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An Argument About Free Will

Posted: Thu Aug 25, 2011 1:07 pm
by Philosophy Now
Luke Pollard and Rebecca Massey-Chase dialogue about freedom vs determinism.

http://philosophynow.org/issues/66/An_A ... _Free_Will

Re: An Argument About Free Will

Posted: Fri Aug 26, 2011 9:25 pm
by lancek4
Pollard. Massey-chase.

I tend to agree with Massey-Chase, though I see this discussion as showing the wholeness of the truth (if there is one).
The probelm is: if Pollard is correct, that we are independant of a causal universe, or that such a causal universe is only partially causal, then that means that there must be some 'unknown' element that allows for our significant separation from the universe so as to allow us to 'remove' ourselves from the causal universe and have choice.

This must mean that whatever we may know or come to know of the universe is always and necissarily untrue, or concordantly untrue. Because, for example, if we were to discover that element of the universe which allows us a 'liberated and free' choice, we would still be in the situation of asserting our 'free will to choose'. especially about that element which allos us choice, we could be in effect denying that element by asserting that our choices alloed us to come unto that element that allows us choice.

In other words, to assert that we have an 'essentially free' choice is to assert a supernatural or extra-universal element, or, in short: God. I am not arguing here whether God exists or not, just that this seems to be the necessary conclusion.

Masey-chase is correct in seeing that it is a linguistic probelm. Because, whenever i assert something about the universe as True, or essential, I am eliciting a power from beyond discourse, i am invoking a 'truth' upon which I am basing my truth so it may be true.

i believe Sarte explains it best. Freedom is a human condition of existing. it does not express some essential element of the universe, only a human situation. Choice is likewise in bad faith; an assertion of choice always posits an essential element that is beyond discourse in which the individual has faith in. It is difficult to speak of, because when I say 'freedom is a human condition of existing', most will see this as expressing choice and freewill, and they completely miss the bare existential quality of human's being and saying "I have a choice".

Re: An Argument About Free Will

Posted: Sat Aug 27, 2011 12:43 am
by blackbox
I can't help thinking (determined being that I am) that arguments for freewill tend to be incredibly shallow. They seem to consist of little more than "we feel as if we have freewill, therefore freewill is real". And, frustratingly, they never provide any explanation as to how this "free" will could even be coherent within the universe as we know it. They don't even attempt explanation.

No one disputes that we feel as if our will is free. The question is whether this feeling is illusory or not. Merely repeating that we feel it cannot ever settle that question.

And referring to social constructs which assume freewill, such as our moral notions of responsibility or accountability cannot settle it either. Yes, previously people felt their will was free and built/spoke/framed their moral constructs on that assumption. But, logic 101, arguments can never establish that which they are assuming. These appeals to moral notions are fallacies.

As far as I can see, all Pollard offers is unfounded assertion followed by a simple fallacy.

Re: An Argument About Free Will

Posted: Tue Aug 30, 2011 5:22 am
by blackbox
Does anyone reading this post care to comment on my assertion that appealing to moral notions like responsibility is circular and therefore fallacious? It's a common argument given in support of freewill, so I guess I could be missing something.

Re: An Argument About Free Will

Posted: Tue Aug 30, 2011 6:11 pm
by lancek4
blackbox wrote:Does anyone reading this post care to comment on my assertion that appealing to moral notions like responsibility is circular and therefore fallacious? It's a common argument given in support of freewill, so I guess I could be missing something.
I feel I may not have the mental discipline to crack into your statement beyond what you have stated, since I seem to understand and agree. I would only add that, consistent with yours, freewill and responsibility argue and imply each other and therefore circular, and in this, any assertion of choice likewise assumes and relies upon an ethical basis that is unspoken, even as its constituent elements are elaborated upon -- since these too are circular in thier realtion to the other dependant terms.
I do not know an argument against this that does not likewise imply the circularity -- except complete denial.

