Moral theories are self-contradictory

[HegelsBagels]

In this post I'm going to make use of the notion of a complete moral theory, which I define as follows:
-a complete moral theory admits no two actions that it cannot rank in order of moral worth.

My argument will be that we need to be more careful about what we're looking for, in any attempt to systematize morality it would seem that we are trying to develop the means by which to adjudicate between more and more classes of moral action, with the destined end result being able to remove all aporia and ultimately be able to decide what's moral in every possible circumstance. That is to say, ethical theory seems to be striving for a complete moral theory.

I'll make use of a couple more ideas. First, by 'degree of freedom' at any moment, I mean the measure of actions that an agent is able to choose from in a given situation, ie how many choices an agent has. Second, I will use the fact (which I don't believe is in contention) that free agents are able to alter their own and others' future degrees of freedom.

Finally a note: freedom is a precondition to morality; no free agent, no morality.

Ok, so now follows a logical deduction: Assume the existence of a complete moral theory. Take some agent at a given time and in a given circumstance where they have X actions to choose from. Now rank all elements of X in terms of moral worth according to the moral theory. Now suppose that some elements of X impact future degree of freedom. For each such element, i, the is a future set of actions Xi that can be limited or expanded by i, and which can also be ranked in terms of moral worth. However, for these future actions sets, the present agent doesn't know how well the future agent will perform, and so must assume that with some distribution the future agent could choose any of those actions. In any case where the limitation or expansion of Xi does not leave the net moral worth of possible actions unaltered, i inherits the moral worth difference in overall moral worth of predicted actions. Therefore it follows that a complete moral theory results in the adjustment of our own degree of freedom such that we are not able to act immorally to itself gain moral worth. In other words, the precondition of morality is freedom, and a complete moral theory implies a temporal convergence on a lack of freedom to be the most moral, annihilating the reason for having a moral theory. Or even more briefly: in the context of a complete moral theory, moral action removes the precondition for moral action.

I see this is a contradiction. Moral thinking is supposed to help guide us in an ever-present moral experience, not guide us to become amoral. But that means that none of our theories can ever become complete, or else this becomes an implied eventuality. I'd also note that we can reflect on what happens to people's freedoms when some society believes they have a complete moral theory, namely that they can adjudicate every issue. I'm tempted to say that we should be happy we are finite and incapable of ever constructing a complete and consistent moral theory, but I think I'd be contradicting myself.

tl;dr In the context of a complete moral theory, moral action removes the precondition for moral action, namely, freedom.

[mickthinks]

i inherits the moral worth difference in overall moral worth of predicted actions.

I don't see why the moral worth of action i, already determined (completely?) under the complete moral theory, must partake of and be adjusted by the net moral worth of future actions Xi. If I risk my life to save that of a child, I don't think the moral value of that act is reduced because the child is Adolf Hitler.

[HegelsBagels]

i inherits the moral worth difference in overall moral worth of predicted actions.

I don't see why the moral worth of action i, already determined (completely?) under the complete moral theory, must partake of and be adjusted by the net moral worth of future actions Xi. If I risk my life to save that of a child, I don't think the moral value of that act is reduced because the child is Adolf Hitler.

The Hitler example should stop being used, its flawed, it has the same built in self-contradiction as any time-travel story. But ok I take your point, suppose you single-handedly had the opportunity to stop a genocide by killing a child, and there was no other way and you knew that if you acted there would be no genocide, but instead a social recovery to stability and prosperity. Well, we were talking about a complete moral theory, so what does it say is worse, infanticide or genocide? Given whichever answer, it is of greatest moral value to act accordingly. Now you asked if, when the moral worth of action i is already determined, how the predicted moral worth of possible actions Xi can then alter it. It doesn't if the action is already undertaken before knowledge is gained, quite clearly if you save a child because your moral theory tells you saving children is good, and then later you find out the child maliciously killed its family in a fire, it doesn't change the moral worth of your action.

There's an important point to make here, a moral theory is inapplicable without a state of knowledge, which is independent of the moral theory. A moral theory tells you what to do given what you know with varying degrees of certainty, it does not tell you what to do in the absence of knowledge. In fact, knowledge in some ways is a kind of freedom (knowledge is power etc etc), and is a precondition to a moral situation. This isn't a problem for the definition of a complete moral theory: given any state of knowledge and degree of freedom, it ranks actions in order of moral worth. My point was that when altering your future freedom itself is in your power, it becomes moral now to make yourself amoral later.

