Philosophy Now Forum

Often when I present my views [Kantianism, Constructivism,] grounded on the human conditions, the usual counter is that my views are of solipsism and solipsistic, while the opposers are ignorant 'Solipsism' is an incoherent concept.

The concept of solipsism arise from the dogmatic ideology of philosophical realism [direc/indirect realism, scientific realism][absolute mind-independence] which is grounded on an illusion, thus delusional.

The Incoherence of Solipsism
https://iep.utm.edu/solipsis/#H7
With the belief in the essential privacy of experience eliminated as false, the last presupposition underlying solipsism is removed and solipsism is shown as foundationless, in theory and in fact. One might even say, solipsism is necessarily foundationless, for to make an appeal to logical rules or empirical evidence the solipsist would implicitly have to affirm the very thing that he purportedly refuses to believe: the reality of intersubjectively valid criteria and a public, extra-mental world. There is a temptation to say that solipsism is a false philosophical theory, but this is not quite strong or accurate enough. As a theory, it is incoherent. What makes it incoherent, above all else, is that the solipsist requires a language (that is, a sign-system) to think or to affirm his solipsistic thoughts at all.
Read more at the link above.

Here is a discussion to support my point:

Atla wrote: ↑Sun Nov 03, 2024 10:32 am

Atla the KG wrote:How was Jacobi's solipsistic charge countered by Kant himself?

ChatGpt wrote:Kant directly addressed Jacobi's concerns about solipsism in his later writings, particularly in his Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics and the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. Here’s how Kant himself countered Jacobi’s interpretation:

1. Clarifying Empirical Realism and Transcendental Idealism
Kant was careful to distinguish between what he called empirical realism and transcendental idealism. In his view, transcendental idealism merely states that we can only know things as they appear to us (phenomena) and not as they are in themselves (noumena). This did not mean that external objects do not exist or that we are isolated within our own minds. Instead, he argued that empirical realism (the belief in a stable, external, objective world) is fully compatible with transcendental idealism, as it pertains to how we experience the world rather than what exists.

Kant emphasized that we do experience a shared, structured world of empirical objects in space and time, which exists independently of any one individual’s mind. This shared experience among rational beings, he argued, refuted Jacobi’s interpretation of his system as solipsistic.

No need to go further, Kant absolutely didn't refute Jacobi's charge. He just emphasized the importance of assuming stuff in our solipsistic minds, out of practical necessity. And his lie worked, the rest is history.

The above merely exposed your ignorance and being an ultracrepidarian and a philosophical gnat.

I highlighted to ChatGpt the following;
The Incoherence of Solipsism
https://iep.utm.edu/solipsis/#H7

ChatGpt wrote:Jacobi’s charge of solipsism is indeed questionable, especially considering that solipsism itself may lack coherence as a philosophical concept. Solipsism asserts that only one's own mind is certain to exist, which becomes challenging to defend within a coherent philosophical or scientific framework, particularly when viewed through the lens of scientific antirealism.

Kant’s empirical realism, which emphasizes a shared phenomenal world structured by space, time, and our cognitive faculties, aligns well with scientific antirealism. Scientific antirealism acknowledges that while we interact with and model an empirical world, our scientific theories do not necessarily reveal the ultimate nature of things-in-themselves but rather provide practical, coherent ways of organizing our observations. This perspective supports Kant’s idea that objective knowledge is attainable in the phenomenal realm without making metaphysical claims about the noumenal world.

Under this view, Kant’s empirical realism not only avoids the pitfalls of solipsism but also aligns with the credibility of scientific antirealism, offering a framework that upholds practical realism.
His framework enables intersubjective consistency and empirical knowledge without assuming that our representations mirror things as they exist independently of perception.

Thus, Kant’s response to Jacobi is both more realistic and more objectively credible, aligning with a system that acknowledges the limits of knowledge while maintaining a structured, shared reality.

Atla insisted [relying on an incoherent concept] Kant's Transcendental Idealism /Empirical Realism is solipsistic, but it is countered as otherwise.

What is critical with Kant's view is whether it contribute to the progress of humanity, and it really does.

Discuss??
Above??

Notes:

Notes:

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Mon Nov 04, 2024 3:54 am Often when I present my views [Kantianism, Constructivism,] grounded on the human conditions, the usual counter is that my views are of solipsism and solipsistic, while the opposers are ignorant 'Solipsism' is an incoherent concept.

This would make sense if people don't hold incoherent ideas. Here's the implicit argument so far. People accuse me of solipsism. Solipsism is an incoherent concept. Therefore I cannot believe in an incoherent concept.

