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Damn good question, veg. For Many Worlds to work, free will must exist. If you can't actually choose (in the libertarian sense) then there can be no branching.accelafine wrote: ↑Sat Aug 24, 2024 11:33 pmIf all of our decisions are 'pre-determined' and there is no 'free will' then how can there ever be a point at which any decision is ever 'all decisions at once', with every possible decision 'branching off' to create an alternate 'world'?
All of your decisions are not, 'fully', 'pre-determined'. However, all of 'the choices', which you have to 'decide from', are/were 'pre-determined'.accelafine wrote: ↑Sat Aug 24, 2024 11:33 pm Is there a conflict there? If all of our decisions are 'pre-determined' and there is no 'free will' then how can there ever be a point at which any decision is ever 'all decisions at once', with every possible decision 'branching off' to create an alternate 'world'?
The branching itself would ostensibly be predetermined (or just "determined", I think the prefix "pre" is probably better omitted here)accelafine wrote: ↑Sat Aug 24, 2024 11:33 pm Is there a conflict there? If all of our decisions are 'pre-determined' and there is no 'free will' then how can there ever be a point at which any decision is ever 'all decisions at once', with every possible decision 'branching off' to create an alternate 'world'?
I did wonder about the addition of 'pre' as tautology.Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Sun Aug 25, 2024 1:16 pmThe branching itself would ostensibly be predetermined (or just "determined", I think the prefix "pre" is probably better omitted here)accelafine wrote: ↑Sat Aug 24, 2024 11:33 pm Is there a conflict there? If all of our decisions are 'pre-determined' and there is no 'free will' then how can there ever be a point at which any decision is ever 'all decisions at once', with every possible decision 'branching off' to create an alternate 'world'?
Determined by what? By the wave function / Schroedinger equation. That's what they're there for, that what they do.
Explanation of what? I'm not sure what you think I was trying to convince you of, I'm just having a conversation about the topic.accelafine wrote: ↑Sun Aug 25, 2024 2:16 pmI did wonder about the addition of 'pre' as tautology.Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Sun Aug 25, 2024 1:16 pmThe branching itself would ostensibly be predetermined (or just "determined", I think the prefix "pre" is probably better omitted here)accelafine wrote: ↑Sat Aug 24, 2024 11:33 pm Is there a conflict there? If all of our decisions are 'pre-determined' and there is no 'free will' then how can there ever be a point at which any decision is ever 'all decisions at once', with every possible decision 'branching off' to create an alternate 'world'?
Determined by what? By the wave function / Schroedinger equation. That's what they're there for, that what they do.
Your 'explanation' isn't terribly convincing.
Thanks for that. It's the apparent conflict with 'free will' that I was wondering about. Sean Carroll doesn't seem to have any doubt that he's right.Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Sun Aug 25, 2024 2:29 pmExplanation of what? I'm not sure what you think I was trying to convince you of, I'm just having a conversation about the topic.accelafine wrote: ↑Sun Aug 25, 2024 2:16 pmI did wonder about the addition of 'pre' as tautology.Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Sun Aug 25, 2024 1:16 pm
The branching itself would ostensibly be predetermined (or just "determined", I think the prefix "pre" is probably better omitted here)
Determined by what? By the wave function / Schroedinger equation. That's what they're there for, that what they do.
Your 'explanation' isn't terribly convincing.
Many Worlds is, at its root, of course not about human decisions at all, it's about the behavior of fundamental particles. You often hear about things like "superposition", how a particle when it's not being measured isn't in a distinct location but is in a kind of probability-cloud of locations. The thing that defines the shape of this probability cloud is called the Wave Function. (if you would like to be convinced of that by something with more esteem than myself, read here: https://www.britannica.com/science/wave-function)
And the schrodinger equation is the equation in QM which defines how wave functions evolve over time (if you want some more esteem than myself, read here: https://www.britannica.com/science/Schrodinger-equation). And the schrodinger equation is deterministic - given a complete quantum state, the schrodinger equation evolves that qunatum state into the future in one singular way. (please read this if you'd like to be convinced I haven't just made that up:: https://www.preposterousuniverse.com/bl ... ns%20sneak)
The above shouldn't be read as an attempt to convince, it's informative, and it's just straight-forwardly simply the definition of thesethings in a QM context. You don't need to take my word for it. Everything I've said is basic and straight-forward and easily verifiable. I'm available to help you verify it if you like.
Many Worlds re-interprets the wave function as, not just a probability cloud, but a 'world-distribution cloud'. So where the Copenhagen intereptation says "there's 20% chance the particle is here, 20% chance it's there, and 60% in the middle", Many Worlds says something maybe more closely resembling (but not necessarily exactly this wording) "20% of worlds will have this particle here, 20% there, and 60% in the middle". It takes the wave function and, in a way, makes the superposition it represents *real*.
