Philosophy Now Forum

Ethical naturalism (also called moral naturalism or naturalistic cognitivistic definism)[1] is the meta-ethical view which claims that:

• Ethical sentences express propositions.
  Some such propositions are true.
  Those propositions are made true by objective features of the world.
  These moral features of the world are reducible to some set of non-moral features.

The versions of ethical naturalism which have received the most sustained philosophical interest, for example, Cornell realism, differ from the position that "the way things are is always the way they ought to be", which few ethical naturalists hold.
Ethical naturalism does, however, reject the fact-value distinction: it [Ethical naturalism] suggests that inquiry into the natural world can increase our moral knowledge in just the same way it increases our scientific knowledge.
Indeed, proponents of ethical naturalism have argued that humanity needs to invest in the science of morality, a broad and loosely defined field that uses evidence from biology, primatology, anthropology, psychology, neuroscience, and other areas to classify and describe moral behavior.[2][3]

Ethical naturalism encompasses any reduction of ethical properties, such as 'goodness', to non-ethical properties; there are many different examples of such reductions, and thus many different varieties of ethical naturalism. Hedonism, for example, is the view that goodness is ultimately just pleasure.[4]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethical_naturalism

Do you agree Moral or Ethical Naturalism is the way forward to facilitate moral progress?

Discuss??
Views??

Notes:
Just in case, someone noted some confusion.

Ethical Naturalism relying on scientific antirealism is 'moral realism,' but it is relative moral realism not absolute moral realism.
It is relative moral realism because it is grounded upon relative mind-independence [empirical realism] on absolute mind-independence [philosophical realism].

Notes:

It's a shame that the ethics sub has devolved into nothing but one autistic kid pestering an aloof uncle to explain why he thinks that facts about the world can be true independently of any perspective from within that world. Moral naturalism would be a thing that is thoroughly worthy of discussion here were it not destined to be drowned out by that other thing.

The problem is that there are countless mutually unintelligible or outright contradictory versions of moral naturalism, mainly depending on which perspective-independently true property of the world we choose to try to naturalise to. Whether we are adopting hedonic principles and naturalising the 'good' directly to the pleasurable, or progressing more like Boyd by collecting some assemblage of ideas that people in general seem to think are perhaps important, and hoping to naturalise to the heap rather than an item...

...this dichotomy in itself rasises a problem. Why don't we just instantly know what world property (or cluster of properties) to naturalise moral concepts to? One answer to that question is the anti-realist one: That it's a choice that we are continually re-assessing. That we do look as Boyd suggests towards a cluster of different concerns, but that because those concerns exist in a state of continuous turmoil, we collectively, individually, are required to re-think how important each element of that cluster is, and at times what it even represents.

But this is the PN ethical theory sub. So all we will get is an autist shouting that it reduces to morality-proper and that anything lost in that reduction (sympathy for meat animals for instance) was unscientific morality-improper.

FlashDangerpants wrote: ↑Tue Jun 18, 2024 7:39 am It's a shame that the ethics sub has devolved into nothing but one autistic kid pestering an aloof uncle to explain why he thinks that facts about the world can be true independently of any perspective from within that world. Moral naturalism would be a thing that is thoroughly worthy of discussion here were it not destined to be drowned out by that other thing.

The problem is that there are countless mutually unintelligible or outright contradictory versions of moral naturalism, mainly depending on which perspective-independently true property of the world we choose to try to naturalise to. Whether we are adopting hedonic principles and naturalising the 'good' directly to the pleasurable, or progressing more like Boyd by collecting some assemblage of ideas that people in general seem to think are perhaps important, and hoping to naturalise to the heap rather than an item...

...this dichotomy in itself rasises a problem. Why don't we just instantly know what world property (or cluster of properties) to naturalise moral concepts to? One answer to that question is the anti-realist one: That it's a choice that we are continually re-assessing. That we do look as Boyd suggests towards a cluster of different concerns, but that because those concerns exist in a state of continuous turmoil, we collectively, individually, are required to re-think how important each element of that cluster is, and at times what it even represents.

But this is the PN ethical theory sub. So all we will get is an autist shouting that it reduces to morality-proper and that anything lost in that reduction (sympathy for meat animals for instance) was unscientific morality-improper.

I have never been certified as autistic in any degree of its spectrum.
You are just lashing out wildly when pointed out you have a cognitive moral deficit in morality.
viewtopic.php?t=41991
You are also morally sick, i.e. condemning the mentally handicap group of autistics. Are you aware there a loads of great people in history and at present who are on some degree the the autistic spectrum.

