Moral status: robots, foetuses, and healthy patients
Posted: Wed May 07, 2025 11:23 pm
Suppose we build a Mark 1 robot that is conscious but not sentient, i.e. cannot feel pleasure or pain. Because he does not feel pleasure or pain, it cannot matter to him what we do to him, and since it cannot matter to him, it need not matter to us, either. This robot therefore has no moral status.
Now suppose we build a Mark 2 robot. Unlike the Mark 1, this robot can feel pleasure and pain. Because he can feel pleasure and pain, what we do to him matters to him. If we saw the Mark 1 robot's leg off, he has no reason to mind, because it doesn't hurt. If we saw the Mark 2 robot's leg off, he does have a reason to mind: it hurts, so he would rather we didn't. Because what happens to him matters to him, the Mark 2 robot has moral status.
Now suppose we have a kit that will enable us to upgrade the Mark 1 robot to Mark 2. Once we have upgraded the robot, he will have moral status. Does he have moral status already, on the grounds that he can be upgraded? I think not. It's the other way round: the robot will acquire moral status if we upgrade him, but if we don't upgrade him, he will continue to have no moral status.
There is a parallel here with foetuses, human or otherwise. Once a foetus becomes sentient, can feel pleasure or pain, it matters to it what happens to it, so it has moral status. Before it becomes sentient, it feels no pleasure or pain, so it does not matter to it what happens to it, and it therefore has no moral status. Pro-lifers are therefore correct if they say that it is wrong to abort a sentient foetus, but they are incorrect if they say that it is wrong to abort a pre-sentient foetus. The pre-sentient foetus is like the Mark 1 robot awaiting an upgrade to Mark 2; if it gets upgraded, i.e. develops sentience, it will acquire moral status, but if we abort it before that happens, it never acquires moral status, so there is nothing wrong with aborting it at that early stage.
It is a mistake to treat a being with no moral status as if it had moral status. No being is directly wronged by this, but it could indirectly cause harm, e.g. by diverting resources that could have helped some other being or beings.
It is a mistake to treat a being with moral status as if it had no moral status, and in this case, the being so treated is directly wronged. In the surgeon problem, the healthy patient has moral status but is merely used as a source of spare organs, i.e. treated as if he had no moral status, and is therefore wronged. Utilitarians would claim that the good done to the unhealthy patients outweighs the evil done to the healthy patient, but this does not alter the fact that the healthy patient has been wronged.
What determines a being’s moral status? Being a hedonist, I think this must be based somehow on pleasure and pain. An easy case is where an old person and a young person are in a burning building, and only one can be rescued. The young person, we assume, has more net pleasure ahead of them than the old person, and therefore more reason to mind being burned to death. So the young person has higher moral status than the old person.
However, moral status is not just about who has more net pleasure ahead of them; it is essentially about who stands to gain more from an action. Suppose sentient being A is starving, while sentient being B is well-fed. Feeding B will make little improvement to B’s net pleasure, whereas feeding A will make a great improvement to A's net pleasure; so on this issue at this time, A has higher moral status than B.
How much of this is objective? I am satisfied that pleasure is objectively good and pain is objectively bad, and I am satisfied that treating a being in a way that does not conform to their moral status is incorrect and may be wrong. But what if good and right point in different directions? What if the healthy patient is Adolf Hitler at the age of, say, 20? We wrong Hitler if we take his organs, but we do a huge amount of good by killing him before he gets the chance to kill 6 million Jews. Should we avoid wronging Hitler by letting him live, thus allowing a huge evil to occur? Or should we prevent the evil, but wrong Hitler in the process? There seems to be no common currency between good and evil on the one hand, and right and wrong on the other, and so at the present time I see no objective way of deciding this kind of case. It appears to me at present that the choice can only be subjective. But I am still thinking about it.
P.S. I apologise in advance if I am slow to reply to comments. My life continues to be extremely busy. If people prefer not to comment on the grounds that they may not get a quick reply, I quite understand.
Now suppose we build a Mark 2 robot. Unlike the Mark 1, this robot can feel pleasure and pain. Because he can feel pleasure and pain, what we do to him matters to him. If we saw the Mark 1 robot's leg off, he has no reason to mind, because it doesn't hurt. If we saw the Mark 2 robot's leg off, he does have a reason to mind: it hurts, so he would rather we didn't. Because what happens to him matters to him, the Mark 2 robot has moral status.
Now suppose we have a kit that will enable us to upgrade the Mark 1 robot to Mark 2. Once we have upgraded the robot, he will have moral status. Does he have moral status already, on the grounds that he can be upgraded? I think not. It's the other way round: the robot will acquire moral status if we upgrade him, but if we don't upgrade him, he will continue to have no moral status.
There is a parallel here with foetuses, human or otherwise. Once a foetus becomes sentient, can feel pleasure or pain, it matters to it what happens to it, so it has moral status. Before it becomes sentient, it feels no pleasure or pain, so it does not matter to it what happens to it, and it therefore has no moral status. Pro-lifers are therefore correct if they say that it is wrong to abort a sentient foetus, but they are incorrect if they say that it is wrong to abort a pre-sentient foetus. The pre-sentient foetus is like the Mark 1 robot awaiting an upgrade to Mark 2; if it gets upgraded, i.e. develops sentience, it will acquire moral status, but if we abort it before that happens, it never acquires moral status, so there is nothing wrong with aborting it at that early stage.
It is a mistake to treat a being with no moral status as if it had moral status. No being is directly wronged by this, but it could indirectly cause harm, e.g. by diverting resources that could have helped some other being or beings.
It is a mistake to treat a being with moral status as if it had no moral status, and in this case, the being so treated is directly wronged. In the surgeon problem, the healthy patient has moral status but is merely used as a source of spare organs, i.e. treated as if he had no moral status, and is therefore wronged. Utilitarians would claim that the good done to the unhealthy patients outweighs the evil done to the healthy patient, but this does not alter the fact that the healthy patient has been wronged.
What determines a being’s moral status? Being a hedonist, I think this must be based somehow on pleasure and pain. An easy case is where an old person and a young person are in a burning building, and only one can be rescued. The young person, we assume, has more net pleasure ahead of them than the old person, and therefore more reason to mind being burned to death. So the young person has higher moral status than the old person.
However, moral status is not just about who has more net pleasure ahead of them; it is essentially about who stands to gain more from an action. Suppose sentient being A is starving, while sentient being B is well-fed. Feeding B will make little improvement to B’s net pleasure, whereas feeding A will make a great improvement to A's net pleasure; so on this issue at this time, A has higher moral status than B.
How much of this is objective? I am satisfied that pleasure is objectively good and pain is objectively bad, and I am satisfied that treating a being in a way that does not conform to their moral status is incorrect and may be wrong. But what if good and right point in different directions? What if the healthy patient is Adolf Hitler at the age of, say, 20? We wrong Hitler if we take his organs, but we do a huge amount of good by killing him before he gets the chance to kill 6 million Jews. Should we avoid wronging Hitler by letting him live, thus allowing a huge evil to occur? Or should we prevent the evil, but wrong Hitler in the process? There seems to be no common currency between good and evil on the one hand, and right and wrong on the other, and so at the present time I see no objective way of deciding this kind of case. It appears to me at present that the choice can only be subjective. But I am still thinking about it.
P.S. I apologise in advance if I am slow to reply to comments. My life continues to be extremely busy. If people prefer not to comment on the grounds that they may not get a quick reply, I quite understand.