I just typed a reply and then when I got to the end I wondered if use of words like "real" has muddied the water a little. Maybe not so I'll leave my reply as it stands but point out that at the end I've asked the same question again.
chaz wyman wrote:John wrote:The original would the the "real" one in the sense that there's a continuity before and after the duplication. The duplicate would be just that, a copy. Just because it doesn't know it's a copy doesn't mean it isn't. In making the duplicate you've just copied some material, in my opinion, so I think it only becomes problematic if you accord the mind some special status and drift into dualism.
This is a false objection, as the duplicate is identical.
They may be indistinguishable but they are not the same. Leave humans out of it and imagine it's something inanimate that we can't distinguish. Does that make them the same entity? If sub-atomic particles cannot be distinguished from each other and, let's say, we have no way of telling two electrons apart does that mean they're the same electron?
chaz wyman wrote:The Star Trek ref was an episode where 2 Spocks emerged from the same transporter, indistinguishable.
I think the episode you're thinking of is
The Enemy Within and, a minor point I'll admit, it was Kirk who was copied not Spock. They weren't duplicates though as one was "good" and one was "evil". Personally I think the Star Trek teleporter is a death machine that creates copies even if the copy doesn't know that it's a copy. The original person dies when their atoms are scrambled because scrambling someone's atoms seems like a pretty effective way to kill them to me. Maybe that's a diversion though.
chaz wyman wrote:The point is that even where there is a clear case for continuity- the copy is in effect a continuum of the original. Effectively you would be the same and you would immediately start to diverge.
Let's imagine that you copied yourself for a mission to Mars. There are 2 ways to do this.
1) the copy goes on the mission so the 'original' continues his normal life on earth.
2) the copy continues the life on earth ,m whilst the 'original' goes on the mission to Mars.
Case 1 presents your position that the copy is just that - only a copy.
Actually, I'm not claiming the copy is "only" a copy in any sense that it should mean it has less moral worth than the original (though I do admit that as it's hard avoid referring to "it" this may seem to be the case). It is still a human being and I would therefore accord it the same value as the original.
chaz wyman wrote:But Case 2 is markedly different, the copy enjoys the continuity whilst the old original is expendable.
By continuity I meant in the sense that the original, as a physical entity, would continue to exist as it had before the copy was made but the copy has only just come in to existence as a physical entity.
chaz wyman wrote:You do not have a single atom in your body that you had 6 years ago. You are in effect a copy of yourself, but with each day you change. Personhood has nothing to do with the particular atoms in your body.
At no point are all of my atoms replaced at once though. Besides, I'm not denying him personhood I just think he needs to get his own passport.
chaz wyman wrote:Case 2 is as valid a continuity as the original.
What if the copy wasn't an exact physical copy, let's say it has some minor distinguishing mark that no one notices, but in every other aspect it is a passable copy that has exactly the same memories as the original? What is the important part? The memories and way it thinks or that every atom has to be arranged identically so that the slightest skin blemish disqualifies it as being the same person?
chaz wyman wrote:Surely being you - is doing what you do, and how you are to other people. If the original in Case 2 returned from Mars in seven years surely he would be less the person, than the copy - the only way the person could continue would be the copy version. The original would have lost his home, wife and children etc.
I'm wondering if we're at crossed purposes here and this is more about personhood rather than whether a copy of me can legitimately claim to be me which is what I originally thought we were debating but now I'm not so sure.
I don't think a copy of me can claim to be me but I do think it can claim to be a person.
