Philosophy Now Forum

I'm taking a class in Philosophy of Science at college, and we're studying the distinction between "science" and "pseudo-science". The articles we're reading by Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, Paul Thagard, Michael Ruse, and Larry Laudan somehow miss the mark, in my opinion: The two categories are poorly chosen, and "pseudo-science" is pejorative.

I've chosen to recast the discussion in terms of three categories of activity by which human beings try to make sense of the world. These categories (the topic title) are "Science", "Potential-Science" and "Speculation". I will try to define these terms without assuming “science” is more respectable, in some sense, than the other two activities.  I avoid the term “Pseudo-Science” and try to neutralize the disdainful attitude that term arouses in many people, including myself.  I hope the terms “Potential-science" and “Speculation” are not only more neutral, but also better categories for comparison with “Science”. 

In defining these three human activities, I will address (1) the nature of the activity, (2) the purpose of the activity, and (3) the result of the activity. These definitions do not necessarily draw clear “demarcation lines” among the three concepts.  

Science

Nature of activity

(a) Observation of  objects, phenomena and their behavior in the world that can be detected or observed or measured by the primary human senses (such as sight) or by extensions of those senses (such as microscope).  This includes experimentation -- observation of the interactions, correlations, behavior, or other relations among objects and phenomena according to some plan of study.  Observation consists of describing or recording the presence, behavior, or status of the objects and phenomena in terms of the human senses or their extensions.  Quantification is a predominant feature, but qualification is also a feature.

(b)  Precise explanation or prediction of the behavior or final state of specified objects and phenomena (subjects of study) according to recipes or formulas or theories, based on or applied to the initial state or behavior of the subjects of study.  The objects, phenomena, behavior or state explained/predicted, and the initial state of the subjects of study are all assumed to be observable by human senses or their extensions, often through quantification.  The recipes or formulas or theory often involve mathematical principles and expressions, and are based on the assumption that causation, interactions, correlations, effects, or other types of relationship exist among the objects of study (it is assumed they can have an influence on each other).

(c)  Testing of explanations or predictions based on a given recipe or theory or formula through experimentation (observation according to a study plan).  The tests may lead to verification (corroboration) of the theory or to contradiction of the theory -- not necessarily “proof” or “disproof”.

(d)  Development of new recipes, formulas, or theories for explanation or prediction.

Activity (a) can occur without (b).  Thus science may be purely descriptive or experimental - counting, measuring, qualifying, quantifying the observable objects and phenomena and their interactions in various situations.  Activity (b) might be called predictive or analytical science. 

Purpose of activity

(a) To gain advantages in living in the world of observable objects and phenomena: For example, economic advantage, better food, clothing, shelter and other living conditions, defense against, control of, or neutralizing of enemies, gaining power, dealing with power.

(b) To experience aesthetic or intellectual pleasure or stimulation.

Result of activity

Often the achievement of the purposes listed.  Also the development of new recipes, formulas, or theories which improve explanations or predictions.

Examples of science are physics, cooking, architecture, manufacturing cars and computers and cellos, biology.

Potential-science

Nature of activity 

(a) Same as in the case of “science”, except that the objects and phenomena are not as strictly defined because they are more difficult to observe or classify or because effective means and methods of observation have yet to be devised.  Qualification is more common, but quantification is also present.

(b) Same as in the case of “science”, except that the explanations and predictions are less strict or precise.  Mathematical expressions corresponding to quantification are less common.

(c) Same as for “science”.

Purpose and results are the same as for science.  A common perception is that science gives better results, but potential-science often addresses objects and phenomena that are especially difficult to observe. In some areas, it may become science with better methods of detection and observation.

Examples of potential-science are sociology, economics, business management, sport fishing.

Speculation

Nature of activity

(a)  Observation of objects and phenomena in the world by means of the human senses and their extensions;  or imagining or dreaming of objects and phenomena that have or have not been directly observed.  Quantification of observations and designed experiments to gather observations are rare but not precluded; thought experiments are common.

(b)  Development of definitions of, and assumptions regarding objects and phenomena, observed or imaginary.