Really? People can believe in incoherent concepts?

For me, the problem is not that I think you don't believe in other minds. I would guess you do. It's rather than you have never reconciled your various beliefs with other minds being noumena. Kant tries to solve this by claiming that without common features in all minds we would not have objective knowledge, but I suggest you check critiques of Kant pointing out that this is circular.

Kant of course argues that his is a transcendental approach rather than an empirical one, but his ideas here fall apart in the face of what we have learned via anthropology, (ironicallly) from contructivist critiques of universal psychology, ethnology, comparative sex psychology,´and more fields:
Cognitive Science
Cultural Psychology
Developmental Psychology
Linguistic Anthropology
Neuroscience
Sociology of Knowledge
Environmental Psychology
Evolutionary Psychology
Post-Structuralism
Queer Theory and Gender Studies
Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning
Cross-Cultural Education and Pedagogy
Psychiatry and Clinical Psychology
Comparative Philosophy
Digital Anthropology and Media Studies

All these fields of study put to rest the kind of universal view of experiencing that certain European philosophers, including Kant, assumed.

Futhermore your missing the point completely. One can have contradictory ideas. One can have a belief and interact with others from a solipsistic attitude without even realizing it. One can also not have thought through what one's own beliefs entail.

In addition, the assumption is we have a metaphorially speaking set of binary switches in the brain. I believe X or I don't believe X. When in fact we can have all sorts of gradations of belief, perhaps without even knowing it. The person who wants to not be racist and officially is antiracist who nevertheless treats other races poorly. He is not aware of this. He would answer that he is not racist. He might even criticize others for being racist, but is unaware of his own biases and racism.

It all cuts back to a similar pattern.
Someone says that your position entails X.
Your response is I never said X, so that is a strawman.
Someone says you believe X.
You argue that X is incoherent. (as if one cannot possibly believe something incoherent).

There is a naivte about the human mind that is staggering here. It is as if what is on the surface, the official position, is the only thing that his happening. And that is solipsistic. It is as if you are only surface and the mind is outside.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Mon Nov 04, 2024 3:54 am Often when I present my views [Kantianism, Constructivism,]

Actually word salad, to "present" "your" ideas means that there are other actual people and that you actually present your ideas to them. As a Kantian solipsist you can never actually do that, you just pretend to while talking to yourself.

Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Mon Nov 04, 2024 5:09 am

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Mon Nov 04, 2024 3:54 am Often when I present my views [Kantianism, Constructivism,] grounded on the human conditions, the usual counter is that my views are of solipsism and solipsistic, while the opposers are ignorant 'Solipsism' is an incoherent concept.

This would make sense if people don't hold incoherent ideas. Here's the implicit argument so far. People accuse me of solipsism. Solipsism is an incoherent concept. Therefore I cannot believe in an incoherent concept.

Really? People can believe in incoherent concepts?

You got it wrong, rather it is;

Solipsism is an incoherent concept.
No rational person would accept an incoherent concept
Therefore I do not accept Solipsism as realistic nor tenable.

For me, the problem is not that I think you don't believe in other minds. I would guess you do. It's rather than you have never reconciled your various beliefs with other minds being noumena. Kant tries to solve this by claiming that without common features in all minds we would not have objective knowledge, but I suggest you check critiques of Kant pointing out that this is circular.

You got it wrong again [most of the time in posts with me].
Kant believed in other empirical minds [verified and justified empirically], but not the noumenal mind which is the soul that survives physical death, which is an illusion.
Kant resolved the issue by claiming that without common features in all empirical minds we would not have objective knowledge.

Kant of course argues that his is a transcendental approach rather than an empirical one, but his ideas here fall apart in the face of what we have learned via anthropology, (ironicallly) from contructivist critiques of universal psychology, ethnology, comparative sex psychology,´and more fields:
Cognitive Science
Cultural Psychology
Developmental Psychology
Linguistic Anthropology
Neuroscience
Sociology of Knowledge
Environmental Psychology
Evolutionary Psychology
Post-Structuralism
Queer Theory and Gender Studies
Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning
Cross-Cultural Education and Pedagogy
Psychiatry and Clinical Psychology
Comparative Philosophy
Digital Anthropology and Media Studies

All these fields of study put to rest the kind of universal view of experiencing that certain European philosophers, including Kant, assumed.

Again you are so ignorant.
Kantianism can reconciled with all the above.
There is nothing that is grounded on the human condition that Kantianism cannot deal with.

Kant was touted as the intellectual godfather of cognitive science.
Link
Even the controversial "Critical" Race Theory is traceable to the fundamentals of Kant's Critical Philosophy; it is abused.

