Philosophy Now Forum

Here is an article from Philosophy Now
Against Direct Realism
Paul Griffith
with the following conclusion;

Contemporary direct realists may still claim to be defending the notion of direct perception in a sense which is independent of our scientific understanding of the perceptual process.
But such a defence would be the equivalent of getting off a drink-driving charge on a legal technicality whilst admittedly drunk at the wheel.

The verdict may be in accordance with statute, but we wouldn’t want the accused driving the school bus.
Nor would we want a theory of direct perception which was defended on merely technical linguistic grounds driving our worldview.
At stake is no less than our understanding of this world in which we find ourselves, and our place within it.

https://philosophynow.org/issues/146/Ag ... ct_Realism

Griffith also wrote his doctorate thesis on
the critique of Direct Realism re Causality.

Griffith's thesis cover the issue in much details with reference to Cognitive Science.
Here is the conclusion;

"...
An argument against the conjunction of direct realism and the
standard causal picture
5 Summary of conclusions
This dissertation draws on the twenty first century alliance between philosophy and cognitive science to defend the thesis that: Metaphysical direct realism is incompatible with an explanation of the perceptual process in terms of a naturalistically understood causal chain of events.
In support of this thesis we have drawn the following conclusions:

1. Although causal arguments against direct realism have been dismissed lightly as irrelevant or confused in much of the philosophical literature, such objections arise from a failure to distinguish between metaphysical and epistemological claims, and between factual and strictly-conceptual claims.
Thus sound arguments are rejected along with the patently unsound.

2. When the argument from causation is formalized as an argument against the conjunction of the metaphysical directness-claim factually construed and the standard causal picture, it presents a particularly serious objection to the direct realism of contemporary analytic philosophy.
Since only the veridical case is at issue, the disjunctivist’s objection is avoided altogether and the representationalist’s objection is substantially weakened.
However, the argument can be challenged by both the small but influential minority of representationalist direct realists, who are prepared to reject the Weak Phenomenal Principle outright, and others who, whilst accepting the Principle, would question the argument’s call on the notion of an immediate object of awareness.
To break the impasse, we turn to cognitive science to understand more clearly what representations actually are, what they represent and how they represent.

3. Although it has been maintained that “direct realism” is a strictly-conceptual thesis which stands apart from the factual theses properly addressed within cognitive science, such a deflationary construal would not do justice to the substantial and significant thesis which has been debated since the Early Moderns and is now defended within contemporary analytic philosophy.
Moreover such a demarcation would be impossible to maintain in the context of work on embodiment, computation and representation which is undertaken within a twenty first century alliance of the science and philosophy of perception.

4. Mainstream representation-friendly cognitive science fleshes-out the standard causal picture, and thereby provides the basis for a more sophisticated causal argument against representationalist direct realism, which does not depend on the Weak Phenomenal Principle or the notion of an immediate object of awareness.
None of the representations so far posited, or in prospect within a naturalistic framework, can supply the representational content required of a representation in representationalist direct realism.
Such representations (those posited or in prospect) are second-order isomorphic to their targets and, as such, are well suited to the explanation of perceptually guided behaviour in terms of surrogate reasoning.
However they cannot supply representational content which represents objects as having the properties that they (the objects) actually have.
Thus mainstream representationfriendly cognitive science is shown to be incompatible with the metaphysical directnessclaim.

5. Gibsonian, representation-averse, cognitive science rejects the standard causal picture, thereby disarming the argument from causation, and cannot be shown to be incompatible with the metaphysical directness-claim.
Thus, it could be maintained that by virtue of positing a non-standard, but nevertheless naturalistic, causal picture, it does present an 217 objection to our central thesis.
We would reject this suggestion on two counts.
Firstly there are, as yet, no fleshed-out representation-averse explanations, and arguably none in prospect.
Secondly, although Gibsonian cognitive science might be compatible with the metaphysical directness-claim, it is, arguably, not robustly realist; indeed some of its proponents are avowedly antirealist.
Although, outside the scope of this dissertation, we would go further to maintain that representation-averse cognitive science is, in principle, incompatible with the realism-claim.
We suggest, as the basis for further work, such an argument in Appendix A.

