The Issue of Personal Identity or "Will I still be me?"

[reasonemotion]

This question is probably the single most frequently asked question about mind uploading. Many people will concede that the technology may develop, and may produce a duplicate android or whatever that thinks it's you -- but is it really you? What's really being debated here is the issue of personal identity, which has been a philosophical bone of contention for centuries.

What do you think?

[John]

Many people will concede that the technology may develop, and may produce a duplicate android or whatever that thinks it's you -- but is it really you?

I think you answer your own question when you call it a "duplicate".

[bobevenson]

As I've said before, nobody is anybody. You're not even you. If you were able to meet your exact biological twin who was born 10,000 years ago in Outer Mongolia, you could both be made to look exactly the same, employing the services of a good barber and haberdasher, but there the similarity would end due to your vastly different institutional grids of religious, cultural and social values. Of course, that's the basic message of "The Ouzo Prophecy" (http://church-of-ouzo.com/pdf/ouzo-prophecy.pdf) that nobody understands except your humble narrator.

[chaz wyman]

This question is probably the single most frequently asked question about mind uploading. Many people will concede that the technology may develop, and may produce a duplicate android or whatever that thinks it's you -- but is it really you? What's really being debated here is the issue of personal identity, which has been a philosophical bone of contention for centuries.

What do you think?

You are not the person you were yesterday - not will ever be.
You only think that continuity is the key to beingness - but how profound is sleep or other moments of unconsciousness such as under anaesthetic?

You can ask the same question of the Star Trek transporter device.

[chaz wyman]

Many people will concede that the technology may develop, and may produce a duplicate android or whatever that thinks it's you -- but is it really you?

I think you answer your own question when you call it a "duplicate".

But if you could not tell the difference between the two - then what?
Which would be the "real" John?

[John]

Many people will concede that the technology may develop, and may produce a duplicate android or whatever that thinks it's you -- but is it really you?

I think you answer your own question when you call it a "duplicate".

But if you could not tell the difference between the two - then what?
Which would be the "real" John?

The original would the the "real" one in the sense that there's a continuity before and after the duplication. The duplicate would be just that, a copy. Just because it doesn't know it's a copy doesn't mean it isn't. In making the duplicate you've just copied some material, in my opinion, so I think it only becomes problematic if you accord the mind some special status and drift into dualism.

[Notvacka]

Chaz is basically right.

I would like to add that two individuals could never be truly indistinguishable. To be that, they would have to occupy the same time and space, making them one and the same rather than two discrete individuals.

If you placed two otherwise identical individuals beside each other, you could still identify them as the one on the left and the one on the right. They could neve be exactly the same person.

You are not the same person you were yesterday or even five minutes ago. The you of yesterday and the you of today are differentiated by time. If you could physically travel backwards in time, there would be two simultaneous versions of you, and they would both be themselves.

I think you answer your own question when you call it a "duplicate".

But if you could not tell the difference between the two - then what?
Which would be the "real" John?

The simple answer is that both would be real Johns.

[chaz wyman]

I think you answer your own question when you call it a "duplicate".

But if you could not tell the difference between the two - then what?
Which would be the "real" John?

The original would the the "real" one in the sense that there's a continuity before and after the duplication. The duplicate would be just that, a copy. Just because it doesn't know it's a copy doesn't mean it isn't. In making the duplicate you've just copied some material, in my opinion, so I think it only becomes problematic if you accord the mind some special status and drift into dualism.

This is a false objection, as the duplicate is identical. The Star Trek ref was an episode where 2 Spocks emerged from the same transporter, indistinguishable.

The point is that even where there is a clear case for continuity- the copy is in effect a continuum of the original. Effectively you would be the same and you would immediately start to diverge.
Let's imagine that you copied yourself for a mission to Mars. There are 2 ways to do this.
1) the copy goes on the mission so the 'original' continues his normal life on earth.
2) the copy continues the life on earth ,m whilst the 'original' goes on the mission to Mars.

Case 1 presents your position that the copy is just that - only a copy.
But Case 2 is markedly different, the copy enjoys the continuity whilst the old original is expendable.

You do not have a single atom in your body that you had 6 years ago. You are in effect a copy of yourself, but with each day you change. Personhood has nothing to do with the particular atoms in your body. Case 2 is as valid a continuity as the original.
Surely being you - is doing what you do, and how you are to other people. If the original in Case 2 returned from Mars in seven years surely he would be less the person, than the copy - the only way the person could continue would be the copy version. The original would have lost his home, wife and children etc.

