Philosophy Now Forum

I often encounter the question on whether Kant is realist or antirealist?

The central point is the evolutionary default of metaphysical realism or philosophical realism:

Philosophical realism ... is the view that a certain kind of thing (ranging widely from abstract objects like numbers to moral statements to the physical world itself) has mind-independent existence, i.e. that it exists even in the absence of any mind perceiving it or that its existence is not just a mere appearance in the eye of the beholder.

...... realism [p] is contrasted with idealism.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism

Those who oppose the above are anti-p-realists.

Kant is ultimately an antirealist, i.e. anti-p-realist [see next post for detailed reference].

Kant wrote:From the start, we have declared ourselves in favour of this Transcendental Idealism;
CPR-A370

While being a transcendental Idealist i.e. anti-p-realist, Kant is an empirical realist;

Kant wrote:The Transcendental Idealist, on the other hand, may be an Empirical Realist CPR-A370

Being an Empirical Realist means the empirical external world is independent of the human mind in one sense.
For example the apple on the tree out there exists independent of humans in one sense.
The oncoming train on the rail one is stepping on is not existing in the mind but external to the person's body, brain and mind.

However, Kant's empirical realism is subsumed within his ultimate transcendental Idealism [anti-p-realist].


Kant identify p-realists as Transcendental Realists which implied they are delusional in believing reality is absolute mind-independent.
Transcendental Realists believe what is reality is transcendental i.e. beyond the reach of human minds, exist regardless of humans i.e. absolutely mind-independent.


So, Kant is a Transcendental Idealist i.e. anti-p-realist while being an Empirical Realist at the same time in different contexts.

Notes:
Here is how Kant [in the CPR] declared to be opposing Realism [transcendental aka philosophical realism; in [..] = mine

[CPR A369]
By Transcendental Idealism, I mean the Doctrine that Appearances are to be regarded as being, one and all, Representations only, not Things-in-Themselves,
and that Time and Space are therefore only Sensible Forms of our Intuition, not Determinations Given as existing-by-themselves, nor Conditions of Objects viewed as Things-in-Themselves.

To this [Transcendental] Idealism there is opposed a Transcendental Realism which regards Time and Space as something Given in-themselves, independently of our Sensibility.

The Transcendental Realist [aka philosophical realist] thus interprets Outer Appearances (their Reality being taken as granted) as Things-in-Themselves,
which exist independently of us and of our Sensibility, and
which are therefore Outside us
the phrase 'outside us' being interpreted in conformity with Pure Concepts of Understanding [Categories].

It is, in fact, this Transcendental Realist who afterwards plays the part of Empirical Idealist.
After wrongly supposing that Objects of the Senses, if they are to be External, must have an Existence-by-themselves, and independently of the Senses,
he [the Transcendental Realist] finds that, judged from this point of view [Transcendental Realism], all our sensuous Representations are inadequate to establish their Reality.

[A370] From the start, we have declared ourselves in favour of this Transcendental Idealism;
and our Doctrine thus removes all difficulty in the way of accepting the Existence of Matter on the unaided testimony of our mere Self-Consciousness,
or of declaring it [Matter] to be thereby proved in the same manner as the Existence of myself as a Thinking Being is proved.

The Transcendental Idealist is, therefore, an Empirical Realist, and allows to Matter, as Appearance, a Reality which does not permit of being inferred, but is Immediately Perceived.

[A371]Transcendental Realism, on the other hand, inevitably falls into difficulties, and finds itself obliged to give way to Empirical Idealism,
in that it regards the Objects of Outer Sense as something distinct from the Senses themselves,
treating mere Appearances as Self-Subsistent Beings, existing outside us.
On such a view [Transcendental Realism] as this, however clearly we may be conscious 1 of our Representation of these Things, [but] it is still far from certain that, if the Representation exists, there exists also the Object corresponding to it.

In our System [Transcendental Idealism], on the other hand, these External Things, namely Matter, are in all their Configurations and Alterations nothing but mere Appearances, that is, Representations in us, of the Reality of which we are Immediately Conscious.

Since, so far as I know, all psychologists [re independent Soul] who adopt Empirical Idealism are Transcendental Realists, they have certainly proceeded quite consistently in ascribing great importance to Empirical Idealism, as one of the problems in regard to which the human mind is quite at a loss how to proceed.

For if we regard Outer Appearances as Representations produced in us by their [external] Objects,
and if these [external] Objects be Things existing in-themselves outside us, [as philosophical realists]
it is indeed impossible to see how we can come to know the Existence of the [external] Objects
otherwise than by Inference from the Effect to the Cause;
and this being so, it must always remain doubtful whether the Cause in question be in us or outside us.

[A378]If we treat Outer Objects as Things-in-Themselves, it is quite impossible to understand how we could arrive at a Knowledge of their Reality outside us, since we have to rely merely on the Representation which is in us.

