Philosophy Now Forum

Kant’s Theory of Knowledge
by Graham Bird, pg. 190-191

At Bxxvi—xxvii, for example, Kant says:

• 'But our further contention must also be duly borne in mind, namely that though we cannot know these objects as things-in-themselves, we must yet be in a position at least to think them as things-in-themselves:
  Otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be appearance without anything that appears.'

It has sometimes been argued (cf. Adickes: Kant und das Ding an sich, Ch. 1, p. 6) that in this passage Kant commits himself to the existence of noumena in a quite new way.
But this is not so.

All that Kant says is that while we cannot know things as they are in themselves, we must be able to conceive them.

It has, however, already been granted (Ch. 5, p. 76, and Ch. 2, p. 34) that intelligible objects are conceivable, that is to say not logically impossible.
Kant wishes to insist that we may without contradiction speak of intelligible objects, and even of appearances as appearances of such objects.
His argument in this passage asserts only that such a way of speaking about appearances would be inconsistent if the concept of a noumenon were itself inconsistent.
But to say that noumena are not logically impossible is not to admit that there are any such objects, nor to suppose that we could have knowledge of them.
In a footnote Kant repeats his general warning that logical possibility is not the same as material possibility, and not at all the same as actual existence.

This passage does not commit Kant to the existence of noumena in any new way, but it throws some light on his use or choice of the term 'Erscheinung' or 'appearance'.
It has been argued (Ch. 3, p. 46 ff.) that Kant employs this term in his account of perception in a way quite different from that in which the term 'appearance' is normally used.
To speak of what we perceive as an appearance is to say neither that all our perceptions are illusory, nor that we have to infer objects and their empirical properties from their appearances.

In the transcendental context appearances are not related to their objects in the way in which ordinarily appearances are related to their empirical objects.
It is clear, from this passage in the Preface, that Kant chose the term 'appearance' at least partly because it suggests the notion of a thing which appears.
But in the transcendental context in which 'appearance' is contrasted with 'transcendental object' or 'noumenon', this suggestion indicates only the conceivability of such transcendental objects and not their actual existence.

Kant's conceptual experiment, in which this transcendental contrast is an important part of the apparatus, does not require the actual existence of noumena but only their logical possibility.
192

The experiment is carried out properly in the solution to the Third Antinomy, although the results are reported in advance even in the Preface.
Kant reaches the conclusion that freedom and causality are compatible, because we can conceive a situation in which the same event is phenomenally caused but noumenally free.
Or again, that we can give a sense to the notion of intervention in a causal chain, by conceiving the chain to be phenomenal and the intervention based upon noumena.
Or again, that the two apparently conflicting notions can be said to be compatible, because we can conceive the same person to be phenomenally determined but noumenally free.
The experiment, on Kant's reading, yields a confirmation of the transcendental contrast between phenomena and noumena, because it is in terms of this contrast that the two apparently conflicting concepts can be reconciled. The world of theoretical knowledge is restricted to that of phenomena, and for this reason there is room in the noumenal world for faith (B xxx).

The natural responses to this solution are to say that it is unsatisfying and wrong.
Kant seems to have assigned the world of practice or morals to the realm of noumena (cf. B579, note), about which we are supposed to be totally ignorant.
To speak of moral judgments or of moral concepts as applying to such a world may seem to make the notion of morality not more but less intelligible.
Kant generally treats claims about supposed noumenal objects as illusory or empty, but in this transitional context he seems anxious to promote claims which are intended to be true of such objects.
It would be entirely natural to say on the basis of this argument either that Kant's problem does not arise, or that his solution to it contradicts what he says elsewhere of intelligible objects and dialectical Ideas.