Re: An Argument About Free Will

Posted: Wed Aug 31, 2011 12:16 am
by blackbox
lancek4 wrote:I feel I may not have the mental discipline to crack into your statement beyond what you have stated, since I seem to understand and agree. I would only add that, consistent with yours, freewill and responsibility argue and imply each other and therefore circular, and in this, any assertion of choice likewise assumes and relies upon an ethical basis that is unspoken, even as its constituent elements are elaborated upon -- since these too are circular in thier realtion to the other dependant terms.
I do not know an argument against this that does not likewise imply the circularity -- except complete denial.
Hey cheers. Although, I can't see that choice has an ethical assumption within it. I do think it suffers from the same problem as concepts such as responsibility, that is, since people have long assumed our choices are free, freedom is assumed as soon as the word "choice" is used. I think this is why many people cannot distinguish between a "choice" and a "free choice". In such discussions, it would be more helpful to use some other descriptor, such as "a decision event" that does not necessarily assume freedom.

Re: An Argument About Free Will

Posted: Wed Aug 31, 2011 2:55 pm
by Thundril
blackbox wrote:
lancek4 wrote:I feel I may not have the mental discipline to crack into your statement beyond what you have stated, since I seem to understand and agree. I would only add that, consistent with yours, freewill and responsibility argue and imply each other and therefore circular, and in this, any assertion of choice likewise assumes and relies upon an ethical basis that is unspoken, even as its constituent elements are elaborated upon -- since these too are circular in thier realtion to the other dependant terms.
I do not know an argument against this that does not likewise imply the circularity -- except complete denial.
Hey cheers. Although, I can't see that choice has an ethical assumption within it. I do think it suffers from the same problem as concepts such as responsibility, that is, since people have long assumed our choices are free, freedom is assumed as soon as the word "choice" is used. I think this is why many people cannot distinguish between a "choice" and a "free choice". In such discussions, it would be more helpful to use some other descriptor, such as "a decision event" that does not necessarily assume freedom.
I also am inclined to the view that our experience of 'choosing' is something that happens to us as a result of a decision-making 'event'. But if that is true, does it imply that this present discussion is itself only the working-out of the relations already pre-existing in the Universe? and to be logically consistent with this view (that our power to choose is fundamentally illusory) really ought we to stop trying to persuade each other of anything? Or indeed does it not imply that we can't follow this thought to it's logical conclusion, and stop debating. Or that if some of us do, that in itself will be only the working-out of all the pre-existing relations and conditions. . . .
Is surrender to the Universe, (Allah, Krishna or whatever you want to call it) the only logical way forward? Must those of us incapable of such surrender start to pretend that we are choosing to argue for our political principles in order that we may still suppose that some of our discussions might make a difference?

Re: An Argument About Free Will

Posted: Wed Aug 31, 2011 3:16 pm
by Notvacka
blackbox wrote:Does anyone reading this post care to comment on my assertion that appealing to moral notions like responsibility is circular and therefore fallacious? It's a common argument given in support of freewill, so I guess I could be missing something.
I have nothing to add to this debate that I haven't said before in other threads in this forum, but I'll gladly quote myself: :D
Notvacka wrote:As for being circular, I suppose all true arguments must be circular, lest they require some leap of faith. After all, what could you possibly say with certainty about existence in a non circular fashion?
Notvacka wrote:As a concept, free will is intrinsically linked to the concept of identity.

Free will and identity are core concepts of the human experience. Both may be mere illusions, but we all experience them, which makes them important.

Who am I? My identity is defined by circumstances and by my actions. Circumstances determine me, but I determine my actions. You could exclude me from the equation and conclude that circumstances determine my actions. But that would be to deny my existence as a human being.

Free will does not exist in a strictly objective sense. Neither do I. (I'm not talking about my body, which could probably be objectively verified to some degree. )

Without free will, we don't exist. And in some perversely objective way, we don't. But that's not how we experience it.

Free will and identity is what we experience between circumstances and actions.

On a purely subjective level, free will is experienced as having alternatives to choose from. On the same subjective level, identity is experienced as being the one doing the choosing.

My point being that the subjective experience is perhaps more important than any objective reality. We don't live in reality anyway, but rather in a collectively constructed and shared illusion.
Notvacka wrote:The key to this, and the beauty of it all, is that we don't know. Living life is like watching a movie you have not seen before. The fact that the movie can only play out one way doesn't spoil it, because you don't know how it will play out. I don't believe that free will exists in reality, but I don't actually live there, I live in the illusion. Knowing that it's an illusion doesn't make any practical difference. (I try to use the word "illusion" without its usual negative connotations here.)

