Philosophy Now Forum

• 1. Moral Realism within Philosophical or Metaphysical Realism. -Non-FSERC
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism
  where reality or things are absolutely independent of the human mind and conditions.
  1a. Moral Realism - Philosophical Realism - scientific realism
  Supporters: Boyd, Landau, McCord, Railton, Brink, Sturgeon, ...
  1b. Moral Realism - Philosophical Realism - theism.
  
  
  2. Moral Realism within Empirical Realism -FSERC
  here realism is confined to what is empirically and rationally possible.
  Moral Realism - Empirical Realism - scientific antirealism
  Because it is empirical, reality and things in this case are not absolutely but only relatively independent of the human mind and conditions.
  For example, the external world is independent and out there, but it is ultimately subsumed within the human conditions [as in transcendental idealism].
  
  3. Quasi-realism
  Quasi-realism is the meta-ethical view which claims that:
  Ethical sentences do not express propositions.
  Instead, ethical sentences project emotional attitudes as though they were real properties. -WIKI
  
  4. Moral Relativism
  Moral relativism is used to describe several philosophical positions concerned with the differences [disagreements] in moral judgments across different peoples and cultures.
  
  5. Moral Skepticism
  Moral skepticism is a class of meta-ethical theories all members of which entail that no one has any moral knowledge.
  note Amoralist Skepticism below.
  
  6. Moral Nihilism
  Moral nihilism is the meta-ethical view that nothing is morally right or morally wrong and that morality does not exist. -WIKI

Amoralist Skepticism
Much moral skepticism is skepticism about the objectivity of morality, that is, skepticism about the existence of moral facts or the possibility of moral knowledge.

But another traditional kind of skepticism accepts the existence of moral facts and concedes that we have moral knowledge, and asks why we should care about these facts.
Call this amoralist skepticism.
Amoralists are the traditional way of representing this second kind of skepticism; the amoralist is someone who recognizes the existence of moral considerations and remains unmoved.

The internalist relies on the possibility of inverted-commas usage of moral language, and replies that people can be unmoved by considerations that are only conventionally regarded as moral, but insists that a genuine amoralist is inconceivable.

However Note
Thus, according to the internalist, apparent amoralists such as Plato's Thrasymachus, Hobbes's Fool,7 and Mike, the conman in David Mamet's film House of Games, remain unmoved not by what they regard as moral considerations but only by what others regard as moral considerations; their own views about morality are really completely different from conventional views.

The hybrid internalist, by contrast, could concede the conceivability of this kind of amoralist but would have to insist that the amoralist is necessarily mistaken in thinking that morality does require the action to which she sincerely professes indifference.
(Although it is not clear how a form of hybrid internalism that insisted on moral mistakes could be a premise in an antirealist argument.)
The problem for internalism is that it does not take the amoralist's challenge seriously enough.
Amoralist skepticism [indifferent to moral facts] is a familiar philosophical and popular form of skepticism.


Brink 46-47

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sun Jun 30, 2024 3:08 am As I had pointed out elsewhere, those who reject moral realism, i.e. objective moral facts has a moral cognitive deficit just like psychopaths who has a deficit in empathy and the inability to tune into the emotions of others.