Philosophy Now Forum

The reason why is because of the old canard, Euthyphro's Dilemma. Let's remove language about "commands," though, and just talk about whatever the "good" is supposed to be.

If what God thinks and does is good because it is good, then "goodness" is a standard that's external to God that God just follows like the rest of us. It would mean that God had no part in defining or creating what "good" is, because if He did, then "goodness" as a standard would be up to whatever God's whim was when He created it, and that's the next thing that will be brought up. In this case, if moral realism is true (and there are "moral truths"), then God has nothing to do with them: He either follows them or He doesn't, he either commands that we follow them as well or He doesn't, but He had nothing to do with why they are there.

If what is good is actually good because God thinks it is good -- if God defines Goodness by His preferences -- then there is likewise no moral realism: there are no "moral truths," there are only preferences that God happens to have, and there is nothing about reality about why we ought to have those same preferences. One could argue, "you ought to agree with God's preferences because He's powerful and can cause you to suffer forever if you don't," but that isn't moral realism (that's "might makes right"). One could argue, "you ought to agree with God's preferences because God created you so you owe him," but there is a missing argument for why a creation must agree with the preferences of a creator (suppose Hitler were to create a truly conscious AI: does the AI have a moral obligation to agree with Hitler's preferences because he is the AI's creator? Prima facie I think you would agree that would be asinine).

God can have whatever preferences He has, but that wouldn't imbue all other sentient, conscious, sapient beings with the "ought" that they ought to have the same preferences. In such a scenario, moral realism isn't true at all: there are no "moral truths," only God's preferences. It can be true that God has preferences, but it wouldn't be true that we are compelled to agree with them. If God were to command that we smash babies upon rocks, it wouldn't be true that we ought to agree that is "good."

In neither scenario does theism seem to have anything to do with moral realism: either there are moral truths or there are not, but God's existence seems to have nothing to do with that dichotomy: they will happily go on existing with or without God, and God is either beholden to moral truths the same as the rest of us (if they exist) or not (if they don't).

Why, then, do so many theists claim not only to be moral realists, but that moral realism is dependent on theism? It can't be, even if it were true.

Astro Cat wrote: ↑Tue May 28, 2024 6:58 am If what is good is actually good because God thinks it is good -- if God defines Goodness by His preferences -- then there is likewise no moral realism: there are no "moral truths," there are only preferences that God happens to have, and there is nothing about reality about why we ought to have those same preferences. One could argue, "you ought to agree with God's preferences because He's powerful and can cause you to suffer forever if you don't," but that isn't moral realism (that's "might makes right"). One could argue, "you ought to agree with God's preferences because God created you so you owe him," but there is a missing argument for why a creation must agree with the preferences of a creator (suppose Hitler were to create a truly conscious AI: does the AI have a moral obligation to agree with Hitler's preferences because he is the AI's creator? Prima facie I think you would agree that would be asinine).

While I agree with all you wrote there, there is the logical possbility of breaking the dilemma via the concept of Morally Uncooperative Worlds. One version of that would be for instance to allow that Mackie is right to stress the oddness of moral properties that pertain to objects, subjects, situations or whatever in his Argument from Queerness.
But then just bite the bullet: allow that while it is true that moral properties exist, and that therefore there is a grounding in actual property objectivity (not this fraudulent 'objective as defined by privileged language users' crap), sadly humanity hasn't got the right equipment (sensory, mental, whatever) to access this information.

By this view, the world is morally uncooperative in that it hides these details from us and thus we have no means by which to independently access reliable moral information. God however has all the equipment required to know anything at all, including this, and thus we are able to receive true moral information as relayed by his good self. After that it's back to just faith though, faith that you are getting true information from the correct mighty overlord and that it's not just a big bully telling you his opinions but dressing them up as special facts you can't be allowed to understand for yourself.

The second part of that Mackie argument is about the epistemological reasons why we ought or ought not to believe in things such as incomprehensible moral properties. Personally I go with the ought-not there.

FlashDangerpants wrote: ↑Tue May 28, 2024 9:52 am
While I agree with all you wrote there, there is the logical possbility of breaking the dilemma via the concept of Morally Uncooperative Worlds. One version of that would be for instance to allow that Mackie is right to stress the oddness of moral properties that pertain to objects, subjects, situations or whatever in his Argument from Queerness.
But then just bite the bullet: allow that while it is true that moral properties exist, and that therefore there is a grounding in actual property objectivity (not this fraudulent 'objective as defined by privileged language users' crap), sadly humanity hasn't got the right equipment (sensory, mental, whatever) to access this information.

