chaz wyman wrote:
If you have access to these sources then by all means investigate them and tell me why you don't like them.
I have already watched the Horizon documentary and listened to the IOT radio podcast and told you why I don't agree with their and your conclusions, but for your benefit I will recap.
1) Haynes' conclusion: "Thus, a network of high-level control areas can begin to shape an upcoming decision long before it enters awareness."
2) Summary of the LIbet experiment - an action potential occurs before a subject is aware of making a conscious choice
3) My interpretation: there are processes going on in the brain that precede the awarenes of a decision that favour one decision rather than another
4) This not the same as saying that decisions themselves are made by the brain before a conscious choice has been registered, which is what you are claiming.
5) At most it demonstrates that humans may find it difficult to exert free will, which I have no problem accepting, but not that it is impossible.
Your last response to these points was:
1) You will have to read the article yourself. it is quite plain.
Can you tell me which bit of the article I missed or misunderstood and explain what interpretation I should have come to other than (3)?
2) Free-will without a conscious choice is not choice at all. You must have a idiosyncratic view of free-will , maybe you should try to define what you mean by it?
I have tried before, without success, but I get the impression this is because you refuse to acknowledge the coherence of probablistic\non-deterministic causation without specifying your worries with it. So all I can do is refer you to Robert Kane's work and see if he can make more sense to you than I do.
3) The idea of the will is compatible with determinism but the idea of free-will is a fantasy. There are perfectly good philosophical reason why this is true, as I have demonstrated in several places on this Forum.
Hume said all that need be said on the subject.
You have certainly demonstrated it could be a fantasy, but not that it necessarily is a fantasy, except by defining free-will in extremely narrow terms that requires it to exclude causal factors such as genetics, experience and motivation.