Philosophy Now Forum

Re Morality, there are two senses of 'ought' to be considered;
1. The typical ought arising from personal or unjustified group opinions and beliefs.
2. The scientifically verifiable ought, e.g. potentials that is applicable to sentient Agents i.e. human subjects which are related to moral drives.

Hume discusses the problem in book III, part I, section I of his book, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739):

In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Is%E2%80%93ought_problem

I agree with Hume on the above which is based on the first sense of 'ought' listed above.
It is very noticeable Hume's emphasis was directed at the theists' moral model where 'oughts' are simply imposed on believers and non-believers simply from a Holy Texts and a non-existent God threatening non-compliance of oughts with Hellfire.
This ought is based on the opinions and beliefs [faith] of individual and groups.

Hume is a believer in the necessary function of Morality within human nature where he asserted that moral impulses are initiated from sensation of sentiments arising from some physical anatomy in the person.

Hume identifies “sympathy” as the capacity that makes moral evaluation possible by allowing us to take an interest in the public good (T 3.3.1.9).
Because of the central role that sympathy plays in Hume’s moral theory, his account of sympathy deserves further attention. Hume tells us that sympathy is the human capacity to “receive” the feelings and beliefs of other people (T 2.1.11.2). That is, it is the process by which we experience what others are feeling and thinking.
https://iep.utm.edu/humemora/

That is, it is the process by which we experience what others are feeling and thinking. This process begins by forming an idea of what another person is experiencing. This idea might be formed through observing the effects of another’s feeling (T 2.1.11.3). For instance, from my observation that another person is smiling, and my prior knowledge that smiling is associated with happiness, I form an idea of the other’s happiness.
My idea of another’s emotion can also be formed prior to the other person feeling the emotion. This occurs through observing the usual causes of that emotion.
Hume provides the example of someone who observes surgical instruments being prepared for a painful operation. He notes that this person would feel terrified for the person about to suffer through the operation even though the operation had not yet begun (T 3.3.1.7).
This is because the observer already established a prior mental association between surgical instruments and pain.
https://iep.utm.edu/humemora/

Then he [as with his time] admitted his ignorance;

The examination of our sensations belongs more to anatomists and natural philosophers than to moral; and therefore shall not at present be enter’d upon.
SECTION II.: Division of the Subject.
………………..
Its effects are every where conspicuous; but as to its causes, they are mostly unknown, and must be resolv’d into original qualities of human nature, which I pretend not to explain.
A Treatise of Human nature [1739]

In the above whilst Hume speculated the source of moral impulses, he admitted his ignorance on the physical elements that are responsible for the moral sentiments of sympathy [empathy].

Now in 2023, we have already advance so far [with neurosciences, neuropsychology, genetics, genomics and etc.] from Hume's time to discover more and more the likely physical elements [Hume's "anatomy"] that are responsible for moral drives and impulses.

We are now in a position to present hypothesis to support those,
2. The scientifically verifiable oughts, e.g. potentials that are applicable to sentient Agents i.e. human subjects which are related to moral drives.

This is the New Paradigm of Morality where extensive research has been done to link the inherent moral propensity within ALL humans to their respective physical referent within the brain, mind and body.

The unfortunate things is there are the majority and the dogmatic who are still stuck in the Old Paradigm clinging to Hume's maxim re 1 above, i.e. No Ought from Is.

It is time we move on to the New Paradigm of Morality, but given the inherent natural Resistance to Change and risk of Cold Turkey the dogmatic are not likely to change.

Here's VA's mistake.

1 Hume didn't know what makes humans do what they do, or think and feel what they think and feel.

2 When we know what makes humans do what they do, or think and feel what they think and feel, then we'll know what humans should or ought to do, think and feel.

Because 2 is fallacious - a non sequitur - 1 is irrelevant. What Hume pointed out is a logical impossibility, which remains an impossibility whatever facts are known about human nature. VA's 'new paradigm' is nothing of the sort.

Questions for VA. Do you understand the following?

Non-moral (such as factual) premises can't entail a moral conclusion.

And so do you understand why the following is a non sequitur?

Humans are programmed with 'ought-not-to-kill-humans'; therefore, humans ought not to kill humans.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu Jan 12, 2023 10:44 am Non-moral (such as factual) premises can't entail a moral conclusion.

Justify this claim without moralising.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu Jan 12, 2023 10:44 am Humans are programmed with 'ought-not-to-kill-humans'; therefore, humans ought not to kill humans.

You are going to have to elaborate on what you mean by "can't" - because you just did what you (supposedly) can't do.

Here, let me help you out. I think what you were trying to say was "Non-moral (such as factual) premises ought not entail a moral conclusion."

Too fucking bad! They can and they do!

There's nothing moral or immoral about a contradiction, or a deductively invalid argument.

One could say it's immoral to insist on logical consistency and deductive validity. But that would be a matter of opinion, and so subjective.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu Jan 12, 2023 2:12 pm There's nothing moral or immoral about a contradiction, or a deductively invalid argument.

Liar.

Contradictory arguments exist.
Non-contradictory arguments exist.

Why the bias/discrimination against one and preference for the other?

Deductively valid arguments exist.
Deductively invalid arguments exist.

Why the bias/discrimination against one and preference for the other?

That sure seems like moral behaviour to me.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu Jan 12, 2023 2:12 pm One could say it's immoral to insist on logical consistency and deductive validity. But that would be a matter of opinion, and so subjective.

But nobody is saying such things.

I am pointing out that despite the presence of alternative options YOU are insisting on validity and consistency as a matter of principle.

You are treating validity and consistency as normative. Your behaviour implies that arguments ought to be valid and free from contradictions.

Why? Queue normative moral argument.

Here is a point where Hume advocates the focus on Effects rather than chasing after causes in the case of more refined philosophical reflections.

This is the point where I stated it is more realistic to focus on the TOP-DOWN approach, i.e. focus on effects than the BOTTOM-UP approach [by Philosophical Realists] speculating on pre-existing illusory causes.

These are therefore the principles of union or cohesion among our simple ideas, and in the imagination supply the place of that inseparable connexion, by which they are united in our memory.

Here is a kind of ATTRACTION, which in the mental world will be found to have as extraordinary effects as in the natural, and to shew itself in as many and as various forms.
Its effects are every where conspicuous; but as to its causes, they are mostly unknown, and must be resolved into original qualities of human nature, which I pretend not to explain.

Nothing is more requisite for a true philosopher, than to restrain the intemperate [having or showing a lack of self-control; immoderate] desire of searching into causes, and having established any doctrine upon a sufficient number of experiments, rest contented with that, when he sees a farther examination would lead him into obscure and uncertain speculations.

In that case his enquiry would be much better employed in examining the effects than the causes of his principle.

Treatise: Book I, PartI I, Sect. IV. Of The Connection Or Association Of Ideas.