By this view, the world is morally uncooperative in that it hides these details from us and thus we have no means by which to independently access reliable moral information. God however has all the equipment required to know anything at all, including this, and thus we are able to receive true moral information as relayed by his good self. After that it's back to just faith though, faith that you are getting true information from the correct mighty overlord and that it's not just a big bully telling you his opinions but dressing them up as special facts you can't be allowed to understand for yourself.

The second part of that Mackie argument is about the epistemological reasons why we ought or ought not to believe in things such as incomprehensible moral properties. Personally I go with the ought-not there.

If I understand the notion right, it's just the first horn even if assumed to be true (e.g., God is still just observing and relaying something external to Himself that we can't epistemologically/sensorily/whatever access).

Ah but as I typed this I suddenly understood the point (because the title and gyst was that theism is extraneous for moral realism). Okay, I see the point.

You're right that the next objection would be about how we would know what's being relayed is what's actually there. But, I think it's interesting that the objection is weaker than the initial one. So, I think that was worth reading and to think about for a while (I'm about to go to bed before long).

I'm a moral noncognitivist myself, so I'm right there with you. I doubt "moral truths" is even a meaningful utterance in the first place, but ya know.

FlashDangerpants wrote: ↑Tue May 28, 2024 9:52 am

Astro Cat wrote: ↑Tue May 28, 2024 6:58 am If what is good is actually good because God thinks it is good -- if God defines Goodness by His preferences -- then there is likewise no moral realism: there are no "moral truths," there are only preferences that God happens to have, and there is nothing about reality about why we ought to have those same preferences. One could argue, "you ought to agree with God's preferences because He's powerful and can cause you to suffer forever if you don't," but that isn't moral realism (that's "might makes right"). One could argue, "you ought to agree with God's preferences because God created you so you owe him," but there is a missing argument for why a creation must agree with the preferences of a creator (suppose Hitler were to create a truly conscious AI: does the AI have a moral obligation to agree with Hitler's preferences because he is the AI's creator? Prima facie I think you would agree that would be asinine).

While I agree with all you wrote there, there is the logical possbility of breaking the dilemma via the concept of Morally Uncooperative Worlds. One version of that would be for instance to allow that Mackie is right to stress the oddness of moral properties that pertain to objects, subjects, situations or whatever in his Argument from Queerness.
But then just bite the bullet: allow that while it is true that moral properties exist, and that therefore there is a grounding in actual property objectivity (not this fraudulent 'objective as defined by privileged language users' crap), sadly humanity hasn't got the right equipment (sensory, mental, whatever) to access this information.

By this view, the world is morally uncooperative in that it hides these details from us and thus we have no means by which to independently access reliable moral information. God however has all the equipment required to know anything at all, including this, and thus we are able to receive true moral information as relayed by his good self. After that it's back to just faith though, faith that you are getting true information from the correct mighty overlord and that it's not just a big bully telling you his opinions but dressing them up as special facts you can't be allowed to understand for yourself.

The second part of that Mackie argument is about the epistemological reasons why we ought or ought not to believe in things such as incomprehensible moral properties. Personally I go with the ought-not there.

See, this is why I even bother with philosophy websites. This is what I convince myself will be there: sane people with sane and interesting responses to think about and poke holes at and test, etc.

Sure, but I am an Islamophobic because it is irrational to fear Islam infiltrating my country?


1. Marriage and sex with pre-menstrual girls https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WIsRJ3hiHpE
Introduction to Surah
65. At-Talâq

4. And those of your women as have passed the age of monthly courses, for them the 'Iddah (prescribed period), if you have doubts (about their periods), is three months, and for those who have no courses [(i.e. they are still immature) their 'Iddah (prescribed period) is three months likewise, except in case of death][] . And for those who are pregnant (whether they are divorced or their husbands are dead), their 'Iddah (prescribed period) is until they deliver (their burdens), and whosoever fears Allâh and keeps his duty to Him, He will make his matter easy for him.


2. Killing on non-believers
“Kill them [unbelievers] wherever you find them… And fight them until there is no more unbelief and worship is for Allah alone” (Quran 2:191-193).

“Strike off their heads and strike from them every fingertip” (Quran 8:12).

“Allah has purchased from the believers their lives and their properties; in exchange for that they will have Paradise. They fight in the cause of Allah, so they slay and are slain” (Quran 9:111).

