Pure Consciousness?

[MGL]

When you talk about sensations of redness and pain as being a subjective nature of brain activity, then you are obviously talking about an argument for qualia. I think there is qualia and I also think that the physicalist explanation does not do justice to our mental lives. So we obviously share a common position on this. However, I would say, no brains - no qualia.

So what is the association between qualia and brains?

If you accept that the conscious mind can be correlated with physical processes in the brain you presumably accept that each component of a conscious experience ( eg a particular sensation of redness at a particular point in a visual field ) can be correlated with a component or sub-processs of the brain processes. Now if we would expect science to reduce each component brain process to fundamental sub-atomic events that are common to reality as a whole, why would we not expect the qualia correlated with those sub-process of the brain to be grounded on some equally fundamental feature of nature? Otherwise we are obliged to conclude that some very special and specific complex arrangement of matter magically produces qualia from nothing. High level correlations between phenomena are often noted by science, but scientists usually attempt to explain this by reducing it to lower level phenomena such that the correlation is simply an inevitable consequence of the interaction of the lower level phenomena.

[chaz wyman]

However there are many examples where we find X from not X. For example a collection of people can be a nation; sand can be a castle - but we do not have to attribute nationhood to all people, nor do we have to suggest that there is castle-hood in all grains of sand.

These explanations work becasue the higher objects ( nations and sand castles ) can be reduced to more ubiquitous components ( people, grains of sand ).

The only way this kind of explanation to work for consciousness is to presume that its phenomenal properties are alreasy present in the matter and energy that constitute the brain processes. Otherwise these have to be miraculously produced in an unreducable way simply from some mysterious specific arrangement.

To take the nation analogy, it would be like saying that a nation of red-haired people is reducable to an aggregate of people with no hair. That the act of congregating together magically gives them all red-hair.

The argument does not rest on my poorly chosen analogies.
You could just as easily take the qualities of any compounds as offering examples of X from not X. Water is remarkably different from either oxygen or hydrogen.
When you get such extreme complexity of structure to be found in the human brain, we can assume that is the source of consciousness even thought we cannot explain it in detail. We have difficulty explaining all the properties of water as distinct from it's constituents.

[chaz wyman]

This is not inference. It is an empirical fact that "there is no consciousness to be found in matter other than brains." Empirical facts need no warrant. My conclusion that consciousness is a consequence of the existence of brain matter, is warranted by the evidence. You would be right to suggest that I have no warrant to suggest that brain matter is the only possible source of consciousness, but then I do not have to make that suggestion to assess the quality of arguments concerned with this topic.. I cannot prove that a banana is not capable of calculating the circumference of the earth either, but such things do not worry me.

Can you clarify what you mean by "there is no consciousness to be found in matter other than brains"

is it:

1) no consciousness has been observed in matter other than brains
or
2) it has been observed that there is no consciousness in matter other than brains

I mean all examples of consciousness come from brains, and that no other matter, as yet, as been observed to exhibit consciousness.

If #1 then you are welcome to claim this as an empirical fact. If #2 then you need to clarify what you mean by consciousness.
What's yours? Obviously you have a problem with that empirical fact, so I am assuming that you are thinking of a definition which would invalidate this factual proposal.

Do you think that to call something conscious requires it to satisfy the following two necessary conjoint conditions:

a) purposive behaviour
b) the existence of phenomenal properties in which that behaviour is mediated.

Not necessarily a, and you might have to unpack b.

If you define consciousness as necessarily requiring the exhibition of purposive behaviour then you are perhaps reasonably warranted in claim 2, but you may need to clarify your definition to avoid attracting confused criticism.

I know of no definition of consciousness that would invalidate the factuality of my assertion.
What's on your mind?
So my question now is:

Do you think that there is a necessary connection between the phenomenal properties of consciousness and its purposive behaviour?
If so what is your warrant for claiming this?

No, I do not necessarily equate intentionality and consciousness, though I think you need consciousness for intentionality, by definition, I think that consciousness is not equivalent to it, and can be a characteristic of non intentional behaviour. The unusual or uniqueness for consciousness has more to do with the ability to reflect.
I think it is clear enough that many living things have purposeful behaviour, that they are aware of their surroundings, that they can respond to events around them, but the degree to which they are conscious (reflective) of that environment and able to choose a response varies markedly across the large range of evolution.

[Ginkgo]

When you talk about sensations of redness and pain as being a subjective nature of brain activity, then you are obviously talking about an argument for qualia. I think there is qualia and I also think that the physicalist explanation does not do justice to our mental lives. So we obviously share a common position on this. However, I would say, no brains - no qualia.

So what is the association between qualia and brains?

