Philosophy Now Forum

Peter you keep insisting I am not getting it so I have isolated the issue from that haystack thread for special attention here;

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Tue Jul 12, 2022 11:32 am If there are no noumena (things-in-themselves), then the claim that there are only phenomena (things-as-they-appear) is incoherent.
The distinction collapses, and all we have is things.
And the claim that those things can only be things-in-themselves is perfectly circular and so self-defeating.

My response;

The truth is you are too ignorant and dogmatic in understand my full posts.

My point was your statement below is incoherent in the first place because it is a strawman; Kant would not agree with it at all.
PH:If there are no noumena (things-in-themselves), then the claim that there are only phenomena (things-as-they-appear) is incoherent.

In your statement above there are two parts, i.e.
1. there are no noumena (things-in-themselves)
2. there are only phenomena (things-as-they-appear)

The point is, regardless of whether 'there are no noumena' or 'there are noumena',
statement [2] cannot be incoherent because phenomena can be verified and justified as real within the scientific FSK.

As had explained in the earlier stage of my post, Kant introduced "the concept of the noumena" as the illusion that you and others are insisting upon.
Thus what Kant is presenting is that you [and your likes] are claiming there is a noumena as underlying the phenomena which to Kant is mere nonsense.

But to pacify [temporary shut up] the impatient of your likes, Kant would have implied, "OK let there be a 'noumena' in contrast to the phenomena but it is only to be accepted as a limiting concept but not a real thing."

Kant subsequently demonstrated the "noumena" aka the thing-in-itself is illusory.

So,
If there are no noumena (illusions), then the claim that there are only phenomena (things-as-they-appear)
is definitely coherent.
i.e. if there are no illusions, then there are only phenomena, the real things.

It is irrational to insist that it is incoherent as you have claimed earlier.
viewtopic.php?p=583088#p583088

I have explained why it is not incoherent but PH still insisted;

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Wed Jul 13, 2022 9:18 amNo, you're just not getting it.

The use of the term 'phenomena' is incoherent, because it makes no sense to call something an appearance if there's nothing of which it's an appearance. If there are no noumena, the term 'phenomena' makes a distinction which doesn't obtain. As you put it, there are only 'the real things' - which makes you a realist after all.

The claim that realists believe in the existence of things-in-themselves is a straw man - a product of Kant's argument. Realists have no idea what a thing-in-itself can possibly be. Outside Kantian blather, the expression has no discernable meaning

Btw, I am a reasonable expert on Kant's Noumena versus Phenomena, so it is likely PH is not getting it rather than me not getting it.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Wed Jul 13, 2022 8:42 am You are the one who is not getting it.
For Kant the distinction Phenomena vs Noumena is critical to expose philosophical realists [like you regardless of your denial] in claiming there are "things that exist independent of human opinions and beliefs" which Kant labelled as 'noumena'.

The use of the term 'phenomena' is incoherent, because it makes no sense to call something an appearance if there's nothing of which it's an appearance. If there are no noumena, the term 'phenomena' makes a distinction which doesn't obtain. As you put it, there are only 'the real things' - which makes you a realist after all.

The term 'phenomena' is a common term to denote things that are observable, verifiable and justifiable via a credible FSK like the scientific FSK. In this case, the term 'phenomena' make sense, i.e. empirical and scientific sense. Phenomena 'obtain' in relation to the scientific framework.

In your case, you are claiming there is more to 'phenomena' which is 'fact,' the thing that is a feature of reality [states of affairs] which is independent of human opinions and beliefs, i.e. independent [not entangled] of the scientific framework.
To Kant, what you are claiming as 'fact' i.e. fact independent of human conditions, is an illusory thing which Kant labelled as 'noumena'.

You are very ignorant to insist the term 'phenomena' is incoherent without the 'noumena' which you are inferring from crude logic.
The term 'phenomena' is VERY real but it has to be entangled with a credible FSK like the scientific FSK.
You cannot deny there are phenomena like hurricanes, volcanic erruptions, earthquakes, suns, planets, physical things, etc. which can be verified and justified by Science.

Yes, I claim there are 'real things' but they are not independent of the human conditions but emerged with the human conditions, e.g. within the scientific framework.
In this sense I am an Empirical Realist [not a philosophical realist] which is entangled with empirical evidences, verification and justifications within the credible scientific FSK.

The claim that realists believe in the existence of things-in-themselves is a straw man - a product of Kant's argument. Realists have no idea what a thing-in-itself can possibly be. Outside Kantian blather, the expression has no discernable meaning.

You think you have no idea what a thing-in-itself is?
Surely you should be aware, you are claiming [ignorantly and dogmatically] there are "real" things which are independent of humans' beliefs and opinion, thus not entangled with the human conditions at all.
This is precisely a thing-in-itself or things-in-themselves you are insisting on and believing in, so how can you deny that?
In this case you are philosophical realist [independent of real thing] not an empirical realist [entangled with real things emergently].

In what way is a noumenon a 'limiting concept'? How does it discipline the supposed extravagance of realism?

And anyway, what and where is a concept? In what way does a concept exist? Are concepts phenomena - things for the existence of which there's empirical evidence? If so, where's the evidence?

Or are they noumena - but no - there are no noumena. So the concept of a dog is a phenomenon - an appearance.

And you think this rubbish is serious?

is a sensory impression (phenomena) a completely private event?

-Imp

(this is more of an ontological question, yet there is no category...)

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Fri Aug 05, 2022 9:13 am In what way is a noumenon a 'limiting concept'? How does it discipline the supposed extravagance of realism?

