Philosophy Now Forum

"8.5. CONCLUSION
A posteriori objections to my defense of Moral Realism are not compelling.
The metaphysical and epistemological commitments of Moral Realism are not only intelligible, but plausible.
Moral Realism is not metaphysically queer.
Moral facts and properties are no more sui generis [unique] than are the facts and properties of other higher-order disciplines.

Ethical naturalism claims that Moral facts and properties are constituted by, and so supervene on, natural and social scientific facts and properties.

If materialism is true and these natural facts and properties are just organized combinations of physical facts and properties, then Moral facts and properties will themselves be constituted by, and so supervene on, organized combinations of physical facts and properties.
Nor is Moral Realism epistemologically queer.
Moral Realism should be combined with a coherentist Moral epistemology.
Those explanatory relations between Moral and nonmoral beliefs that coherentism requires are not undermined on a posteriori grounds.
Moral facts fulfill whatever explanatory obligation an a posteriori defense of Moral Realism imposes, and there is good reason to believe that most genuine Moral disagreements are resolvable at least in principle on the basis of coherentist reasoning about Moral and nonmoral issues."

The term "supervene on" in the context of ethical naturalism means that moral properties are ultimately determined by natural and social scientific properties.

Imagine a layer cake, where the frosting (moral properties) rests on the cake layers (natural and social scientific properties). The frosting wouldn't exist without the cake, but the specific flavor of the frosting (e.g., chocolate, vanilla) can still influence our overall experience of the cake.

Here are some examples of how moral properties supervene on natural and social scientific properties:

Helping behavior: Our natural capacity for empathy (social science) and understanding a situation (natural science) can lead us to believe that helping someone in need is the morally right thing to do.
Stealing: Our knowledge of social norms (property rights) and sense of justice (fairness) can lead us to believe that stealing is morally wrong.

In essence, ethical naturalism suggests that our moral beliefs are not based on some mysterious moral realm, but rather on our understanding of the natural and social world around us.

AI-wR wrote:Yes, in the scenario you described, there is a case of moral facts or properties supervening on natural facts.

Here's the breakdown:
• Natural Fact: The existence and function of mirror neurons in the human brain. These neurons fire both when we perform an action and when we observe someone else perform a similar action.

• Natural Fact: Empathy, the ability to understand and share the feelings of another person. This is believed to be influenced by mirror neurons.

• Moral Property: The idea that killing another human is wrong. This falls within a larger moral framework and system.

Supervenience Argument:
• Mirror neurons (natural fact) contribute to our capacity for empathy (another natural fact).
• Empathy (natural fact) can motivate us to avoid harming others (linked to the moral property of not killing).
Here, the moral property ("killing is wrong") supervenes on the natural facts of mirror neurons and empathy. While empathy doesn't directly dictate morality, it creates a natural tendency that can be integrated into a moral framework.

It's important to consider some nuances:
• Not all humans with mirror neurons experience empathy to the same degree. Other factors contribute to moral reasoning.
• Moral frameworks are also shaped by social and cultural factors, not just biological ones.

Overall, the scenario suggests that moral properties can be influenced by, and perhaps even depend on, underlying natural properties. This is how supervenience plays a role in the relationship between biology and morality.

Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Wed Jul 10, 2024 10:20 am This argument is only meaningful if you can show an example of how *changing a natural fact* corresponds to some parallel change in a moral fact (or vice versa, not sure which order is the right one here). Without that, using the word "supervene" is just word candy.

When someone says 'mental states supervene on brain states', whether that's true or false, that statement only has meaning because the person saying it can imagine how *changing one* can affect a change in the other (for example, pumping adrenaline into my nervous system would change my mental state accordingly).

If you can't think of corresponding changes, you're using the wrong word.

So, since your example given was stealing, what change in a Natural Fact (or facts) would result in Stealing being moral?

Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Wed Jul 10, 2024 10:20 am This argument is only meaningful if you can show an example of how *changing a natural fact* corresponds to some parallel change in a moral fact (or vice versa, not sure which order is the right one here). Without that, using the word "supervene" is just word candy.