Kant's argument will seem objectionable in these ways so long as it is understood as a straightforward defence of freedom.
It would be natural to argue, for example, that the problem only seems to arise because Kant held that causal laws were necessary, or that every event has a cause, although these claims have been already disputed. Yet Kant certainly appears to claim that we are sometimes free agents, but that this is true only of our noumenal selves or intelligible characters.
193

But Kant states a number of qualifications to this outline of argument, which show that it is very far from being a simple defence of this kind.
He makes considerable efforts, for example, to avoid the charge of inconsistency, by stating exactly what he has, and what he has not, been able to prove.
He makes it clear that he has not been able, and has not even intended, to prove that we are free agents in any intelligible world.
He claims also, at the end of the Third Antinomy, that the conflict between causality and freedom is an illusion (B586).
This may suggest that his attitude towards this Antinomy is not wholly different from his attitude to the others, and that he does not regard the problem of freedom as a genuine problem.
But this raises obvious difficulties, for if Kant recognised that to speak of freedom in an intelligible world is an illusion, then it is hard to see what the appeal to an intelligible world is designed to do.

Kant states that his argument has not shown that freedom in an intelligible world is 'real', or even 'possible' (B585—586).
These provisos are analogous to his persistent claim that the logical possibility of noumena does not amount to an admission of their material possibility or actual existence.
All that the argument can show in the Third Antinomy is that the concepts of freedom and causality, however much they may seem to conflict, cannot be said to be incompatible.
This is to insist again on the claim that the problem, and the associated experiment, are concerned with concepts and their relations.
Such a problem can quite properly be discussed without considering whether the concepts in question are exemplified in our experience or are empty.
To discuss whether two concepts are compatible is quite different from discussing whether any objects actually satisfy them.
Since Kant's problem is of this logical kind it would be a mistake to think that the claims about intelligible freedom in his argument are stated to be true of any intelligible world.
Since he is required to argue only that a situation in which causality and freedom are both ascribed to the same event is logically possible, he is committed to saying only that such a situation is conceivable and not that it actually obtains.
It may be disputed whether such a situation really is conceivable, but at least this is not the same as disputing whether freedom actually obtains in some intelligible world inaccessible to our senses.

VA asked ChatGpt:
Kant CPR Cognition vs Knowledge:
In the original German Critique of Pure Reason, Kant differentiated between "Cognition" [Erkenntnis] and 'Knowledge" [Wissen].
Here are two English translations related to Cognition vs Knowledge:

[NK Smith Translations] But our further contention must also be duly borne in mind, namely, that though we cannot Know these Objects as Things-in-Themselves, we must yet be in position at least to think them as Things-in-Themselves;*
otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be Appearance without anything that appears. [Bxxvi]

[Guyer & Wood Translation] Yet the reservation must also be well noted, that even if we cannot cognize these same objects as Things-in-Themselves, we at least must be able to think them as Things-in-Themselves.*
For otherwise there would follow the absurd proposition that there is an Appearance without anything that appears. Bxxvi

According to Kant, the 'cognitive' process whilst linked is a separate process from the 'knowledge; process. It is only after an object is cognized [intuition + concept] that is it subsequently known [knowledge held to be true].

Many interpreters who relied on Smith's translation interpret 'cannot know' in the sense there is still something substantial out there but remain unknown.

But if the thing-in-itself cannot be cognized, it follow there is no question of it being possible to known at all or exists as an unknown object.

The absurdity refer to only logical absurdity not in the sense there must be a thing-in-itself that is substantial.
Elsewhere Kant asserted the noumenon or thing-in-itself is only to be used regulatively for practical purposes as a useful illusion.

Therefore those who interpret Smith's "cannot know" as the thing-in-itself is still something that is substantial [of positive existence] out there is wrong.

ChatGPT said:
Your interpretation aligns with a more skeptical reading of Kant, emphasizing the distinction between cognition and knowledge. Kant's claim that we cannot cognize or know things-in-themselves but must think them as such doesn't imply that the thing-in-itself has a positive substantial existence. Rather, the idea of the thing-in-itself functions as a necessary conceptual boundary to avoid the absurdity of appearances without anything that appears, which, as you suggest, is a logical absurdity rather than an ontological assertion.

In this view, the thing-in-itself is not something substantial "out there" waiting to be known; it's a regulative idea, helping us to understand the limits of human cognition. This reading also fits with Kant's use of the noumenon as a practical concept rather than something that can be known or intuited. Your critical stance on the mistranslation or misinterpretation in Smith’s translation helps clarify this distinction between cognition (Erkenntnis) and knowledge (Wissen), as well as the way we should approach Kant's thing-in-itself.