All the above are merely sh:t of complains based on ignorance and most probably triggered by cognitive dissonance driven by an existential crisis.

Whilst it is OK to discuss Kant, it is very critical that when you have not read Kant thoroughly [3 years full time] you have understand your limitations and be humbled by it, don't be an ultracrepidarian.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Mon Nov 04, 2024 3:54 am Often when I present my views [Kantianism, Constructivism,]

So, let's focus on the irony here. Kant was saying that we could apriori in a transcendental methodology rather than an empirical one, assume that minds are constructed universally in very similar ways. We can infer this. Unfortunately Kantianism/Constructivism is an oxymoron.

So let’s break this down: Kant’s whole deal was that everyone has these built-in structures in their minds—things like space, time, and causality—that shape how we all experience the world. He thought these were universal, baked into the brains of all rational beings like an operating system. But if you look at what’s come out in the last 50 years or so, a lot of it doesn’t really back that up. Enter the constructivists, who would say, “Hold on a second, that’s way too simple.”

First off, the constructivists argue that our minds are shaped by the world we grow up in, not just by some pre-installed software. Take cultural psychology: this field has shown us that people’s thinking styles, moral reasoning, and even the way they solve problems can be wildly different depending on where they come from. So, the idea that we all process stuff the same way just doesn’t hold water. Sure, Kant might say space and time are universal, but try telling that to someone who grew up in a culture with a cyclical view of time compared to the Western linear one. It’s like comparing apples and... abstract art.

Learning Changes stuff - Now, the constructivist approach says knowledge isn’t just sitting there in our heads, ready to go. We build it as we interact with the world. This is a big deal because it means that how we think and understand isn’t fixed—it grows and changes. If Kant were right, we’d all have identical experiences of reality, but developmental psychology shows us that’s not true. Kids learn differently, people adapt in unique ways, and our environment shapes how we see and process everything.

Let’s talk perception and meaning-making. Kant thought that categories like “causality” were just universal lenses everyone uses to make sense of life. Constructivists call foul on that. They say that perception isn’t a one-size-fits-all deal; it’s influenced by everything from the language you speak to the symbols and norms you grew up with. Some cultures don’t even use the same type of causality logic that’s embedded in Western thought. So, if Kant’s structures were universal, how do we explain that?

Here’s where linguistic anthropology jumps in and says, “Not so fast, Kant.” Ever heard of linguistic relativity, the idea that language shapes thought? It’s real, and there’s research to back it up. Your mother tongue can influence how you categorize colors, think about directions, and even understand concepts like time. This means that if you put two people from different language backgrounds together, their mental “filters” might not line up the way Kant imagined.

Constructivists love to point out that what counts as “knowledge” or basic cognitive frameworks can shift over time and depend on social context. So, what seems like a universal truth today could be looked at very differently in another era or culture. The categories we use—like space and time—aren’t just floating in the ether; they’re products of collective human practices that have evolved. So, Kant’s claim that these categories are universal a priori truths? A lot of constructivists would say they’re more like socially agreed-upon norms that can change. If you doubt this try talking to shamans, new agers, Buddhists, Hindus and neurologically unique people as a start. Of course with the domination of Western media, we may in the end through the ultimate colonialism, construct something closer to a universalism here, but that will be, yes, constructed.

Modern psychology has really put a dent in the idea that everyone’s mind is the same. Cognitive diversity is a thing, and it’s backed by loads of evidence. People’s brains work differently, whether because of different upbringings, education, or even just their unique life experiences. That variability runs counter to Kant’s idea that we all come pre-equipped with the same mental blueprint. We’re more like unique puzzles pieced together from personal and cultural experiences than identical machines.

Kant had this whole argument that intersubjectivity—basically, understanding and communicating with each other—was possible because we all use the same mental software. Constructivists beg to differ. They’d say, “Hey, shared understanding doesn’t need identical minds; it comes from social interaction and cultural practices.” We learn to communicate through shared language and symbols, not because we all have the same mental toolkit. IOW it is taking a final product achieved via work and calling it a basic structure of mind.

So, here’s the gist: constructivists would tell Kant that he’s oversimplifying. The mind isn’t a standard-issue piece of hardware; it’s more like an app that gets constantly updated by the environment, culture, and individual experiences. People might share some basic cognitive capabilities, sure, but how those show up in real life? That’s where the variability comes in. And that makes Kant’s idea of universal cognitive structures feel, well, pretty outdated. But worse, it is completely confused about the utter uniqueness of the human, extremely neuroplastic brain and thus our minds.

