Philosophy Now Forum

We need a FSK-ed brain for there to be a FSK-ed mind but the mind is not 100% brain anatomically.

There are primitive thinkers like Peter Holmes who do not believe the mind exists as a real thing based on his ideology of illusory things re Philosophical Realism of independence.
This, for PH is to avoid the phobia of the a mind as a soul that is absolutely independent from the body thus can survive physical death as claim by Descartes.

Peter Holmes claimed whatever is regarded as mental actions are confined to brain activities, there is no mind in relation to these mental actions.

But the point is, a corpse and a person in coma also has an anatomical brain, but these brain cannot perform mental actions, like writing a book, composing songs & poetry, arts, sports, be moral competent, has feelings, qualia, etc.

As such, there must some thing that drives the brain to perform the above mental actions, and this thing is general assign the label 'mind' [it can be any other name, it is still that rose].
So, if there is no FSK-ed brain, there is no FSK-ed mind; we need brain for there to be a mind but the mind is not 100% brain anatomically.

A real FSK-ed mind exists and must grounded [or supervene] upon a physical brain but the mind is also extended to other parts of the body.
This is the EMBODIED MIND.

The Embodied Mind enables the human based Embodied Cognitive Science FSK.

Embodied cognition [driven by an Embodied Mind] is the theory that many features of cognition, whether human or otherwise, are shaped by aspects of an organism's entire body.
Sensory and motor systems are seen as fundamentally integrated with cognitive processing. The cognitive features include high-level mental constructs (such as concepts and categories) and performance on various cognitive tasks (such as reasoning or judgment). The bodily aspects involve the motor system, the perceptual system, the bodily interactions with the environment (situatedness), and the assumptions about the world built into the organism's functional structure.

The embodied mind thesis challenges other theories, such as cognitivism, computationalism, and Cartesian dualism.[1][2]
It is closely related to the extended mind thesis, situated cognition, and enactivism.

The modern version depends on insights drawn from up to date research in psychology, linguistics, cognitive science, dynamical systems, artificial intelligence, robotics, animal cognition, plant cognition, and neurobiology.

The FSK-ed Embodied Mind is fundamental to FSK-ed objective Morality.

Views

Notes: KIV

Here is a version that argue the Brain and Mind are separate FSK-ed entities.

This is a new perspective to the mind;

"moreover, there is evidence that the mind is hormonal as well as neural"

In this highly original work, Teed Rockwell rejects both dualism and the mind-brain identity theory.
He proposes instead that mental phenomena emerge not merely from brain activity but from an interacting nexus of brain, body, and world.
The mind can be seen not as an organ within the body, but as a "behavioral field" that fluctuates within this brain-body-world nexus.

If we reject the dominant form of the mind-brain identity theory—which Rockwell calls "Cartesian materialism" (distinct from Daniel Dennett's concept of the same name)—and accept this new alternative, then many philosophical and scientific problems can be solved. Other philosophers have flirted with these ideas, including Dewey, Heidegger, Putnam, Millikan, and Dennett. But Rockwell goes further than these tentative speculations and offers a detailed alternative to the dominant philosophical view, applying pragmatist insights to contemporary scientific and philosophical problems.

Rockwell shows that neuroscience no longer supports the mind-brain identity theory because the brain cannot be isolated from the rest of the nervous system; moreover, there is evidence that the mind is hormonal as well as neural.

These data, and Rockwell's reanalysis of the concept of causality, show why the borders of mental embodiment cannot be neatly drawn at the skull, or even at the skin. Rockwell then demonstrates how his proposed view of the mind can resolve paradoxes engendered by the mind-brain identity theory in such fields as neuroscience, artificial intelligence, epistemology, and philosophy of language.

Finally, he argues that understanding the mind as a "behavioral field" supports the new cognitive science paradigm of dynamic systems theory (DST).
https://direct.mit.edu/books/book/2221/ ... rnative-to

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Tue Jun 06, 2023 7:07 am But the point is, a corpse and a person in coma also has an anatomical brain, but these brain cannot perform mental actions, like writing a book, composing songs & poetry, arts, sports, be moral competent, has feelings, qualia, etc.

Yes, the word 'brain' can cover dead tissue and not normally functioning brain tissue. Though PH could say wherever we have what you call mind we have brain. IOW we may have situations where there are what we call brains present without minds, but we won't have minds present without brains present - and then, given his position, he would likely add that the word 'mind' is superfluous. I don't agree, but that's another ship.

But, again, why isn't mind considered a noumenon, by you?

It is very philosophically immature for anyone in our current era to ignore the term 'mind' used within a specific human-based FSK, e.g. neuro-psychology, neuro-cognitive science, neurosciences in general.

Philosophical Realists believe reality is independent of the mind, brain or human conditions.
As such there cannot be mind that is independent of the brain.
This is why such immature thinking is;

Philosophical Realism is A Threat to Humanity
viewtopic.php?t=40094
or a hindrance to humanity's progress.