VA asked ChatGpt:
ChatGpt: "Kant's claim that we cannot cognize or know things-in-themselves"

To be precise can be ignore the term "know" [Wissen] but rather just use 'cognize' i.e. Kant original Erkenntnis as what Guyer & Wood did.

ChatGPT said:

You're right to emphasize precision in using Kant's terminology.
The term "cognize" (Erkenntnis) is more appropriate than "know" (Wissen) in the context of Kant’s philosophy, as he was precise about the distinctions.
Kant focuses on the cognitive process that combines intuitions and concepts to form judgments about objects, and he insists that we cannot cognize (erkennen) things-in-themselves.
This refers to the limitations of our faculties when it comes to accessing the noumenal realm.

So, it would indeed be more accurate to speak of Kant's claim as "we cannot cognize things-in-themselves," rather than mixing it with the idea of "knowing" (Wissen).
The latter introduces confusion because "Wissen" implies holding something to be true, which goes beyond what Kant allowed regarding things-in-themselves.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Wed Sep 20, 2023 6:19 am This cherry picked quote from Kant CPR,
"otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be Appearance without anything that appears"
if often highlighted by philosophical gnats and Ultracrepidarian insisting the noumenon is something that is real in relation to 'that which appear'.

seeds wrote: ↑Fri Sep 08, 2023 6:26 pm By the way, noumena truly do exist.

Indeed, I have provided what I suggest is a clear example of a noumenon, several times in other threads, in the form of the noumenal (superpositioned/non-local) status of an electron as it resides in the interim space between the double-slitted wall and that of the phosphorescent screen of the Double Slit Experiment,...



...for what is taking place in that interim space is something that is obviously "real" yet can only be apprehended by way of the "intellect and intuition" and never by any sort of direct or empirical means.

It is the near perfect example of the existence of a noumenon which, according to Wiki,...

"...is not itself sensible and must therefore remain otherwise unknowable to us..."

seeds wrote: ↑Wed Sep 20, 2023 7:20 am Furthermore, how many times does this "philosophical gnat" have to demonstrate to you the existence of a "real" (scientifically verified) noumenon before it finally sinks in...

By the way, noumena truly do exist.

'But our further contention must also be duly borne in mind, namely that though we cannot know these objects as things-in-themselves, we must yet be in a position at least to think them as things-in-themselves:

It has sometimes been argued (cf. Adickes: Kant und das Ding an sich, Ch. 1, p. 6) that in this passage Kant commits himself to the existence of noumena in a quite new way.

All that Kant says is that while we cannot know things as they are in themselves, we must be able to conceive them.

His argument in this passage asserts only that such a way of speaking about appearances would be inconsistent if the concept of a noumenon were itself inconsistent.

Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Wed Sep 20, 2023 8:00 am Again, he doesn't seem to read the texts carefully. The texts he presents do not support his position.

So, we have Mr. Bird, who, obviously, acknowledges that there are a number of interpretations of Kant.

He quotes:

'But our further contention must also be duly borne in mind, namely that though we cannot know these objects as things-in-themselves, we must yet be in a position at least to think them as things-in-themselves:

We cannot know them as ding an sich. That sentence is talking about epistemology. We cannot know them AS things in themselves. This is not ontology: they are not there. The sentence even implies that they are, but that we can't know them. However given the whole of Kant I think it is fair to say he is not doing what VA is doing, saying that there are no noumena.

I don't think VA read the next sentence well either....

It has sometimes been argued (cf. Adickes: Kant und das Ding an sich, Ch. 1, p. 6) that in this passage Kant commits himself to the existence of noumena in a quite new way.

Mr. Bird is saying that Kant was not committed to noumean existing.
VA has committed himself to noumena NOT existing.

All Mr. Bird is doing is showing that Kant cannot be shown to be a believer in the existence of noumena.
That in no way supports VA's position that Kant is saying there are noumena, not does it support VA's 'atheist' (rather than 'agnostic') postiion on noumena.