That's why the wikipedia article on Many Worlds starts with "The many-worlds interpretation (MWI) is an interpretation of quantum mechanics that asserts that the universal wavefunction is objectively real, and that there is no wave function collapse." I'm just wording that in a different way.
My contribution to this thread of yours is not adversarial, it's conversational. You're interested in Many Worlds, I know some stuff about Many Worlds. Let's talk about it. Is there something in particular you're not convinced of?
Can you go into more detail about the conflict? I'm not sure I understand what conflict you think is there.accelafine wrote: ↑Sun Aug 25, 2024 3:15 pm
Thanks for that. It's the apparent conflict with 'free will' that I was wondering about. Sean Carroll doesn't seem to have any doubt that he's right.
Those 'other worlds' still have to follow the laws of physics, so no 'Broomstick Batman'.Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Sun Aug 25, 2024 3:47 pm Two very serious problems attend any “many worlds” explanation.
One is, “how many?” If it’s “infinite,” then the chance of any one outcome (say, a habitable Earth of our kind) is infinitely improbable, by definition: for whatever state one posits, there is always an infinite number of other ways things could be. So the “infinite worlds” explanation turns out not to be an “explanation” of anything at all, because it doesn’t any longer “explain” why this particular world exists, and not another.
And if there is a limited number of “many” worlds, then there has to be some principle or “law” that limits the number of possibilities that can be actualized: and how is that principle grounded and made necessary?
Another is, “If every possible state of affairs is realized in some world somewhere,” then why is that limited, and not infinite? Are we to believe there’s a “world” in which Batman is real, and Superman is a broomstick or a warthog? If not, then what is the limiting principle that makes a world like ours possible, but the Batman-Superman world out of the realm of even an infinite number of worlds?
But the biggest problem of all is this, so far as free will is concerned: “In what way is being the mere pawn of randomness a more ‘liberatory’ or ‘freedom-allowing’ option than being totally predetermined by material forces or a deterministic deity? Neither randomness, nor material determination, nor Calvinist determinism leaves any significant role for human decision-making and choice, which, in all cases, is merely an illusion — the deep truth remaining that randomness, or materiality, or that arbitrary supposed-deity actually predetermines all that seems to be “chosen,” and nothing really is.
Okay. Then the question arises, “Why are the laws of physics what they are?” Why, for example, do we have particular values for the strong and weak forces in the atom, or the cosmological constant, or any of the other countless values we have to have in place in order for anything to exist at all? And right away, we’re into the question known as “fine tuning”: why did an allegedly random universe, which is said to be infinite in scope, cough up precisely the right values for a universe to exist?accelafine wrote: ↑Sun Aug 25, 2024 7:49 pmThose 'other worlds' still have to follow the laws of physics, so no 'Broomstick Batman'.Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Sun Aug 25, 2024 3:47 pm Two very serious problems attend any “many worlds” explanation.
One is, “how many?” If it’s “infinite,” then the chance of any one outcome (say, a habitable Earth of our kind) is infinitely improbable, by definition: for whatever state one posits, there is always an infinite number of other ways things could be. So the “infinite worlds” explanation turns out not to be an “explanation” of anything at all, because it doesn’t any longer “explain” why this particular world exists, and not another.
And if there is a limited number of “many” worlds, then there has to be some principle or “law” that limits the number of possibilities that can be actualized: and how is that principle grounded and made necessary?
Another is, “If every possible state of affairs is realized in some world somewhere,” then why is that limited, and not infinite? Are we to believe there’s a “world” in which Batman is real, and Superman is a broomstick or a warthog? If not, then what is the limiting principle that makes a world like ours possible, but the Batman-Superman world out of the realm of even an infinite number of worlds?
But the biggest problem of all is this, so far as free will is concerned: “In what way is being the mere pawn of randomness a more ‘liberatory’ or ‘freedom-allowing’ option than being totally predetermined by material forces or a deterministic deity? Neither randomness, nor material determination, nor Calvinist determinism leaves any significant role for human decision-making and choice, which, in all cases, is merely an illusion — the deep truth remaining that randomness, or materiality, or that arbitrary supposed-deity actually predetermines all that seems to be “chosen,” and nothing really is.
Douglas Adams might be able to help you out with that.Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Sun Aug 25, 2024 10:47 pm And right away, we’re into the question known as “fine tuning”: why did an allegedly random universe, which is said to be infinite in scope, cough up precisely the right values for a universe to exist?
That Douglas clip is a great example of the cult of personality: someone folks admire sez sumthin' quite silly, but they admire him so he must be onto sumthin'.