The search for pleasure is the search for god

[thedoc]

One could replace "aim" by "pleasure" in this context, because pleasure is something everybody aims at.
Deontology: The means justifies the pleasure.
Consequentialism: The pleasure justifies the means.

The other option is to replace "means" by pleasure:
Deontology: The pleasure justifies the aim.
Consequentialism: The aim justifies the pleasure.
.

If I might offer an example that might illustrate some of these principles.
In playing the piano there are a few pieces that I can play competently and do so for my own pleasure. The require nothing more than my sitting down and playing them.
There are other pieces that I like and want to play but lack the ability to do so. They will require time and effort to practice and become proficient in their performance. The frustrating thing is that some of them are pieces that I had played well 40 years ago, but that time without a piano to play on regularly means that I have lost the ability to do so.
In these cases I can play a piece that I know for the immediate pleasure of doing so. But the pieces that I cannot now play will require some time and effort to become proficient and that pleasure will come later.
(I had played while I was in HS and for awhile after, but did not have a piano in the house since. 3 Years ago in November we volunteered to "store" a Sohmer Model 57 for our church and I decided I wanted a piano of my own when the Sohmer was taken away. So I found a Baldwin model R the next summer and for almost 2 years had 2 grand pianos, a 5' 7" and a 5' 8", in my living room.) I finally had the opportunity to relearn how to play.

[duszek]

A. I play a piece of music and the pleasure is immediate.

B. I try to learn to play a piece of music hoping for pleasure and reward in the future.

Two questions:

1. Is the pleasure a means or is it an aim ?

Pleasure seems to be an aim both in A. and in B.
In B. for sure, because it cannot be the means.
In A. it could be an immediate aim. Or it could be a means to achieve some other aim (entertaining and calming crying babies or impatient patients).

2. What justifies what ?

[thedoc]

A. I play a piece of music and the pleasure is immediate.

B. I try to learn to play a piece of music hoping for pleasure and reward in the future.

Two questions:

1. Is the pleasure a means or is it an aim ?

Pleasure seems to be an aim both in A. and in B.
In B. for sure, because it cannot be the means.
In A. it could be an immediate aim. Or it could be a means to achieve some other aim (entertaining and calming crying babies or impatient patients).

2. What justifies what ?

I agree with your assessment but would add that in A. the playing can be both the means and the aim. In that simply the act of successfully playing a piece brings the pleasure in addition to hearing the music. Most of the time I play when I am home alone so entertainment, (except my own) or any other aim is not a factor. If listening to the music were the only goal, that could be achieved by finding it on 'YouTube' or purchasing the music on a disc. Indeed there is only a limited selection of music that I can ever hope to play, if it is the music that I wish to listen to, and there is much that is impossible for me to reproduce. For example I enjoy listening to Tchaikovsky's Violin Concerto, but I don't play the violin, nor do I have a symphony orchestra in my living room. So my choices are online or a disc.

One other point, for some, myself included, the striving is the pleasure and the aim, but in B. it could also be the means. In that just the striving to accomplish some goal is a pleasure in itself.

[Immanuel Can]

Nope.

Pleasure is always an "end." It isn't a basis of duty. No deontologist thinks it is. They think "duty" is a reflection of the universal "moral law."

You don't have to believe them, of course; but it's only fair to understand them on the terms by which they understand themselves.

[thedoc]

No.

I don't practice because I have some 'duty' to practice and improve. I do it because I want to, and it gives me pleasure to do so. The pleasure is in the striving not in the end. even if the end brings great pleasure, there is much to be had in the process.

In college there was a professor of ceramics who taught his students to raise a pot till it collapsed so that they would learn the limits of the material. The pleasure was in the learning, even if that learning was to learn to fail.

Can, it seems that there are some life experiences that you lack.

[Immanuel Can]

No, no, no...

I'm not telling you about my experiences or even my preferences. I'm just trying to explain deontology for the benefit of those who may not grasp it as a system.

