Draft I Part XXI
Posted: Fri Apr 07, 2023 7:58 pm
There is generally a dichotomy between ‘thought’ and ‘empirical sense’ and this can be observed in many philosophers such as Plato and Kant. This dichotomy is false however considering we observe the empirical senses through the thought (i.e. thinking about what we sense) and the thought through the empirical senses (i.e. drawing out a thought on a chalkboard or tablet). By becoming its opposite ‘thought’ and ‘empirical sense’ are no longer oppositional but equivocal. In these respects any analysis on thought begins to be ambiguous as the distinction of thought itself lends little contrast that allows it to be an individual entity that stands apart. It may be observed from this absence of clear distinction that ‘thought’ can equate to just about anything and everything and from this it becomes a meaningless category and yet this is all just a thought.
Thought becomes self-referential, through this equivocation with the ‘empirical senses’, and any distinction of the phenomenon of ‘thought’ is a distinction against itself thus leading to contradiction. This contradiction furthers in the respect that the act of ‘distinction’ is in itself a thought thus ‘distinction’ must be distinct from ‘distinction’ thus leaving to further absurdity in what was previously stated. However this necessity of distinction, though not distinct, may be illusive in the respect that one thought leads to another thought as evidenced by the ‘thought of the thought’ leading to the ‘thought of distinction’. A paradox ensues as one thought becomes distinct from another thought yet this distinction necessitates a connection by the observation that one thought projects from another thought. In one thought standing apart from another thought the thoughts paradoxically create a connection as the standing apart of one from another necessitates a relationship where one thought could not exist unless it was able to ‘stand apart’; this act of ‘standing apart’ requires another phenomenon thus a relationship occurs, this ‘relationship’ is a thought a well.
A fallacy of equivocation occurs: thoughts are connected ‘and’ thoughts are divided. This connection and division are both thoughts, i.e. we are thinking of connection and division, and under the terms of the use of “and” ‘connection’ and ‘division’ are both connected not only in this respect but also in the respect that both are ‘thoughts’. Yet they are dually distinct thoughts as one stands apart from the other, as evidenced by the distinctions in wording we use to express them, and as such are dually divided. In these respects the nature of thought is neither connection nor division as well. This is absurdity as the fundamental thoughts of ‘connection’ and ‘division’, which are the groundings of all thought, become completely ambiguous when analyzed further. Thoughts, and its groundings (which are also thoughts), become a circle of arguments and rationale which can lead to any direction whatsoever.
A form of self-referentiality becomes inevitable when thinking about thoughts and from this it may be implied that the concept of infinity results. One thought leads to another thought and a continuity results even though the continuity may be indefinite in nature due to its absence of ending. From this comes the distinction of ‘infinity’ which paradoxically is not a distinction considering the act of thinking about infinity is effectively infinite in one respect, thus leading to indefiniteness, while in another respect ‘infinity’ is a ‘thought’ which stands apart from another ‘thought’ yet is the connection of one thought to another thought by that fact that said distinctions are all ‘thoughts’. Infinity is a thought and to think about infinity is to think about a thought. In these respects a paradox occurs as the distinction which occurs through thought is a result of a self-referentiality which necessitates a certain degree of sameness. Self-referentiality becomes distinction and distinction becomes self-referentiality and an equivocation occurs even though both are distinct. Even the distinction of ‘distinction’ from ‘self-referentiality’ lends itself to a certain self-referentiality where ‘distinction’ is ‘distinct’ from ‘self-referentiality’ but this distinction of ‘distinction’ is self-referential thus leading to a contradiction where this ‘distinction of distinction’ is no longer a distinction. From this it may be implied that the other groundings of thought, i.e. ‘distinction’ and ‘self-referentiality’ (which mirror ‘connection’ and ‘division’), make little sense even though they are still thoughts. ‘Thought’ becomes a meaningless phenomenon even though it effectively means itself and the nature of questioning such things in itself becomes questionable.
Self-referentiality and distinction are meaningless thoughts as evidenced above and the nature of thought becomes fundamentally obscure when rationalized or talked about. Another contradiction results from this thought as ‘obscurity’ is a thought as well that must be effectively defined through distinction and yet it cannot be considering the nature of thoughts as discussed prior. In other terms “to speak of obscurity is in itself obscure” and a contradictory statement results as this prior statement is self-negating. From this it may be implied that thoughts are fundamentally self-negating when thought about further but this self-negation is negated by the fact that it is also a thought that is not self-negating. Self-negation cannot be the inherent ‘quality of thought’, which is a ‘thought’, behind thoughts and yet it is as the ‘self-negation of self-negation’ is a self-negation. Contradiction and absurdity result….and yet the contradictory argument goes further as to think about contradiction is a contradiction and to think about absurdity is absurdity. From this is may be implied that identity is the thought itself as the thought strictly “is what it is”. However due to its contradictory nature, and the contradictory nature of this ‘contradictory nature, it cannot even be said that a thought “is what it is” as it may be simultaneously be said and argued “it is not what it is” or even “it is not even what it is not”.