[Skip]

In fact, knowledge in some ways is a kind of freedom (knowledge is power etc etc), and is a precondition to a moral situation.

I would say, in the case of moral action, knowledge constrains freedom; ignorance expands freedom. You judge the morality of a present action in the present circumstances. While every act does, for good or ill, affect the future, you cannot know how the effects of your particular act will converge with the effects of 6 billion other human acts taking place at the same moment.

Why should a comprehensive moral theory not aim at its own annihilation? A true communist state is aimed at its own demise, and a parent raises a child toward independence from the parent. A tamper-proof morality would result in societies of such spontaneously well-behaved people that they no longer require a moral code.

Unfortunately, moral systems arise from cultures. Making up a universal, mathematical one is possible in theory, but will be incompatible with the hardware already walking all over the globe.

[HegelsBagels]

In fact, knowledge in some ways is a kind of freedom (knowledge is power etc etc), and is a precondition to a moral situation.

I would say, in the case of moral action, knowledge constrains freedom; ignorance expands freedom. You judge the morality of a present action in the present circumstances. While every act does, for good or ill, affect the future, you cannot know how the effects of your particular act will converge with the effects of 6 billion other human acts taking place at the same moment.

The point you made that knowledge constrains freedom is false. It is impossible for an agent to choose an action of which he/she is not aware, hence he/she is not free to do it. One could argue that they might accidentally stumble into it anyway, but that then is a random event, not an act originating in freedom. If on the other hand, an agent has plenty of knowledge, they may be more aware of how bad some of their potential choices are, but this does not make them less free to choose them. Unless you want to contend that we are psychologically incapable of choosing what is bad for us.

Why should a comprehensive moral theory not aim at its own annihilation? A true communist state is aimed at its own demise, and a parent raises a child toward independence from the parent. A tamper-proof morality would result in societies of such spontaneously well-behaved people that they no longer require a moral code.

Your second point is an excellent one, its exactly what I wanted this thread to get to.
You ask: What is wrong with a moral theory being aimed at its own annihilation? After all there are plenty of endeavours in human life and society which have as their goal to render themselves unnecessary, parenting for instance.
I answer as follows: Practically there is nothing wrong. The issue is a logical one with the very notion of morality, that a complete moral theory must generate the claim it is better to become unfree in a moral sense. Hence the concept of being morally rational is whats at issue, and self-contradictory (taking as the meaning of rationality the reconciliation of incompatible claims, such that a complete moral theory would be completely rational).

Unfortunately, moral systems arise from cultures. Making up a universal, mathematical one is possible in theory, but will be incompatible with the hardware already walking all over the globe.

The fact that the origins of the globe's moral systems are disparate doesn't preclude the potential completeness of a moral theory. Only moral relativism does. Moreover, its entirely unnecessary for an individual to be aware of the moral theory for it to be in effect, all that is required is that the means are available to consistently rank morally charged actions.

With this post I was trying to get people thinking about what they can expect given their own assumptions about morality. Either all moral situations have an answer, or some don't. If all do, then you believe there is a complete moral theory, within which there is an apparent contradiction. If you believe some situations have no answer, then you believe that some moral clashes must be resolved irrationally: by aversion, conversion, or coercion.

[Skip]

Either all moral situations have an answer, or some don't.

They all have some answer in each system, but not necessarily the right answer for you. Moralists contrive improbable situations, like whether to push the fat man onto the trolley tracks, to confound theory, but that's not how moral action really works, and that's not how real people have to make their daily decisions.

If all do, then you believe there is a complete moral theory, within which there is an apparent contradiction.

I never could believe in such a thing. Guidelines, more or less comprehensive, more or less appropriate, for a social context, but that's about all.

If you believe some situations have no answer, then you believe that some moral clashes must be resolved irrationally: by aversion, conversion, or coercion.

I don't see why resolution needs to be irrational. People make decisions using a combination of reason, emotion and reflex. If one theorist can't come up with an answer for ever possible moral dilemma (and he can't! Life is not that predictable.) that doesn't mean a hundred ordinary people can't or won't come up with a dozen different solutions when they encounter an unexpected conflict.

[HegelsBagels]

I don't see why resolution needs to be irrational. People make decisions using a combination of reason, emotion and reflex. If one theorist can't come up with an answer for ever possible moral dilemma (and he can't! Life is not that predictable.) that doesn't mean a hundred ordinary people can't or won't come up with a dozen different solutions when they encounter an unexpected conflict.