If any of us would have acted differently in any given situation, it would have made a difference. It's just the notion that we could have that is false. If a character in a movie suddenly sits down on the floor in protest, complaining that it's all "just a movie", stating that he won't "play along" anymore (this kind of meta humor can be quite effective sometimes), if he does, it's because it's in the script. The fact that it's in the script doesn't mean that it doesn't matter. The whole movie is of course affected.

I use this film analogy to illustrate that any notion of breaking out of the illusion is pointless. We might reveal the illusion for what it is, but we can't escape it.

Re: An Argument About Free Will

Posted: Wed Aug 31, 2011 3:31 pm
by Thundril
Notvacka wrote: If any of us would have acted differently in any given situation, it would have made a difference. It's just the notion that we could have that is false. If a character in a movie suddenly sits down on the floor in protest, complaining that it's all "just a movie", stating that he won't "play along" anymore (this kind of meta humor can be quite effective sometimes),if he does, it's because it's in the script. The fact that it's in the script doesn't mean that it doesn't matter.
Brechtian theatre calls this technique alienation; it's purpose is to remind the audience that they are watching a play. Specifically, it is used to make clear the distinction between the play and the real world. In the real world, (in Brecht's view) we are not merely watchers of an unfolding scene; we can change the world by our active choices.
Without this capacity to choose to act, we return to the position of passive observers, even of our own words and actions. I greatly dislike this position, but I'm not sure how to get out of it. Normally, I manage by forgetting about it, and proceeding as though I had a power of choosing.

Re: An Argument About Free Will

Posted: Wed Aug 31, 2011 4:34 pm
by Notvacka
Thundril wrote:Without this capacity to choose to act, we return to the position of passive observers, even of our own words and actions. I greatly dislike this position, but I'm not sure how to get out of it. Normally, I manage by forgetting about it, and proceeding as though I had a power of choosing.
Yes. There is no other way to live than to "forget" about such things. The determinist perspective is only useful in retrospect, when you judge your own actions or the actions of others. We must live in the moment (how often are we not told to live in the moment?) though the moment is a "mere" illusion. I find myself constantly repeating that we don't live in "reality", and that the notion of "reality" is of limited use to us.

Re: An Argument About Free Will

Posted: Wed Aug 31, 2011 6:56 pm
by Thundril
This won't do for me, Notvacka. I (the long tangled skein of interconnecting events that constitutes whatever it is that is thinking 'I') have this connection to something I call reality. You admit (though in different words) that reality exists. It seems to me you choose to use some words differently, to persuade yourself that it's OK to forget that reality exists, and proceed as if what is going on in your head is itself 'reality'.
A reasonable approach, if you can manage it. But I can't pretend to that extent. Reality exists. Our current SR view of space-time seems to leave us with either total determinism or a magical 'ghost in the machine' which allows us to cause some particles (even if only with our brains) to move in ways other than the way they would move if we didn't 'persuade' them.
I'm not satisfied that the purely deterministic view can account for my own experience of 'choosing'; or for my own feeling that political and moral discourse are important and worthwhile: but nor do I feel that recourse to magical substitutes for explanation are any good either. I guess the only position I can accept for myself is 'I don't understand how this works. Yet.'

Re: An Argument About Free Will

Posted: Wed Aug 31, 2011 9:13 pm
by Notvacka
Thundril wrote:This won't do for me, Notvacka. I (the long tangled skein of interconnecting events that constitutes whatever it is that is thinking 'I') have this connection to something I call reality. You admit (though in different words) that reality exists. It seems to me you choose to use some words differently, to persuade yourself that it's OK to forget that reality exists, and proceed as if what is going on in your head is itself 'reality'.
Something like that, yes. Though I don't have to "persuade" myself, since notions like "now" and "free will" are things I experience all the time. The idea of a static four-dimensional world might represent "reality" better, but you have to admit that you too experience writing these posts of your own free will, and that it takes some effort to really believe that you could not have chosen to do something else instead! Your "connection" to reality is through your senses, and as tenous as mine.