In conclusion to think about thoughts is an endeavor which results in thoughtlessness even though this ‘thoughtlessness’ is a distinct thought. Thought is contradiction in terms and in usage and even this “contradiction in terms and in usage” is a ‘contradiction in terms and in usage’. From this it may be implied that thought is fundamentally empty in nature and to move beyond a state of contradiction is to move beyond a state of thought, however this is also a thought so it may also be implied that it is not necessary to move beyond a state of contradiction and to just keep thinking. Either way results in neither way as one choice, to think, and the other choice, not to think, results in an inevitable self-negation. As a result of the arguments presented it may be best to balance ‘thought’ with ‘thoughtlessness’…even though this is a thought…or is it?
Thought becomes self-referential, through this equivocation with the ‘empirical senses’, and any distinction of the phenomenon of ‘thought’ is a distinction against itself thus leading to contradiction. This contradiction furthers in the respect that the act of ‘distinction’ is in itself a thought thus ‘distinction’ must be distinct from ‘distinction’ thus leaving to further absurdity in what was previously stated. However this necessity of distinction, though not distinct, may be illusive in the respect that one thought leads to another thought as evidenced by the ‘thought of the thought’ leading to the ‘thought of distinction’. A paradox ensues as one thought becomes distinct from another thought yet this distinction necessitates a connection by the observation that one thought projects from another thought. In one thought standing apart from another thought the thoughts paradoxically create a connection as the standing apart of one from another necessitates a relationship where one thought could not exist unless it was able to ‘stand apart’; this act of ‘standing apart’ requires another phenomenon thus a relationship occurs, this ‘relationship’ is a thought a well.
A fallacy of equivocation occurs: thoughts are connected ‘and’ thoughts are divided. This connection and division are both thoughts, i.e. we are thinking of connection and division, and under the terms of the use of “and” ‘connection’ and ‘division’ are both connected not only in this respect but also in the respect that both are ‘thoughts’. Yet they are dually distinct thoughts as one stands apart from the other, as evidenced by the distinctions in wording we use to express them, and as such are dually divided. In these respects the nature of thought is neither connection nor division as well. This is absurdity as the fundamental thoughts of ‘connection’ and ‘division’, which are the groundings of all thought, become completely ambiguous when analyzed further. Thoughts, and its groundings (which are also thoughts), become a circle of arguments and rationale which can lead to any direction whatsoever.
A form of self-referentiality becomes inevitable when thinking about thoughts and from this it may be implied that the concept of infinity results. One thought leads to another thought and a continuity results even though the continuity may be indefinite in nature due to its absence of ending. From this comes the distinction of ‘infinity’ which paradoxically is not a distinction considering the act of thinking about infinity is effectively infinite in one respect, thus leading to indefiniteness, while in another respect ‘infinity’ is a ‘thought’ which stands apart from another ‘thought’ yet is the connection of one thought to another thought by that fact that said distinctions are all ‘thoughts’. Infinity is a thought and to think about infinity is to think about a thought. In these respects a paradox occurs as the distinction which occurs through thought is a result of a self-referentiality which necessitates a certain degree of sameness. Self-referentiality becomes distinction and distinction becomes self-referentiality and an equivocation occurs even though both are distinct. Even the distinction of ‘distinction’ from ‘self-referentiality’ lends itself to a certain self-referentiality where ‘distinction’ is ‘distinct’ from ‘self-referentiality’ but this distinction of ‘distinction’ is self-referential thus leading to a contradiction where this ‘distinction of distinction’ is no longer a distinction. From this it may be implied that the other groundings of thought, i.e. ‘distinction’ and ‘self-referentiality’ (which mirror ‘connection’ and ‘division’), make little sense even though they are still thoughts. ‘Thought’ becomes a meaningless phenomenon even though it effectively means itself and the nature of questioning such things in itself becomes questionable.
Self-referentiality and distinction are meaningless thoughts as evidenced above and the nature of thought becomes fundamentally obscure when rationalized or talked about. Another contradiction results from this thought as ‘obscurity’ is a thought as well that must be effectively defined through distinction and yet it cannot be considering the nature of thoughts as discussed prior. In other terms “to speak of obscurity is in itself obscure” and a contradictory statement results as this prior statement is self-negating. From this it may be implied that thoughts are fundamentally self-negating when thought about further but this self-negation is negated by the fact that it is also a thought that is not self-negating. Self-negation cannot be the inherent ‘quality of thought’, which is a ‘thought’, behind thoughts and yet it is as the ‘self-negation of self-negation’ is a self-negation. Contradiction and absurdity result….and yet the contradictory argument goes further as to think about contradiction is a contradiction and to think about absurdity is absurdity. From this is may be implied that identity is the thought itself as the thought strictly “is what it is”. However due to its contradictory nature, and the contradictory nature of this ‘contradictory nature, it cannot even be said that a thought “is what it is” as it may be simultaneously be said and argued “it is not what it is” or even “it is not even what it is not”.
In conclusion to think about thoughts is an endeavor which results in thoughtlessness even though this ‘thoughtlessness’ is a distinct thought. Thought is contradiction in terms and in usage and even this “contradiction in terms and in usage” is a ‘contradiction in terms and in usage’. From this it may be implied that thought is fundamentally empty in nature and to move beyond a state of contradiction is to move beyond a state of thought, however this is also a thought so it may also be implied that it is not necessary to move beyond a state of contradiction and to just keep thinking. Either way results in neither way as one choice, to think, and the other choice, not to think, results in an inevitable self-negation. As a result of the arguments presented it may be best to balance ‘thought’ with ‘thoughtlessness’…even though this is a thought…or is it?