• It has sometimes been argued (cf. Adickes: Kant und das Ding an sich, Ch. 1, p. 6) that in this passage Kant commits himself to the existence of noumena in a quite new way.
  But this is not so.
  All that Kant says is that while we cannot know things as they are in themselves, we must be able to conceive them.

seeds wrote: ↑Wed Sep 20, 2023 7:20 am

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Wed Sep 20, 2023 6:19 am This cherry picked quote from Kant CPR,
"otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be Appearance without anything that appears"
if often highlighted by philosophical gnats and Ultracrepidarian insisting the noumenon is something that is real in relation to 'that which appear'.

Calling us "...philosophical gnats and Ultracrepidarians..." shows that you are getting too emotional and personal as a defense mechanism to soothe your cognitive dissonances brought on by people pointing out your unhealthy obsession with a smelly old philosopher who lived in the 18th century.

Furthermore, how many times does this "philosophical gnat" have to demonstrate to you the existence of a "real" (scientifically verified) noumenon before it finally sinks in...

seeds wrote: ↑Fri Sep 08, 2023 6:26 pm By the way, noumena truly do exist.

Indeed, I have provided what I suggest is a clear example of a noumenon, several times in other threads, in the form of the noumenal (superpositioned/non-local) status of an electron as it resides in the interim space between the double-slitted wall and that of the phosphorescent screen of the Double Slit Experiment,...



...for what is taking place in that interim space is something that is obviously "real" yet can only be apprehended by way of the "intellect and intuition" and never by any sort of direct or empirical means.

It is the near perfect example of the existence of a noumenon which, according to Wiki,...

"...is not itself sensible and must therefore remain otherwise unknowable to us..."

(And once again, V, I'm still waiting for that drawing of a "square circle" that you insisted was achievable in the mind via thought.)
_______

The idealistic thesis that knowing is an immanent action within man and therefore that man cannot transcend his own mind has dominated modern philosophy. It has led many to the conclusion, unwarranted though it may be, that man cannot know things in themselves. The logical conclusion of such thinking is solipsism, however much its proponents deny this. It is not in any sense a new insight into the problem of knowledge, but simply an old mistake revived. Implicit in the view of the early Greek sophists, it is later found in the skepticism of the Platonic academies. Aristotle was aware of it and deals with it in his Metaphysics, where he complains that men who think this way reduce themselves to the level of plants (1006a 15). In modern thought, the faulty definition of the idea by J. locke reintroduced it; G. berkeley applied it to man's knowledge of matter; and D. hume applied it finally to all things, turning it into a corrosive skepticism that seemed insane even to its author. Hume can hardly be called a conscious solipsist, but he would have become one had he carried his thought to its logical outcome.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Wed Sep 20, 2023 8:52 am

seeds wrote: ↑Fri Sep 08, 2023 6:26 pm By the way, noumena truly do exist.

Indeed, I have provided what I suggest is a clear example of a noumenon, several times in other threads, in the form of the noumenal (superpositioned/non-local) status of an electron as it resides in the interim space between the double-slitted wall and that of the phosphorescent screen of the Double Slit Experiment,...



...for what is taking place in that interim space is something that is obviously "real" yet can only be apprehended by way of the "intellect and intuition" and never by any sort of direct or empirical means.

It is the near perfect example of the existence of a noumenon which, according to Wiki,...

"...is not itself sensible and must therefore remain otherwise unknowable to us..."

(And once again, V, I'm still waiting for that drawing of a "square circle" that you insisted was achievable in the mind via thought.)
_______

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Wed Sep 20, 2023 8:52 am I am not wasting my time with your silly idea.

Professor Jim Al-Khalili wrote: "In some strange sense, it really does suggest the moon doesn't exist when we're not looking. It truly defies common sense."