This is a profoundly inert statement, you've said absolutely nothing. Of course when people encounter unexpected moral conflict, they cope, but how? Either an ethical theory can say something about a moral situation before it is encountered, or people simply agree on how to deal with it in the future without the help of philosophy.

It is completely worthless to claim that we can engage in ethical philosophy without having the courage or the rational basis to say more than what people already agree on without our thought.

[Skip]

It is completely worthless to claim that we can engage in ethical philosophy without having the courage or the rational basis to say more than what people already agree on without our thought.

Maybe so. It's not particularly valuable, either, to insist on complicating ethical philosophy beyond any practical application.
Agreement of a community over base values is important. Drawing up guidelines for bahavi0our and interaction based on those shared values is important. Pushing them beyond their useful capacity is harmless self-indulgence.

[fiveredapples]

In this post I'm going to make use of the notion of a complete moral theory, which I define as follows:
-a complete moral theory admits no two actions that it cannot rank in order of moral worth.

My argument will be that we need to be more careful about what we're looking for, in any attempt to systematize morality it would seem that we are trying to develop the means by which to adjudicate between more and more classes of moral action, with the destined end result being able to remove all aporia and ultimately be able to decide what's moral in every possible circumstance. That is to say, ethical theory seems to be striving for a complete moral theory.

I'll make use of a couple more ideas. First, by 'degree of freedom' at any moment, I mean the measure of actions that an agent is able to choose from in a given situation, ie how many choices an agent has. Second, I will use the fact (which I don't believe is in contention) that free agents are able to alter their own and others' future degrees of freedom.

Finally a note: freedom is a precondition to morality; no free agent, no morality.

Ok, so now follows a logical deduction: Assume the existence of a complete moral theory. Take some agent at a given time and in a given circumstance where they have X actions to choose from. Now rank all elements of X in terms of moral worth according to the moral theory. Now suppose that some elements of X impact future degree of freedom. For each such element, i, the is a future set of actions Xi that can be limited or expanded by i, and which can also be ranked in terms of moral worth. However, for these future actions sets, the present agent doesn't know how well the future agent will perform, and so must assume that with some distribution the future agent could choose any of those actions. In any case where the limitation or expansion of Xi does not leave the net moral worth of possible actions unaltered, i inherits the moral worth difference in overall moral worth of predicted actions. Therefore it follows that a complete moral theory results in the adjustment of our own degree of freedom such that we are not able to act immorally to itself gain moral worth. In other words, the precondition of morality is freedom, and a complete moral theory implies a temporal convergence on a lack of freedom to be the most moral, annihilating the reason for having a moral theory. Or even more briefly: in the context of a complete moral theory, moral action removes the precondition for moral action.

I see this is a contradiction. Moral thinking is supposed to help guide us in an ever-present moral experience, not guide us to become amoral. But that means that none of our theories can ever become complete, or else this becomes an implied eventuality. I'd also note that we can reflect on what happens to people's freedoms when some society believes they have a complete moral theory, namely that they can adjudicate every issue. I'm tempted to say that we should be happy we are finite and incapable of ever constructing a complete and consistent moral theory, but I think I'd be contradicting myself.

tl;dr In the context of a complete moral theory, moral action removes the precondition for moral action, namely, freedom.

This is nearly incomprehensible. Learn to write. I'm not surprised that "Hegel" is part of your name.

[John K]

Learn to write.

He is. How else can he do it?

[Skip]

He might have done it more concisely and more clearly. For my taste, also less combatively. Still harmless, though.

[QMan]

HegelsBagels:
In this post I'm going to make use of the notion of a complete moral theory, which I define as follows:
-a complete moral theory admits no two actions that it cannot rank in order of moral worth.
.....

An A for effort, but you lost me about 1/4 down the page. Let me suggest putting your ideas into concise bulletinized list form.

Here is my suggestion. Life is really much less complicated then that from my perspective, since I belief morality only exists if there is an authoritative and qualified source for moral teaching. To me that is the bible. The reference I am supplying below expands on that to my satisfaction. Accordingly God is not nitpicking what various nations, races, societies do as long as they have deduced from his teaching in the bible or from natural law that the essentials of morality, namely his commandments should be obeyed. Sorry my atheist/agnostic friends there is no democracy in the workplace or in heaven. If you have trouble with authority then you are not realistic.

Copied from Medjugorje web site:

October 1, 1981

Are all religions good?

"Members of all faiths are equal before God. God rules over each faith just like a sovereign over his kingdom. In the world, all religions are not the same because all people have not complied with the commandments of God. They reject and disparage them."

http://www.medjugorje.com/medjugorje-me ... mainform=1