When someone says 'mental states supervene on brain states', whether that's true or false, that statement only has meaning because the person saying it can imagine how *changing one* can affect a change in the other (for example, pumping adrenaline into my nervous system would change my mental state accordingly).

If you can't think of corresponding changes, you're using the wrong word.

So, since your example given was stealing, what change in a Natural Fact (or facts) would result in Stealing being moral?

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Wed Jul 10, 2024 11:13 am

Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Wed Jul 10, 2024 10:20 am This argument is only meaningful if you can show an example of how *changing a natural fact* corresponds to some parallel change in a moral fact (or vice versa, not sure which order is the right one here). Without that, using the word "supervene" is just word candy.

When someone says 'mental states supervene on brain states', whether that's true or false, that statement only has meaning because the person saying it can imagine how *changing one* can affect a change in the other (for example, pumping adrenaline into my nervous system would change my mental state accordingly).

If you can't think of corresponding changes, you're using the wrong word.

So, since your example given was stealing, what change in a Natural Fact (or facts) would result in Stealing being moral?

Agreed. That's a good test. And I think a claim of 'supervenience' often disguises a failure to show a connection

But beside that, the cited argument for moral realism/objectivism, as usual, merely offers an explanation for why we have moral values and codes - rules such as 'X is morally wrong' - but can never show that X is morally wrong. The explanation can be perfectly rational - which is why 'moral non-cognitivism' is such an offensive label - but there's no possible logical entailment to a moral conclusion.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Jul 11, 2024 5:48 am

Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Wed Jul 10, 2024 10:20 am This argument is only meaningful if you can show an example of how *changing a natural fact* corresponds to some parallel change in a moral fact (or vice versa, not sure which order is the right one here). Without that, using the word "supervene" is just word candy.

When someone says 'mental states supervene on brain states', whether that's true or false, that statement only has meaning because the person saying it can imagine how *changing one* can affect a change in the other (for example, pumping adrenaline into my nervous system would change my mental state accordingly).

If you can't think of corresponding changes, you're using the wrong word.

So, since your example given was stealing, what change in a Natural Fact (or facts) would result in Stealing being moral?

Supervene does not imply 'changing a natural fact into a moral fact'.

Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Thu Jul 11, 2024 6:11 am

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Jul 11, 2024 5:48 am

Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Wed Jul 10, 2024 10:20 am This argument is only meaningful if you can show an example of how *changing a natural fact* corresponds to some parallel change in a moral fact (or vice versa, not sure which order is the right one here). Without that, using the word "supervene" is just word candy.

When someone says 'mental states supervene on brain states', whether that's true or false, that statement only has meaning because the person saying it can imagine how *changing one* can affect a change in the other (for example, pumping adrenaline into my nervous system would change my mental state accordingly).

If you can't think of corresponding changes, you're using the wrong word.

So, since your example given was stealing, what change in a Natural Fact (or facts) would result in Stealing being moral?

Supervene does not imply 'changing a natural fact into a moral fact'.

That's not related to anything I said. You don't understand the language here well enough to even have this conversation. Facepalm. I didn't say anything about changing a natural fact INTO a moral fact. You have no idea what the words you use mean. No surprise.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Jul 11, 2024 6:21 am

Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Thu Jul 11, 2024 6:11 am

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Jul 11, 2024 5:48 am
Supervene does not imply 'changing a natural fact into a moral fact'.

That's not related to anything I said. You don't understand the language here well enough to even have this conversation. Facepalm. I didn't say anything about changing a natural fact INTO a moral fact. You have no idea what the words you use mean. No surprise.

You stated,

"what change in a Natural Fact (or facts) would result in Stealing being moral"
which mean change a Natural Fact into what? thus in context to a moral fact or resulting in a moral conclusion.

Don't blame others when your own communication is so bad.

FlashDangerpants wrote: ↑Thu Jul 11, 2024 7:09 am He just can't read.