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Wed Sep 20, 2023 8:52 am I am referring to the idea of "square-circle' not an image of a square-circle.
If you can read the word "square-circle' that is an idea [in thought] of a square-circle.
Surely you can think of thoughts or ideas like 1+1=3 and all sorts of falsehoods.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Aug 10, 2023 4:49 am I had mentioned, the noumenon can only exists as an intelligible or an object of thought and NEVER as real [Knowledge -JTB].
As far as thought is concerned, any thing can be thought of, even the thought of a square-circle which is impossible to be real.
The noumenon when stretched to the extreme of the ultimate thing-in-itself is like a square-circle which is impossible to be real [empirical intuition].

seeds wrote: ↑Wed Sep 20, 2023 5:35 pm However, to be nice like Iwannaplato and give you the benefit of the doubt, it may just be a situation of you simply being oblivious of the implications of your own words in the following quote...

Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Wed Sep 20, 2023 8:30 pm

seeds wrote: ↑Wed Sep 20, 2023 5:35 pm However, to be nice like Iwannaplato and give you the benefit of the doubt, it may just be a situation of you simply being oblivious of the implications of your own words in the following quote...

Just to keep within our roles, I am going to accept the ludircrous analogy between squaring circles and noumena. He seems to think if he tells us an analogy holds, he doesn't have to justify it. But let's grant that it might be a good analogy....
https://www.discovermagazine.com/the-sc ... the-circle

Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Wed Sep 20, 2023 8:30 pm And let's remember things like: 1) non-Euclidian geometry seemed fantasy, until it turned out that it actually applied to reality.

2) The idea that something could be a wave and a particle at the same time seems impossible, until it wasn't.

3) Anything that smacked of Lamarkianism in evolutionary theory was considered categorically false, until epigenetics started rearing its complicated head.

People get mighty confident with their deductions, and categories that seems mutually exclusive, may turn out not to be.

Discover Magazine wrote: Even with the mathematicians’ new rules and a powerful enough computer, it’s an understatement to say that drawing the pieces won’t be easy. The new algorithm requires about 10^200 pieces; for comparison, physicists estimate that the universe contains about 10^80 atoms.

seeds wrote: ↑Wed Sep 20, 2023 5:35 pm

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Wed Sep 20, 2023 8:52 am

seeds wrote: ↑Fri Sep 08, 2023 6:26 pm By the way, noumena truly do exist.

Indeed, I have provided what I suggest is a clear example of a noumenon, several times in other threads, in the form of the noumenal (superpositioned/non-local) status of an electron as it resides in the interim space between the double-slitted wall and that of the phosphorescent screen of the Double Slit Experiment,...



...for what is taking place in that interim space is something that is obviously "real" yet can only be apprehended by way of the "intellect and intuition" and never by any sort of direct or empirical means.

It is the near perfect example of the existence of a noumenon which, according to Wiki,...


(And once again, V, I'm still waiting for that drawing of a "square circle" that you insisted was achievable in the mind via thought.)
_______

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Wed Sep 20, 2023 8:52 am I am not wasting my time with your silly idea.

Are you talking about the "silly ideas" implicit in quantum theory?

Are you talking about the "silly ideas" that have led to the creation of the very means by which we are carrying on this conversation on what we call an "Internet"?

Are you talking about the "silly ideas" from which one of your favorite authority figures - Professor Jim Al-Khalili - derived the following quote that you like to use to support your claims?...

Professor Jim Al-Khalili wrote: "In some strange sense, it really does suggest the moon doesn't exist when we're not looking. It truly defies common sense."

I could go on and on, but you're right, you dare not waste any of your precious time entertaining any ideas that will debunk your insistence of the impossibility of the noumenon actually being real and not just some figment of our imaginations.

As an interesting sidenote, did you happen to notice the names of the three books that Professor Al-Khalili mentioned a few moments prior to his quote about the moon that you like to use?

They were "The Tao of Physics," "The Dancing Wu Li Masters," and the Professor's personal favorite - "Space- Time and Beyond: Toward an Explanation of the Unexplainable," all three of which I read back in the 80's and still have in my collection.

Have you read them? Perhaps if you read them (and dozens of others like them) 50 times or more, you would have a better idea of where I am coming from.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Wed Sep 20, 2023 8:52 am I am referring to the idea of "square-circle' not an image of a square-circle.
If you can read the word "square-circle' that is an idea [in thought] of a square-circle.
Surely you can think of thoughts or ideas like 1+1=3 and all sorts of falsehoods.