Instead of autistic, you if think so, condemned me as stupid, idiotic or moronic but show the evidence for you condemnation.

As you are a Moral Nihilist, I condemn you as an immoral person where anything moral is involved.
You have no moral say in regards to genocides [e.g. Oct7 and so on], torturing and killing babies for pleasure, all evil acts thus by implication indirectly complicit to these evils from a moral perspective.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sun Jun 23, 2024 4:48 am I have never been certified as autistic in any degree of its spectrum.
You are just lashing out wildly when pointed out you have a cognitive moral deficit in morality.
viewtopic.php?t=41991

It is very obvious that you have some level of ASD. You will be certified as soon as you understand that it is in your own best interest to get tested. But yes, you did make the topic relevant by starting multiple threads about my cognitive state.

Knowing that you are prickly about this topic, I did incidentally make a protracted point of advising you to stop doing that before I determined that your own actions had put the autism thing fully into play. But because you are autistic, you didn't pick up on the subtext. Bad luck.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sun Jun 23, 2024 4:48 am You are also morally sick, i.e. condemning the mentally handicap group of autistics. Are you aware there a loads of great people in history and at present who are on some degree the the autistic spectrum.

What makes you think I am condemning you for your autism? You would benefit from getting tested and diagnosed and then receiving the added assistance that is available to help autisitic people navigate a society that isn't well tuned for them. Politely pretending we cannot tell you are autistic has done you no favours, so we may as well just be open about it.

I have no idea if the result would be better behaviour on the internet from you. A qualified autism counsellor might be able to teach you something about how to take other people into account, or how to get less hostile reactions when you try to steamroll them all the time. But quite likely there would be no perceivable difference here. Nonetheless, you should get tested and diagnosed in order to improve your quality of life even if though the result is likely to have no bearing on mine.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sun Jun 23, 2024 4:48 am Instead of autistic, you if think so, condemned me as stupid, idiotic or moronic but show the evidence for you condemnation.

Autism is the best explanation for your repetitive ritual behaviours, rigid thinking and limited to the point of non existent theory of mind.

The reason you don't understand simple philosophical argument structures is that you don't get implications and subtext very well, which is the result of autism not stupidity. The reason you don't see any difference between a robot telling you you are right all the time and actually making strong arguments is similarly the autism, not stupidity.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sun Jun 23, 2024 4:48 am As you are a Moral Nihilist, I condemn you as an immoral person where anything moral is involved.
You have no moral say in regards to genocides [e.g. Oct7 and so on], torturing and killing babies for pleasure, all evil acts thus by implication indirectly complicit to these evils from a moral perspective.

None of that is accurate, but the reality of my position is far too nuanced for you to get unless you somehow learn to properly read and understand what other people write. If you don't get an autism counselror there is little prospect of that happening.

Well, let's make a Kantian critique of moral naturalism
Moral Naturalism: Derives moral principles from natural facts and empirical observations about human nature and well-being.
Kant: Derives moral principles from rationality and the categorical imperative, independent of natural facts.

Moral Naturalism: Often linked to the consequences of actions and their effects on well-being. Consequentialism.
Kanti: Focuses on the inherent rightness or wrongness of actions based on rational duty, regardless of consequences. Deontology

Moral Naturalism: Relies on empirical science and observation to understand and derive moral truths.
Kant: Relies on a priori rational principles and the structure of reason itself.

Moral Naturalism: Often assumes a realist position where moral facts exist independently of human beliefs. Note the irony: Independent of humans.
Kant: Can be seen as constructivist, where moral truths are constructed by rational agents through the application of the categorical imperative.

There's no telling how many different objective moralities each of these two approach may create.
There's no telling how many one can arrive at if you use both approachs.

There's a bit of a problem if you can arrive at many different objective or is it 'objective' moralities.

The OP asked for Discuss?? Views?? on,
Do you agree Moral or Ethical Naturalism is the way forward to facilitate moral progress?
Anything else is off topic.

"Ethical naturalism does, however, reject the fact-value distinction: it [Ethical naturalism] suggests that inquiry into the natural world can increase our moral knowledge in just the same way it increases our scientific knowledge."