If you accept that the conscious mind can be correlated with physical processes in the brain you presumably accept that each component of a conscious experience ( eg a particular sensation of redness at a particular point in a visual field ) can be correlated with a component or sub-processs of the brain processes. Now if we would expect science to reduce each component brain process to fundamental sub-atomic events that are common to reality as a whole, why would we not expect the qualia correlated with those sub-process of the brain to be grounded on some equally fundamental feature of nature? Otherwise we are obliged to conclude that some very special and specific complex arrangement of matter magically produces qualia from nothing. High level correlations between phenomena are often noted by science, but scientists usually attempt to explain this by reducing it to lower level phenomena such that the correlation is simply an inevitable consequence of the interaction of the lower level phenomena.

This of course is assuming that qualia actually exists. I think it does, but a physicalist like Dennett would call people like myself 'qualiaphiles'.

I guess the short answer is that quallia needs reside within the mind rather than the object. Pain is an example of qualia. So if I were to put my hand on a hot plate, I would feel pain. However, I cannot claim that somehow the pain resides within the object (hotplate).

[MGL]

I guess the short answer is that qualia needs reside within the mind rather than the object. Pain is an example of qualia. So if I were to put my hand on a hot plate, I would feel pain. However, I cannot claim that somehow the pain resides within the object (hotplate).

I'm sorry, I am not being clear. I agree that the qualia we associate with our experiences must reside in our mind rather than the object we are experiencing. But my point is that the qualia must be a property of whatever physical process it is that equates to our mind. If qualia exist, they must be a feature of physical reality. If this feature is peculiar to brain processes then that needs to be explained. If it cannot be explained then it must be a primitive feature of reality in general.

[MGL]

No, I do not necessarily equate intentionality and consciousness, though I think you need consciousness for intentionality, by definition, I think that consciousness is not equivalent to it, and can be a characteristic of non intentional behaviour. The unusual or uniqueness for consciousness has more to do with the ability to reflect.
I think it is clear enough that many living things have purposeful behaviour, that they are aware of their surroundings, that they can respond to events around them, but the degree to which they are conscious (reflective) of that environment and able to choose a response varies markedly across the large range of evolution.

You seem to be claiming that consciousness can be observed by an observer in other objects. That objects that have consciousness, necessarily have some external behaviour x that can be observed. Thus if an object lacks x then it cannot be conscious.

I presume you also agree that a necessary feature of consciousness is the occurrence of phenomenal events ( sensations of redness,pain etc ) that can only be directly observed by the conscious person to which these events belong as part of their conscious experience.

Thus, there is a necessary feature of consciousness that it is impossible for an oberserver to observe in objects other than themselves.


What you seem to be saying is that anything that lacks some observable external behaviour X, will lack consciousness, and becausue it lacks consciousness, it will also lack phenomenal events.


Is this a correct understanding of your position?

[Ginkgo]

I guess the short answer is that qualia needs reside within the mind rather than the object. Pain is an example of qualia. So if I were to put my hand on a hot plate, I would feel pain. However, I cannot claim that somehow the pain resides within the object (hotplate).

I'm sorry, I am not being clear. I agree that the qualia we associate with our experiences must reside in our mind rather than the object we are experiencing. But my point is that the qualia must be a property of whatever physical process it is that equates to our mind. If qualia exist, they must be a feature of physical reality. If this feature is peculiar to brain processes then that needs to be explained. If it cannot be explained then it must be a primitive feature of reality in general.

I think I can see what you are saying. I think you are making a distinction between primary and secondary qualities when it comes to objects being observed. Primary qualities are the properties that are not observer dependent. They actually reside in the object for everyone to observe. They are features of the object that remain the same for everyone.

Secondary qualities are the subjective features of the object that exist within our minds not the object itself. It is what we impose upon the observation process. So if I am observing a rock there exists a certain objective feature of a rock (perhaps shape) that is primary and specific to this object that allows not only me to recognize it as a rock, but everyone else. The subjective features or qualia come into play when I pick up the rock and drop it on my foot causing me to feel pain.

[MGL]

I think I can see what you are saying. I think you are making a distinction between primary and secondary qualities when it comes to objects being observed. Primary qualities are the properties that are not observer dependent. They actually reside in the object for everyone to observe. They are features of the object that remain the same for everyone.

Secondary qualities are the subjective features of the object that exist within our minds not the object itself. It is what we impose upon the observation process. So if I am observing a rock there exists a certain objective feature of a rock (perhaps shape) that is primary and specific to this object that allows not only me to recognize it as a rock, but everyone else. The subjective features or qualia come into play when I pick up the rock and drop it on my foot causing me to feel pain.

OK, but as qualia exist in our mind, they must be considered as primary qualities of our mind. Yet they are unobservable except to the mind they belong to. So we have this seemingly peculiar object, the brain that has two kinds of primary qualities - ones that can be observed by everyone ( neurons etc ) and ones that cannot ( qualia ) except by the brain they belong to.