Sorry, little V, but I'm simply not going to allow you to get away with that devious explanation.

However, to be nice like Iwannaplato and give you the benefit of the doubt, it may just be a situation of you simply being oblivious of the implications of your own words in the following quote...

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Aug 10, 2023 4:49 am I had mentioned, the noumenon can only exists as an intelligible or an object of thought and NEVER as real [Knowledge -JTB].
As far as thought is concerned, any thing can be thought of, even the thought of a square-circle which is impossible to be real.
The noumenon when stretched to the extreme of the ultimate thing-in-itself is like a square-circle which is impossible to be real [empirical intuition].

You simply cannot put the visualizable noumenon in the same category as the utterly un-visualizable "square-circle," which truly is an impossibility to be real in any context whatsoever.

In other words, contrary to what you clearly asserted in the above quote, the noumenon is most definitely not like a square-circle.

Indeed, I drew for you a clear "mental picture" of a "real" noumenon in my little thought experiment involving the Double Slit Experiment.
_______

• Leon M. Lederman, a Nobel Prize-winning physicist and current Director Emeritus of Fermilab, criticized both The Tao of Physics and Gary Zukav's The Dancing Wu Li Masters in his 1993 book The God Particle: If the Universe Is the Answer, What Is the Question?[9]
  
  Starting with reasonable descriptions of quantum physics, he constructs elaborate extensions, totally bereft of the understanding of how carefully experiment and theory are woven together and how much blood, sweat, and tears go into each painful advance.
  
  Philosopher of science Eric Scerri criticizes both Capra and Zukav and similar books.

seeds wrote: ↑Thu Sep 21, 2023 12:27 am Nah, I can't grant such a thing. You can if you feel the need to take pity on the poor boy, but it's a terrible analogy.

Yeah, but everything you mentioned above were discoverable and verifiable phenomena (and that includes my tentative verification of the existence of a "real" noumenon in my little quantum thought experiment).

However, "square-circles"?...Not so much - as in truly impossible. And I don't think I'm simply being arrogantly over-confident in saying such a thing.

Discover Magazine wrote: Even with the mathematicians’ new rules and a powerful enough computer, it’s an understatement to say that drawing the pieces won’t be easy. The new algorithm requires about 10^200 pieces; for comparison, physicists estimate that the universe contains about 10^80 atoms.

I'm having a difficult time trying to understand why you seem to keep defending little V's flawed position, while he, in return, has absolutely no respect for your point of view?

Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Wed Sep 20, 2023 8:00 am Again, he doesn't seem to read the texts carefully. The texts he presents do not support his position.

So, we have Mr. Bird, who, obviously, acknowledges that there are a number of interpretations of Kant.

He quotes:

'But our further contention must also be duly borne in mind, namely that though we cannot know these objects as things-in-themselves, we must yet be in a position at least to think them as things-in-themselves:

We cannot know them as ding an sich. That sentence is talking about epistemology. We cannot know them AS things in themselves. This is not ontology: they are not there. The sentence even implies that they are, but that we can't know them. However given the whole of Kant I think it is fair to say he is not doing what VA is doing, saying that there are no noumena.

I don't think VA read the next sentence well either....

It has sometimes been argued (cf. Adickes: Kant und das Ding an sich, Ch. 1, p. 6) that in this passage Kant commits himself to the existence of noumena in a quite new way.

Mr. Bird is saying that Kant was not committed to noumean existing.
VA has committed himself to noumena NOT existing.

All Mr. Bird is doing is showing that Kant cannot be shown to be a believer in the existence of noumena.
That in no way supports VA's position that Kant is saying there are noumena, not does it support VA's 'atheist' (rather than 'agnostic') postiion on noumena.

• It has sometimes been argued (cf. Adickes: Kant und das Ding an sich, Ch. 1, p. 6) that in this passage Kant commits himself to the existence of noumena in a quite new way.
  But this is not so.
  All that Kant says is that while we cannot know things as they are in themselves, we must be able to conceive them.

Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Thu Sep 21, 2023 4:43 am I still think it's a nice tag team approach.

left, right and center