false dichotomy between an unenunciated scientific morality (setting aside its internal deontology) and a religious morality. The real dichotomy to study will be between a secular morality and a religious morality.

And also, let's be reminded that religion's motivational power for moving people to action includes Islamic State militants chopping heads, or Joshua slaying all the Canaanite population, or European conquerors passing the sword through millions of indian natives, or thousands of men and women burned alive at the stake for heresy and witchcraft, or stoning women to death for infidelity, or hanging them for blasphemy. All this for the purpose of happiness and the meaning of life embedded in religious doctrines.

Is religion effective in motivating people? I don't doubt it. Just last week a Christian couple in Pakistan was beaten and burned alive by their neighbours for blasphemy against the Quran. There we see the motivational power of religion.

Now that leads us into the second criteria (getting the job done). Is religion actually leading to happiness in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan? Is it getting the job done in Detroit or Dublin? Oddly enough, you said that knowing that:

"would require scientific studies, perhaps - suicide rates, wealth, family structures - whatever measures of happiness you choose."

So by your own words, you're admitting that science is required for measuring religion's moral effectiveness. You will not know it from religion, but from science. Thus, a distinction between a good or failed epistemology becomes crucial. And now my argument, stated several times in this thread, comes in handy:

..."if we believe that truth-seeking is essential to moral systems as guidance for our actions, we are compelled to use the most powerful instruments of knowledge that can yield a high degree of certainty about the mechanisms of reality. So far, that is only achievable through rational, methodological sciences, which seek for proof and constant revision of their findings. Religion, no matter how good its intentions might be, cannot achieve that, it actually opposes such a methodological approach to reality."

In this, obviously, we disagree, since you have stated that a succesful or failed epistemology is not crucial for informing moral actions:

...The test is: does it work? The test is very much not: Is it true, is it consistent, or does it provide a theory of reality?

...I do not think that logical consistency is a necessary condition of religion or morality

It is effective in regards to how to gain knowledge of the facts of the world. Having knowledge of the facts of the world then can inform your decisions. I propose that a well informed decision is better than an ill-informed decision.

Not if the information obtained by science has nothing to do with the questions one is asking and the solutions one is seeking.

How about the question whether religion is actually leading to happiness. How would you know a non-religious approach to moral duties is any better or worst than a religious approach in that sense? You said it would require scientific studies to know. So, at best, lacking any scientific data, all you could venture to say is that a secular morality is not necessarily better than a religious one.

I would say that your faith in social science is wishful thinking based upon the natural analogy one draws between it and the hard sciences and your habit of still maintaining that the hard sciences are close to the Truth and Reality, rather than useful.

No, I didn't say natural sciences and social sciences were analogous epistemologically or methodologically. I explicitly stated they were different, but that social sciences were closely dependent of the facts of hard sciences. The facts of hard science are not my particular habit to defend, because of their objectiveness: modern science has grasped a method that ensures a high level of certainty through independently verified data. I can be out of the picture, science still will hold its truths.

Drawing from the knowledge of people one trusts and admires, such as Buddha or Jesus or Confucius (not to mention older and wiser contemporaries), is a valid and effective method, I think.

Knowledge? From what you have accepted as a failed epistemology? From what you have accepted does not need to be logical consistent? From what you have accepted does not have the tools to measure its effectiveness? It seems you think we can draw knowledge, descriptive effectiveness, from nonsense. Interesting to know that at least about one of them, Jesus, you cannot draw a definite, universal knowledge of what he supposedly preached. You just have to look at the myriad of Christian denominations to realize they clash with each other on several issues about Jesus mandates. Don't you think explanatory effectiveness is crucial for deciding which moral action is more appropriate in this case?

And then again, why Buddha, Jesus or Confucious? Why cherry-picking? Why not Prophet Muhammad or Joshua in his genocidal rampage? Why not the Muslim clerics advocating for enslaving women or the Christian bishops defending the church's system to deal with pedophile priests? And why not Carl Sagan, Salman Rushdie, Paul Kurtz, all of them known atheists? What is the method that allows you to distinguish one from the other as a more valid approach to actions?