“Truly Allah loves those who fight in His cause in battle array…” (Quran 61:4)

“The Messenger of Allah said: I have been commanded to fight against people till they testify that there is no god but Allah, and that Muhammad is the messenger of Allah” (Sahih Muslim 1:33).

Mohammed’s last words: 'Allah cursed the Jews and the Christians because they took the graves of their Prophets as places for praying."'


3. Killing apostates
Bukhari[52:260] "...The Prophet said, 'If somebody (a Muslim) discards his religion, kill him.' "

Quran[4:89] "They wish that you should disbelieve as they disbelieve, and then you would be equal; therefore take not to yourselves friends of them, until they emigrate in the way of God; then, if they turn their backs, take them, and slay them wherever you find them; take not to yourselves any one of them as friend or helper."


4. Rape of captured women enemies
Qur’an 4:24 permits intercourse with women captured in jihad (holy war). The verse states: “And women already married, except those whom your right hands possess.” This implies that female captives can be taken as concubines or wives by Muslim men after they have been captured in battle


PS. There are 11 islamic countries that have the death penalty for homosexuals, yes they're killed just just being homosexuals. "Allah" instructs that theives have their hands chopped off

Astro Cat wrote: ↑Tue May 28, 2024 6:58 am ...........

Why, then, do so many theists claim not only to be moral realists, but that moral realism is dependent on theism? It can't be, even if it were true.

I believe you are viewing "morality & ethics" from a corrupted perspective which is not realistic.

What is reality is all-there-is of which humans are intricately part and parcel of.
Within the whole of reality and all human activities there are patterns which humans intuitively recognized and categorized as morality & ethics which is related to the well-beings and flourishing of the individual[s] and humanity.

Intuitively humans has relate morality with 'good' and 'goodness' but the term good is too loose and ambiguous.

I believe in alignment with what is natural, morality should be defined in the negative, i.e.
-morality is the management of evil to enable its related good [whatever] to emerge.
Thus morality is not about chasing what is 'good' but rather getting rid of what is evil.
In this sense we need a definition of 'what is evil' and an exhaustive list of evil acts with its related degrees of evil_ness.

The human species has evolved with moral function as an innate potential with different degrees of quantum and activeness in different people.
This innate moral function and potential is represented by its physical neural correlates and algorithm.
So, what is objective and is truth-apt is the existence of the physical neural correlates as inferred which can be verified by science in the future.

Moral realism and truth is not those God's ought within the holy texts.
Theists represent the majority of humans and thus it is inevitable they are aware of the activities that are supposed to be recognized as 'moral'.
However, their mistake is to attribute all these moral activities to a God.

But nevertheless, theism has intuitively recognized certain moral truths that are represented by its neural correlates, e.g. 'shall not not killed' a prevention of evil. There is moral realism as far as this specific moral maxim [not every theistic command] is concerned.
Another point is whenever we speak of objective morality it must be qualified to a specific list of moral element; morality cannot be generalized and unconditional.

What is real and objective is contingent upon a human-based Framework and System [FS] of which the scientific FS is the gold standard of credibility and objectivity.
Thus whatever is contingent within a moral FS is real and objective [subject to degrees of credibility and objectivity].

Theism is contingent upon the theistic FS thus cannot be the same as the moral FS.
Besides in contrast to the gold standard, the theistic FS has negligible credibility and objectivity.

Moral Realism and objectivity is not about right or wrong [opinions, beliefs, judgment and descriptions] good vs bad, but rather it must be qualified to the physical neural correlates and its algorithm in the brain which has truth-values conditioned upon a human-based FS.

Astro Cat wrote: ↑Tue May 28, 2024 6:58 amThe reason why is because of the old canard, Euthyphro's Dilemma. Let's remove language about "commands," though, and just talk about whatever the "good" is supposed to be.

I don't think such a (false) dilemma is relevant here, theism and moral realism are just separate issues period. Most theists are moral realists, but people can also believe in a god that doesn't know objective morals, and people can be atheists while still believing in some universal moral feature of the world.

If what God thinks and does is good because it is good, then "goodness" is a standard that's external to God that God just follows like the rest of us. It would mean that God had no part in defining or creating what "good" is, because if He did, then "goodness" as a standard would be up to whatever God's whim was when He created it, and that's the next thing that will be brought up. In this case, if moral realism is true (and there are "moral truths"), then God has nothing to do with them: He either follows them or He doesn't, he either commands that we follow them as well or He doesn't, but He had nothing to do with why they are there.