But I don't think it's OK to forget that reality exists, and neither do I think of what's going on in my head as reality. My point is that physical reality (matter) and conscious imagination (mind) are different forms of existence, and I choose to view mind as more important because it's closer to me and what I am. "The long tangled skein of interconnecting events that constitutes whatever it is that is thinking I" is not me. The experience of being me is me. I don't deny "reality", I just don't believe it's all there is.

You can view our movement through time, our experience of free will and our sense of self as illusions. From a materialist standpoint, they are, since they don't correspond to anything in physical reality. I view them as every day experiences of the supernatural. Yes, like "God", they are things that I believe in, though I don't believe that they exist in reality.
Thundril wrote:A reasonable approach, if you can manage it. But I can't pretend to that extent. Reality exists. Our current SR view of space-time seems to leave us with either total determinism or a magical 'ghost in the machine' which allows us to cause some particles (even if only with our brains) to move in ways other than the way they would move if we didn't 'persuade' them.
I'm not satisfied that the purely deterministic view can account for my own experience of 'choosing'; or for my own feeling that political and moral discourse are important and worthwhile: but nor do I feel that recourse to magical substitutes for explanation are any good either. I guess the only position I can accept for myself is 'I don't understand how this works. Yet.'
Seems like yours is a reasonable approach too. I also accept for myself that I don't understand how this works. Yet. :)

You might consider my "substitutes for explanation" magical or religious (I'm a theist after all) and they might constitue a recourse of sorts. But I don't pretend to any extent. My beliefs are what they are; beliefs. Thinking everything through is an effort of course, but believing is not. And I don't practise magic or religion.

My earlier film analogy is perhaps a more literal description of how I view life than it first might seem.

I believe that the soul is something we experience as "me, here, now", something that exists in our imagination as well as in some supernatural realm outside reality. I believe that the soul interacts with reality much like you would with a movie. For the duration of the movie, what you experience is the movie, while you (mostly) forget the real world around you. In a (somewhat) similar manner, for the duration of your human life, your soul forgets what (supernatural entity) it is and experience the "movie" that is your life on earth.

Having this view doesn't mean that I believe in all sorts of supernatural crap. People who practise religion or magic usually believe that they can manipulate or somehow cheat reality through supernatural means. I'm not into that. I'm here to experience the movie. 8)

Re: An Argument About Free Will

Posted: Wed Aug 31, 2011 9:33 pm
by Thundril
Notvacka wrote:
Thundril wrote:This won't do for me, Notvacka. I (the long tangled skein of interconnecting events that constitutes whatever it is that is thinking 'I') have this connection to something I call reality. You admit (though in different words) that reality exists. It seems to me you choose to use some words differently, to persuade yourself that it's OK to forget that reality exists, and proceed as if what is going on in your head is itself 'reality'.
Something like that, yes. Though I don't have to "persuade" myself, since notions like "now" and "free will" are things I experience all the time. The idea of a static four-dimensional world might represent "reality" better, but you have to admit that you too experience writing these posts of your own free will, and that it takes some effort to really believe that you could not have chosen to do something else instead! Your "connection" to reality is through your senses, and as tenous as mine.

But I don't think it's OK to forget that reality exists, and neither do I think of what's going on in my head as reality. My point is that physical reality (matter) and conscious imagination (mind) are different forms of existence, and I choose to view mind as more important because it's closer to me and what I am. "The long tangled skein of interconnecting events that constitutes whatever it is that is thinking I" is not me. The experience of being me is me. I don't deny "reality", I just don't believe it's all there is.

You can view our movement through time, our experience of free will and our sense of self as illusions. From a materialist standpoint, they are, since they don't correspond to anything in physical reality. I view them as every day experiences of the supernatural. Yes, like "God", they are things that I believe in, though I don't believe that they exist in reality.
Thundril wrote:A reasonable approach, if you can manage it. But I can't pretend to that extent. Reality exists. Our current SR view of space-time seems to leave us with either total determinism or a magical 'ghost in the machine' which allows us to cause some particles (even if only with our brains) to move in ways other than the way they would move if we didn't 'persuade' them.
I'm not satisfied that the purely deterministic view can account for my own experience of 'choosing'; or for my own feeling that political and moral discourse are important and worthwhile: but nor do I feel that recourse to magical substitutes for explanation are any good either. I guess the only position I can accept for myself is 'I don't understand how this works. Yet.'
Seems like yours is a reasonable approach too. I also accept for myself that I don't understand how this works. Yet. :)

You might consider my "substitutes for explanation" magical or religious (I'm a theist after all) and they might constitue a recourse of sorts. But I don't pretend to any extent. My beliefs are what they are; beliefs. Thinking everything through is an effort of course, but believing is not. And I don't practise magic or religion.

