Ginkgo wrote:Sorry, I'll give it another go. I'll try to be more specific.
"Experience is a unique subjective quality, or "What it is like to be human? But Nagel asked, "What is it like to be a bat?"
Yes, but it can be applied to any living organism. By Nagel asking "What is it like to be a bat?" Nagel is trying to show that physicalism of the Dennett type doesn't do justice to our mental lives. In other words, it is an attempt on the part of Nagel to show that physicalism is an inadequate explanation when it comes to consciousness.
By asking his question Nagel is not saying your dog is not conscious. Obviously dogs are not conscious in the same way humans are. For Nagel consciousness exists if there is something that it is like to be that organism. Is there something that it is like to be Fido? If the answer is yes, then he is conscious.
"Consciousness is our thought, logic, reason and memory, but it is also our emotions, feelings, desires, dreams, sensitivity, knowledge awareness and instincts. If it is not part of out consciousness, then what is it?"
Yes they are all part of our consciousness. This is why it is useful to divide some things into the hard category and others into the easy category.
The difference here is that Dennett would say they all belong to the easy problem. The brain is consciousness. Everything you have listed is just matter in motion. It is the working of the chemicals and neurons in the brain that produces our emotions, feelings, as well as the rational aspect of our lives.
Someone like Chalmers would disagree and say, "Yes there are some aspects of consciousness that can be explained in terms of the working of the brain. A computer can do some of the things you have listed. For example, you don't have to be human to have a memory. It can be explained as matter in motion. However, the important difference for Chalmers is that this doesn't explain the feelings and emotions of an individual. A computer doesn't know what it is like to be a computer (even though it has a memory), but a human knows what it is like to be sad and upset.
Dennett would probably want to get in the last word and say, that if we can build a computer complicated enough it will exhibit all of the emotional traits of a human.
What I am suggesting is that you would need to divide your list into hard problems of consciousness and easy problems of consciousness. This would give you a working definition.
Ginkgo
After perusing the thoughtful conversation between Gee and Ginkgo, I feel compelled to step in at this jpoint, perhaps adding another G to the discussion.
Gee's query about a pure mind is exactly where I began my integration of physics and philosophy, just about 53 years ago. I found the notion in an "If" magazine science fiction short story. It connected with my Catholic background and I immediately applied it to God. A physics student at the time, I could not help but find ways to integrate the idea with physics. The entire process has taken about a half-century, but some of my conclusions may interest the two of you.
Condensing various ideas from your conversation and integrating them with my own opinions, I propose this:
There is an entity that might be described as a "pure mind." Quite a lot of them, actually. They were precipitated from a collision of spaces with opposite physical properties, and in a sense have always existed. (The theory behind this simple statement is too detailed to present here, but is in print.)
Gee shows insights into the nature of reality that run deeper than those of most modern physicists, who have pulled loose from their roots. He sees reality as a relationship between causes and effects. So while the "pure mind" concept is esthetically attractive, he wonders what it plays off of. (Yep, that is lousy English. My bad and it's late.)
Parts of my hypotheses can be expressed in terms of this idea. Suppose that "pure mind" came into being (we can worry about how, later), kind of like our impure (i.e. integrated with a brain/body system) minds came into being-- completely unconscious and no more self-aware that a baby rodent. Our core minds (the "pure" mind) are connected to brain-body systems that try their damnedest to trick us into becoming genuinely conscious. Sometimes we listen up. You guys seem to have done so, or are taking honest pokes at the process.
After the body's demise, we get to experience consciousness as a pure mind, divorced from body for awhile. That's another story.
To integrate the notion of a pure mind into any story about the Beginnings of things, it is necessary to find something with which such a mind can interact. Therefore it is necessary to propose the existence of a separate entity or substance with which such a mind might interact. The First Law of Thermodynamics implies that energy (whatever that turns out to be) cannot be created or destroyed.
So, what if "pure mind" had an innate property that violated the 2nd Law of Thermodynamics? It could construct a universe from raw, unstructured energy. Perhaps it did?
