A Synthesis of the Computational Theory of Mind, Process Philosophy and Naturalistic Meaning
Posted: Fri Nov 21, 2025 8:31 am
The computational theory of mind (CTM) is a mechanistic view of cognition, and thus a mechanistic view of mind. It views mental processing as the manipulation of symbols in working memory under the direction of a central executive. There are many criticisms of CTM; one major criticism is that CTM relies on an internal interpreter, or homunculus. Another criticism of CTM is that CTM cannot provide a grounded definition of meaning. Representations in CTM are treated as static, and CTM has no account of how to explain consciousness or qualia. These limitations of CTM can be addressed, and CTM's limitations can be resolved into a coherent framework, by combining CTM with process philosophy, a naturalized definition of meaning, and a processual ontology informed by quantum physics.
In this synthesis, meaning is objective and exists within causal structure. The patterns in the world – whether they be the rings on a tree, footprints in the sand, or the magnetic states of a bar magnet -- contain information because of lawful relationships between them, and those lawful relationships exist independently of any observer. Charles Sanders Peirce's interpretant is naturally realized through Whitehead's concept of prehension: each actual occasion (the basic unit of reality), "feels" or takes in causal input and integrates those inputs into a coherent state which becomes a datum for future actual occasions. Therefore, prehension is a primitive form of both interpretation and experience, and allows for triadic semiosis to take place without any requirement for consciousness. Consciousness/mind is not fundamental. Information/meaning is.
CTM can be understood as a computational instantiation of prehensions. Working memory can be thought of as a series of actual occasions that maintain and integrate symbolic representations over time, while the central executive directs selective and goal-oriented prehensions. The conscious experience and qualia that we have arise from a network of recursive prehensions, where the primitive feelings in individual occasions are integrated in time and in relation to produce our rich phenomenological experiences. The self-awareness that we have arises when actual occasions do not only prehend external inputs, but also the internal prehensions of other actual occasions, producing nested feedback loops that allow us to develop internal models of ourselves and the world around us.
Similarly, processual explanations can be used to explain object perception. The objects we perceive do not exist as an unchanging entity with existence; they are a series of processes. Appearance depends on how rapidly the processes occur relative to the time it takes for the brain to process them. The slowest processes will appear as objects; the fastest will either blur together or be seen as temporary patterns. Both quantum indetermination and the observer effect support this processual explanation for objects, which indicates that all prehension (the act of perceiving whether by a conscious observer or other physical means), shapes what occurs next and where meaning exists within the relationships between processes.
To further develop the understanding of how (CTM) views cognitive processes, connectionism—a competing idea of CTM—could be utilized to model cognitive processes as dynamic, distributed and adaptively developing networks instead of symbolic manipulation systems. Connectionist architectures are able to model computations over representations through treating their individual or collective units as mini-processes whose states are relational and therefore computationally extended, self-organized and contextual. When combined with a Process Philosophy, such networks could be viewed as generating higher-order actual occasions; wherein the emergent computational dynamics of the network would generate experiential poles, thus providing a basis for understanding conscious experience as the emergent property of relational processes which occur during ongoing activity. In addition to accounting for both functional and information-related properties of cognition, as well as the information related properties of cognitive processes as posited by CTM, this view provides a processual ontology of consciousness, thereby connecting the functionality of cognitive processes to phenomenal experience.
This integrated framework eliminates the static and mechanical constraints of CTM, naturally describes Peirce's three-place semiotic, ties meaning to the causal process, explains both the emergence of qualitative experience (qualia) and consciousness as a result of complex prehensions, identifies self-conscious awareness through nested feedback loops, and creates a computational-observer based, processual understanding of objects that are perceived.
In this synthesis, meaning is objective and exists within causal structure. The patterns in the world – whether they be the rings on a tree, footprints in the sand, or the magnetic states of a bar magnet -- contain information because of lawful relationships between them, and those lawful relationships exist independently of any observer. Charles Sanders Peirce's interpretant is naturally realized through Whitehead's concept of prehension: each actual occasion (the basic unit of reality), "feels" or takes in causal input and integrates those inputs into a coherent state which becomes a datum for future actual occasions. Therefore, prehension is a primitive form of both interpretation and experience, and allows for triadic semiosis to take place without any requirement for consciousness. Consciousness/mind is not fundamental. Information/meaning is.
CTM can be understood as a computational instantiation of prehensions. Working memory can be thought of as a series of actual occasions that maintain and integrate symbolic representations over time, while the central executive directs selective and goal-oriented prehensions. The conscious experience and qualia that we have arise from a network of recursive prehensions, where the primitive feelings in individual occasions are integrated in time and in relation to produce our rich phenomenological experiences. The self-awareness that we have arises when actual occasions do not only prehend external inputs, but also the internal prehensions of other actual occasions, producing nested feedback loops that allow us to develop internal models of ourselves and the world around us.
Similarly, processual explanations can be used to explain object perception. The objects we perceive do not exist as an unchanging entity with existence; they are a series of processes. Appearance depends on how rapidly the processes occur relative to the time it takes for the brain to process them. The slowest processes will appear as objects; the fastest will either blur together or be seen as temporary patterns. Both quantum indetermination and the observer effect support this processual explanation for objects, which indicates that all prehension (the act of perceiving whether by a conscious observer or other physical means), shapes what occurs next and where meaning exists within the relationships between processes.
To further develop the understanding of how (CTM) views cognitive processes, connectionism—a competing idea of CTM—could be utilized to model cognitive processes as dynamic, distributed and adaptively developing networks instead of symbolic manipulation systems. Connectionist architectures are able to model computations over representations through treating their individual or collective units as mini-processes whose states are relational and therefore computationally extended, self-organized and contextual. When combined with a Process Philosophy, such networks could be viewed as generating higher-order actual occasions; wherein the emergent computational dynamics of the network would generate experiential poles, thus providing a basis for understanding conscious experience as the emergent property of relational processes which occur during ongoing activity. In addition to accounting for both functional and information-related properties of cognition, as well as the information related properties of cognitive processes as posited by CTM, this view provides a processual ontology of consciousness, thereby connecting the functionality of cognitive processes to phenomenal experience.
This integrated framework eliminates the static and mechanical constraints of CTM, naturally describes Peirce's three-place semiotic, ties meaning to the causal process, explains both the emergence of qualitative experience (qualia) and consciousness as a result of complex prehensions, identifies self-conscious awareness through nested feedback loops, and creates a computational-observer based, processual understanding of objects that are perceived.