Deontologists aren't into "intrinsic" pleasure of the sort you describe either. You're still speaking consequentially. Neo-Kantian deontologists think that only axioms conforming to a version of the categorical imperative are appropriate reasons for moral judgments. They explicitly deny the idea that the production of any kind of mere "experience" whether in the performance of an action or as a result of it, can count as a reason.

I'm saying I *understand* what you're saying -- but I'm saying it's also not deontology. You're not a deontologist.

[Ginkgo]

Could a drug addict be an example of deontology of pleasure ?

No, because deontology implies "duty," as in "I have a duty to do X, no matter how I feel about it or what I hope to gain from it." It would be hard to see how one would ever have a duty to do drugs.

Drug addicts do what they do because they have a particular outcome in view, called a "high." If they were deontologists, they would *not* be wanting to take the drugs, but would be cognizant that they had a duty to take them anyway. It's hard to make sense of that suggestion.

This is correct. It is rule based ethics. Your pleasure or the pleasure of any other member of society is not important. All that matters it that you are following a rule.

[thedoc]

No, no, no...

I'm not telling you about my experiences or even my preferences. I'm just trying to explain deontology for the benefit of those who may not grasp it as a system.

Deontologists aren't into "intrinsic" pleasure of the sort you describe either. You're still speaking consequentially. Neo-Kantian deontologists think that only axioms conforming to a version of the categorical imperative are appropriate reasons for moral judgments. They explicitly deny the idea that the production of any kind of mere "experience" whether in the performance of an action or as a result of it, can count as a reason.

I'm saying I *understand* what you're saying -- but I'm saying it's also not deontology. You're not a deontologist.

Thankyou, I get it now, but for future reference I usually post based on what I know best, my own experience and I try to not say too much about the experience of others. Also I'm still catching up on the terminology, my formal philosophy and reading of philosophy is many years out of date, and probably not as much in depth as I would like it to be.

[Immanuel Can]

Sorry -- didn't mean to come off as a snob.

[thedoc]

Sorry -- didn't mean to come off as a snob.

Not a problem, and I didn't see it that way. as long as we keep exchanging ideas, we can come to understand each other, total agreement is not necessary, but it is nice when it happens.

[Immanuel Can]

Fair enough.

[thedoc]

Good, now back to the Piano (figuratively speaking), agreeing that we are not Deontologists, how does it hold up as an example?

[Immanuel Can]

You mean this?

In playing the piano there are a few pieces that I can play competently and do so for my own pleasure. The require nothing more than my sitting down and playing them.
There are other pieces that I like and want to play but lack the ability to do so. They will require time and effort to practice and become proficient in their performance. The frustrating thing is that some of them are pieces that I had played well 40 years ago, but that time without a piano to play on regularly means that I have lost the ability to do so.
In these cases I can play a piece that I know for the immediate pleasure of doing so. But the pieces that I cannot now play will require some time and effort to become proficient and that pleasure will come later.

It looks to me like a description of two consequentialisms: 1) short-horizon consequentialism, and 2) longer-horizon consequentialism. But no deontology would be involved unless you somehow had a "duty" to play piano, regardless of the short and long term pleasures.

[thedoc]

You mean this?

In playing the piano there are a few pieces that I can play competently and do so for my own pleasure. The require nothing more than my sitting down and playing them.
There are other pieces that I like and want to play but lack the ability to do so. They will require time and effort to practice and become proficient in their performance. The frustrating thing is that some of them are pieces that I had played well 40 years ago, but that time without a piano to play on regularly means that I have lost the ability to do so.
In these cases I can play a piece that I know for the immediate pleasure of doing so. But the pieces that I cannot now play will require some time and effort to become proficient and that pleasure will come later.

It looks to me like a description of two consequentialisms: 1) short-horizon consequentialism, and 2) longer-horizon consequentialism. But no deontology would be involved unless you somehow had a "duty" to play piano, regardless of the short and long term pleasures.

Thankyou, I will add these to my vocabulary and agree that for the most part these are the case. However I have an 8 year old and a soon to be 4 year old grandchildren that spend a lot of time with me and I maintain the proficiency with the piano in the hope that one or both of them will become interested enough to want to learn from me. And after the basics, I will encourage them to take up lessons with a 'real' piano teacher.