Good Search Results:

"Mind" =About 2,910,000,000 results (0.44 seconds)
"brain" = About 1,500,000,000 results (0.41 seconds)

Roughly, we can infer the concept of 'mind' is not something frivolous and empty as PH insist upon.
When we research deeper into the term "mind" there is a greater sense of FSK-ed reality to it.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Wed Jun 07, 2023 3:29 am It is very philosophically immature for anyone in our current era to ignore the term 'mind' used within a specific human-based FSK, e.g. neuro-psychology, neuro-cognitive science, neurosciences in general.

Philosophical Realists believe reality is independent of the mind, brain or human conditions.
As such there cannot be mind that is independent of the brain.
This is why such immature thinking is;

Philosophical Realism is A Threat to Humanity
viewtopic.php?t=40094
or a hindrance to humanity's progress.

Good Search Results:

"Mind" =About 2,910,000,000 results (0.44 seconds)
"brain" = About 1,500,000,000 results (0.41 seconds)

Roughly, we can infer the concept of 'mind' is not something frivolous and empty as PH insist upon.
When we research deeper into the term "mind" there is a greater sense of FSK-ed reality to it.

I just Googled 'God' and got 4 340 000 000 results (0,40 seconds).
I agree, I don't think PH's position holds, but this is not showing it well, unless you now think that God refers to something real. I do, but then, not because of Google.

To the more critical, rational and mature thinkers in philosophy, the idea of 'God' is an illusion and never FSK-ed real; the most credible FSK is that of science.

'Brain' [obviously] and 'mind' are terms that are generally acceptable by the more critical, rational and mature thinkers in philosophy to be realistic, verifiable and justifiable by the scientific FSK.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Wed Jun 07, 2023 4:56 am To the more critical, rational and mature thinkers in philosophy, the idea of 'God' is an illusion and never FSK-ed real; the most credible FSK is that of science.

Sure, great, my point was that googling 'evidence' in the way you did is not useful. That's all.

IOW you are responding as if I argued that mind should not be taken seriously.

My point was that your evidence via Googling evidence should not be taken seriously.

Conceding small points does not mean that PH will forever have a hold on you. And avoiding the use of Google (and Chatgbt) 'evidence' for example, will make your posts stronger.

- a suggestion from an antirealist who believes in minds. (me)

From above;

"Roughly, we can infer the concept of 'mind' is not something frivolous and empty as PH insist upon.
When we research deeper into the term "mind" there is a greater sense of FSK-ed reality to it."

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Wed Jun 07, 2023 5:12 am From above;

"Roughly, we can infer the concept of 'mind' is not something frivolous and empty as PH insist upon.
When we research deeper into the term "mind" there is a greater sense of FSK-ed reality to it."

I'll drop it after this: the number of hits means little except that the topic is popular. If you mean, when one goes in and analyzes those hits, one finds there is a greater FSKed reality to it, it only works for some hits.

Contrast your approach with googling: mind scientific research papers pdf
At least there's some meat in there for someone focusing on scientific FSK derived information.

The ad populum argument implicit in your listing google hits to single words is likely going to turn off many of the very people your intersted in convincing.

But, hey, if you are convinced listing google hits, with a vague suggestion that people researcher deeper, is a good approach, keep it up.

Another tack for the we should only use 'brain' and never 'mind' or any other mental concept, is to ask
how do we know mind is brain and not the whole body or more?
how to we know what is conscious and what is not?
As long as you've dipped into antirealism, you might want to look at panpschism or at least the skeptical objectiions to certain minds mean brains arguments.
We do not know the mechanisms that lead to consciousness - we do know many processes that lead to various cognitive functions. It is often assumed that we need complicated processing for consciousness, but there is no evidence this is the case. We just have evidence that cognitive functions are connected to complicated neuronal systems, though we can't be sure they are limited to them. For all we know consciousness is simply a facet of matter.
Also, why do reductionists leave out the complicated nerve nexuses around the heart and gut, when dismissing minds. For some reason the human mind is reducible to only the brain. There are also nerve receptors distributed throughout the body (see Candace Pert's work).
There's also a strong trend to granting consciousness to more 'things'. At first it was humans only. Then in the 60s forward animals were granted consciousness and an ever increasing number of mental processes. In the last couple of decades the evidence for plant consciousness has been accumulating and this is no longer marginal science. Plants do not have brains, at least not like ours.

The Mind is really brain crowd has a lot to justify.

I don't say we don't have minds - or I hope I've never said that. If I have, I apologise. And I'm very interested in research that indicates that what we call the mind is not limited to the brain, or even to life forms with brains. I think the 'embodied mind' makes sense.

My point is this: pending evidence for the existence of the mind as a separate, abstract or non-physical thing, belief in its existence is irrational - and mentalist talk, about minds containing mental things and events, is metaphorical. Every single mentalist expression can be parsed or explained 'non-mentalistically'.

I go further. Pending evidence for the existence of anything non-physical, what could be called non-dogmatic physicalism - or methodological naturalism in science - is the rational default position. And I'm happy to debate that claim with anyone who clings to the superstition that non-physical things exist.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Wed Jun 07, 2023 7:17 am pending evidence for the existence of the mind as a separate, abstract or non-physical thing, belief in its existence is irrational - and mentalist talk, about minds containing mental things and events, is metaphorical.