[A380]
But if the psychologist takes Appearances for Things-in-Themselves, and as existing-in and by-themselves, then whether
he be a materialist who admits into his System nothing but Matter alone, or
a spiritualist who admits only Thinking Beings (that is, Beings with the Form of our Inner Sense), or
a dualist who accepts both,
he will always, owing to this misunderstanding, be entangled in Pseudo-Rational Speculations
as to how that which is not a Thing-in-Itself, but only the Appearance of a Thing-in-General, can exist-by-itself.

Notes: KIV

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sun Mar 31, 2024 9:23 am I often encounter the question on whether Kant is realist or antirealist?

The central point is the evolutionary default of metaphysical realism or philosophical realism:

Philosophical realism ... is the view that a certain kind of thing (ranging widely from abstract objects like numbers to moral statements to the physical world itself) has mind-independent existence, i.e. that it exists even in the absence of any mind perceiving it or that its existence is not just a mere appearance in the eye of the beholder.

...... realism [p] is contrasted with idealism.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism

Those who oppose the above are anti-p-realists.

Kant is ultimately an antirealist, i.e. anti-p-realist.

Kant wrote:From the start, we have declared ourselves in favour of this Transcendental Idealism;
CPR-A370

While being a transcendental Idealist i.e. anti-p-realist, Kant is an empirical realist;

Kant wrote:The Transcendental Idealist, on the other hand, may be an Empirical Realist CPR-A370

Being an Empirical Realist means the empirical external world is independent of the human mind in one sense.
For example the apple on the tree out there exists independent of humans in one sense.
The oncoming train on the rail one is stepping on is not existing in the mind but external to the person's body, brain and mind.

However, Kant's empirical realism is subsumed within his ultimate transcendental Idealism [anti-p-realist].


Kant identify p-realists as Transcendental Realists which implied they are delusional in believing reality is absolute mind-independent.
Transcendental Realists believe what is reality is transcendental i.e. beyond the reach of human minds, exist regardless of humans i.e. absolutely mind-independent.


So, Kant is a Transcendental Idealist i.e. anti-p-realist while being an Empirical Realist at the same time in different contexts.

One has to wonder how this guy spent 10 years on this topic, and still doesn't know that philosophical realism and transcendental realism aren't synonymous. Nor did Kant say that.

Nor is transcendental idealism necessarily anti-realist. VA gets even the most basic issues of his philosophy wrong. Maybe deliberately.

Atla wrote: ↑Sun Mar 31, 2024 3:26 pm One has to wonder how this guy spent 10 years on this topic, and still doesn't know that philosophical realism and transcendental realism aren't synonymous. Nor did Kant say that.

Nor is transcendental idealism necessarily anti-realist. VA gets even the most basic issues of his philosophy wrong. Maybe deliberately.

You [gnat] are so arrogant with your ignorance of Kant's CPR.

Transcendental Realism, on the other hand, inevitably falls into difficulties, and finds itself obliged to give way to Empirical Idealism,
in that it regards the Objects of Outer Sense as something distinct from the Senses themselves,
treating mere Appearances as Self-Subsistent Beings, existing outside us.
On such a view [Transcendental Realism] as this, however clearly we may be conscious 1 of our Representation of these Things, [but] it is still far from certain that, if the Representation exists, there exists also the Object corresponding to it.
CPR A371

Philosophical realism is Transcendental Realism

• Transcendental Realism is Empirical Idealism [A371]
  Philosophical realism is Empirical Idealism
  Therefore, philosophical realism is Transcendental Realism

Transcendental Idealist is antirealist[p]

• Idealist oppose p-realist
  Antirealist[p] oppose p-realist
  Thus, Idealist is antirealist[p]
  Therefore, Transcendental Idealist is antirealist[p].

I have already exposed your gnat ignorance a '1000' times.
Read up thoroughly what you are trying to critique.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Mon Apr 01, 2024 3:36 am

Atla wrote: ↑Sun Mar 31, 2024 3:26 pm One has to wonder how this guy spent 10 years on this topic, and still doesn't know that philosophical realism and transcendental realism aren't synonymous. Nor did Kant say that.

Nor is transcendental idealism necessarily anti-realist. VA gets even the most basic issues of his philosophy wrong. Maybe deliberately.

You [gnat] are so arrogant with your ignorance of Kant's CPR.

Transcendental Realism, on the other hand, inevitably falls into difficulties, and finds itself obliged to give way to Empirical Idealism,
in that it regards the Objects of Outer Sense as something distinct from the Senses themselves,
treating mere Appearances as Self-Subsistent Beings, existing outside us.
On such a view [Transcendental Realism] as this, however clearly we may be conscious 1 of our Representation of these Things, [but] it is still far from certain that, if the Representation exists, there exists also the Object corresponding to it.
CPR A371

Philosophical realism is Transcendental Realism

• Transcendental Realism is Empirical Idealism [A371]
  Philosophical realism is Empirical Idealism
  Therefore, philosophical realism is Transcendental Realism

Transcendental Idealist is antirealist[p]

• Idealist oppose p-realist
  Antirealist[p] oppose p-realist
  Thus, Idealist is antirealist[p]
  Therefore, Transcendental Idealist is antirealist[p].

