The Voice of Time wrote:Objects obviously exist because we can reason with them. In what form they exist, is another matter.
Well at least you admit that the actual physical existence of objects is not the same thing as how humans have named them. I'm going to demonstrate this below with an example.
The Voice of Time wrote:and so obviously the world treats itself as containing objects as well.
I never denied the existence of substances which interact dynamically by laws. I only denied the existence of objects. The following example will demonstrate what I mean by this.
We can start off by imagining how to get a robot to recognize objects in a room. Consider the room you sit in now. It is awash in modern technological artifacts, (computer, mouse, keyboard, light bulb, electrical wires, etc). I will also assume that the vast majority of objects around you are the result of a
"manufacturing process". This is definitely true in the room I occupy now.
One might be led astray into thinking that geometrical categorization is a necessary and sufficient process to recognize these modern artifacts. One could simply train a robot with the so-called "invariant features" of said objects along with their names. One might be seduced into thinking that method is sufficient for general object recognition. I am about to show you that it is not.
We will invite an adult homo sapien from the year 367 B.C. into your room. (Let's do this exercise with a time machine.) Put this ancient person into the room in which you occupy right at this moment. He will see something that appears to be a box with "tubes" running out of the back of it. That is your computer. You could try to explain to this person what a "computer" is, and his eyes would glaze over. There are no poetic metaphors that could ever fully explain what that thing is or what it does to this ancient person. Further , he would have no idea what "wires" are, because he has no understanding of electricity. Where there are wires, his eyes would see "tubes" instead -- and no matter what you tried to explain to him, he would see tubes and tubes only.
The most interesting encounter is when you ask him to identify the lightbulbs in the room. His ancient mind would see only fire. Literally. No matter how much you tried to explain to him that those glowing orbs are not fire, but these electrical artifacts called "lightbulbs" he would never understand it. A similar frustrating exchange would take place when you tried to explain to him your cordless telephone.
You show this ancient person something with glowing LED lights on, showing a non-natural color, (
such as pastel green) Let him touch the LED light and see that is is cold to the touch. He has never seen anything like this in his life, and would probably consider it magic. In his ancient language he might refer to it as "magical glowing stones".
So let's look at how well this Ancient Greek person from 367 BC did on our
Object-recognition task .
Lightbulb. (answered "fire")
green LED indicator. (answered "magical glowing stone")
Computer wires. (answered "tubes")
Car engine (answered "floating chariot that roars")
plastic (answered "colorful and like tree bark")
He failed miserably on this task. A modern robot trained on "data sets" would do better than him at this recognition task.
But more importantly, why did he fail? He failed because objects all around us are determined by a vast history of cultural and technological knowledge. After this example, I don't think anyone can reasonably deny that the world around us is objectively made up of substances, not objects. Identifying objects is not a matter of visual or kinematic features, but derives only from an understanding of how those objects are used by humans who name them.
We should come full circle now and see what this fact means in the context of problems in epistemology. An implicit assumption is that knowledge is justified when it was received as data to the senses. Imagine a hunter who shoots at a cardboard cutout of a deer. He certainly believed there was a deer there. But in actuality he is only shooting at a cardboard cutout. But now imagine there is a deer standing behind the cutout. He ends up shooting a real, albeit hidden, deer. Can we say that he had knowledge of the real deer? Epistemologists find this problem
perplexing precisely because they falsely assume that beliefs in the head correspond in a 1-to-1 fashion with the outside world of substance. They suppose it is "good enough" that he merely held a belief of some deer being there. But the alternative never ever happens. There is never a situation of "actual knowledge" of the "actual deer" because objects categories are created by the brain. The use of "Deer" and "hunter" is suspiciously misleading here since deer are such an ancient object category to humans. If you replaced "Deer" with "iPhone 5" a very plausible argument could be made that certain hunters from the 1920s could never actually know what that thing is (as per above) -- even if their eyes are perceiving it directly.