Imo that's one particular take on God where God is a finite actor, a finite agent. But God could be infinite, where nothing is external to God and God can't follow anything. "Goodness" as a standard could be part of God, even without any creation having taken place. Maybe whims and choices are also human things that don't apply to God, God could be beyond those.

If what is good is actually good because God thinks it is good -- if God defines Goodness by His preferences -- then there is likewise no moral realism: there are no "moral truths," there are only preferences that God happens to have, and there is nothing about reality about why we ought to have those same preferences. One could argue, "you ought to agree with God's preferences because He's powerful and can cause you to suffer forever if you don't," but that isn't moral realism (that's "might makes right"). One could argue, "you ought to agree with God's preferences because God created you so you owe him," but there is a missing argument for why a creation must agree with the preferences of a creator (suppose Hitler were to create a truly conscious AI: does the AI have a moral obligation to agree with Hitler's preferences because he is the AI's creator? Prima facie I think you would agree that would be asinine).

Again if God is infinite, then God could be beyond preferences, beyond thinking, beyond defining things etc.

Point is, imo all God arguments are kinda pointless, because God could have infinite, absolute, eternal properties that we just can't wrap our heads around.

Astro Cat wrote: ↑Tue May 28, 2024 10:04 am

FlashDangerpants wrote: ↑Tue May 28, 2024 9:52 am
While I agree with all you wrote there, there is the logical possbility of breaking the dilemma via the concept of Morally Uncooperative Worlds. One version of that would be for instance to allow that Mackie is right to stress the oddness of moral properties that pertain to objects, subjects, situations or whatever in his Argument from Queerness.
But then just bite the bullet: allow that while it is true that moral properties exist, and that therefore there is a grounding in actual property objectivity (not this fraudulent 'objective as defined by privileged language users' crap), sadly humanity hasn't got the right equipment (sensory, mental, whatever) to access this information.

By this view, the world is morally uncooperative in that it hides these details from us and thus we have no means by which to independently access reliable moral information. God however has all the equipment required to know anything at all, including this, and thus we are able to receive true moral information as relayed by his good self. After that it's back to just faith though, faith that you are getting true information from the correct mighty overlord and that it's not just a big bully telling you his opinions but dressing them up as special facts you can't be allowed to understand for yourself.

The second part of that Mackie argument is about the epistemological reasons why we ought or ought not to believe in things such as incomprehensible moral properties. Personally I go with the ought-not there.

If I understand the notion right, it's just the first horn even if assumed to be true (e.g., God is still just observing and relaying something external to Himself that we can't epistemologically/sensorily/whatever access).

Ah but as I typed this I suddenly understood the point (because the title and gyst was that theism is extraneous for moral realism). Okay, I see the point.

You're right that the next objection would be about how we would know what's being relayed is what's actually there. But, I think it's interesting that the objection is weaker than the initial one. So, I think that was worth reading and to think about for a while (I'm about to go to bed before long).

I agree, it would probably end up as a can kicked down the road rather than a ball knocked out of the park. But it's fun for me to see how it develops.

Astro Cat wrote: ↑Tue May 28, 2024 10:04 am I'm a moral noncognitivist myself, so I'm right there with you. I doubt "moral truths" is even a meaningful utterance in the first place, but ya know.

I highly recommend guarding your sanity by refusing any offer made by either Vegetable Albatross or Immanuel Can to discuss noncognitivism. It's a cause of much confusion for them.

FlashDangerpants wrote: ↑Tue May 28, 2024 1:08 pm
I agree, it would probably end up as a can kicked down the road rather than a ball knocked out of the park. But it's fun for me to see how it develops.

I think my ultimate take on this is that it works (it denies the objection made by the OP that theism is unrelated to moral realism at all), but that I also doubt very many theists actually take the position -- it isn't what they mean when they talk about morality, and they will usually reject the First Horn.

Then, of course, there would be the problem of discerning whether what God reports is true, and one couldn't appeal to God's "good" nature without engaging in something vicious. So I think we can shrug about it at the end of the day.

FlashDangerpants wrote: I highly recommend guarding your sanity by refusing any offer made by either Vegetable Albatross or Immanuel Can to discuss noncognitivism. It's a cause of much confusion for them.

I wouldn't be here if I weren't bored at least

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Tue May 28, 2024 11:52 am I believe you are viewing "morality & ethics" from a corrupted perspective which is not realistic.