(c)  Use of logic or other process of thought, feeling, compromise, or consent to make conclusions, statements, or predictions about the objects and phenomena and their relationships and behavior.

(d)  Criticize or verify other speculative systems or develop a new speculative system.

Note:  Mathematics, especially pure mathematics, can thus be put in the class of “Speculation”.  When used to develop or provide formulas and theories for science and potential-science, the objects and phenomena defined and thought about within mathematics are replaced by quantification or characterizations of “corresponding” objects and phenomena observed within science activity.

Purpose of activity

(a) Provide a source of potential formulas, theory, or other system for understanding the world.  Mathematics in particular provides a source of formulas and theory to support explanations and predictions within science and potential-science.

(b) Intellectual or aesthetic pleasure or stimulation, emotional comfort.

Result of activity - often the achievement of the purposes listed.  

Examples of speculation:  Mathematics; belief/faith systems or social systems such as Christianity, Islam, secular humanism, capitalism, socialism; political science, investing in the stock market, philosophy, and writing history.

I realize that you are in class and have a rigorous schedule, but
have you ever considered Jaques Lacan.
He proposes three orders of reality:(generally defined they go:)
the Symbolic: the world of things that can be known; 'of the object'.
the Imaginary: the world of thoughts where things may not be what they seem.
the Real: that which is 'of the subject'; that which cannot be known or symbolized.

I wonder how are the categories of science and such defined, and how are these definitions based in a limited and arbitrary designation of what reality is?

How do these categories contribute and or help with our situation of world probelms?
In what way does a scientific solution to a problem contribute to more, aggrivateing problems?

I think pseudo-science is a good category for the sake that it points out malpractice, how science is not to be conducted!

I also find the case of Calory/Caloric-theory to be one of great teaching, a bad example, although scientific-practice at the time, it has lost the battle versus the competitor.

To continue to point out both the winners and the losers may give us a pattern or way of thinking that yields good scientific results in the future (and save us some resources).

The case against the category of pseudo-science is not well accounted for here, I think.

Aetixintro wrote:I think pseudo-science is a good category for the sake that it points out malpractice, how science is not to be conducted!

I also find the case of Calory/Caloric-theory to be one of great teaching, a bad example, although scientific-practice at the time, it has lost the battle versus the competitor.

To continue to point out both the winners and the losers may give us a pattern or way of thinking that yields good scientific results in the future (and save us some resources).

The case against the category of pseudo-science is not well accounted for here, I think.

Are you making a point against Lacan with pseudo science? Im not sure, but if you are, I think you had best consult your professors about that.

I see that you are young and invested in 'things' and 'success'. thats typical of youth. Very good. it is as it should be.
But if you want to discuss philosophic ideas, you should decide if you are going to only concern yourself with method, because then you are not considering philosophy, but only dogma. Science is a good problem solver for many things but it is a limited discourse. And its applications beyond its scope are the reasons behind the problems of today.
I hope you can have some hubris in your religious science.

Oh -
The Philosophy of Science, if it is teching you what is reflected in your paper, is a misnomer. What is should be called is 'the Methodology of considering scientific discourse'. Philosophy of science would ask questions concerning the validity of science and how its modes might be incorrect (and correct).
Just a note. Bring it to your professor and ask him if his philosophical position is separate from his careeer.

Mike Strand wrote:I'm taking a class in Philosophy of Science at college, and we're studying the distinction between "science" and "pseudo-science". The articles we're reading by Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, Paul Thagard, Michael Ruse, and Larry Laudan somehow miss the mark, in my opinion: The two categories are poorly chosen, and "pseudo-science" is pejorative.

I've chosen to recast the discussion in terms of three categories of activity by which human beings try to make sense of the world. These categories (the topic title) are "Science", "Potential-Science" and "Speculation". I will try to define these terms without assuming “science” is more respectable, in some sense, than the other two activities.  I avoid the term “Pseudo-Science” and try to neutralize the disdainful attitude that term arouses in many people, including myself.  I hope the terms “Potential-science" and “Speculation” are not only more neutral, but also better categories for comparison with “Science”. 