Now, Kant can't be blamed for this as an individual. He was born when he was and when Europeans though they were the dominant norm, the ideal. Well, European men, though that. They did not have the benefits of the 20th century's crushing of these ideas of universality. But anyone born in the last 5 decades has no such excuse, unless they are compelled (at gunpoint?) to treat the CPR as the Bible.

Atla wrote: ↑Mon Nov 04, 2024 5:33 am

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Mon Nov 04, 2024 3:54 am Often when I present my views [Kantianism, Constructivism,]

Actually word salad, to "present" "your" ideas means that there are other actual people and that you actually present your ideas to them. As a Kantian solipsist you can never actually do that, you just pretend to while talking to yourself.

This is so stupid and insults your own intelligence.
Counter the OP before making your claims above.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Mon Nov 04, 2024 5:51 am

Atla wrote: ↑Mon Nov 04, 2024 5:33 am

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Mon Nov 04, 2024 3:54 am Often when I present my views [Kantianism, Constructivism,]

Actually word salad, to "present" "your" ideas means that there are other actual people and that you actually present your ideas to them. As a Kantian solipsist you can never actually do that, you just pretend to while talking to yourself.

This is so stupid and insults your own intelligence.
Counter the OP before making your claims above.

Already have, besides why are "you" asking "me", when you just make up that I exist? Solipsism is so dumb.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Mon Nov 04, 2024 5:48 am You got it wrong, rather it is;

Solipsism is an incoherent concept.
No rational person would accept an incoherent concept
Therefore I do not accept Solipsism as realistic nor tenable.

Which is not what you wrote. And also, it includes the silliness of assuming that people are good judges of their own rationality. But you go ahead and read what you wrote and see if it fits my syllogism or yours.

For me, the problem is not that I think you don't believe in other minds. I would guess you do. It's rather than you have never reconciled your various beliefs with other minds being noumena. Kant tries to solve this by claiming that without common features in all minds we would not have objective knowledge, but I suggest you check critiques of Kant pointing out that this is circular.

You got it wrong again [most of the time in posts with me].
Kant believed in other empirical minds [verified and justified empirically],

Yes he believed in them, but he precisely and exactly did not think they could be verified empirically. How could he? How do we experience other minds empirically. Are you psychic?

"The human being, whom I cognize through my outer perceptions as a phenomenon, I cognize in myself through pure apperception, yet also as a noumenon."
— Critique of Practical Reason, 5:105

Ask you AI if Kant thought one could demonstrate the existence of other minds empirically. See, what his actual process is. Guess what, it's via inference.

but not the noumenal mind which is the soul that survives physical death, which is an illusion.

Well, Kant considered the immoral nature of the soul necessary to be moral agents. But here you're utterly confused. He did consider other minds noumena, precisely because they cannot be experienced.

Kant resolved the issue by claiming that without common features in all empirical minds we would not have objective knowledge.

Which I said earlier, and further is not an empirical demonstration, so you were confused above, and three is problematic given that it is circular. Also mentioned above or in the other thread.

Kant of course argues that his is a transcendental approach rather than an empirical one, but his ideas here fall apart in the face of what we have learned via anthropology, (ironicallly) from contructivist critiques of universal psychology, ethnology, comparative sex psychology,´and more fields:
Cognitive Science
Cultural Psychology
Developmental Psychology
Linguistic Anthropology
Neuroscience
Sociology of Knowledge
Environmental Psychology
Evolutionary Psychology
Post-Structuralism
Queer Theory and Gender Studies
Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning
Cross-Cultural Education and Pedagogy
Psychiatry and Clinical Psychology
Comparative Philosophy
Digital Anthropology and Media Studies

All these fields of study put to rest the kind of universal view of experiencing that certain European philosophers, including Kant, assumed.

Again you are so ignorant.
Kantianism can reconciled with all the above.
There is nothing that is grounded on the human condition that Kantianism cannot deal with.

No substance showing that you understand the problem raised by these field for universalizing mental structures.

Kant was touted as the intellectual godfather of cognitive science.
Link
Even the controversial "Critical" Race Theory is traceable to the fundamentals of Kant's Critical Philosophy; it is abused.

That's not a response to the problem raised by Kant's universalizing structures of the mind and how it conceives.

All the above are merely sh:t of complains based on ignorance and most probably triggered by cognitive dissonance driven by an existential crisis.

Substanceless mind reading claims. You seem not to understand what noumena are.

Whilst it is OK to discuss Kant, it is very critical that when you have not read Kant thoroughly [3 years full time] you have understand your limitations and be humbled by it, don't be an ultracrepidarian.