I have already exposed your gnat ignorance a '1000' times.
Read up thoroughly what you are trying to critique.

I don't think you ever actually "read" the CPR. Speed-reading it is not the same.

VA's God wrote: Kant didn't claim that transcendental realism is the same as philosophical realism. In his philosophy, transcendental realism refers to the view that objects exist independently of our perception, but we can never know them as they are in themselves. This differs from philosophical realism, which typically asserts that objects exist independently and we can have knowledge of them as they are.

VA's God wrote: Transcendental idealism, as proposed by philosophers like Immanuel Kant, posits that reality as we perceive it is shaped by our cognitive faculties. It asserts that we can only know things as they appear to us, not as they are in themselves. While transcendental idealism challenges certain aspects of realism by emphasizing the role of the mind in constructing reality, it doesn't necessarily entail philosophical anti-realism outright. Some interpretations of transcendental idealism still allow for a form of realism, albeit one that acknowledges the limitations of human perception and cognition in accessing ultimate reality. However, it's important to note that interpretations of Kant's transcendental idealism can vary, and different philosophers may draw different conclusions regarding its implications for realism.

So much overlap of 'ism' renders "philosophy" a pile of wank.

Sad that you all spent so much time studying various forms of it (ism) && (ist)

attofishpi wrote: ↑Mon Apr 01, 2024 5:51 am So much overlap of 'ism' renders "philosophy" a pile of wank.

Sad that you all spent so much time studying various forms of it (ism) && (ist)

So many forms of ism, aren't or, should I say isn't!

...more gobbledygook from yours truly!

I didn't study philosophy, I have a general picture built from science and psychology and well, everything, and judge all of philosophy from there. Why would I waste time studying isms when 95%+ of them are wrong or useless.

Dubious wrote: ↑Mon Apr 01, 2024 5:59 am

attofishpi wrote: ↑Mon Apr 01, 2024 5:51 am So much overlap of 'ism' renders "philosophy" a pile of wank.

Sad that you all spent so much time studying various forms of it (ism) && (ist)

So many forms of ism, aren't or, should I say isn't!

...more gobbledygook from yours truly!

..ah yes, gobbledygook indeed.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0u7sa6WFhxg

attofishpi wrote: ↑Mon Apr 01, 2024 6:06 am

Dubious wrote: ↑Mon Apr 01, 2024 5:59 am

attofishpi wrote: ↑Mon Apr 01, 2024 5:51 am So much overlap of 'ism' renders "philosophy" a pile of wank.

Sad that you all spent so much time studying various forms of it (ism) && (ist)

So many forms of ism, aren't or, should I say isn't!

...more gobbledygook from yours truly!

..ah yes, gobbledygook indeed.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0u7sa6WFhxg

It's this extremely practical philosophy called realism which has transformed the Brits into a superior species which they themselves will attest to!

Dubious wrote: ↑Mon Apr 01, 2024 6:19 am

attofishpi wrote: ↑Mon Apr 01, 2024 6:06 am

Dubious wrote: ↑Mon Apr 01, 2024 5:59 am
So many forms of ism, aren't or, should I say isn't!

...more gobbledygook from yours truly!

..ah yes, gobbledygook indeed.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0u7sa6WFhxg

It's this extremely practical philosophy called realism which has transformed the Brits into a superior species which they themselves will attest to!

Ah shit. Does that make me a realist? Can a Christian be a realist (even one that nose reality is a convoluted apparition of the Truth) ?

attofishpi wrote: ↑Mon Apr 01, 2024 6:23 am

Dubious wrote: ↑Mon Apr 01, 2024 6:19 am

attofishpi wrote: ↑Mon Apr 01, 2024 6:06 am

..ah yes, gobbledygook indeed.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0u7sa6WFhxg

It's this extremely practical philosophy called realism which has transformed the Brits into a superior species which they themselves will attest to!

Ah shit. Does that make me a realist? Can a Christian be a realist (even one that nose reality is a convoluted apparition of the Truth) ?

There are some noses that are indeed convoluted the owners of which can only hope it's an apparition!

..nonsensical, typical poor English from a spawn of England.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sun Mar 31, 2024 9:23 am Being an Empirical Realist means the empirical external world is independent of the human mind in one sense.
For example the apple on the tree out there exists independent of humans in one sense.
The oncoming train on the rail one is stepping on is not existing in the mind but external to the person's body, brain and mind.

So, tell us about the two senses (or more if there are more). In what sense are these things independent. In what sense are they dependent.
Presumably even in a coma the person still can get run over by the train. We could use the coma situation as one limit of one kind of independence.
The unaware person still affected. But however you want to illustrate the dependence and independence.
I suggest you try to avoid the word absolute since it has no descriptive value.