Philosophy Now Forum

Moral facts deniers rely on realism* [philosophical, indirect, or direct] to insist there are no moral facts thus morality cannot be objective.

Here is an argument why "realism is not an epistemologically tenable position".


....................
Why our best theories of perception and physics undermine realism
Michael H. Herzog & Adrien Doerig
https://osf.io/r4sf9/download

Abstract
Realism about objects proposes an isomorphism between the objects of the external world and the corresponding mental representations.

A candle on a table leads to the percept of this candle.
Ontologically, realism locates objects between the entities of fundamental physics and the perceiver.

Here, we show that under the assumption of a mind independent world of physical particles there is no space for a mind independent world of objects.

The mental representations partition the physical world into classes of states, each class corresponding to one mental representation.
Since there are many more physical states than representations, the mapping is not unique.
Hence, different perceivers may maintain different partitions of the physical world, leading to different mind dependent representations and objects.

In general, we show that if there is one fundamental ontology (fundamental physics), one cannot have any other ontology (objects) in addition.

Furthermore, we show that realism is not even a desirable goal of perception.
These considerations by no means favor dualism or solipsism.

These ontological considerations are presented in part II.
Based on neuroscience results, we show in part I that realism is not an epistemologically tenable position either.

...................
Discuss?? Views??

Notes:

There are two senses of realism, i.e.
1. Transcendental Realism - [philosophical, metaphysical direct, indirect, naive]
2. Empirical Realism - [oppose philosophical realism].

From that essay in the OP.

Realism and Idealism. Most philosophical theories either subscribe to a realism where objects
are mind independent (Crane & French, 2015; Descartes, 1637/1987; Hume, 1739/2003; Locke,
1689/1841; Moore, 1905) or to idealistic positions where objects disappear when they are not
perceived (Berkeley, 1710/1881; Fichte, 1796/1998; Hegel, 1807/2012). We maintain an
intermediate position: there is a mind independent world, described by the world vector, but
objects are mind dependent.

IOW there is an undifferentiated mind independent reality, they believe, but objects do not have a mind independent existence, because we are abstracting them out of the whole.

This goes precisely against your position that there is no mind independent reality.

I am not sure how Atla would weigh in on this one, for example.

Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Wed Nov 15, 2023 3:22 pm From that essay in the OP.

Realism and Idealism. Most philosophical theories either subscribe to a realism where objects are mind independent
(Crane & French, 2015; Descartes, 1637/1987; Hume, 1739/2003; Locke, 1689/1841; Moore, 1905) or to idealistic positions where objects disappear when they are not perceived (Berkeley, 1710/1881; Fichte, 1796/1998; Hegel, 1807/2012).
We maintain an intermediate position: there is a mind independent world, described by the world vector, but objects are mind dependent.

IOW there is an undifferentiated mind independent reality, they believe, but objects do not have a mind independent existence, because we are abstracting them out of the whole.

This goes precisely against your position that there is no mind independent reality.

I am not sure how Atla would weigh in on this one, for example.

My reference to realism is the following;

Philosophical realism – is the view that a certain kind of thing (ranging widely from abstract objects like numbers to moral statements to the physical world itself) has mind-independent existence, i.e. that it exists even in the absence of any mind perceiving it or that its existence is not just a mere appearance in the eye of the beholder.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism

The article refers to direct and indirect realism which agree with the above, however the article differentiate things into the following;
1. Physical things - solid to particles/quarks.
2. Vector World as a thing

The typical Realists [philosophical] claims that there are real mind-independent objects and things like cats, dogs, apples, tables, atoms, molecules, quarks, in the external world.

However, the article is non-conventional and refer to a Vector World as the only mind-independent thing;

The Article wrote:But aren’t objects composed of atoms, molecules, etc., and, therefore, exist in a mind-independent fashion?
No.
Only the world vector exists in a mind-independent fashion.
Atoms and molecules are mind-dependent constructions, and so are all the other entities of our physical theories, including light, heat, etc. 26
Only the fundamental entities described by the world vector are mind independent.
Ontologically, the world contains only the fundamental entities described by the world vector.

What is the vector world?

The state of the world at time t is described by a world vector expressing the current state of the fundamental entities of the world (e.g., the quantum numbers of quantum fields).

In the toy example above, the world comprised all possible vectors (i.e., {(0,0,0,0), (0,0,0,1),
(0,0,1,0), (0,1,0,0), (1,0,0,0), (1,0,0,1), (1,0,1,0), (1,1,0,0), (0,1,0,1), (0,1,1,0), (0,0,1,1), (0,1,1,1), (1,0,1,1), (1,1,0,1), (1,1,1,0), (1,1,1,1)}) .