Ethical Naturalism can be developed in parallel with science.
But, there are two very distinct perspectives and groundings to science, i.e.
1. Scientific Realism - absolute mind-independence
2. Scientific antiRealism - relative mind-independence contingent upon a FSERC

Ethical Naturalism grounded on scientific realism is reasonable to a degree but its ultimate claim there are absolutely mind-independent objective moral facts as in there are absolutely mind-independent facts is problematic.
To claim there are absolutely mind-independent facts [scientific or moral] that exists beyond the specific human-based framework and system is merely confirming an illusion.

Ethical Naturalism that relies on scientific data [scientific antirealism] merely claim there are relative mind-independent objective* moral facts as grounded on the human-based moral framework and system [FS].
* it is objective because the human-based moral FS is collective-based [many subjects] not dependent of a subject's opinions, beliefs or judgments.

Just in case, someone noted some confusion.

Ethical Naturalism relying on scientific antirealism is 'moral realism,' but it is relative moral realism not absolute moral realism.
It is relative moral realism because it is grounded upon relative mind-independence [empirical realism] on absolute mind-independence [philosophical realism].
Ethical Naturalism in this case is moral realism and also moral objectivity because it is based on a human-based moral framework and system, thus not subjective as based on a subject's opinions, beliefs and judgment.

For Information:

Moral Naturalism is not strictly consequentialism.
Kantian Morality is not that of the typical understanding of what is deontology.

Deontology generally refers to strict rules and principles which are enforceable within a framework and system.
In the case of Kantian Morality [it is an exception], the rules and principles are categorical imperative in theory only, so, they are not be enforced on individual[s] but merely to be use as guides or standard only.
From an overall basis Kantian morality is also consequentialism, i.e. it relies on consequences to compare with the ideal standard to drive moral improvements.
Kantian morality is deontological-consequentialism.

Moral Naturalism [scientific antirealism] is critical to Kantian morality in the aspect of establishing moral maxims and duties from the categorical imperatives. Most posters here are ignorant of this not regularly discussed aspect of Kantian morality and ethics.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Mon Jun 24, 2024 3:14 am For Information:

Moral Naturalism is not strictly consequentialism.

True, but there is a tendency to evaluate the consequences of morals/behavior in terms of the effects on human well being.

Kantian Morality is not that of the typical understanding of what is deontology.

Deontology generally refers to strict rules and principles which are enforceable within a framework and system.

No, the term does not entail strict rules. That adjective is VA's addition. It is simply that it distinguishes itself from consequentialism, in that certain things are bad or good in and of themselves, regardless of the consquences. It has nothing to do with enforcement, for example.

Moral Naturalism [scientific antirealism] is critical to Kantian morality in the aspect of establishing moral maxims and duties from the categorical imperatives. Most posters here are ignorant of this not regularly discussed aspect of Kantian morality and ethics.

Moral naturalism and scientific antirealism are distinct positions within two different areas, ethics and the philosophy of science. Someone could be both (but it's rare since most moral naturalists are metaphysical realists). Anyway, they cover different issues.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Mon Jun 24, 2024 2:52 am The OP asked for Discuss?? Views?? on,
Do you agree Moral or Ethical Naturalism is the way forward to facilitate moral progress?
Anything else is off topic.

You ignored the on topic stuff in my previous post.

I say naturalism is probably not going to work out, but what natural property are you planning to naturalise moral properties onto anyway? There's no sense in which your own constructivist theory is naturalistic.

It isn't moral naturalism to just say "my morality-proper thingy expresses natural facts" you have to show how an ethical proposition such as "don't steal from widows" comes to rest on an actual natural property. If you do some silly nonsense about dna/rna and the direction into the future that some dna wants us to take, that's just mysticism not naturalism.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Mon Jun 24, 2024 2:52 am "Ethical naturalism does, however, reject the fact-value distinction: it [Ethical naturalism] suggests that inquiry into the natural world can increase our moral knowledge in just the same way it increases our scientific knowledge."

To get away from the is/ought problem by adopting the naturalistic fallacy is to leap out of the frying pan and into the fire.

Two thoughts.

1 Consequentialism merely kicks the deontological can down the road. The morality of an action's consequences is as much a matter of opinion as the morality of the action itself.

2 Flash is right about ethical naturalism. The mistake is always the same: work forwards from a moral premise, or backwards from a moral conclusion; then forget where you started; then 'find' morality intrinsic in nature.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Mon Jun 24, 2024 11:02 am Two thoughts.

1 Consequentialism merely kicks the deontological can down the road. The morality of an action's consequences is as much a matter of opinion as the morality of the action itself.