What is reality is all-there-is of which humans are intricately part and parcel of.
Within the whole of reality and all human activities there are patterns which humans intuitively recognized and categorized as morality & ethics which is related to the well-beings and flourishing of the individual[s] and humanity.

Intuitively humans has relate morality with 'good' and 'goodness' but the term good is too loose and ambiguous.

I believe in alignment with what is natural, morality should be defined in the negative, i.e.
-morality is the management of evil to enable its related good [whatever] to emerge.
Thus morality is not about chasing what is 'good' but rather getting rid of what is evil.
In this sense we need a definition of 'what is evil' and an exhaustive list of evil acts with its related degrees of evil_ness.

The human species has evolved with moral function as an innate potential with different degrees of quantum and activeness in different people.
This innate moral function and potential is represented by its physical neural correlates and algorithm.
So, what is objective and is truth-apt is the existence of the physical neural correlates as inferred which can be verified by science in the future.

Moral realism and truth is not those God's ought within the holy texts.
Theists represent the majority of humans and thus it is inevitable they are aware of the activities that are supposed to be recognized as 'moral'.
However, their mistake is to attribute all these moral activities to a God.

But nevertheless, theism has intuitively recognized certain moral truths that are represented by its neural correlates, e.g. 'shall not not killed' a prevention of evil. There is moral realism as far as this specific moral maxim [not every theistic command] is concerned.
Another point is whenever we speak of objective morality it must be qualified to a specific list of moral element; morality cannot be generalized and unconditional.

What is real and objective is contingent upon a human-based Framework and System [FS] of which the scientific FS is the gold standard of credibility and objectivity.
Thus whatever is contingent within a moral FS is real and objective [subject to degrees of credibility and objectivity].

Theism is contingent upon the theistic FS thus cannot be the same as the moral FS.
Besides in contrast to the gold standard, the theistic FS has negligible credibility and objectivity.

Moral Realism and objectivity is not about right or wrong [opinions, beliefs, judgment and descriptions] good vs bad, but rather it must be qualified to the physical neural correlates and its algorithm in the brain which has truth-values conditioned upon a human-based FS.

Sounds to me like you aren't a moral realist, if I can discern some of your argument. Yet that would be preaching to the choir. I am not a moral realist, I was just pointing out that if there were to be moral realism, theistic arguments attempting to root it in theism fall short.

Atla wrote: ↑Tue May 28, 2024 1:07 pm I don't think such a (false) dilemma is relevant here, theism and moral realism are just separate issues period. Most theists are moral realists, but people can also believe in a god that doesn't know objective morals, and people can be atheists while still believing in some universal moral feature of the world.

The dilemma isn't false, though: if there is good, then what is good is either good because it is good or because it is defined to be so by God. There aren't any other options in a theistic framework (again, given that there is such a thing as a moral fact or truth).

Atla wrote: Imo that's one particular take on God where God is a finite actor, a finite agent. But God could be infinite, where nothing is external to God and God can't follow anything. "Goodness" as a standard could be part of God, even without any creation having taken place. Maybe whims and choices are also human things that don't apply to God, God could be beyond those.

It wouldn't be possible for there to be "nothing external to God" or for God not to follow anything. For instance, logical limitation is something that God can't create and has no power over. In order for God to be God, logical limitation must be an aspect of reality (e.g. that A = A, that either A or not-A, that not A and not-A at the same time and in the same respect, etc.) God can't be the "source" of that because it must be true in a way that's "prior" (not temporally, but logically) to God: in order for God to even be God, it must already be true.

We can also point this out by noting that God has a nature: God has properties, at least properties like having power and having knowledge (omnipotence and omniscience). All we have to do is ask, "Did God choose His nature?"

The answer can't be "yes," because in order to choose a nature, it requires already having a nature (at least the knowledge of what options are available, and the power to enact the choice).

But if the answer is "no," then there is at least one thing external to God: that which makes God even able to be God: logical limitation. God can't be the source of it, isn't sovereign over it, it can't be a "part of God," and so on: it must be external. So, going back, it is impossible to have a situation where "nothing is external to God," because logic (not the thinking process, but the existence of limitation) is one such thing that must be.

Atla wrote: Again if God is infinite, then God could be beyond preferences, beyond thinking, beyond defining things etc.

Point is, imo all God arguments are kinda pointless, because God could have infinite, absolute, eternal properties that we just can't wrap our heads around.