My earlier film analogy is perhaps a more literal description of how I view life than it first might seem.

I believe that the soul is something we experience as "me, here, now", something that exists in our imagination as well as in some supernatural realm outside reality. I believe that the soul interacts with reality much like you would with a movie. For the duration of the movie, what you experience is the movie, while you (mostly) forget the real world around you. In a (somewhat) similar manner, for the duration of your human life, your soul forgets what (supernatural entity) it is and experience the "movie" that is your life on earth.

Having this view doesn't mean that I believe in all sorts of supernatural crap. People who practise religion or magic usually believe that they can manipulate or somehow cheat reality through supernatural means. I'm not into that. I'm here to experience the movie. 8)
You get the tickets, I'll get the popcorn!

Re: An Argument About Free Will

Posted: Thu Sep 01, 2011 5:03 am
by blackbox
Thundril wrote:... does it imply that this present discussion is itself only the working-out of the relations already pre-existing in the Universe? and to be logically consistent with this view (that our power to choose is fundamentally illusory) really ought we to stop trying to persuade each other of anything? Or indeed does it not imply that we can't follow this thought to it's logical conclusion, and stop debating. Or that if some of us do, that in itself will be only the working-out of all the pre-existing relations and conditions. . . .
Is surrender to the Universe, (Allah, Krishna or whatever you want to call it) the only logical way forward? Must those of us incapable of such surrender start to pretend that we are choosing to argue for our political principles in order that we may still suppose that some of our discussions might make a difference?
The interesting word for me here is "only". Yes, I think determinism holds that this discussion is the working out of causal antecedents, some of which we may be aware of, the vast majority we are oblivious to. But why do we (and I think this is a common reaction) react to this understanding as if it is somehow inferior, that it's a letdown, an "only"? I must say, the longer I've considered this issue, the more my initial repugnance has dissipated. I see it now as very explanatory, obvious, even, and not at all threatening or inferior.

For example, some people have a certain gene that makes them, when they taste water with a particular chemical in it, spit it out in horror at its bitter taste. Other people can taste the same thing and not notice any bitterness at all. The gene is a causal antecedent. It explains the variance in individual reaction to the same chemical. There's nothing strange in this, and yet we do often react negatively to the idea that everything we do/think/say, are the result of previous causes.

I've wondered for a long time how reason could be understandable within determinism, and your questions about the implications determinism has for debate reminds me of that same question. My best answer on this is here, if you're interested: viewtopic.php?f=10&t=7132

Re: An Argument About Free Will

Posted: Thu Sep 01, 2011 1:34 pm
by MGL
Rebecca Massey-Chase said:

"I hope that those advocating free will agree that we make choices for reasons, or their definition of free will must then entail arbitrary decisions"

I am puzzled by this presumption, especially because it is precisely because I can make arbitrary decisions that I consider myself as having a free will. Of course any arbitrary decision I make is always constrained by the context of circumstances, beliefs and desires that could be environmentally, culturally and biologically determined. But if I face a choice between options I cannot find a reason to compel me one way or the other, I will make an arbitrary choice. Whetever I decide upon may be based on processes that are unconscious and these could be deterministic of course. But even if we assume they are - what if I decided to make my choice based on the results of a quantum dice. Then my behaviour will be indirectly indeterministic. If this is possible, why could I not rely on a natural internal quantum dice? After all, there are bioligical processes that depend on quantum processes. Photosysnthesis I believe is one.

When Sartre said we are condemned to be free, I understood as him meaning that our freedom entails the dreadful responsibility of having to make choices whitout always knowing what the correct one should be. The view that simple indeterminism does not equate to free will becasue we are then at the mercy of indeterministic forces rather than determinstic ones presumes that there is a distinction to be made between those forces and the conscious entity we identify as ourselves.