Parmenidean One

[drwho]

Parmenides came up with an argument to prove that what exists is: one, unchanging and indestructible. His argument is as follows:

There are two basic options with regard to objects of thought:

1. It is
2. It is not

He contends that what is not is that which does not exist. We can't think about what truly does not exist since there is nothing to think about. Trying to think about what does not exist is a hopeless path of inquiry.

We can only think about , "What is" and trying to think about "what is not" is unthinkable.

"What is" is One

Suppose A is Being. Now, try something of something different from Being. The only thing different from Being is Not-Being which is nothing at all, therefore what exists is One.

"What is" cannot change

For Being to change, it must become Non-Being, but non-being is unthinkable, so change too is unthinkable. Change requires non-being to exist, but non-being cannot exist therefore there is no change.

[Impenitent]

You can't step in the same river twice - Heraclitus

-Imp

[uwot]

Parmenides came up with an argument to prove that what exists is: one, unchanging and indestructible.

I think Parmenides thought of 'Being' in a material sense: that it is a plenum. His fundamental point was that being is. It seems trivial, but it is the only thing that cannot be challenged by anyone but an idiot. Try it:
There is nothing.
Says who?
Oh yeah.
You can ascribe qualities to things that exist, you cannot however do the same for things that don't exist. Given that something exists, if nothing isn't part of it, where can it be? If it is beyond something, then it is the thing that something is in and isn't nothing. If it is is in something, then it has borders and shape and can be described, hence isn't nothing. Parmenides argued that things can't change, because in order to do so, something has to move into a space occupied by nothing, but since nothing doesn't exist, there is nowhere for something to move into, which is more or less the Pauli exclusion principle.
Democritus (or Leucippus) came up with the argument that reality is made up of matter and void. Atoms (atomos-uncuttable) swirled around in nothingness, hooked up together and made the world as we see it. These days, few people think there is any such thing as nothing, even nothing is a quantum foam or field or 'branes' or whatnot that can go bonkers at any moment for no good reason.
Parmenides was right, nothing doesn't exist, but nothing he said consequently follows.

[jamest]

Parmenides came up with an argument to prove that what exists is: one, unchanging and indestructible. His argument is as follows:

There are two basic options with regard to objects of thought:

1. It is
2. It is not

He contends that what is not is that which does not exist. We can't think about what truly does not exist since there is nothing to think about. Trying to think about what does not exist is a hopeless path of inquiry.

We can only think about , "What is" and trying to think about "what is not" is unthinkable.

I agree with that. I would also add that this proves that existence is boundless (not finite), because 'nothing' is incapable of bounding something.

"What is" is One

Suppose A is Being. Now, try something of something different from Being. The only thing different from Being is Not-Being which is nothing at all, therefore what exists is One.

I'm not sure that this follows. We know that A is Being, but nothing here addresses the possibility of distinct kinds of being. Why can't B exist but not be the same as A? Does Parmenides address this?

"What is" cannot change

For Being to change, it must become Non-Being,

Why? And are we discussing changes in substance or properties?

but non-being is unthinkable, so change too is unthinkable. Change requires non-being to exist, but non-being cannot exist therefore there is no change.

Well, there are evidently changes of sorts. Changes in what I perceive, how I feel, my attitudes, etc.. So perhaps Parmenides has substance on his mind when he talks about change being impossible. I could agree with that, but do not find his reasoning here to be compelling.

[drwho]

I'm not sure that this follows. We know that A is Being, but nothing here addresses the possibility of distinct kinds of being. Why can't B exist but not be the same as A? Does Parmenides address this?

Here's one way to put the issue:

Suppose there are two beings: A and B

1) A is being
2) B is not A
3) Therefore, B is not being (B is nothing at all)

[jamest]

I'm not sure that this follows. We know that A is Being, but nothing here addresses the possibility of distinct kinds of being. Why can't B exist but not be the same as A? Does Parmenides address this?

Here's one way to put the issue:

Suppose there are two beings: A and B

1) A is being
2) B is not A
3) Therefore, B is not being (B is nothing at all)

I don't think that 3 necessarily follows, as one could state [instead]:

3) Therefore, B is not a being like A (it's a distinct kind of being) (therefore, not necessarily nothing).

Again, I don't think he addresses the possibility of distinct kinds of being*. This allows him to assume that existence is singular (A) in order to prove that existence is singular (as not-A = nothing). Circular reasoning, I think.

* Which is not to say that distinct kinds of being are possible. Ultimately, I think one would have to argue for substance dualism/multiplicity in order to defend the notion, and Descartes came a cropper with that one. Ultimately I do like Parmenides conclusions, but the way he reaches them seems suspect to me.

What surprises me, doc, is that a materialist such as yourself would like his conclusions (or argument). Can Parmenides' argument be reconciled with physicalism?

[drwho]

I'm not sure that this follows. We know that A is Being, but nothing here addresses the possibility of distinct kinds of being. Why can't B exist but not be the same as A? Does Parmenides address this?

Here's one way to put the issue:

Suppose there are two beings: A and B

1) A is being
2) B is not A
3) Therefore, B is not being (B is nothing at all)

I don't think that 3 necessarily follows, as one could state [instead]:

3) Therefore, B is not a being like A (it's a distinct kind of being) (therefore, not necessarily nothing).

Again, I don't think he addresses the possibility of distinct kinds of being*. This allows him to assume that existence is singular (A) in order to prove that existence is singular (as not-A = nothing). Circular reasoning, I think.

* Which is not to say that distinct kinds of being are possible. Ultimately, I think one would have to argue for substance dualism/multiplicity in order to defend the notion, and Descartes came a cropper with that one. Ultimately I do like Parmenides conclusions, but the way he reaches them seems suspect to me.

What surprises me, doc, is that a materialist such as yourself would like his conclusions (or argument). Can Parmenides' argument be reconciled with physicalism?

I find Parmenides fascinating whether his conclusions can be reconciled with materialism or not. To address your point:

"3) Therefore, B is not a being like A (it's a distinct kind of being) (therefore, not necessarily nothing)."

Parmenides is subjecting the notion of being (existence) to rigorous logical analysis. Consider what it means to 'not-exist'.


What does not exist cannot have any properties.
What does not exist cannot have any substance.
What does not exist cannot have any qualities.
What does not exist cannot have any relation to existence.

Given this analysis, 'what does not exist' cannot be an object of thought. Non-existence is unknowable and cannot be uttered or indicated.

What does not exist is nothing at all. And 'nothing' cannot ever 'be'. Likewise being cannot be thought as 'nothing' since 'nothing is unthinkable.

For Parmenides there cannot be different 'kinds' being. Either it is or it is not and the two cannot related to each other in any way at all (since there are not two things but one). The mistake comes from thinking of 'non-being' as 'something'