If qualia are only found in brains it must be the case that qualia are produced by the universally observable primary qualities of brains. But how can the universally observable primary qualities of a brain ( its spatio-temporal functions and relations ) explain phenomenal qualities such as redness or pain?

Is it not simpler to presume that all objects have two kinds of primary qualities - the universally observable spatio-temporal relational properties and internal intrinsic phenomenal ones which are just used by the brain to perform the function of discriminating the universally observable primary qualities of other objects it perceives?

[MGL]

The argument does not rest on my poorly chosen analogies.
You could just as easily take the qualities of any compounds as offering examples of X from not X. Water is remarkably different from either oxygen or hydrogen.
When you get such extreme complexity of structure to be found in the human brain, we can assume that is the source of consciousness even thought we cannot explain it in detail. We have difficulty explaining all the properties of water as distinct from it's constituents.

Take the property of liquidity we attribute to water. This is not a property of single molecules of water. But it is a property that is derivable from the way water molecules interact with one another at a certain temperature. Rather than bonding into a solid, they slip and slide over each other, which results in the macroscopic feature of liquidity. And the way water molecules interact with each other is in turn derivable from the properties of hydrogen an oxygen atoms.

I am sure there are plenty of examples where there is currently no explanation of some macroscopic phenomena from its components and probably becasue of issues of complexity. But if there is warranted confidence that the former emerges from the latter, it is because both levels of description share sufficienttly common basic properties. Yet with the brain I cannot see how any degree of complexity would be able to explain the phenomena of redness. All it could possibly do is establish a correlation between a neural process and the FUNCTION that a sensation of redness performs in the brain/mind. It could never explain how that neural process is responsible for redness. That would always have to be assumed.

[chaz wyman]

The argument does not rest on my poorly chosen analogies.
You could just as easily take the qualities of any compounds as offering examples of X from not X. Water is remarkably different from either oxygen or hydrogen.
When you get such extreme complexity of structure to be found in the human brain, we can assume that is the source of consciousness even thought we cannot explain it in detail. We have difficulty explaining all the properties of water as distinct from it's constituents.

Take the property of liquidity we attribute to water. This is not a property of single molecules of water. But it is a property that is derivable from the way water molecules interact with one another at a certain temperature. Rather than bonding into a solid, they slip and slide over each other, which results in the macroscopic feature of liquidity. And the way water molecules interact with each other is in turn derivable from the properties of hydrogen an oxygen
atoms.

.

Actually there are many surprises in chemistry, and water is one such compound where the qualities of the substance cannot simply be predicted or inferred from the constituent atoms. And most of what we eventually learn about those atoms are inferred from observing water and back-interpreting to uncover the properties of the atoms.
I deliberately chose a simple compound. But now take DNA as an example of X from not X. No one would have guess that building carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen and oxygen in such a way would ever have given rise to a complex storage system for all life on earth.
Now back to the point.
It is alleged that, because we cannot account for 'mind' in terms of the 'physical', that we have to suggest that there is such a thing as 'pure consciousness', or 'panpsychism' to help us. I say no. It is a solution looking for a problem that does not really exist. Consciousness is a quality of certain specialised forms of matter, in the same way that protein transcription is a unique quality of RNA, and genetic memory is a special property of DNA genes.
I do not throw my hands up is despair and say uh - I don't get it, genetic memory must be a property all all existence, like 'pure consciousness'.

The rest of your comments are interesting but do not address the point I was making.

[chaz wyman]

No, I do not necessarily equate intentionality and consciousness, though I think you need consciousness for intentionality, by definition, I think that consciousness is not equivalent to it, and can be a characteristic of non intentional behaviour. The unusual or uniqueness for consciousness has more to do with the ability to reflect.
I think it is clear enough that many living things have purposeful behaviour, that they are aware of their surroundings, that they can respond to events around them, but the degree to which they are conscious (reflective) of that environment and able to choose a response varies markedly across the large range of evolution.

You seem to be claiming that consciousness can be observed by an observer in other objects. That objects that have consciousness, necessarily have some external behaviour x that can be observed. Thus if an object lacks x then it cannot be conscious.

Is this problematic for you? All I am saying is that consciousness as I understand it in myself is evident in others.

I presume you also agree that a necessary feature of consciousness is the occurrence of phenomenal events ( sensations of redness,pain etc ) that can only be directly observed by the conscious person to which these events belong as part of their conscious experience.

Thus, there is a necessary feature of consciousness that it is impossible for an oberserver to observe in objects other than themselves.


What you seem to be saying is that anything that lacks some observable external behaviour X, will lack consciousness, and becausue it lacks consciousness, it will also lack phenomenal events.