And anyway, what and where is a concept? In what way does a concept exist? Are concepts phenomena - things for the existence of which there's empirical evidence? If so, where's the evidence?

Or are they noumena - but no - there are no noumena. So the concept of a dog is a phenomenon - an appearance.

And you think this rubbish is serious?

As I had insisted you had not understood [not necessary agree with] Kant thoroughly.

I have also reference this a 'thousand' times, in Kant's words;

Kant in CPR wrote:The Concept of a Noumenon is thus a merely limiting Concept, the Function of which is to curb the pretensions of Sensibility; and it is therefore only of negative employment.
...
What our Understanding acquires through this Concept of a Noumenon, is a negative extension;
that is to say, Understanding is not limited through Sensibility;
on the contrary, it {understanding} itself Limits Sensibility by applying the term Noumena to Things-in-Themselves (Things not regarded as Appearances).
B311

If you claimed to have understood Kant, why you did not take the above into account?

In any case, it is very difficult for one to understand the above statements without putting them in the full perspective of the whole Critique of Pure Reason.

Impenitent wrote: ↑Fri Aug 05, 2022 3:57 pm is a sensory impression (phenomena) a completely private event?
-Imp
(this is more of an ontological question, yet there is no category...)

What is phenomena can be easily verified and justified by Science via its scientific method and peer review.
There is nothing ontological with Science.

But the majority are habituated with dualism, thus the mention of 'phenomena', to them, must entailed 'noumena' because to them [dualists] for every +ve there must be a -ve, there cannot be creation without a creator, something cannot come fro nothing, and the likes.

Because the ultimate explanation is so complex, Kant provided the reservation, i.e. to the ignorant he would have said something like;
Kant: 'OK, OK, let there be "noumena" in correspondence to 'phenomena' for the moment, but that noumena is merely a limiting concept, not some object of substance'

After pacifying the impatient he ultimately demonstrated that 'noumena' is the 'thing-in-itself' which is an illusion implying it is driven by desperate psychological drives from within.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sat Aug 06, 2022 5:37 am

Impenitent wrote: ↑Fri Aug 05, 2022 3:57 pm is a sensory impression (phenomena) a completely private event?
-Imp
(this is more of an ontological question, yet there is no category...)

What is phenomena can be easily verified and justified by Science via its scientific method and peer review.
There is nothing ontological with Science.

But the majority are habituated with dualism, thus the mention of 'phenomena', to them, must entailed 'noumena' because to them [dualists] for every +ve there must be a -ve, there cannot be creation without a creator, something cannot come fro nothing, and the likes.

Because the ultimate explanation is so complex, Kant provided the reservation, i.e. to the ignorant he would have said something like;
Kant: 'OK, OK, let there be "noumena" in correspondence to 'phenomena' for the moment, but that noumena is merely a limiting concept, not some object of substance'

After pacifying the impatient he ultimately demonstrated that 'noumena' is the 'thing-in-itself' which is an illusion implying it is driven by desperate psychological drives from within.

So, after all, what Kant called phenomena aren't appearances - things as they appear to us - but just things that just exist. Well, that was a useful little detour.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Sat Aug 06, 2022 8:08 am

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sat Aug 06, 2022 5:37 am

Impenitent wrote: ↑Fri Aug 05, 2022 3:57 pm is a sensory impression (phenomena) a completely private event?
-Imp
(this is more of an ontological question, yet there is no category...)

What is phenomena can be easily verified and justified by Science via its scientific method and peer review.
There is nothing ontological with Science.

But the majority are habituated with dualism, thus the mention of 'phenomena', to them, must entailed 'noumena' because to them [dualists] for every +ve there must be a -ve, there cannot be creation without a creator, something cannot come fro nothing, and the likes.

Because the ultimate explanation is so complex, Kant provided the reservation, i.e. to the ignorant he would have said something like;
Kant: 'OK, OK, let there be "noumena" in correspondence to 'phenomena' for the moment, but that noumena is merely a limiting concept, not some object of substance'

After pacifying the impatient he ultimately demonstrated that 'noumena' is the 'thing-in-itself' which is an illusion implying it is driven by desperate psychological drives from within.

So, after all, what Kant called phenomena aren't appearances - things as they appear to us - but just things that just exist. Well, that was a useful little detour.

"phenomena are described or differentiated appearances" see below.

As I had mentioned it was necessary of Kant to present the above finer distinction to expose the hasty thoughts of the dualists and those who are inclined to the correspondence theory of truth or people like you, 'fact as a feature of reality'.

Note this from Graham Bird [mine];

In CPR and P Kant refines the traditional philosophical account of Appearance by distinguishing between Appearance, Phenomenon and Illusion [noumena].

The senses present us with indeterminate appearances, which it is the function of Understanding [intellect] to determine or describe.
The term 'appearance', which in its transcendental use is given to whatever is an object of the senses, is therefore quite neutral as to the description of what we empirically perceive.
Kant's claim that the senses are inarticulate, or passive, amounts in this way to the stipulations that
appearances are nondescript or indeterminate,
while phenomena are described or differentiated appearances.
Graham Bird

There is no thing in itself to find, object or the world as an object, your apparent reality, your everyday reality, is the emergent quality of the energies of ultimate reality on your body/biology. This is the source of all objects including your body itself. Science tells us today that ultimate reality is a place of no things, in other words, there really is nothing but energy, and energy as a readout from one's biology is object, your apparent reality. This follows logically from the fact that subject and object are one and can never be separated. It is so even if you wish to think of the energy as the thing in itself you can't, subject and object stand or fall together take one away and the other ceases to be. Reality is reaction to those energies of ultimate reality, again a place of no things.