Chaz:
Okay. I queried you objection the the equation morality = a code of conduct, because I believe that morality can be nothing but a list of rules based on contingent and ad hoc historical and social circumstances.
Because you "believe"...? I can show otherwise. The above is a textbook example of affirming the consequent. If the premiss is "morality refers to codes of conduct", then "because I believe morality can be nothing but a set of rules based on, etc" is not very compelling support, and not at all indicative of the reasoning capability necessary to comprehend my position
unless there is much paving the way on my part. Given certain - yet to have been realized - conditions, I'm more that willing to do that. In fact, I
welcome the opportunity to bear the burden of proof regarding my own claims. I am of the position that if one cannot come to meaningful and coherent terms in order to describe their own thought/belief, then they do not know what it is that they think/believe.
I reject any claim, i think, that morality can be anything beyond which people believe is the right thing to do.
That commonly held notion plays a variable role in the methodology required for analyzing the common conception of morality, but it is
not sufficient for properly identifying morality. Following from the above - because we know that codes of conduct can and do vary with individual particulars, such as familial and cultural(social) influences(belief and values), the notion of what is
believed to be 'the right thing to do' varies accordingly. It corresponds to personal belief that, upon examination and comparison, is extant within a limited number of particular cases. That is because 'moral' belief grounds the notions of 'right/wrong' and 'good/evil'. Most 'moral' belief does not necessarily follow from universal morality. Therefore, much of what is commonly called 'moral' issues, are anything but. Thus, 'the right thing to do' line of thinking concludes that morality is subject to familial/cultural thought/belief, and/or traditional values which are created within, and is/are therefore
subject to the mind(thought/belief).
Again, I do not find this very objection very engaging. It seems to represent the same 'ole story with the same 'ole gounds, and is a well-worn and mistaken path for the identification of morality. I can only hope that your future rejoinders begin to take note of the differences between what little I've written and what you are evidently presupposing. Judging by the content of your response, those presuppositions have a high degree of influence upon the thought/belief that follows. These have included but are not limited to, the numerous non sequiturs expressed throughout your reply. The following is prima facie evidence of just that.
TO go further would be an appeal to a divine legislative authority; or a set of Platonic values that exist out there in the ether somewhere.
Poisoning the well with false dilemma based upon a non-sequitur. Presupposing being privy to another's current and/or future mental activities tends to negatively alter that which can be mentally apprehended. Confirmation bias. Given the fact that you're
not yet privy to my position or it's ground, it is quite clear to me that your rejoinders are sorely lacking.
In practice there is no 'absolute' from which to draw a distinction between a thing believed and that thing, because, say, if you believe killing is wrong, there is nothing more than that - a belief.
As I've
already said, I
do not argue 'absolutes', unless that is, I'm pointing the inherent self-contraction contained in the all too common, intellectual and philosophically immature claim that "there are no absolutes". That
is an absolute claim, in and of itself. As such, it is self-defeating.

On another note, why invoke the terms 'right and wrong' to argue against what I've written? I didn't invoke them in support of my position - nor would I. They do not, themselves, do much to facilitate the ability to understand what morality is. I'm putting it to you that the conventional conception of morality is wrong. In order for a reader to understand how I justify that claim, s/he must first pay close attention.
As Hobbes might have put it: Good is that which pleaseth man; Evil is that which pleaseth him not.
No argument here. "Good and evil" along with "right and wrong" are conclusions mistakenly stated as thought they are matters of fact. They're grounded upon pre-existing 'moral' belief, and constitute ground for utterances of ought. "One ought not murder" is grounded upon the belief that murder is wrong for everybody. That belief, as all thought/belief does, necessarily presupposes it's own 'loose' truth/reality correspondence; to the way things are. I do not argue 'oughts', neither will I engage in arguing about 'right/wrong' nor 'good/evil'. In fact, we most likely would agree. Rather, my position has simple premisses/axioms. One of those being, that which is immoral conflicts with morality. That which is moral does not.
Thus, due to this simple foundation, the need arises to properly identify morality.
It is a ridiculous claim characteristic of a Theistic way of thinking to assert that morality is an emergent property of the Universe, when there is only evidence to suggest that it is only a property of human thinking. No humans = no morality. It is subject to human need.
Tell me, if you could/would...
1. Enumerate
all of the "characteristic[s]
of a Theistic way of thinking"?
2. Do those constitute necessary and sufficent evidence/reason to conclude that if any and/or all are present, then we must only conclude that the claim itself
is necessarily "ridiculous", and therefore we must dismiss it prior to contemplation?
3. The claim clearly said "the universe
and/or it's contents". That was not included.
4. Misrepresenting what
is written via omission, whether intentional/deliberate or accidental, is a misrepresentation none-the-less. For now, I'm giving the benefit of doubt. Call it well-intended charity.
Now to the simple point...
5. Humans
are contents of the universe. That is a fact.
6. You're open admission that morality
is a property of human thought/belief (inadvertantly?) renders you're position unjustifiable. You've just removed your own ground while simultaneuosly aligning your own position with the very thing that you earlier called "a ridiculous claim characteristic of a Theistic way of thinking".
Again, not very interesting, nor compelling.
Your paragraph begining "Morality" and ending "meta-ethical" is incoherent.
Evidently we have two very different notions of what constitutes being "incoherent". You've baldly asserted incoherence on my part, and I've actively shown how yours is. Ironically enough, that is the first time that that has been said about that particular description. Given that the objection began by
denying morality as a property, and later contrary to that denial, called it
a property of thought/belief leaves little more to be said on my part. You've succeeded in rendering your own position untenable.
As for LP - you still have not answered my questions.
I'm not interested in discussing modern day ethics. I'm analyzing that which necessarily grounds it.
LP might seem like a good way to begin the analysis of morality, but I doubt whether it has much utility.
You're entitled to personal doubt. Given that doubt itself is necessarily grounded upon pre-existing belief(s), for clarity's sake alone, would you care to openly and clearly assert that belief(or set thereof), and then justify holding it(them)? Perhaps then you would also be willing to take the time to figure out whether or not those particular beliefs match up to my position, prior to posting.