Wyman wrote:Eureka! We agree(as to what I am claiming). Except that:
you said it had to be grounded on religion.
I didn't say ethics
had to be grounded on religion. I'm open to any grounds - even opiates if effective, or a secular religion.
So, we must conclude that you support a Machiavellian political ethics, where "the ends justifies the means". It doesn't matter if it's an atheist regime, a theocracy, a world ruled by machines and agents Smiths, or anything, as long as it ensures political stability. Ok, that's your view and I cannot agree with it. I would not support an "atheist regime", more than a "theist regime", if by that we understand state power, deceitful practices, mass manipulation, etc. I advocate for a secular state, which just means remaining neutral about religion and based on a set of universal principles of mankind (more or less covered in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights). That is perfectly consistent with advocacy for a democratic regime, where the right of all groups to promote their beliefs privately, whether they are religious or non-religious, are guaranteed. I personally prefer an atheist society and feel I have the right to promote atheism in civil society, but my right does not allow me to block other people's right to promote religion. It should work the other way around, too: they cannot block my right to promote atheism. All of this, as long as the fundamental, secular, universal principles of human rights, are respected and guaranteed by the state.
Wyman wrote:And I added that no such religion, secular or otherwise, could be grounded in reason, which I basically equate with science. You said that reason consists of much more than just science, so the fact that science is not normative does not mean that ethics (as normative) cannot be grounded in reason.
Let's clarify some terms first, because you seem to be contrasting them as if they worked at the same level. Reason is a human faculty, which resides in human brains. Not something floating up in the air, an institution or a cultural practice. Along with other faculties, like language, a psyche adapted to group behavior, and upright walking, reason is essential to the species, an innate feature of humans. Without it, it wouldn't be called human species. Science, as well as philosophy and religion, are human cultural practices or institutions, they are a historical epiphenomenon of those innate features, but they are not essential to the species to survive as species. If they are essential, they're only to civilization.
Science develops the tools of reasoning to explain the universe with a good degree of certainty, seeking objective thruths, bringing to the surface complex and usually unperceivable relations behind the objects it studies. Religion, on the other hand, while still grounded on basic rationalizations of perceived phenomena, does not care about methodical search and discovery of objective truths, nor developing the tools of reasoning. It conforms with mythical, unsubstantiated claims, based on superficial observations and naive hypothesis, often related to supernatural forces from fictional worlds. It is plain superstition. And when confronted with the truths of science, religion usually dismisses that which makes human reasoning a powerful tool for discovering truth, in order to keep its dogmas and fantasies safe from scrutiny. Religion is the greatest friend of naive, infant-like reasoning and the biggest enemy of truthful, reliable, complex type of knowledge, as is found in science. Science may not be normative, but the development of our human potential, which encompasses the growth of our understanding and transforming the world for the good of this and future generations, is an ethical goal that cannot be achieved without the help of science. Religion works in the opposite direction.
Wyman wrote:However, I do not buy the way you get around the impossibility of a non-faith based ethics grounded in reason:
The point is that we do have compulsory bodily functions, instinctive mechanisms and emotions, which are part of our mental life and experiences within the natural and social environment. It has been well established that these other drivers are present in people's actions, especially the mechanisms of emotions. So there's no need to exclude any of these factors when conceiving ethics from a purely secular perspective.
There is a difference between explaining human behavior and justifying it. I would of course accept scientific explanations of human behavior as explaining
why we behave as we do. Are you claiming that these explanations somehow relate to how we
ought to behave - i.e. provide a basis for justifying human behavior?
Although behavior and action can be treated as synonyms, a valid distinction can be made in order to understand the difference between what is, and what ought to be. This distinction has to do with what I already explained above, about human's innate features, and what is put on practice in a cultural, historical context. Put in the simplest terms, behavior can be understood as those patterns directly derived from the innate features of the species. All animals, as member of a species, display a particular behavior. And so, a tiger today is the same as was a tiger a thousand years ago. Humans, however, because of their particular innate features (developed neocortex, language, etc.), have been able to invent culture. Through culture, humans have reinvented themselves, they have created a second, "artificial" nature, being the history of mankind actually the history of the dialectical relation between man and nature. The free, autonomous behavior of human beings, then becomes action. Ethics takes place in that cultural context, in which natural drives are part of the equation, but unlike the instinctive features of a tiger, they can be overriden to some extent. That's why a tiger's behavior can only be explained, no need to be justified, unlike a person's actions, which already imply a norm and a justification according to that norm.
Wyman wrote:Blaggart pointed out above that certain areas of the brain are responsible for religious fervor. This explains, to an extent, why some people have such feelings. It is not a justification for holding religious beliefs.
I'm sure we make normative decisions based (at least in part) on deeply seated mechanisms in our brain. Whether or not these decisions are correct cannot be determined by those same mechanisms, can they?
I think the existence of those brain areas "responsible for religious fervor" are questionable, the same way as many other modularized mechanisms proposed by Evolutionary Psychology. There are no distinctive, specialized "religious feelings", nor "patriotic feelings", and so on. The deep neurological traits of emotions and affective processes appear to be general-purpose brain systems, which are then experienced in cultural contexts, organized in normative systems, and labeled as "religious fervor, patriotism, humanism, etc." Science may allow us to understand which are the deeply seated mechanisms in our brain that explain patriotism or lack of patriotism, but it cannot be derived from it whether patriotism or lack of it are good or bad. I actually think that in our current cultural, political context, patriotism is bad and lack of it, good, despite the fact that both feelings are rooted in deep psychological mechanisms.