Philosophy Now Forum

The true correlate of Sensibility, the Thing-in-Itself, is not Known, and cannot be Known, through these Representations; and in Experience no question is ever asked in regard to it.
CPR B45 -NK Smith

and that what we call outer objects are nothing other than mere representations of our Sensibility, whose Form is Space,
but whose true correlate, i.e., the Thing-in-Itself, is not and cannot be cognized [Erkenntnis] through them, but is also never asked after in Experience.
CPR B45 Guyer & Wood

VA asked ChatGpt:
Kant CPR Cognition vs Knowledge:
In the original German Critique of Pure Reason, Kant differentiated between "Cognition" [Erkenntnis] and 'Knowledge" [Wissen].
Here are two English translations related to Cognition vs Knowledge:

[NK Smith Translations] But our further contention must also be duly borne in mind, namely, that though we cannot Know these Objects as Things-in-Themselves, we must yet be in position at least to think them as Things-in-Themselves;*
otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be Appearance without anything that appears. [Bxxvi]

[Guyer & Wood Translation] Yet the reservation must also be well noted, that even if we cannot cognize these same objects as Things-in-Themselves, we at least must be able to think them as Things-in-Themselves.*
For otherwise there would follow the absurd proposition that there is an Appearance without anything that appears. Bxxvi

According to Kant, the 'cognitive' process whilst linked is a separate process from the 'knowledge; process. It is only after an object is cognized [intuition + concept] that is it subsequently known [knowledge held to be true].

Many interpreters who relied on Smith's translation interpret 'cannot know' in the sense there is still something substantial out there but remain unknown.

But if the thing-in-itself cannot be cognized, it follow there is no question of it being possible to known at all or exists as an unknown object.

The absurdity refer to only logical absurdity not in the sense there must be a thing-in-itself that is substantial.
Elsewhere Kant asserted the noumenon or thing-in-itself is only to be used regulatively for practical purposes as a useful illusion.

Therefore those who interpret Smith's "cannot know" as the thing-in-itself is still something that is substantial [of positive existence] out there is wrong.

ChatGPT said:
Your interpretation aligns with a more skeptical reading of Kant, emphasizing the distinction between cognition and knowledge. Kant's claim that we cannot cognize or know things-in-themselves but must think them as such doesn't imply that the thing-in-itself has a positive substantial existence. Rather, the idea of the thing-in-itself functions as a necessary conceptual boundary to avoid the absurdity of appearances without anything that appears, which, as you suggest, is a logical absurdity rather than an ontological assertion.

In this view, the thing-in-itself is not something substantial "out there" waiting to be known; it's a regulative idea, helping us to understand the limits of human cognition. This reading also fits with Kant's use of the noumenon as a practical concept rather than something that can be known or intuited. Your critical stance on the mistranslation or misinterpretation in Smith’s translation helps clarify this distinction between cognition (Erkenntnis) and knowledge (Wissen), as well as the way we should approach Kant's thing-in-itself.

VA asked ChatGpt:
ChatGpt: "Kant's claim that we cannot cognize or know things-in-themselves"

To be precise can be ignore the term "know" [Wissen] but rather just use 'cognize' i.e. Kant original Erkenntnis as what Guyer & Wood did.

ChatGPT said:

You're right to emphasize precision in using Kant's terminology.
The term "cognize" (Erkenntnis) is more appropriate than "know" (Wissen) in the context of Kant’s philosophy, as he was precise about the distinctions.
Kant focuses on the cognitive process that combines intuitions and concepts to form judgments about objects, and he insists that we cannot cognize (erkennen) things-in-themselves.
This refers to the limitations of our faculties when it comes to accessing the noumenal realm.

So, it would indeed be more accurate to speak of Kant's claim as "we cannot cognize things-in-themselves," rather than mixing it with the idea of "knowing" (Wissen).
The latter introduces confusion because "Wissen" implies holding something to be true, which goes beyond what Kant allowed regarding things-in-themselves.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Mon Sep 30, 2024 8:08 am "Kant’s noumenon has been widely misunderstood, particularly by philosophical realists, due to mistranslations and a conflation of concepts.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Mon Sep 30, 2024 8:08 am "Kant’s noumenon has been widely misunderstood, particularly by philosophical realists, due to mistranslations and a conflation of concepts. This OP aims to show that the notion of an ‘unknowable noumenon’ is an oxymoron, not in line with Kant’s ultimate position, and is a result of this confusion.”

