Peter Holmes' grounds on 'Early'-Wittgenstein
Posted: Wed Aug 03, 2022 5:21 am
Every time I requested Peter Holmes to provide the grounds for his philosophical views re his independent 'fact' [so no moral facts] he was unable to provide any answers.
From what he had been posting I believed he got his philosophical grounds re his stance of 'what is fact' from the early-Wittgenstein with his Tractatus.
It is said that Wittgenstein went through 5 phases of his philosophical development and the 3 main ones were;
When Wittgenstein realized his Tractatus was merely 'kindergarten' stuff [philosophical realism] he gave up philosophy in Cambridge to become a gardener and later a primary school teacher.
W subsequent returned to philosophy wiser. In the final stages of his philosophical maturity W became anti-realist [note On Certainty] and argued against Moore who was still holding on to the old ways of philosophical realism re an independent external world.
Meanwhile Peter Holmes is still grasping at Wittgenstein's kindergarten stuff to ground and argue his case re 'what is fact'.
Peter Holmes do you have a counter for the above?
From what he had been posting I believed he got his philosophical grounds re his stance of 'what is fact' from the early-Wittgenstein with his Tractatus.
It is said that Wittgenstein went through 5 phases of his philosophical development and the 3 main ones were;
- 1. Tractatus - Analytic, linguistic & philosophical realism
2. Philosophical Investigation - Language game, breaking from his old ways.
3. On Certainty - philosophical anti-realism
The above are the propositions ["kindergarten" stuff of Wittgenstein] that Peter Holmes relied upon to argue his case.https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/witt ... /#BiogSket
The Tractatus’s structure purports to be representative of its internal essence.
It is constructed around seven basic propositions, numbered by the natural numbers 1–7, with all other paragraphs in the text numbered by decimal expansions.
The seven basic propositions are:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wittgenstein/
Ogden translation
1. The world is everything that is the case.
2. What is the case, the fact, is the existence of atomic facts.
3. The logical picture of the facts is the thought.
4. The thought is the significant proposition.
5. Propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions.
(An elementary proposition is a truth function of itself.)
6. The general form of truth-function is [ṕ, Ḗ, N (Ḗ)]
This is the general form of proposition.
7. Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.
Pears/McGuinness translation
The world is all that is the case.
What is the case—a fact—is the existence of states of affairs.
A logical picture of facts is a thought.
A thought is a proposition with sense.
A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions.
(An elementary proposition is a truth function of itself.)
The general form of truth-function is [ṕ, Ḗ, N (Ḗ)]
This is the general form of a proposition.
What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.
When Wittgenstein realized his Tractatus was merely 'kindergarten' stuff [philosophical realism] he gave up philosophy in Cambridge to become a gardener and later a primary school teacher.
W subsequent returned to philosophy wiser. In the final stages of his philosophical maturity W became anti-realist [note On Certainty] and argued against Moore who was still holding on to the old ways of philosophical realism re an independent external world.
Meanwhile Peter Holmes is still grasping at Wittgenstein's kindergarten stuff to ground and argue his case re 'what is fact'.
Peter Holmes do you have a counter for the above?