In defining these three human activities, I will address (1) the nature of the activity, (2) the purpose of the activity, and (3) the result of the activity. These definitions do not necessarily draw clear “demarcation lines” among the three concepts.  

Science

Nature of activity

(a) Observation of  objects, phenomena and their behavior in the world that can be detected or observed or measured by the primary human senses (such as sight) or by extensions of those senses (such as microscope).  This includes experimentation -- observation of the interactions, correlations, behavior, or other relations among objects and phenomena according to some plan of study.  Observation consists of describing or recording the presence, behavior, or status of the objects and phenomena in terms of the human senses or their extensions.  Quantification is a predominant feature, but qualification is also a feature.

(b)  Precise explanation or prediction of the behavior or final state of specified objects and phenomena (subjects of study) according to recipes or formulas or theories, based on or applied to the initial state or behavior of the subjects of study.  The objects, phenomena, behavior or state explained/predicted, and the initial state of the subjects of study are all assumed to be observable by human senses or their extensions, often through quantification.  The recipes or formulas or theory often involve mathematical principles and expressions, and are based on the assumption that causation, interactions, correlations, effects, or other types of relationship exist among the objects of study (it is assumed they can have an influence on each other).

(c)  Testing of explanations or predictions based on a given recipe or theory or formula through experimentation (observation according to a study plan).  The tests may lead to verification (corroboration) of the theory or to contradiction of the theory -- not necessarily “proof” or “disproof”.

(d)  Development of new recipes, formulas, or theories for explanation or prediction.

Activity (a) can occur without (b).  Thus science may be purely descriptive or experimental - counting, measuring, qualifying, quantifying the observable objects and phenomena and their interactions in various situations.  Activity (b) might be called predictive or analytical science. 

Purpose of activity

(a) To gain advantages in living in the world of observable objects and phenomena: For example, economic advantage, better food, clothing, shelter and other living conditions, defense against, control of, or neutralizing of enemies, gaining power, dealing with power.

(b) To experience aesthetic or intellectual pleasure or stimulation.

Result of activity

Often the achievement of the purposes listed.  Also the development of new recipes, formulas, or theories which improve explanations or predictions.

Examples of science are physics, cooking, architecture, manufacturing cars and computers and cellos, biology.

Potential-science

Nature of activity 

(a) Same as in the case of “science”, except that the objects and phenomena are not as strictly defined because they are more difficult to observe or classify or because effective means and methods of observation have yet to be devised.  Qualification is more common, but quantification is also present.

(b) Same as in the case of “science”, except that the explanations and predictions are less strict or precise.  Mathematical expressions corresponding to quantification are less common.

(c) Same as for “science”.

Purpose and results are the same as for science.  A common perception is that science gives better results, but potential-science often addresses objects and phenomena that are especially difficult to observe. In some areas, it may become science with better methods of detection and observation.

Examples of potential-science are sociology, economics, business management, sport fishing.

Speculation

Nature of activity

(a)  Observation of objects and phenomena in the world by means of the human senses and their extensions;  or imagining or dreaming of objects and phenomena that have or have not been directly observed.  Quantification of observations and designed experiments to gather observations are rare but not precluded; thought experiments are common.

(b)  Development of definitions of, and assumptions regarding objects and phenomena, observed or imaginary.

(c)  Use of logic or other process of thought, feeling, compromise, or consent to make conclusions, statements, or predictions about the objects and phenomena and their relationships and behavior.

(d)  Criticize or verify other speculative systems or develop a new speculative system.

Note:  Mathematics, especially pure mathematics, can thus be put in the class of “Speculation”.  When used to develop or provide formulas and theories for science and potential-science, the objects and phenomena defined and thought about within mathematics are replaced by quantification or characterizations of “corresponding” objects and phenomena observed within science activity.

Purpose of activity

(a) Provide a source of potential formulas, theory, or other system for understanding the world.  Mathematics in particular provides a source of formulas and theory to support explanations and predictions within science and potential-science.

(b) Intellectual or aesthetic pleasure or stimulation, emotional comfort.