The fundamental entities of the Vector World is comprised of the quantum numbers of quantum fields.

Regardless of the authors' claim that their Vector World is mind-independent,
whatever that is, it has to be conditioned upon a human-based science-physics-FSK, because it is human-based it cannot be ultimately and absolutely mind-independent.

My point here is to highlight [with very good arguments] to the typical realists [philosophical] that their claims are not tenable.
There are no absolute* mind-independent [human independent] cats, dogs, apples, tables, atoms, molecules, quarks, in an external world.

* contrast to relative mind-independence of Kantian empirical realism.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Nov 16, 2023 5:24 am The typical Realists [philosophical] claims that there are real mind-independent objects and things like cats, dogs, apples, tables, atoms, molecules, quarks, in the external world.

However, the article is non-conventional and refer to a Vector World as the only mind-independent thing;

Right which is an mind independent reality. And which a realist can, and some do, admit is what is something we abstract portions from that are actually just portions of a whole.

The writer does not agree with you, even if the writer disagrees also with some kinds of realists.

Regardless of the authors' claim that their Vector World is mind-independent,
whatever that is, it has to be conditioned upon a human-based science-physics-FSK, because it is human-based it cannot be ultimately and absolutely mind-independent.

According to you, but not them. The article specifically goes against that claim.

Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Thu Nov 16, 2023 6:07 am

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Nov 16, 2023 5:24 am The typical Realists [philosophical] claims that there are real mind-independent objects and things like cats, dogs, apples, tables, atoms, molecules, quarks, in the external world.

However, the article is non-conventional and refer to a Vector World as the only mind-independent thing;

Right which is an mind independent reality. And which a realist can, and some do, admit is what is something we abstract portions from that are actually just portions of a whole.

The writer does not agree with you, even if the writer disagrees also with some kinds of realists.

Regardless of the authors' claim that their Vector World is mind-independent,
whatever that is, it has to be conditioned upon a human-based science-physics-FSK, because it is human-based it cannot be ultimately and absolutely mind-independent.

According to you, but not them. The article specifically goes against that claim.

I agree with the authors argument to refute the mind-independent reality of ordinary things,
but I disagree with the author's that postulate the existence of mind-independent vector world.

What I asserted is, the authors' claims of a mind-independent vector world is false as I had argued extensively here, i.e.
Why Philosophical Realism is Illusory
viewtopic.php?t=40167

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Nov 16, 2023 6:50 am I agree with the authors argument to refute the mind-independent reality of ordinary things,
but I disagree with the author's that postulate the existence of mind-independent vector world.

Got it.

Be interesting to see if Atla weighs in on the reality of objects. He may have done this elsewhere, but I'll see if I can bring him here to comment in this context, related to their schema.

It raises and interesting issue because we seem to be separate objects, yet our bodies would also be part of the vector world. They refer to individual scientists. I understand that we are perceivers, but it creates an odd image of the universe with undifferentiated vector universe, with these differentiated humans walking around in the undifferentiatedness
OR
we are not really differentiated and individual existence is an illusion.

Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Thu Nov 16, 2023 8:15 am

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Nov 16, 2023 6:50 am I agree with the authors argument to refute the mind-independent reality of ordinary things,
but I disagree with the author's that postulate the existence of mind-independent vector world.

Got it.

Be interesting to see if Atla weighs in on the reality of objects. He may have done this elsewhere, but I'll see if I can bring him here to comment in this context, related to their schema.

It raises and interesting issue because we seem to be separate objects, yet our bodies would also be part of the vector world. They refer to individual scientists. I understand that we are perceivers, but it creates an odd image of the universe with undifferentiated vector universe, with these differentiated humans walking around in the undifferentiatedness
OR
we are not really differentiated and individual existence is an illusion.

Notes:

From the article:
"In this sense, hallucinations may be seen as uncontrolled mental imagery."
"Perception is sometimes called controlled hallucination (Koenderink & van Doorn, 2008; Seth, 2021) or delusional (Lotto, 2017)."

V.S. Ramachandran, The Tell-Tale Brain: A Neuroscientist's Quest for What Makes Us Human
“Indeed, the line between perceiving and hallucinating is not as crisp as we like to think. In a sense, when we look at the world, we are hallucinating all the time. One could almost regard perception as the act of choosing the one hallucination that best fits the incoming data.”

