Is Philosophical Knowledge Self-Simulating Contextual Appearances?
Posted: Mon Aug 11, 2025 8:59 am
If all things are purely distinctions, and to make this distinction is a distinction within the distinction that "all things are distinctions", does this necessitate all knowledge, assertion by default as a thing thus a distinction, being a nesting of assertions and what we know as knowledge is nothing other than self-simulating contexts as assertions are relative?
If this is the case and knowledge resorts to purely interwoven contexts then does the chain of reasoning break as all assertions eventually lead to others in a non-linear way, thus further necessitating that rationality is not entirely necessary for knowledge as all assertions are interwoven to such a degree that a purely linear approach to knowing is impossible?
Now given the assertion that linear knowledge is limited within interwoven co-dependent contextual assertions, and knowledge is reduced to other nested distinctions, with "nested distinctions" being a distinction, does this reduce knowledge to merely be "appearance" given any essence within a distinction is also a distinction?
What differs "appearance" from "distinction" given an appearance is a distinction and distinctions appear within the mind?
If distinctions being appearances, appears as an interconnected web, and this web is the looping of distinctions, does this necessitate learning is less of acquiring knowledge and more of actualizing latent processes of thought and memory?
If this is the case and knowledge resorts to purely interwoven contexts then does the chain of reasoning break as all assertions eventually lead to others in a non-linear way, thus further necessitating that rationality is not entirely necessary for knowledge as all assertions are interwoven to such a degree that a purely linear approach to knowing is impossible?
Now given the assertion that linear knowledge is limited within interwoven co-dependent contextual assertions, and knowledge is reduced to other nested distinctions, with "nested distinctions" being a distinction, does this reduce knowledge to merely be "appearance" given any essence within a distinction is also a distinction?
What differs "appearance" from "distinction" given an appearance is a distinction and distinctions appear within the mind?
If distinctions being appearances, appears as an interconnected web, and this web is the looping of distinctions, does this necessitate learning is less of acquiring knowledge and more of actualizing latent processes of thought and memory?