Empty posturing.

Nothing that shows you even understood the argument or read it.

Atla wrote: ↑Mon Nov 04, 2024 5:33 am

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Mon Nov 04, 2024 3:54 am Often when I present my views [Kantianism, Constructivism,]

Actually word salad, to "present" "your" ideas means that there are other actual people and that you actually present your ideas to them. As a Kantian solipsist you can never actually do that, you just pretend to while talking to yourself.

I'm going with Conceptual Solipsist. He does not interact with the ideas of other people. He senses disagreement and 1) insults the other person 2) does some mind reading 3) reasserts his position.

In other words, he cannot sense other positions. Only his position exists and some kind of external resistence to his position. He literally cannot see thoughts other than his own, but he can sense that there is a lack of acceptance of his thoughts. So, we have a universe made up of his thoughts and 'things that resist his thoughts'.

If he could manage to notice other arguments and perspectives and interact with them, he wouldn't be a Conceptual Solipsist. But he really can only be aware of his own thoughts. Though his memory of his thoughts at other times is limited also. Compared to him we are scholars of his diverse and contradictory positions.

Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Mon Nov 04, 2024 6:00 am

Kant of course argues that his is a transcendental approach rather than an empirical one, but his ideas here fall apart in the face of what we have learned via anthropology, (ironicallly) from contructivist critiques of universal psychology, ethnology, comparative sex psychology,´and more fields:
Cognitive Science
Cultural Psychology
Developmental Psychology
Linguistic Anthropology
Neuroscience
Sociology of Knowledge
Environmental Psychology
Evolutionary Psychology
Post-Structuralism
Queer Theory and Gender Studies
Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning
Cross-Cultural Education and Pedagogy
Psychiatry and Clinical Psychology
Comparative Philosophy
Digital Anthropology and Media Studies

All these fields of study put to rest the kind of universal view of experiencing that certain European philosophers, including Kant, assumed.

Again you are so ignorant.
Kantianism can reconciled with all the above.
There is nothing that is grounded on the human condition that Kantianism cannot deal with.

No substance showing that you understand the problem raised by these field for universalizing mental structures.

What substance?? you have not presented the "substance" in those fields you intended to argue for.
I stated in general, Kant can reconcile with all the above in terms of universal mental structure.
Frame your question properly, give me an example and I will show you are indeed ignorant.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Mon Nov 04, 2024 6:11 am What substance?? you have not presented the "substance" in those fields you intended to argue for.

I actually did. I pointed out that those fields have shown the naivte of thinking, as Kant did, in terms of universal structures of mind. I think pretty much anyone knows about that, especially someone who seems to consider himself a constructivist. You did not respond to that argument at all. But just in case you actually knew very little about constructivism and 20th century challenges to Kants assumptions here, I wrote another post where I fleshed out the position more.
See above.

I stated in general, Kant can reconcile with all the above in terms of universal mental structure.

He's dead, and died utterly unaware of those fields, but perhaps you mean a Kantian could or a Kant's work could be.

Frame your question properly, give me an example and I will show you are indeed ignorant.

It wasn't a question, it was an argument.

Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Mon Nov 04, 2024 6:21 am

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Mon Nov 04, 2024 6:11 am What substance?? you have not presented the "substance" in those fields you intended to argue for.

I actually did. I pointed out that those fields have shown the naivte of thinking, as Kant did, in terms of universal structures of mind. I think pretty much anyone knows about that, especially someone who seems to consider himself a constructivist. You did not respond to that argument at all. But just in case you actually knew very little about constructivism and 20th century challenges to Kants assumptions here, I wrote another post where I fleshed out the position more.
See above.

I stated in general, Kant can reconcile with all the above in terms of universal mental structure.

He's dead, and died utterly unaware of those fields, but perhaps you mean a Kantian could or a Kant's work could be.

Frame your question properly, give me an example and I will show you are indeed ignorant.

It wasn't a question, it was an argument.

I still cannot get your point and/or argument.
Make it simpler with an example.

It's not incoherent when you consider there is no one living life. That there's absolutely nothing behind every living organisms eyeball.

Mediation and deep introspection can turn you inwards to the realisation there is no one driving the dream bus.

So what is all this we might ask, and that is the one question to all our answers. No one knows.

We can philosophise and dissect this down to the smallest particle and still never know what's going on, or what this is.

But then the brain will obviously fill in all the blanks with concepts. Those things called words. Words have created everything.

Words are the creator of the life.

Life is an auditory illusion of light and sound.