We can wrap our heads around some things enough to philosophize about them. If God is too weird then the word itself is empty: what would even be meant by the utterance of "God," then? Something must be cognizable to be referenced.

Astro Cat wrote: ↑Wed May 29, 2024 3:45 amThe dilemma isn't false, though: if there is good, then what is good is either good because it is good or because it is defined to be so by God. There aren't any other options in a theistic framework (again, given that there is such a thing as a moral fact or truth).

Ah okay, didn't know we are restricted to a theistic framework.

It wouldn't be possible for there to be "nothing external to God" or for God not to follow anything. For instance, logical limitation is something that God can't create and has no power over. In order for God to be God, logical limitation must be an aspect of reality (e.g. that A = A, that either A or not-A, that not A and not-A at the same time and in the same respect, etc.) God can't be the "source" of that because it must be true in a way that's "prior" (not temporally, but logically) to God: in order for God to even be God, it must already be true.

We can also point this out by noting that God has a nature: God has properties, at least properties like having power and having knowledge (omnipotence and omniscience). All we have to do is ask, "Did God choose His nature?"

The answer can't be "yes," because in order to choose a nature, it requires already having a nature (at least the knowledge of what options are available, and the power to enact the choice).

But if the answer is "no," then there is at least one thing external to God: that which makes God even able to be God: logical limitation. God can't be the source of it, isn't sovereign over it, it can't be a "part of God," and so on: it must be external. So, going back, it is impossible to have a situation where "nothing is external to God," because logic (not the thinking process, but the existence of limitation) is one such thing that must be.

We can wrap our heads around some things enough to philosophize about them. If God is too weird then the word itself is empty: what would even be meant by the utterance of "God," then? Something must be cognizable to be referenced.

I don't see why God couldn't be beyond our conception of logic either.

Astro Cat wrote: ↑Wed May 29, 2024 3:37 am

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Tue May 28, 2024 11:52 am I believe you are viewing "morality & ethics" from a corrupted perspective which is not realistic.

What is reality is all-there-is of which humans are intricately part and parcel of.
Within the whole of reality and all human activities there are patterns which humans intuitively recognized and categorized as morality & ethics which is related to the well-beings and flourishing of the individual[s] and humanity.

Intuitively humans has relate morality with 'good' and 'goodness' but the term good is too loose and ambiguous.

I believe in alignment with what is natural, morality should be defined in the negative, i.e.
-morality is the management of evil to enable its related good [whatever] to emerge.
Thus morality is not about chasing what is 'good' but rather getting rid of what is evil.
In this sense we need a definition of 'what is evil' and an exhaustive list of evil acts with its related degrees of evil_ness.

The human species has evolved with moral function as an innate potential with different degrees of quantum and activeness in different people.
This innate moral function and potential is represented by its physical neural correlates and algorithm.
So, what is objective and is truth-apt is the existence of the physical neural correlates as inferred which can be verified by science in the future.

Moral realism and truth is not those God's ought within the holy texts.
Theists represent the majority of humans and thus it is inevitable they are aware of the activities that are supposed to be recognized as 'moral'.
However, their mistake is to attribute all these moral activities to a God.

But nevertheless, theism has intuitively recognized certain moral truths that are represented by its neural correlates, e.g. 'shall not not killed' a prevention of evil. There is moral realism as far as this specific moral maxim [not every theistic command] is concerned.
Another point is whenever we speak of objective morality it must be qualified to a specific list of moral element; morality cannot be generalized and unconditional.

What is real and objective is contingent upon a human-based Framework and System [FS] of which the scientific FS is the gold standard of credibility and objectivity.
Thus whatever is contingent within a moral FS is real and objective [subject to degrees of credibility and objectivity].

Theism is contingent upon the theistic FS thus cannot be the same as the moral FS.
Besides in contrast to the gold standard, the theistic FS has negligible credibility and objectivity.

Moral Realism and objectivity is not about right or wrong [opinions, beliefs, judgment and descriptions] good vs bad, but rather it must be qualified to the physical neural correlates and its algorithm in the brain which has truth-values conditioned upon a human-based FS.

Sounds to me like you aren't a moral realist, if I can discern some of your argument. Yet that would be preaching to the choir. I am not a moral realist, I was just pointing out that if there were to be moral realism, theistic arguments attempting to root it in theism fall short.

Mine is that of Moral Objectivism and Moral Realism.
There are nuances to it which you have missed.