If someone says "Moral Facts Supervene on Natural Facts", does that mean there must be some change to a Natural Fact that should result in a change to a Moral Fact?
ChatGPT
Yes, if someone says "Moral facts supervene on natural facts," it implies that any change in moral facts must be accompanied by a change in natural facts. This means that moral facts are dependent on natural facts in such a way that it is impossible for there to be a difference in moral facts without there being a difference in natural facts.

so not all changes to natural facts have to result in changes to moral facts, but SOME changes in natural facts have to result in changes to moral facts?
ChatGPT
Exactly. The principle that "moral facts supervene on natural facts" means that any change in moral facts requires a change in the underlying natural facts, but not every change in natural facts will necessarily lead to a change in moral facts. In other words, while moral facts depend on natural facts, natural facts can vary in ways that do not affect moral facts.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Jul 11, 2024 5:56 am

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Wed Jul 10, 2024 11:13 am

Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Wed Jul 10, 2024 10:20 am This argument is only meaningful if you can show an example of how *changing a natural fact* corresponds to some parallel change in a moral fact (or vice versa, not sure which order is the right one here). Without that, using the word "supervene" is just word candy.

When someone says 'mental states supervene on brain states', whether that's true or false, that statement only has meaning because the person saying it can imagine how *changing one* can affect a change in the other (for example, pumping adrenaline into my nervous system would change my mental state accordingly).

If you can't think of corresponding changes, you're using the wrong word.

So, since your example given was stealing, what change in a Natural Fact (or facts) would result in Stealing being moral?

Agreed. That's a good test. And I think a claim of 'supervenience' often disguises a failure to show a connection

But beside that, the cited argument for moral realism/objectivism, as usual, merely offers an explanation for why we have moral values and codes - rules such as 'X is morally wrong' - but can never show that X is morally wrong. The explanation can be perfectly rational - which is why 'moral non-cognitivism' is such an offensive label - but there's no possible logical entailment to a moral conclusion.

It is immature to insist upon direct connection on such matters with reference to reality.
Your 'what is fact' which you claimed to be real is an illusion; when someone presents a fact that do not match your definition, you charge them with falsehood, no connectivity, e.g. the case of moral facts.

Why is the act of taking something from another is considered a crime of stealing?

It is because the principles and enacted laws of the of the human-based legal FSERC is supervened on a particular act [someone taking another's property without consent].
Such example of supervenience is common everywhere.
And that is applicable to moral matters as explained above.

Morality is not merely about moral judgments which is secondary.
What is primary and critical are the inherent moral functions supervened upon natural facts [physical neurons connectivity and actions] that drive natural spontaneous moral acts without deliberate judgments.

You need to read up,
David Brink's Moral Realism and the Foundation of Ethics
before you can make any credible counters on his claim of 'Moral Facts Supervene on Natural Facts'.

And so what if this person says that they don't believe there's any change in natural fact that corresponds to a change in moral facts?
ChatGPT
If someone says they don't believe there's any change in natural facts that corresponds to a change in moral facts, they are rejecting the idea that moral facts supervene on natural facts. This position implies that they believe moral facts are independent of natural facts.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Wed Jul 10, 2024 11:13 am

Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Wed Jul 10, 2024 10:20 am This argument is only meaningful if you can show an example of how *changing a natural fact* corresponds to some parallel change in a moral fact (or vice versa, not sure which order is the right one here). Without that, using the word "supervene" is just word candy.

When someone says 'mental states supervene on brain states', whether that's true or false, that statement only has meaning because the person saying it can imagine how *changing one* can affect a change in the other (for example, pumping adrenaline into my nervous system would change my mental state accordingly).

If you can't think of corresponding changes, you're using the wrong word.

So, since your example given was stealing, what change in a Natural Fact (or facts) would result in Stealing being moral?

Agreed. That's a good test. And I think a claim of 'supervenience' often disguises a failure to show a connection

But beside that, the cited argument for moral realism/objectivism, as usual, merely offers an explanation for why we have moral values and codes - rules such as 'X is morally wrong' - but can never show that X is morally wrong. The explanation can be perfectly rational - which is why 'moral non-cognitivism' is such an offensive label - but there's no possible logical entailment to a moral conclusion.

Age wrote: ↑Thu Jul 11, 2024 8:05 am
But, it is very easy and simple to show that x is morally Wrong, and even objectively morally Wrong.

However, while you keep believing that it is an absolute impossibility, then you will never see 'that' x is morally Wrong.