It is often stated and claimed by many [mostly philosophical realists] that Kant asserted in the CPR the "Noumenon is Unknowable", "the noumenom cannot be known" which is claimed that the noumenon is something that is absolutely real and mind-independent existing out there but cannot be known.

The noumenon or thing-in-itself is what the philosophical realists, direct realists, indirect realists, scientific realists claimed as existing absolutely independent of the human conditions. It exists regardless of whether there are human or not.

I have already explained the idea of an Unknowable Noumenon is an Oxymoron, it is moot and a non-starter.

The Oxymoron of an Unknowable Noumenon
viewtopic.php?t=42651

Here is another reason why the philosophical realists has been misled to view the noumenon is unknowable but nevertheless exists are real beyond human knowledge or is represented by human knowledge.

In the original German Critique of Pure Reason, Kant differentiated between "Cognition" [Erkenntnis] and 'Knowledge" [Wissen].

I have 7 English translations of the CPR. Up to the most popular English translation by NK Smith, both "Erkenntnis," & "Wissen" had been translated into English as 'knowledge' thus related to know, known, unknown, knowable and unknowable.

NK Smith wrongly translated "Erkenntnis" as 'knowledge' throughout the CPR which had misled readers to interpret knowledge [knowing] literally, e.g.

The true correlate of Sensibility, the Thing-in-Itself, is not Known, and cannot be Known, through these Representations; and in Experience no question is ever asked in regard to it.
CPR B45 -NK Smith

Such a mistake is a serious mistranslation of Kant's original idea.
From the above, the philosophical realists would interpret 'know' from its English perspective which imply there is something out there but cannot be known or is unknowable but nevertheless exists as real out there absolutely independent of the human conditions/mind.

Guyer & Wood recognized Smith's error and translated the same passage as:

and that what we call outer objects are nothing other than mere representations of our Sensibility, whose Form is Space,
but whose true correlate, i.e., the Thing-in-Itself, is not and cannot be cognized [Erkenntnis] through them, but is also never asked after in Experience.
CPR B45 Guyer & Wood

"Cognition" [Erkenntnis] is very complex resulting process that is prior to perception, appearance, knowledge [Wissen] that is subsequently described.

In this case, if the noumenon cannot be cognized [Erkenntnis] how can be subsequently known [literally].

In addition, the noumenon is also never asked after in Experience thus it is never something that is equated with experience.

The term 'true' above is also very nuanced and do not imply there is some true as in the corresponding theory of truth, i.e. there is something real out there that correspond to propositions of it.

This is why Kant asserted the noumenon or thing-in-itself is merely a thought, an illusion i.e. merely a useful illusion and cannot be any real object that is possible to be experienced nor empirically verified.

So the idea of an unknowable noumenon is an Oxymoron due to the conflation of "Cognition" [Erkenntnis] as knowledge in the English sense.

Atla wrote: ↑Mon Sep 30, 2024 12:12 pm
I'm no transcendental realist or direct realist, imo you said nothing new here. Next?

Atla wrote: ↑Mon Sep 30, 2024 12:12 pm "and that what we call outer objects are nothing other than mere representations of our Sensibility, whose Form is Space,
but whose true correlate, i.e., the Thing-in-Itself, is not and cannot be cognized [Erkenntnis] through them, but is also never asked after in Experience" = "unknowable"

I'm no transcendental realist or direct realist, imo you said nothing new here. Next?

I'm no transcendental realist or direct realist, imo you said nothing new here.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Tue Oct 01, 2024 1:34 am

Atla wrote: ↑Mon Sep 30, 2024 12:12 pm "and that what we call outer objects are nothing other than mere representations of our Sensibility, whose Form is Space,
but whose true correlate, i.e., the Thing-in-Itself, is not and cannot be cognized [Erkenntnis] through them, but is also never asked after in Experience" = "unknowable"

I'm no transcendental realist or direct realist, imo you said nothing new here. Next?