We need to consider, there is a need to consider,
There are Two Senses of Reality
viewtopic.php?t=40265
1. Human-based Framework and System [FS] sense.
2. Philosophical Realists' sense which is illusory.

It is likely that you are not a moral realist based on sense 2, i.e. the philosophical realists' sense of realism and 'what is fact'. Your fact is a linguistic-fact, not the real fact.
I have argued against such fact and reality in;

Why Philosophical Realism [PR] is Illusory
viewtopic.php?t=40167

PR's What is Fact is Illusory
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39577

As such, your denial of moral realism is grounded on an illusion, thus not valid.
This is the common view of denying there are no moral facts, so no moral realism or moral objectivity.

Just as your claim there is no moral realism is unsound based on sense 1 [philosophical realism], the theists arguments, there is moral realism based on sense 1 [also based on philosophical realism] is unsound as well.

.............
My version of morality as real, factual and objective is the same as the scientific real, factual and objective as contingent upon a human-based scientific framework and system.
In my case, there is moral realism within a FS which can be justified by science and other fields of knowledge.

According to my FS based morality, there is some elements of morality within theism, but that is pseudo-moral_realism just like the pseudo-science in science-proper.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Wed May 29, 2024 5:15 am Mine is that of Moral Objectivism and Moral Realism.
There are nuances to it which you have missed.

We need to consider, there is a need to consider,
There are Two Senses of Reality
viewtopic.php?t=40265
1. Human-based Framework and System [FS] sense.
2. Philosophical Realists' sense which is illusory.

It is likely that you are not a moral realist based on sense 2, i.e. the philosophical realists' sense of realism and 'what is fact'. Your fact is a linguistic-fact, not the real fact.
I have argued against such fact and reality in;

Why Philosophical Realism [PR] is Illusory
viewtopic.php?t=40167

PR's What is Fact is Illusory
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39577

As such, your denial of moral realism is grounded on an illusion, thus not valid.
This is the common view of denying there are no moral facts, so no moral realism or moral objectivity.

Just as your claim there is no moral realism is unsound based on sense 1 [philosophical realism], the theists arguments, there is moral realism based on sense 1 [also based on philosophical realism] is unsound as well.

.............
My version of morality as real, factual and objective is the same as the scientific real, factual and objective as contingent upon a human-based scientific framework and system.
In my case, there is moral realism within a FS which can be justified by science and other fields of knowledge.

According to my FS based morality, there is some elements of morality within theism, but that is pseudo-moral_realism just like the pseudo-science in science-proper.

I have skimmed the linked posts, but I think the format will be difficult if having a discussion across three different posts. Can you summarize here for a discussion in one location on the relevant topic?

For instance, in the first post, you talk about a gap between perception and reality and declare the perception illusory. I don't think any serious realist denies that such a gap exists. This is more of an epistemic objection than an ontological objection, the realist is only saying they have epistemic warrant to believe there is a mind-independent candle; not that their perception of a candle itself is reality.

Astro Cat wrote: ↑Tue May 28, 2024 6:58 am The reason why is because of the old canard, Euthyphro's Dilemma. Let's remove language about "commands," though, and just talk about whatever the "good" is supposed to be.

If what God thinks and does is good because it is good, then "goodness" is a standard that's external to God that God just follows like the rest of us. It would mean that God had no part in defining or creating what "good" is, because if He did, then "goodness" as a standard would be up to whatever God's whim was when He created it, and that's the next thing that will be brought up. In this case, if moral realism is true (and there are "moral truths"), then God has nothing to do with them: He either follows them or He doesn't, he either commands that we follow them as well or He doesn't, but He had nothing to do with why they are there.

If what is good is actually good because God thinks it is good -- if God defines Goodness by His preferences -- then there is likewise no moral realism: there are no "moral truths," there are only preferences that God happens to have, and there is nothing about reality about why we ought to have those same preferences. One could argue, "you ought to agree with God's preferences because He's powerful and can cause you to suffer forever if you don't," but that isn't moral realism (that's "might makes right"). One could argue, "you ought to agree with God's preferences because God created you so you owe him," but there is a missing argument for why a creation must agree with the preferences of a creator (suppose Hitler were to create a truly conscious AI: does the AI have a moral obligation to agree with Hitler's preferences because he is the AI's creator? Prima facie I think you would agree that would be asinine).