On the other hand, I have not proposed modern science as the source of moral codes, that's not its business. Science is instrumental, not an end for itself. What I propose is the philosophy of secular humanism (which you can deem as a religion, if you like). It's a philosophy underpinned by our human potential to gain facts about the world as a reliable source for strategic thought on social issues and measuring the effectiveness of our actions.

[Wyman]

Crap, I just spent a long time writing a long response and then lost it. Have to reply tomorrow.

[Wyman]

But there's no point in arguing that it is more effective than modern science in doing so, because it is not even something that science tries to do, it is not science's business.

I accept that. I don't like psychology or other pseudoscientific enterprises (usually for profit) pretending to be/cloaking themselves in science, for the same reason you don't like religion's pretensions towards explaining the universe. I realize that you yourself do not advocate for psuedoscience.

No, I didn't say natural sciences and social sciences were analogous epistemologically or methodologically. I explicitly stated they were different, but that social sciences were closely dependent of the facts of hard sciences.

It's that second sentence that makes me doubt that you completely buy in to the first sentence or the previous quote. But I won't argue it further.

The crux of the matter is my seemingly contradictory statement:

Oddly enough, you said that knowing that:

"would require scientific studies, perhaps - suicide rates, wealth, family structures - whatever measures of happiness you choose."

So by your own words, you're admitting that science is required for measuring religion's moral effectiveness. You will not know it from religion, but from science. Thus, a distinction between a good or failed epistemology becomes crucial. And now my argument, stated several times in this thread, comes in handy:

From which you conclude:

You said it would require scientific studies to know. So, at best, lacking any scientific data, all you could venture to say is that a secular morality is not necessarily better than a religious one.

I will grant you that I have only shown (proven) that much, in the linguistic/conceptual scheme of scientific, propositional knowledge (I address this below). And I would argue against a secular humanist who oversteps this equity between moralities, just as I would argue with a religious person if they did the same. I may have overstepped it myself, being argumentative - although I did say that I did not want to get into an anecdotal tit for tat. I generally give some slack to religion and see the problem as more of a general problem of humans, placing less blame than you on religion as a cause of those problems. I see religion's relation to atrocities as more correlative and less as a causal relationship, although I admit exceptions. The French revolutionaries chopped off a good amount of heads in the name of 'liberte, egalite, et fraternite' but I don't believe that those ideas 'caused' the atrocities. Killing in the name of religion seems more of a Western thing to me, because religion has been involved in the power structures. The Mongol hordes and the Chinese dynasties did an awful lot of killing for other reasons - probably power. I would agree with you less when it comes to atrocities perpetrated by power structures, such as the Catholic Church, or religious governments - I think the power structures would have killed with or without religion. I would agree with you on the more 'grassroots' atrocities, such as pogroms in Europe and Russia.

But let me explain the apparent contradiction in my saying that I would judge success of moralities based on a 'study.'

Take an opera singer or a basketball player. We could ask who is the best at what they do. We could poll audiences. We could poll other professional opera singers or athletes. We could poll those who claim some expertise in the area, such as critics. Depending on the results of these polls, we may agree on certain things regarding opera singers and athletes. Or not, as we may dispute the phrasing of questions, relevance of the participants, etc.. We can quantify some things regarding the player or singer's expertise - points scored, rebounds, or vocal range, tone. But much in the analysis will remain subjective.
But to say that we may resort to such methods does not go to show that basketball players or opera singers do not have knowledge. This knowledge they have may not be amenable to explaining the universe or the law of gravity, but they have knowledge nonetheless.

Such knowledge is obtained through training, habit, talent, emulation, participation. It is difficult to quantify, but attempts at quantification can be helpful and relevant in some situations - such as a debate on 'who's the best' - although I don't see it being conclusive. The knowledge such a 'study' would provide, if it is successful, is of a completely different kind than knowledge of the activity itself.

[Arising_uk]

Crap, I just spent a long time writing a long response and then lost it. Have to reply tomorrow.

If this was due to being timed out from the forum then next time before re-logging in try hitting the back-buttons on your browser and copying the post before re-logging in, then you can just paste it back in.

[Conde Lucanor]

I accept that. I don't like psychology or other pseudoscientific enterprises (usually for profit) pretending to be/cloaking themselves in science, for the same reason you don't like religion's pretensions towards explaining the universe. I realize that you yourself do not advocate for psuedoscience.

