Philosophy Now Forum

Philosophical Realists are fond to charging anti-philosophical-realists as solipsistic.
But Philosophical Realists are so ignorant, they are adopting a solipsistic stance in ignorance.

Philosophical Realism claim Mind-Independence;
Philosophical realism is ... about a c ... der. -WIKI

Solipsism is;

• Solipsism is the philosophical idea that only one's mind is sure to exist. As an epistemological position, solipsism holds that knowledge of anything outside one's own mind is unsure; the external world and other minds cannot be known and might not exist outside the mind. WIKI

Solipsism is grounded upon Philosophical Realism which assumes there is a mind-independent reality.
As such, when anyone who disagrees with Philosophical Realism they are charged with solipsism.
However, philosophical realism is grounded on an illusion [not realistic], thus has no grounds to claim that anti-philosophical realists are unrealistic.

Anti-Philosophical-Realism [Kantian kind] accept other minds [gemut] exist as real minds and such minds are not of the Substance Dualism claims.
As such, anti-Philosophical-Realism [Kantian kind] cannot be solipsistic.

From the anti-philosophical realists' perspective, actually, it is the P-realists re mind-independence who are into solipsism while being ignorant they are.

Edited to make it clearer;

• 1. P-realists claimed things are mind-independent, i.e. of one's mind.
  2. As such, other minds are independent of one's mind.
  
  3. But, anti-p-realists proved the idea of mind-independence is illusory.
  4. So, other minds which are independent of one's mind [2, 3] are illusory.
  5. As such to the p-realist, only one's mind [p-realist’s] is real, the other external minds are illusory [4].
  
  6. Solipsism claims only one’s mind is real
  Therefore the P-Realists are solipsistic! [5,6]

ETA:
Here is one good example of a philosophical realist kicking his own ass;

• viewtopic.php?p=648426#p648426
  "If I understood this right, then I have to say, what a load of idealistic-solipsistic-narcissistic nonsense coming from a self-important philosopher."

This is the typical of p-realists throwing derogatory terms at anti-p-realists.

Views?

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Jun 08, 2023 3:27 am 1. P-realists claimed things are mind-independent, i.e. of one's mind.
2. As such, other minds are independent of one's mind.
3. But the idea of mind-independence is illusory.
4. So, other minds which are independent of one's mind are illusory.
5. As such, only one's mind is real, the other minds are illusory.
6. Therefore the P-Realists are solipsistic!


Views?

You just mixed realism with anti-realism creating a hybrid set of premises which lead to your last statement. Premises 3 and 4 are anti-realist premises. Premises 1 and 2 are realist premises.
So of four premises you have 2 from each and this leads to conclusions 5 and 6.
IOW you just showed that someone combining CONTRADICTORY premises, two from realism and two from antirealism is a solipsistic person.

A solipsist believes their mind is the only one.

And then, for your version of an antirealist, why are other minds not noumena?

Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Thu Jun 08, 2023 4:46 am And then, for your version of an antirealist, why are other minds not noumena?

I think they are.. you only exist to him temporarily and tentatively, as long as he is using an FSK that allows this.

From above;

"Anti-Philosophical-Realism [Kantian kind] accept other minds [gemut] exist as real minds and such minds are not of the Substance Dualism claims.
As such, anti-Philosophical-Realism [Kantian kind] cannot be solipsistic."

To be clearer;

Anti-Philosophical-Realism [Kantian kind] accept other minds [gemut] exist as real human-based FSK-ed minds and such minds are not of the Substance Dualism claims, thus not noumenal.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Jun 08, 2023 4:54 am From above;

"Anti-Philosophical-Realism [Kantian kind] accept other minds [gemut] exist as real minds and such minds are not of the Substance Dualism claims.
As such, anti-Philosophical-Realism [Kantian kind] cannot be solipsistic."

To be clearer;

Anti-Philosophical-Realism [Kantian kind] accept other minds [gemut] exist as real human-based FSK-ed minds and such minds are not of the Substance Dualism claims, thus not noumenal.

Yes, you assert it, but why are other minds NOT like ding an sich? It doesn't fit with your antirealism. You assert it, but it doesn't fit, I don't think.

We see behavior, but other minds are unobservables.

Mind independent reality does not exist in your model.
Realists see a mind independent reality as the source of our perceptions. That there is a something when we perceive a cat, for example. A cat that exists when we aren't looking at it. This cat is the source of our perceptions.
They think that way about other minds also. The behavior, facial expressions, sounds of their voice that give us the impression there is a mind like ours in there has to do with a real, unobservable mind.

But antirealism does not have this real thing that gives us the perceptions. The real thing that is the cause of our impressions, that exists when we are not looking at it.