Pending evidence for the existence of beliefs as a separate, abstract or non-physical thing, any belief in the existence of beliefs is irrational and mentalist talk about beliefs is metaphorical.

Furthermore...

Pending evidence for the existence of metaphors as a separate, abstract or non-physical thing, any belief in the existence of metaphors is irrational and mentalist talk about metaphors is ??? (now that metaphors are in question).

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Wed Jun 07, 2023 7:17 am Every single mentalist expression can be parsed or explained 'non-mentalistically'.

OK. Explain the mentalist expression "belief" 'non-mentalistically'.

Do you believe in beliefs; or don't you believe in beliefs?

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Wed Jun 07, 2023 7:17 am I don't say we don't have minds - or I hope I've never said that. If I have, I apologise. And I'm very interested in research that indicates that what we call the mind is not limited to the brain, or even to life forms with brains. I think the 'embodied mind' makes sense.

My point is this: pending evidence for the existence of the mind as a separate, abstract or non-physical thing, belief in its existence is irrational - and mentalist talk, about minds containing mental things and events, is metaphorical. Every single mentalist expression can be parsed or explained 'non-mentalistically'.

I go further. Pending evidence for the existence of anything non-physical, what could be called non-dogmatic physicalism - or methodological naturalism in science - is the rational default position. And I'm happy to debate that claim with anyone who clings to the superstition that non-physical things exist.

Every time I mentioned 'mind-independent' you straight-away jumped at it to insist there is no such thing as mind, as such the term 'mind-independent' is non-sensical.
That is despite telling you [a million times] what I meant my 'mind' in 'mind-independent' has nothing to do with Descartes's dualism and non-physical mind and me explaining my concept of 'what is mind' is the 'embodied mind'.

So in future whenever I mention 'mind-independent' it mean the embodied mind.

In this case, your ideology is Philosophical Realism,

• Philosophical Realism is .... about a certain kind of thing is the thesis that this kind of thing has mind-independent existence, i.e. that it is not just a mere appearance in the eye of the beholder.
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism

'mind-independent' as above is embodied-mind-independent.
The term "mind-independent" is the common usage.

In this case your 'what is fact' that is embodied-mind-independent is still illusory [noumenal].
You still have not proven how your 'what is fact' that is embodied-mind-independent is real?
In the future I will merely use 'mind-independent' as a convenience.

And I'm happy to debate that claim with anyone who clings to the superstition that non-physical things exist.

You can raise that in the Religion section where theists claim the non-physical things like God, Soul, real platonic ideas and the like exist.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Wed Jun 07, 2023 7:40 am

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Wed Jun 07, 2023 7:17 am I don't say we don't have minds - or I hope I've never said that. If I have, I apologise. And I'm very interested in research that indicates that what we call the mind is not limited to the brain, or even to life forms with brains. I think the 'embodied mind' makes sense.

My point is this: pending evidence for the existence of the mind as a separate, abstract or non-physical thing, belief in its existence is irrational - and mentalist talk, about minds containing mental things and events, is metaphorical. Every single mentalist expression can be parsed or explained 'non-mentalistically'.

I go further. Pending evidence for the existence of anything non-physical, what could be called non-dogmatic physicalism - or methodological naturalism in science - is the rational default position. And I'm happy to debate that claim with anyone who clings to the superstition that non-physical things exist.

Every time I mentioned 'mind-independent' you straight-away jumped at it to insist there is no such thing as mind, as such the term 'mind-independent' is non-sensical.
That is despite telling you [a million times] what I meant my 'mind' in 'mind-independent' has nothing to do with Descartes's dualism and non-physical mind and me explaining my concept of 'what is mind' is the 'embodied mind'.

So in future whenever I mention 'mind-independent' it mean the embodied mind.

In this case, your ideology is Philosophical Realism,

• Philosophical Realism is .... about a certain kind of thing is the thesis that this kind of thing has mind-independent existence, i.e. that it is not just a mere appearance in the eye of the beholder.
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism

'mind-independent' as above is embodied-mind-independent.
The term "mind-independent" is the common usage.

In this case your 'what is fact' that is embodied-mind-independent is still illusory [noumenal].
You still have not proven how your 'what is fact' that is embodied-mind-independent is real?
In the future I will merely use 'mind-independent' as a convenience.

And I'm happy to debate that claim with anyone who clings to the superstition that non-physical things exist.

You can raise that in the Religion section where theists claim the non-physical things like God, Soul, real platonic ideas and the like exist.

To be clear, don't use the expression 'mind-independent' any more, because it's deeply corrupted by substance dualism.

Instead, let's use 'human-body-independent' - because the embodied mind is the human body.

So now, your claim is that reality is not and cannot be independent from the human body.

And that's a load of cack - which is what I've been saying all along.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Wed Jun 07, 2023 8:01 am So now, your claim is that reality is not and cannot be independent from the human body.

Which property of reality is its "independence". Please point at it.

Reality's "independence" is what humans say about reality.

Way to confuse what we say about things for the way things are. Again.