God can have whatever preferences He has, but that wouldn't imbue all other sentient, conscious, sapient beings with the "ought" that they ought to have the same preferences. In such a scenario, moral realism isn't true at all: there are no "moral truths," only God's preferences. It can be true that God has preferences, but it wouldn't be true that we are compelled to agree with them. If God were to command that we smash babies upon rocks, it wouldn't be true that we ought to agree that is "good."

In neither scenario does theism seem to have anything to do with moral realism: either there are moral truths or there are not, but God's existence seems to have nothing to do with that dichotomy: they will happily go on existing with or without God, and God is either beholden to moral truths the same as the rest of us (if they exist) or not (if they don't).

Why, then, do so many theists claim not only to be moral realists, but that moral realism is dependent on theism? It can't be, even if it were true.

Do you want an answer? As a Theist, I can tell you what I think it is.

The description of Euthyphro's Dilemma has a missing piece: and it's very key. Socrates thinks its so important that he makes darn sure he has it in place before he launches the dilemma. Because the truth is, absolutely everything depends on it...and he knows it.

Here's the relevant section, reproduced for your consideration:

So: What about the gods, Euthyphro? If they indeed disagree over
something, don't they disagree over these very things?
Euth: It's undoubtedly necessary.
So: Then some of the gods think different things to be just,
according to you, worthy Euthyphro, and noble and shameful and good
and bad, since they surely wouldn't be at odds with one another unless
they were disagreeing about these things. Right?
Euth: You're right.
So: And so what each group thinks is noble and good and just, they
also love these thing, and they hate the things that are the opposites of
these?
Euth: Certainly.
So: Then according to you some of them think that these things are
just, while others think they are unjust, the things that, because there's a
dispute, they are at odds about and are at war over. Isn't this so?
Euth: It is.
So: The same things, it seems, are both hated by the gods and loved,
and so would be both despised and beloved by them?
Euth: It seems so.
So: And the same things would be both pious and impious,
Euthyphro, according to this argument?
Euth: I'm afraid so.
So: So you haven't answered what I was asking, you marvelous
man. Because I didn't ask you for what is both pious and impious at once,
and as it appears, both beloved and despised by the gods. As a result,
Euthyphro, it wouldn't be surprising if in doing what you're doing now—
punishing your father—you were doing something beloved by Zeus but
despised by Kronos and Ouranos, and while it is dear to Hephaestos, it is
despised by Hera, and if any other god disagrees with another on the
subject, your action will appear the same way to them, too.
(Woods-Pack, 2007)

So what you see is that the dispute over what is "the Good" is premised this way: that the gods disagree about what it is; therefore, it cannot be identical with what the gods regard as pious, or what they love. "The Good" must stand separate from the divine opinions.

In other words, Socrates premise is Polytheism, not Monotheism. Socrates was, after all, a Polytheist who only occasionally talked about "the God," and mostly referred to "the gods," just like everybody in his day did.

What difference does it make? Well, the Dilemma requires us to accept a dichotomy between "Good" and "[will of/beloved of the] gods." If there were a way in which these things were identical, then the Dilemma itself would be premised on a false dichotomy, and would fail.

Do you see it yet? Under Monotheism, there are no alternate gods. There is but one God, who is the Grounds of all Being. To say that something is "good" then, is to say it is consonant with the will, character and purposes of God...the only God that exists (or to use Socratic terms, it is "pious" and "what God loves"). So it is not a case that we can propose that either God commands X to be moral OR it is moral, so God commands it. We would have to say that X is moral because it is consonant with the nature of God AND God also commands it because of this.

So the Dilemma actually lacks one of its essential premises. And framed Theistically, it becomes ridiculous. It becomes like the question, "Is this man a father, or is he a son?" If somebody posed that question, we might well laugh, and say, "Those things are not mutually exclusive at all. All you've done is find two different ways to describe the same man. Here is his father and mother (so you see, he is a son), and here is his own son (and so you see he is, at the same time, a father)." Just so, "the Good" and "what God loves/commands" are identical. God commands love because God is love. God commands mercy, because He is merciful. God commands righteousness, because His whole nature is righteous. Whatever God commands is for our good, because all of it is focused on our good; on bringing us into good relationship with the singular Person who is Himself the very embodiment and meaning of "The Good."

So there's the answer. The Dilemma has some work to do, if it is going to reassert itself. Namely, it would need to show us a conception of "the Good" that would be unmistakeable to us as authentically good, but was impossible to understand as intrinsic to or reflective of the nature of the only God that exists. And just how does the skeptic manage to achieve that?