No, you seem to be saying that.
Why, exactly, I do not know as yet, but I imagine it may have something to do with your parallel argument about qualia which I am not following in detail.



Is this a correct understanding of your position?

No, it is a correct understanding of your own position.

What I am saying is that exhaustive tests; observations over 100s of years; everyday experience and provide us with a wealth of evidence about consciousness. All of this evidence comes from creatures with brains, which when they cease to function correlate exactly with the cessation of the evidence of consciousness, and that particular forms of damage to brains leads to often very predictable forms of malfunction in cognitive activity.
The evidence is now so overwhelming that there is no need to posit any extra-somatic, or incorporeal essence or quality for the explanation for conscious behaviour, and that the answers to all matters concerning personality and conscious activity are to be found (eventually) by studying the neural matter and its connection with the bodily functions. I see no case for dualism, nor the sort of monism underlying pan-psychic theories.

[Ginkgo]

I think I can see what you are saying. I think you are making a distinction between primary and secondary qualities when it comes to objects being observed. Primary qualities are the properties that are not observer dependent. They actually reside in the object for everyone to observe. They are features of the object that remain the same for everyone.

Secondary qualities are the subjective features of the object that exist within our minds not the object itself. It is what we impose upon the observation process. So if I am observing a rock there exists a certain objective feature of a rock (perhaps shape) that is primary and specific to this object that allows not only me to recognize it as a rock, but everyone else. The subjective features or qualia come into play when I pick up the rock and drop it on my foot causing me to feel pain.

OK, but as qualia exist in our mind, they must be considered as primary qualities of our mind. Yet they are unobservable except to the mind they belong to. So we have this seemingly peculiar object, the brain that has two kinds of primary qualities - ones that can be observed by everyone ( neurons etc ) and ones that cannot ( qualia ) except by the brain they belong to.

If qualia are only found in brains it must be the case that qualia are produced by the universally observable primary qualities of brains. But how can the universally observable primary qualities of a brain ( its spatio-temporal functions and relations ) explain phenomenal qualities such as redness or pain?

Is it not simpler to presume that all objects have two kinds of primary qualities - the universally observable spatio-temporal relational properties and internal intrinsic phenomenal ones which are just used by the brain to perform the function of discriminating the universally observable primary qualities of other objects it perceives?

In this case I would think you need to determine mental states that have qualia and mental states that don't. Not an easy task.



Ginkgo

[MGL]

...Is this problematic for you? All I am saying is that consciousness as I understand it in myself is evident in others.
...No, you seem to be saying that.
...No, it is a correct understanding of your own position.

I am afraid your responses aren't clarifying your position to me. My questions are my attempt to unpack your conception of consciousness, but your responses, by never directly answering or by omitting any elaboration when you object, only make it less clear.

[MGL]

...there are many surprises in chemistry...
...No one would have guess that...

The fact that something about an object cannot be predicted from KNOWN properties of its constituents is not the same thing as saying that it is not determined by as yet UNKNOWN properties of its constituents.

No one might have guessed that building carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen and oxygen into strings of DNA would ever have given rise to a complex storage system for all life on earth. But I would be very surprised if there is a scientist who does not believe that all POSSIBLE life forms could IN PRINCIPLE be deduced from such strings.

It is this that makes consciousness far more difficult to explain from brain processes than life forms from DNA, because it is not possible, even in principle, to see how phenomenal properties could ever be derived from brain processes.

[Ginkgo]

It is this that makes consciousness far more difficult to explain from brain processes than life forms from DNA, because it is not possible, even in principle, to see how phenomenal properties could ever be derived from brain processes.

This is pretty much where the disagreement begins. I think MGL is saying that physical stuff cannot be mental stuff. Hence the need for some type of dualist theory.

The physicalist would say this is exactly what mental phenomenon is. It is physical stuff. Dennett would say that you are creating something extra, where the need for 'extra' doesn't exist. The obvious reply to this is, "Well, how can electrical and chemical activity give rise to the red rock I see before me?"

The physicalist would probably reply that the light from the object goes into the eyes which is then transferred into some type of electrical and chemical activity. This activity is distributed in various places through the brain in terms of space and time. "Then what happens?" "Well, all of this activity ends up where it should always end up when we perceive objects". That place is usually interpreted as being the neural core of consciousness where there is a perceiving 'I' that makes sense of all of this brain activity.

This is when the physicalist springs his surprise. He would then tell us there is no neural core of consciousness and there is no perceiving homunculus that makes sense of all of this electrical and chemical activity. There is no centre of consciousness, rather consciousness is dis-unified. The perceiving 'I' is an illusion; it is an evolutionary trick to help us survive.


While I would agree there is no neural core of consciousness, I tend to think that physicalist explanation fails for a very important reason. But then again, I might be trying to set up a straw man argument for the physicalist.