[John]

I just typed a reply and then when I got to the end I wondered if use of words like "real" has muddied the water a little. Maybe not so I'll leave my reply as it stands but point out that at the end I've asked the same question again.

The original would the the "real" one in the sense that there's a continuity before and after the duplication. The duplicate would be just that, a copy. Just because it doesn't know it's a copy doesn't mean it isn't. In making the duplicate you've just copied some material, in my opinion, so I think it only becomes problematic if you accord the mind some special status and drift into dualism.

This is a false objection, as the duplicate is identical.

They may be indistinguishable but they are not the same. Leave humans out of it and imagine it's something inanimate that we can't distinguish. Does that make them the same entity? If sub-atomic particles cannot be distinguished from each other and, let's say, we have no way of telling two electrons apart does that mean they're the same electron?

The Star Trek ref was an episode where 2 Spocks emerged from the same transporter, indistinguishable.

I think the episode you're thinking of is The Enemy Within and, a minor point I'll admit, it was Kirk who was copied not Spock. They weren't duplicates though as one was "good" and one was "evil". Personally I think the Star Trek teleporter is a death machine that creates copies even if the copy doesn't know that it's a copy. The original person dies when their atoms are scrambled because scrambling someone's atoms seems like a pretty effective way to kill them to me. Maybe that's a diversion though.

The point is that even where there is a clear case for continuity- the copy is in effect a continuum of the original. Effectively you would be the same and you would immediately start to diverge.
Let's imagine that you copied yourself for a mission to Mars. There are 2 ways to do this.
1) the copy goes on the mission so the 'original' continues his normal life on earth.
2) the copy continues the life on earth ,m whilst the 'original' goes on the mission to Mars.

Case 1 presents your position that the copy is just that - only a copy.

Actually, I'm not claiming the copy is "only" a copy in any sense that it should mean it has less moral worth than the original (though I do admit that as it's hard avoid referring to "it" this may seem to be the case). It is still a human being and I would therefore accord it the same value as the original.

But Case 2 is markedly different, the copy enjoys the continuity whilst the old original is expendable.

By continuity I meant in the sense that the original, as a physical entity, would continue to exist as it had before the copy was made but the copy has only just come in to existence as a physical entity.

You do not have a single atom in your body that you had 6 years ago. You are in effect a copy of yourself, but with each day you change. Personhood has nothing to do with the particular atoms in your body.

At no point are all of my atoms replaced at once though. Besides, I'm not denying him personhood I just think he needs to get his own passport.

Case 2 is as valid a continuity as the original.

What if the copy wasn't an exact physical copy, let's say it has some minor distinguishing mark that no one notices, but in every other aspect it is a passable copy that has exactly the same memories as the original? What is the important part? The memories and way it thinks or that every atom has to be arranged identically so that the slightest skin blemish disqualifies it as being the same person?

Surely being you - is doing what you do, and how you are to other people. If the original in Case 2 returned from Mars in seven years surely he would be less the person, than the copy - the only way the person could continue would be the copy version. The original would have lost his home, wife and children etc.

I'm wondering if we're at crossed purposes here and this is more about personhood rather than whether a copy of me can legitimately claim to be me which is what I originally thought we were debating but now I'm not so sure.

I don't think a copy of me can claim to be me but I do think it can claim to be a person.

[chaz wyman]

I just typed a reply and then when I got to the end I wondered if use of words like "real" has muddied the water a little. Maybe not so I'll leave my reply as it stands but point out that at the end I've asked the same question again.

The original would the the "real" one in the sense that there's a continuity before and after the duplication. The duplicate would be just that, a copy. Just because it doesn't know it's a copy doesn't mean it isn't. In making the duplicate you've just copied some material, in my opinion, so I think it only becomes problematic if you accord the mind some special status and drift into dualism.

This is a false objection, as the duplicate is identical.

They may be indistinguishable but they are not the same. Leave humans out of it and imagine it's something inanimate that we can't distinguish. Does that make them the same entity? If sub-atomic particles cannot be distinguished from each other and, let's say, we have no way of telling two electrons apart does that mean they're the same electron?

The Star Trek ref was an episode where 2 Spocks emerged from the same transporter, indistinguishable.