It has never crossed my mind to include psychology among pseudosciences, in the same category as homeopathy, parapsychology, ufology, criptozoology, etc. Granted that psychology is not what you call a "hard science" and that there are some elements in its epistemology which are debatable, just as much as there are in the epistemology of some sociological schools. But pseudosciences do not even reach that level of scientific legitimacy and utility, it's complete worthless junk.

I will grant you that I have only shown (proven) that much, in the linguistic/conceptual scheme of scientific, propositional knowledge (I address this below). And I would argue against a secular humanist who oversteps this equity between moralities, just as I would argue with a religious person if they did the same. I may have overstepped it myself, being argumentative - although I did say that I did not want to get into an anecdotal tit for tat. I generally give some slack to religion and see the problem as more of a general problem of humans, placing less blame than you on religion as a cause of those problems. I see religion's relation to atrocities as more correlative and less as a causal relationship, although I admit exceptions.

I have argued this before and I never placed the blame on religion as a direct cause of the problems of mankind or the only cause for its atrocities, although I do put the blame on the fact of being instrumental. Certainly, what is not part of the solution becomes part of the problem and the delusions of religion are an obstacle, but behind its illusory methods for dealing with life's issues, there are real problems created by social circumstances. I have quoted Marx several times from that famous passage when he talks about religion as the "inverted consciousness of the world", the expression of real suffering.

The French revolutionaries chopped off a good amount of heads in the name of 'liberte, egalite, et fraternite' but I don't believe that those ideas 'caused' the atrocities. Killing in the name of religion seems more of a Western thing to me, because religion has been involved in the power structures. The Mongol hordes and the Chinese dynasties did an awful lot of killing for other reasons - probably power. I would agree with you less when it comes to atrocities perpetrated by power structures, such as the Catholic Church, or religious governments - I think the power structures would have killed with or without religion. I would agree with you on the more 'grassroots' atrocities, such as pogroms in Europe and Russia.

I think we can agree on that. I'm pretty sure that the tribes of Israel didn't require reading the bible passages where god sponsors the genocidal career of Joshua, to sense genocide as acceptable. There were going to be genocides anyway, because that's how mankind has been. Religion is just another way of justifiying it.

But let me explain the apparent contradiction in my saying that I would judge success of moralities based on a 'study.'

Take an opera singer or a basketball player. We could ask who is the best at what they do. We could poll audiences. We could poll other professional opera singers or athletes. We could poll those who claim some expertise in the area, such as critics. Depending on the results of these polls, we may agree on certain things regarding opera singers and athletes. Or not, as we may dispute the phrasing of questions, relevance of the participants, etc.. We can quantify some things regarding the player or singer's expertise - points scored, rebounds, or vocal range, tone. But much in the analysis will remain subjective.

It's very hard to follow you here. I'm not sure what's your point and how it relates to our discussion on the difference between what is and what ought to be in terms of knowledge or moral behavior. But anyway, if we're judging competence for performance on any particular field, it is not subjective, as long as you have defined the objective criteria of performance, which happens all the time. Athletes and some type of artists make a living out of this performance criteria. By the way, I don't think surveys and statistics are the way to define objective performance criteria.

But to say that we may resort to such methods does not go to show that basketball players or opera singers do not have knowledge. This knowledge they have may not be amenable to explaining the universe or the law of gravity, but they have knowledge nonetheless.

Such knowledge is obtained through training, habit, talent, emulation, participation. It is difficult to quantify, but attempts at quantification can be helpful and relevant in some situations - such as a debate on 'who's the best' - although I don't see it being conclusive. The knowledge such a 'study' would provide, if it is successful, is of a completely different kind than knowledge of the activity itself.

No one will deny that at a basic empirical level of first-hand observations and practice, some decent knowledge is attained, with the help of common sense. But that's the most superficial level of knowledge, which will show its severe limitations when facing more complex world structures and relations between phenomena. Also, having some skills does not guarantee full comprehension of the subjects one is skilful at. A theory, a more systematized conceptual approach is required for reaching a higher degree of knowledge. That's when philosophy got into business. And then science completely revolutionized knowledge, with philosophy trying to keep its pace.