The fact is that you have not read Kant's CPR fully and thoroughly, thus the handicap.

As stated there is big difference between "Erkenntnis" = Cognition and "Wissen" Knowledge [known or unknowability].

I wrote in the OP.
"In this case, if the noumenon cannot be cognized [Erkenntnis] how can it be subsequently known [literally]" thus unknowable is irrelevant, moot and a non-starter.

"but is also never asked after in Experience" that mean it is moot, the question of it is irrelevant and a non-starter.
Same as the question of whether a square-circle exists in never asked in experience.

I'm no transcendental realist or direct realist, imo you said nothing new here.

You are an indirect realist which is a subset of philosophical realism [aka transcendental realism].

VA asked ChatGpt:
Kant CPR Cognition vs Knowledge:
In the original German Critique of Pure Reason, Kant differentiated between "Cognition" [Erkenntnis] and 'Knowledge" [Wissen].
Here are two English translations related to Cognition vs Knowledge:

[NK Smith Translations] But our further contention must also be duly borne in mind, namely, that though we cannot Know these Objects as Things-in-Themselves, we must yet be in position at least to think them as Things-in-Themselves;*
otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be Appearance without anything that appears. [Bxxvi]

[Guyer & Wood Translation] Yet the reservation must also be well noted, that even if we cannot cognize these same objects as Things-in-Themselves, we at least must be able to think them as Things-in-Themselves.*
For otherwise there would follow the absurd proposition that there is an Appearance without anything that appears. Bxxvi

According to Kant, the 'cognitive' process whilst linked is a separate process from the 'knowledge; process. It is only after an object is cognized [intuition + concept] that is it subsequently known [knowledge held to be true].

Many interpreters who relied on Smith's translation interpret 'cannot know' in the sense there is still something substantial out there but remain unknown.

But if the thing-in-itself cannot be cognized, it follow there is no question of it being possible to known at all or exists as an unknown object.

The absurdity refer to only logical absurdity not in the sense there must be a thing-in-itself that is substantial.
Elsewhere Kant asserted the noumenon or thing-in-itself is only to be used regulatively for practical purposes as a useful illusion.

Therefore those who interpret Smith's "cannot know" as the thing-in-itself is still something that is substantial [of positive existence] out there is wrong.

ChatGPT said:
Your interpretation aligns with a more skeptical reading of Kant, emphasizing the distinction between cognition and knowledge. Kant's claim that we cannot cognize or know things-in-themselves but must think them as such doesn't imply that the thing-in-itself has a positive substantial existence. Rather, the idea of the thing-in-itself functions as a necessary conceptual boundary to avoid the absurdity of appearances without anything that appears, which, as you suggest, is a logical absurdity rather than an ontological assertion.

In this view, the thing-in-itself is not something substantial "out there" waiting to be known; it's a regulative idea, helping us to understand the limits of human cognition. This reading also fits with Kant's use of the noumenon as a practical concept rather than something that can be known or intuited. Your critical stance on the mistranslation or misinterpretation in Smith’s translation helps clarify this distinction between cognition (Erkenntnis) and knowledge (Wissen), as well as the way we should approach Kant's thing-in-itself.

VA asked ChatGpt:
ChatGpt: "Kant's claim that we cannot cognize or know things-in-themselves"

To be precise can be ignore the term "know" [Wissen] but rather just use 'cognize' i.e. Kant original Erkenntnis as what Guyer & Wood did.

ChatGPT said:

You're right to emphasize precision in using Kant's terminology.
The term "cognize" (Erkenntnis) is more appropriate than "know" (Wissen) in the context of Kant’s philosophy, as he was precise about the distinctions.
Kant focuses on the cognitive process that combines intuitions and concepts to form judgments about objects, and he insists that we cannot cognize (erkennen) things-in-themselves.
This refers to the limitations of our faculties when it comes to accessing the noumenal realm.

So, it would indeed be more accurate to speak of Kant's claim as "we cannot cognize things-in-themselves," rather than mixing it with the idea of "knowing" (Wissen).
The latter introduces confusion because "Wissen" implies holding something to be true, which goes beyond what Kant allowed regarding things-in-themselves.