I think the episode you're thinking of is The Enemy Within and, a minor point I'll admit, it was Kirk who was copied not Spock. They weren't duplicates though as one was "good" and one was "evil". Personally I think the Star Trek teleporter is a death machine that creates copies even if the copy doesn't know that it's a copy. The original person dies when their atoms are scrambled because scrambling someone's atoms seems like a pretty effective way to kill them to me. Maybe that's a diversion though.

I'm thinking of a Book written around 197o, called "Spock Must Die!"
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spock_Must_Die!
But one turns out to be nasty anyways.
I remember the Kirk one - he kinda gets divided nice/nasty.

Still - just because there is no actual Star Trek episode does not mean that the ridiculous hypothetical is less valid.

The point is that even where there is a clear case for continuity- the copy is in effect a continuum of the original. Effectively you would be the same and you would immediately start to diverge.
Let's imagine that you copied yourself for a mission to Mars. There are 2 ways to do this.
1) the copy goes on the mission so the 'original' continues his normal life on earth.
2) the copy continues the life on earth ,m whilst the 'original' goes on the mission to Mars.

Case 1 presents your position that the copy is just that - only a copy.

Actually, I'm not claiming the copy is "only" a copy in any sense that it should mean it has less moral worth than the original (though I do admit that as it's hard avoid referring to "it" this may seem to be the case). It is still a human being and I would therefore accord it the same value as the original.

But Case 2 is markedly different, the copy enjoys the continuity whilst the old original is expendable.

By continuity I meant in the sense that the original, as a physical entity, would continue to exist as it had before the copy was made but the copy has only just come in to existence as a physical entity.

You do not have a single atom in your body that you had 6 years ago. You are in effect a copy of yourself, but with each day you change. Personhood has nothing to do with the particular atoms in your body.

At no point are all of my atoms replaced at once though. Besides, I'm not denying him personhood I just think he needs to get his own passport.

Case 2 is as valid a continuity as the original.

What if the copy wasn't an exact physical copy, let's say it has some minor distinguishing mark that no one notices, but in every other aspect it is a passable copy that has exactly the same memories as the original? What is the important part? The memories and way it thinks or that every atom has to be arranged identically so that the slightest skin blemish disqualifies it as being the same person?

Surely being you - is doing what you do, and how you are to other people. If the original in Case 2 returned from Mars in seven years surely he would be less the person, than the copy - the only way the person could continue would be the copy version. The original would have lost his home, wife and children etc.

I'm wondering if we're at crossed purposes here and this is more about personhood rather than whether a copy of me can legitimately claim to be me which is what I originally thought we were debating but now I'm not so sure.

I don't think a copy of me can claim to be me but I do think it can claim to be a person.

[John]

I'm thinking of a Book written around 197o, called "Spock Must Die!"
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spock_Must_Die!
But one turns out to be nasty anyways.
I remember the Kirk one - he kinda gets divided nice/nasty.

Aha, you're more of a Trekkie (or is it Trekker these days?) than me

I used to be slightly fanatical about the TV series but never read the books.

Still - just because there is no actual Star Trek episode does not mean that the ridiculous hypothetical is less valid.

I agree. I'd never really thought about the Star Trek teleporter in any serious sense until I had to write an essay on arguments for or against bodily resurrection and that's when I came to the conclusion it was a death machine. One of the things that attracts me to science fiction is the often quite interesting thought games that appear.

[chaz wyman]

I'm thinking of a Book written around 197o, called "Spock Must Die!"
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spock_Must_Die!
But one turns out to be nasty anyways.
I remember the Kirk one - he kinda gets divided nice/nasty.

Aha, you're more of a Trekkie (or is it Trekker these days?) than me

I used to be slightly fanatical about the TV series but never read the books.

Still - just because there is no actual Star Trek episode does not mean that the ridiculous hypothetical is less valid.

I agree. I'd never really thought about the Star Trek teleporter in any serious sense until I had to write an essay on arguments for or against bodily resurrection and that's when I came to the conclusion it was a death machine. One of the things that attracts me to science fiction is the often quite interesting thought games that appear.

I think I read it in about 1974, when my daily reading was sci-fi. I had all 12(?) CORGI books of the Original Series, and I have not missed any Film or the Next Generation, some Voyager, but SB9 was a spin off too far, and I hate the Captain in the prequel whose name I can't remember "Enterprise"? so have not watched any of those.
I don't think that makes me a Trekkie.
I've got a Life!!! To use Shatners' phrase.