And we cannot look at the other mind of the other person. We see behavior, but we DEDUCE they are like us.

Antirealism does not allow for this decuction, that 'in there' in that other person, there is an independent from our perception other mind.

The other mind is beyond the cocreation of perception.

The antirealist who believes in other minds, is positing something they do not experience. They are positing that the source of those behaviors and facial expressions and sentences is another subjective experiencer. Something is 'in there' that experiences qualia, or example. The antirealist is allowing that we can deduce something real that we do not experience that is the source of the antirealist's experiences of facial expressions and body language and sentences.

This parallels the realists deducing that there is an unexperienced reality out there, independent of his or her mind that is the source of the perceptions he or she experiences.

The antirealist is positing something that is real that is beyond his, in your case, perceptions. Not a part of it, at all.

Now someone can come in and say 'but the other mind is aware of itself so it is real.'

But that makes no sense for YOUR knowledge. All you experience are things that may or may not be the result of another mind. But an antirealist with your position on mind independent things must conclude that that other mind does not exist, since you do not experience it. The argument from that person who may come in is based on the ASSUMPTION that the other mind is real.

Philosophical realists theories are grounded on an illusion.
Thus it follows, whatever philosophical realists assumed as a mind-independent mind out there is illusory.
There are no embodied-mind-independent minds.

Anti-Philosophical-Realism [Kantian] obviously reject Philosophical realism as grounded on illusions. P-realism is driven by an evolutionary default as such an ideological ism is a non-starter with regard to what is reality.

Anti-Philosophical-Realism [Kantian kind] accept other minds [gemut] of other humans exist as real human-based FSK-ed minds (such minds are not of the Substance Dualism claims, thus not noumenal.)

Anti-Philosophical-Realists [Kantian kind] do accept "there is no cat when no one is looking at it" but that is only limited to the common-sense-realism or Empirical Realism, but such Empirical-realism is ultimately Subsumed within a human-based FSK of Transcendental Idealism [human minds] in Kant's case.
Therefore it follows, whatever is ultimately is conditioned upon a human-based FSK, and because it is human based, it CANNOT be embodied-mind-independent [as claimed by P-realists]

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Jun 08, 2023 5:43 am Anti-Philosophical-Realism [Kantian kind] accept other minds [gemut] of other humans exist as real human-based FSK-ed minds (such minds are not of the Substance Dualism claims, thus not noumenal.)

The noumenal does not have to be another substance. The noumenal is just something that is mind independent, whatever it's substance is. It is just beyond what we experience, as other minds are to most philosophies.

As an antirealist all you see is behavior. You do not see, cocreate, the subjective self that is supposedly inside that other person.

And you CANNOT use FSKs like that to justify the existence of a mind independent other mind. We both know that many sciences and thus their FSK posit a mind independent reality. It's assume by the scientists and by their models. It's only within parts of the physics FSK that we are starting to question realism with direct data.

You prioritize that FSK when arguing there is not mind-independent reality. You can't now jump to other FSKs to justify, when it is convenient, the existence of other minds.

If there is no mind-independent reality, then there cannot be some unseen, unperceived, unobserved (as in scientific observation) other mind. We simply have behavior, facial expressions, sentences, etc. If, however, you allow us to deduce the existence of something beyond our experience (this other subjective experiencing)
then you open the door to deduce the unexperienced ding an sich.

When did you cocreate and experience another mind experiencing?

And look, I am generally an antirealist. I actually think your antirealism hasn't gone far enough. It's not that I want to pull you back into realism. That may seem odd, but there it is.

I think you chose antirealism at one point as a counter to PH, but later you became committed to it. Fine, great. But I think things are even more counterintuitive than your version of anti-realism.

Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Thu Jun 08, 2023 7:04 am The noumenal is just something that is mind independent, whatever it's substance is.

What confers/bestows/asserts/judges/determines/bequeaths (add your own synonyms as it pleases you) the quality of "independence"?

Whether it's mind-independence or any other kind of indenendence.

"Independent" is an adjective. I have no idea what a mind-independent adjective could be like.

• What is Mind?
  The mind is the set of faculties responsible for all mental phenomena. They include thought, imagination, memory, will, and sensation. However, the term can also refer to the mental phenomena themselves,[2][3][4] like perception, pleasure and pain, belief, desire, intention, and emotion. They can be divided into different categories, such as conscious and unconscious states or sensory and non-sensory states. -WIKI

The Mind is dealt scientifically within;
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind#Scientific_study

• Neuroscience
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind#Neuroscience
  Cognitive_science
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind#Cognitive_science
  Psychology
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind#Psychology
  Psychiatry,_Neurology_and_Neurosurgery
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind#Psyc ... urosurgery

Principle:
What is reality, facts, truths, knowledge and objectivity are conditioned upon a human-based FSK of which the scientific FSK is the most credible and reliable.