Result of activity - often the achievement of the purposes listed.  

Examples of speculation:  Mathematics; belief/faith systems or social systems such as Christianity, Islam, secular humanism, capitalism, socialism; political science, investing in the stock market, philosophy, and writing history.

I think I would understand your categories better if there were examples of historic efforts included.

I think Proto-science may be the same as "potential science".

Your definitions don't touch the field of that which is encompassed by the term you avoid: Pseudoscience is the realm of those hypotheses and methods which have been debunked by real science.

Aetixintro wrote:I think pseudo-science is a good category for the sake that it points out malpractice, how science is not to be conducted!

I also find the case of Calory/Caloric-theory to be one of great teaching, a bad example, although scientific-practice at the time, it has lost the battle versus the competitor.

To continue to point out both the winners and the losers may give us a pattern or way of thinking that yields good scientific results in the future (and save us some resources).

The case against the category of pseudo-science is not well accounted for here, I think.

Yes. It's interesting how a scientific theory can slide into pseudoscience in the historical context. The geocentric model was also a good scientific theory until the evidence for the heliocentric one started to pile up. Someone who would then claim that phenomena are described more accurately in a geocentric model would be engaging in pseudoscience.

Thanks, I blame blame, lancek4, groktruth, and Aetixintro, for your comments. I apologize for not getting back sooner.

To me, pseudo-science takes two forms: (1) faked science, such as purposeful faking of data or calculations or purposeful bending of logic, or use of obscure reasoning to support a pet theory, in the hope of gaining something while not being found out; and (2) unskilled use of the scientific method -- such that "good" scientists" could easily detect the shortcomings of the associated data-gathering, experiments, calculations, or reasoning.

I want to avoid the use of "pseudo-science" as referring to ideas that were developed through conscientious and skilled use of the scientific method, but were later refined or refuted with new discoveries or new data. For example, I wouldn't call Newton's theories pseudo-science just because they don't work well at the subatomic scale or at high velocities (near the speed of light).

My original post establishing this topic was to categorize three approaches to understanding the world, not necessarily in competition with each other. Their subject matter varies a lot from one approach to the other. Some subjects are difficult to address in a strict sense using the scientific method because of lack of precise and accurate measurement tools, or because of lack of data. This leads to potential science (proto-science) or speculative reasoning (say, about the existence of God).

Mike Strand wrote:Thanks, I blame blame, lancek4, groktruth, and Aetixintro, for your comments. I apologize for not getting back sooner.

To me, pseudo-science takes two forms: (1) faked science, such as purposeful faking of data or calculations or purposeful bending of logic, or use of obscure reasoning to support a pet theory, in the hope of gaining something while not being found out; and (2) unskilled use of the scientific method -- such that "good" scientists" could easily detect the shortcomings of the associated data-gathering, experiments, calculations, or reasoning.

I want to avoid the use of "pseudo-science" as referring to ideas that were developed through conscientious and skilled use of the scientific method, but were later refined or refuted with new discoveries or new data. For example, I wouldn't call Newton's theories pseudo-science just because they don't work well at the subatomic scale or at high velocities (near the speed of light).

My original post establishing this topic was to categorize three approaches to understanding the world, not necessarily in competition with each other. Their subject matter varies a lot from one approach to the other. Some subjects are difficult to address in a strict sense using the scientific method because of lack of precise and accurate measurement tools, or because of lack of data. This leads to potential science (proto-science) or speculative reasoning (say, about the existence of God).

I just thought about another form that pseudoscience can take: A framework of untestable hypotheses that are claimed to be scientific. Speculative reasoning that can potentially be tested or whose advocates don't claim it to be scientific would probably not be pseudoscience.

Thank you, i blame blame, for pointing out a third type of pseudo-science.

Karl Popper would certainly agree (if I understand him correctly), that an untestable hypothesis is not a scientific hypothesis. And it may not be clear to many folks that such theory, claimed to be scientific, isn't testable, and so the proponent is putting one over on such a person. Thus the theory can be viewed as pseudo-science, not only in the strict sense of Popper, but also in view of the false impression it may give to members of the public.