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Nov 16, 2023 8:28 am From the article:
"In this sense, hallucinations may be seen as uncontrolled mental imagery."
"Perception is sometimes called controlled hallucination (Koenderink & van Doorn, 2008; Seth, 2021) or delusional (Lotto, 2017)."

Well, there goes empricism.

V.S. Ramachandran, The Tell-Tale Brain: A Neuroscientist's Quest for What Makes Us Human
“Indeed, the line between perceiving and hallucinating is not as crisp as we like to think. In a sense, when we look at the world, we are hallucinating all the time. One could almost regard perception as the act of choosing the one hallucination that best fits the incoming data.”

And there goes empricism.

It makes no sense of an antirealist to start calling perceptions hallucinations, because for the antirealist those perceptions ARE THE ONLY REAL THINGS, they don't come from something else or point to something else.

Only a realist can call them Hallucinations. Because then you are saying they may not match what is out there.

If there is no mind independent world and you call all perceptions hallucinations, there's nothing real. Nothing.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Wed Nov 15, 2023 11:28 am Moral facts deniers rely on realism* [philosophical, indirect, or direct] to insist there are no moral facts thus morality cannot be objective.

You got off to a bad start.
Most who claim moral relativism and cultural relativism recognise idealism as the reason why objectivity is problematic.
Realist think that objectivity is no problem at all.

You seem to be on the decsent into madness again.

Sculptor wrote: ↑Thu Nov 16, 2023 11:43 am

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Wed Nov 15, 2023 11:28 am Moral facts deniers rely on realism* [philosophical, indirect, or direct] to insist there are no moral facts thus morality cannot be objective.

You got off to a bad start.
Most who claim moral relativism and cultural relativism recognise idealism as the reason why objectivity is problematic.
Realist think that objectivity is no problem at all.

You seem to be on the decsent into madness again.

Yeah, I'm pretty sure most moral realists are also philosophical realists. This dude seems off it.

Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Thu Nov 16, 2023 9:06 am It makes no sense of an antirealist to start calling perceptions hallucinations, because for the antirealist those perceptions ARE THE ONLY REAL THINGS, they don't come from something else or point to something else.

Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Thu Nov 16, 2023 9:06 am Only a realist can call them Hallucinations. Because then you are saying they may not match what is out there.

What utter hogwash. ChatGPT hallucinates. It has no external sensory organs in the usual human sense; so any talk of its percepts "matching" is nonsensical.

Hallucination simply means making up stuff that's not in the training data. Even if the training data is "wrong"; or itself doesn't "match what is out there".

If you teach it that 2+2 is 5 and it answers 6 that's a hallucination.

Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Thu Nov 16, 2023 12:24 pm

Sculptor wrote: ↑Thu Nov 16, 2023 11:43 am

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Wed Nov 15, 2023 11:28 am Moral facts deniers rely on realism* [philosophical, indirect, or direct] to insist there are no moral facts thus morality cannot be objective.

You got off to a bad start.
Most who claim moral relativism and cultural relativism recognise idealism as the reason why objectivity is problematic.
Realist think that objectivity is no problem at all.

You seem to be on the decsent into madness again.

Yeah, I'm pretty sure most moral realists are also philosophical realists. This dude seems off it.

He has only one positive quality and that is persistence. Aside from that he's basically batshit crazy.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Wed Nov 15, 2023 11:28 am Moral facts deniers rely on realism* [philosophical, indirect, or direct] to insist there are no moral facts thus morality cannot be objective.

Are you an idealist, or a realist?

Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Thu Nov 16, 2023 8:15 am Be interesting to see if Atla weighs in on the reality of objects. He may have done this elsewhere, but I'll see if I can bring him here to comment in this context, related to their schema.

An "object" is an illusory feature of dualistic thinking. The natural world seems to be continuous, non-separate, and as to my knowledge, there isn't a single verified counter-example to this known to humanity.

(That's why I don't wanna Plato)

In dualistic thinking, we divide the indivisible natural world into parts, treat them as separate things. And then we start to come up with all kinds of made-up stuff like "relationship between objects", objects "possessing attributes" and so on.

As a nondualist I have really lost the frame of mind where I percieve the world as an interplay of objects and subjects. I simply don't experience the world like that anymore. I had to learn to sort of force myself to return to objects and subjects anyway as that's how we conduct everyday life, but fundamentally I just don't see it anymore. I see one continuous world.

No objects = no-thingness. A thing is an object, it's a way of thinking.

But this doesn't change the fact of indirect perception, nor does it change the fact imo that being a realist on a mind-independent external world is a completely sensible position. OF COURSE the world 'out there' is undifferentiated. That's 100% consistent with indirect perception.