Neuroscience, Cognitive Science, Psychology, Psychiatry, Neurology & Neurosurgery are all human based scientific FSKs which realize the human mind and study it.
Since they are all human-based [embodied mind], it follows, the resultant reality of other-minds in this case cannot be mind-independent but somehow related to human minds.

So, there are FSK-ed other-minds which are real, credible and reliable since Science is recognized in general as the most credible and reliable, contrast theistic-FSK based on faith.

The noumenal is not truly something [whatever is its substance] that is independent of mind.
This is a claim made by p-realism which is groundless and thus non-sensical.

The noumenal is actually a reified illusion which is claimed by delusional p-realists.
The noumenal is merely an intelligible thought without any possibility of being real.
The noumenal is something like the fictitious Santa Claus which can be real at all in the ordinary or whatever real sense.

Realistically, we should term the noumenon as a mind-dependent illusion, NOT as "something [whatever is its substance] that is independent of mind".

According the Kant, whilst the noumenal is an illusion, it is a very useful illusion, like Santa Claus, God, and other fictitious thoughts and fantasies which are impossible to real in the empirical sense.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Jun 08, 2023 8:03 am The noumenal is not truly something [whatever is its substance] that is independent of mind.
This is a claim made by p-realism which is groundless and thus non-sensical.

Yes, I understand your position here.

The noumenal is actually a reified illusion which is claimed by delusional p-realists.
The noumenal is merely an intelligible thought without any possibility of being real.

Same as above.

The noumenal is something like the fictitious Santa Claus which can be real at all in the ordinary or whatever real sense.

Same as above.

Realistically, we should term the noumenon as a mind-dependent illusion, NOT as "something [whatever is its substance] that is independent of mind".

Got it.

According the Kant, whilst the noumenal is an illusion, it is a very useful illusion, like Santa Claus, God, and other fictitious thoughts and fantasies which are impossible to real in the empirical sense.

Understood.

Here's the thing: if someone reading you looks at the process of deciding X is a CLAIM that some noumenal thing, according to you, and sees that other minds would be a similar claim, then there may be a problem with your current version of antirealism.

And let's be clear: Let's assume for a moment that realism is solipsistic. That's not relevant.
If someone says antirealism implies solipsism, responding that realism is solipsistic is irrelevant. Both could be solipsistic. Perhaps some third view is better, for example.

It's not a defense of one's position to show that the other position is or may be false, unless it's just a battle.
Person A: your position on X is incorrect because of Y.
Person B: well you can't be right because your position doesn't work.

Well, actually both their positions could have problems. That kind of argument is only useful in a word war.

OK.

Your antirealism includes the idea that no thing exists independent of minds. That which exists, exists as part of perception, or what gets called perception. There are no unperceived things, things beyond perception, that are the source of phenomena.

Sometimes antirealism gets accused of being solipsism. Let's look at two possibilities.
Solipsism means that there is nothing outside of your mind. There is only one mind. Everything that happens and is, is part of that mind's experiencing. So, other people, the external world, this is all, really something like part of your dream.

A subtler version or antirealist explanation is subjective idealism. Here there are many minds that are real, but there is no reality beyond their minds.

The problem, for me, with the second is that for any individual mind, it does not have a way of determining if other minds are real. Sure, we can say and imagine that the other minds are real and have this as an axiom in our antirealism. But it's an axiom. For each individual mind the claim that other people in fact have minds, is a direct parallel to the claim by realists that there must be a continuous reality even when we are not perceiving it. A mind independent reality.

The antirealist is saying that behind the images of other people, the sounds of their voices, their postures and actions in my perception, there is another mind that, LIKE ME, is an experiencer.

Even though I never experience this experiencing on their part, I now that behind that face, those actions, that body posture, that changing tone of voice, there is a subjective entity like me. Something that exists
even when I am not looking at it. Even when I am not around.

That is a direct parallel to realism.

Sometimes people argue, but no, claiming there are other minds are not a claim about some noumena, those other minds are cocreating reality with the quantum foam.

But how does the antirealist know this?

It is justifying the assumption of other minds by saying that other minds exist and since they exist, they continue to exist, even when I am not around, due to their own consciousnesses.

Yeah, could be. But that's an axiom precisely like the realists axiom that things continue to exist when not perceived.

Why? because we do not go beyond our perceiving. You have no way to check if this idea is correct. That axiom is a realist axiom.

I know that X continues even when I am not around.

The antirealist objects.

No, but they are perceiving. They maintain their own continuation.