Yes, I don't think you can have a purely consequentialist morality. You could have a completely deontological one, but no one does except machines. Every moral group - group of people with a shared morality - I've ever encountered argues from consequences on some or many things.

Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Mon Jun 24, 2024 1:48 pm

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Mon Jun 24, 2024 11:02 am Two thoughts.

1 Consequentialism merely kicks the deontological can down the road. The morality of an action's consequences is as much a matter of opinion as the morality of the action itself.

Yes, I don't think you can have a purely consequentialist morality. You could have a completely deontological one, but no one does except machines. Every moral group - group of people with a shared morality - I've ever encountered argues from consequences on some or many things.

See also virtues and vices (even if nobody is actually hurt nor any rules broken, some people think it's plain wrong to draw furry porn and wank over pictures of some woman dressed up as a dog in stockings). There's worthy versus unworthy wants and desires, and piety seemingly relies on using things according to their original design and purposes. Boringness is wrong in itself just for no particular reason other than being a bad. The only common property to everything we dislike is that we say it is "wrong".

Most of what we actually judge to be rightful or wrongful has nothing to do with rules, outcomes, virtues or even piety. We mostly get annoyed if somebody does something we find surprising. Apparently what we are accustomed to expect becomes the thing that we obviously ought to expect. Accelafine and Immanuel Can have built their entire personalities around that principle and very little else.

That meaningless "ick" factor is what people actually naturalise moral properties to. The history of moral philosophy is nothing but attempts to polish that one turd by backfilling some rules, outcomes or personality traits that might justify the whole set.

FlashDangerpants wrote: ↑Mon Jun 24, 2024 2:04 pm

Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Mon Jun 24, 2024 1:48 pm

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Mon Jun 24, 2024 11:02 am Two thoughts.

1 Consequentialism merely kicks the deontological can down the road. The morality of an action's consequences is as much a matter of opinion as the morality of the action itself.

Yes, I don't think you can have a purely consequentialist morality. You could have a completely deontological one, but no one does except machines. Every moral group - group of people with a shared morality - I've ever encountered argues from consequences on some or many things.

See also virtues and vices (even if nobody is actually hurt nor any rules broken, some people think it's plain wrong to draw furry porn and wank over pictures of some woman dressed up as a dog in stockings). There's worthy versus unworthy wants and desires, and piety seemingly relies on using things according to their original design and purposes. Boringness is wrong in itself just for no particular reason other than being a bad. The only common property to everything we dislike is that we say it is "wrong".

Most of what we actually judge to be rightful or wrongful has nothing to do with rules, outcomes, virtues or even piety. We mostly get annoyed if somebody does something we find surprising. Apparently what we are accustomed to expect becomes the thing that we obviously ought to expect. Accelafine and Immanuel Can have built their entire personalities around that principle and very little else.

That meaningless "ick" factor is what people actually naturalise moral properties to. The history of moral philosophy is nothing but attempts to polish that one turd by backfilling some rules, outcomes or personality traits that might justify the whole set.

Two thoughts on this:
1 - you are talking about openness, it seems to me. One of the 5 personality traits - according to many psychologists model.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Openness_to_experience
2 - Disgust is correlated with tendencies in morality/political positions and it negatively correlates with oppenness.
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10 ... lCode=sppa
https://pure.uvt.nl/ws/portalfiles/port ... tivity.pdf

And disgust originally, it seems has had to do with mate selection and avoidance of harmful microbes. Which ends up being a kind of double edged sword, it seems to me. We could argue - hey conservatives, your projections patterns effective in one realm onto other realms where it is inappropriate. But then other personality traits, including openness probably have similar range shifts going on. Obviously both caution around new things and exploring curiosity have positives and negatives. We can't really resolve political issues by reducing them to original or core survival functions. But it is very interesting.

I think also one could, for example, whittle down some kinds of disgust/rejection with cross cultural training. I think it's possible to show the randomness of many cultural habits and we might well look very disgusting to, say, the Japanese. Americans for example would probably appear more open and less disgusted than Japanese people, and certainly if we go back 100 years. But this doesn't mean that conservatives should give up their positions just cause the Japanese have more disgust about more things conservatives themselves consider just fine.

Ideally any team would have people focuses more on openness and others more focused on caution and using what we know.

This doesn't mean in any given period of time everyone is right and just a specialized team member. There can be imbalances and extremes in a whole population, where the whole society or one part of it overemphasizes their tendency.