6. In terms of our central thesis, we have shown that metaphysical direct realism’s directnessclaim is incompatible with an explanation of the perceptual process in terms of mainstream representation-friendly cognitive science.
Moreover, if the argument proposed in Appendix A goes through, neither mainstream nor Gibsonian representation-averse cognitive science, is compatible with a theory of perception which is at the same time both direct and realist in the sense that metaphysical direct realism requires.
"

our scientific understanding of the perceptual process

What is that exactly?

henry quirk wrote: ↑Fri Dec 17, 2021 4:38 pm our scientific understanding of the perceptual process

What is that exactly?

What the above implied is the direct realist view is merely based on words [linguistic] arguments and ideology of philosophical realism.

• [Philosophical] Realism about a certain kind of thing (like numbers or morality) is the thesis that this kind of thing has mind-independent existence, i.e. that it is not just a mere appearance in the eye of the beholder.[1][2][3] This includes a number of positions within epistemology and metaphysics which express that a given thing instead exists independently of knowledge, thought, or understanding.
  Realism can also be a view about the properties of reality in general, holding that reality exists independent of the mind ..
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism

The above ideology of Philosophical Realism [Direct Realism] is not realistic in contrast to a reality that is supported by science and cognitive science.

As I had mentioned before, your source of knowledge is intuitive, thus such an approach would be a hit-and-miss sort of thing regarding truth and reality.
Your intuitive insight re moral objective [re Chattel Slavery] was on target but in this case re direct realism it is off target where the more refined truths are concerned.

If it is based on common sense I agree "direct realism" is conditionally valid but it is cannot be true at all levels of reality.
Objects [stones] are solid from the common sense view, but at a higher level of reality, objects are not absolutely solid but merely comprised of relations [not even micro independent things] as proven in QM.

henry quirk wrote: ↑Fri Dec 17, 2021 4:38 pm our scientific understanding of the perceptual process

What is that exactly?

Direct realism doesn't work, I'm told. It flies in the face of our scientific understanding of the perceptual process, I'm told.

Okay.

What is our scientific understanding of the perceptual process?

Explain it to me.

henry quirk wrote: ↑Fri Dec 17, 2021 4:38 pm our scientific understanding of the perceptual process

What is that exactly?

Dude: We have a theory that says that all of your words and concepts are malformed and should be replaced
Language: That's not very consistent with the language you are trying to tell us that with
Dude: Yeah, change the language or else
Language: Or you make your own language and say it in that?
Dude: But I want to use this language!
Language: That seems like a you problem
Dude: Nor would we want a theory of direct perception which was defended on merely technical linguistic grounds driving our worldview.
Language: Still a you problem.

FlashDangerpants wrote: ↑Sat Dec 18, 2021 6:41 pm

henry quirk wrote: ↑Fri Dec 17, 2021 4:38 pm our scientific understanding of the perceptual process

What is that exactly?

Dude: We have a theory that says that all of your words and concepts are malformed and should be replaced
Language: That's not very consistent with the language you are trying to tell us that with
Dude: Yeah, change the language or else
Language: Or you make your own language and say it in that?
Dude: But I want to use this language!
Language: That seems like a you problem
Dude: Nor would we want a theory of direct perception which was defended on merely technical linguistic grounds driving our worldview.
Language: Still a you problem.

henry quirk wrote: ↑Sun Dec 19, 2021 5:42 am

FlashDangerpants wrote: ↑Sat Dec 18, 2021 6:41 pm

henry quirk wrote: ↑Fri Dec 17, 2021 4:38 pm our scientific understanding of the perceptual process

What is that exactly?

Dude: We have a theory that says that all of your words and concepts are malformed and should be replaced
Language: That's not very consistent with the language you are trying to tell us that with
Dude: Yeah, change the language or else
Language: Or you make your own language and say it in that?
Dude: But I want to use this language!
Language: That seems like a you problem
Dude: Nor would we want a theory of direct perception which was defended on merely technical linguistic grounds driving our worldview.
Language: Still a you problem.

The stuff about "scientific understanding of the perceptual process" isn't fundamentally different to what you read in Locke. It's just the same but with neuroscience words.

The argument that Vestibule Aquafresh is slinging here basically tells you that you are wrong to think there is a you that is in some sense interacting with a real world through visual and auditory perception. The olds tuff about colour not being a property of the object but of the observation of the object now comes with an extra layer of the same based on the image processing in your brain and how that goes through many unnoticed stages before you register in some sort of Cartesian Theatre scenario where that entity behind your eyes is imaginary in both time and space, a mirage that imagines itself, blah blah blah.

I'm not saying it's wrong as such, just that it's inordinately less important than the people who want it to change the world seem to think.