But that's a mere assumption. And one that is not allowed the realist. "I know that inside that X, there is something that allows it to continue." Or "I know that beyond my perceiving/experiencing there is something inside that X, that makes it an exception. Everything else disappears when I stop perceiving it, but not X.'

Implicit in this is that X is like me. It must, like me, be an experiencer. Because it is like me. Or, really, looks like me, it seems, and has other perceived similarities. So we deduce (actually merely assume at a certain state of human development) that those others are like me: experiencers. But just because we assume that or try, on the basis of similarity as adult to deduce, the existence of other minds, this is a specific case of realism sliding into antirealism.

Because realists either assume based as you have argued on an evolutionary default that there is a mind independent reality or deduce it.

And an antirealist either assumes (based on an evolutionary default or just built in habit) that other minds exist or they deduce it via similarity.

And this is the only X that antirealists allow themselves to deduce into existence the way realists do.

Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Fri Jun 09, 2023 5:58 am The problem, for me, with the second is that for any individual mind, it does not have a way of determining if other minds are real. Sure, we can say and imagine that the other minds are real and have this as an axiom in our antirealism. But it's an axiom. For each individual mind the claim that other people in fact have minds, is a direct parallel to the claim by realists that there must be a continuous reality even when we are not perceiving it. A mind independent reality.

The problem for me is that you don't know how to rank your problems according to severity.

In a reductionist sense - sure. Assuming reality or assuming other minds are both axioms. Neither axiom is more; or less axiomatic.

But there are moral consequences at the edge; and corner cases of each choice. The value-systems and the philosophies which emerge from those axioms; and the moral consequences thereof are not equivalent.

By being certain of reality and less certain of other minds you end up with a value-system which is more certain of tangible things than intangible ideas. Such a philosophy ends up valuing facts more than it values values which is self-defeating from the onset.

A realist has no grounds for any moral objections. The cost is far too great for me, so fuck realism.

I'd sooner choose solipsism over realism - the enemy of my enemy is my friend.

The p-realist claim of what is real is a mind-independent reality which is actually grounded on an illusion.
In addition, there is no way, the p-realist can prove [which has to be minded] his mind-independent reality independent of his mind.
Obvious based on the real experience of himself, his mind is the only real thing, which he cannot deny.
So, to the p-realist, the only real thing is his mind [or self], thus solipsism.
The p-realist [based on their ideology] whilst condemning others as 'solipsistic' are ignorant that in fact, they are the one who are solipsistic as driven by an evolutionary default.

Subjective Idealism [one of the many types of idealism];

• According to Subjective Idealism, since only minds and ideas exist [mind dependent], and only minds cause ideas, then involuntary ideas [independent] must be caused by some other mind, and most of the time this mind is God's.

As such, Subjective Idealism claims all things in reality are mind-dependent but yet still believe in a father of mind-independent reality, i.e. God which is illusory.

Anti-p-realists [Kantian] do believe in the existence of other-minds [FSK-ed] and all minds [one's and other-minds] are collectively inter-related, thus cannot be solipsism, i.e. "that only one's mind is sure to exist.'
There is no way anti-p-realists [Kantian] based on their beliefs can fit into solipsism [as defined] at all.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Fri Jun 09, 2023 7:21 am Anti-p-realists [Kantian] do believe in the existence of other-minds [FSK-ed] and all minds [one's and other-minds] are collectively inter-related, thus cannot be solipsism, i.e. "that only one's mind is sure to exist.'

So they assert the existence of something they do not experience? What is this collective inter-relation and how do anti-p-realists experience other minds?
Because if you, for example, deduced the existence of other minds, using an FSK, then that is a realist activity. If you experienced this collective interrelation, then perhaps it fits with antirealism? How do you experience the collective interrelation of other subjective experiencers? Not their behavior. Not their words and so on. How do you experience their experiencing?

I am not denying that antip realists believe in other minds, nor that you in particular do. I am wondering why? What are the steps or what is your experience of the experiencing of other minds?

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Jun 08, 2023 3:27 am
Edited to make it clearer;

• 1. P-realists claimed things are mind-independent, i.e. of one's mind.
  2. As such, other minds are independent of one's mind.
  
  3. But, anti-p-realists proved the idea of mind-independence is illusory.
  4. So, other minds which are independent of one's mind [2, 3] are illusory.
  5. As such to the p-realist, only one's mind [p-realist’s] is real, the other external minds are illusory [4].
  
  6. Solipsism claims only one’s mind is real
  Therefore the P-Realists are solipsistic! [5,6]

Views?

The fact that you have to use a premise that realists don't even agree with is sufficient to show that your conclusion doesn't follow from realist beliefs (I believe iwannaplato made a similar observation). This format of argumentation is pretty much nonsensical.