Philosophy Now Forum

Some values have no life-affirming consequences. Such are the "worlds beyond" which Nietzsche call nihilistic - which are nihilistic from Nietzsche's point of view.

Every value is potentially life-negating. In other words, the ultimate consequences of a value (as life-negating) become accessible only when we are exposed to its life-negating consequences. Insofar as Nietzsche claims that some values are necessarily life-affirming, he was wrong. We are not perceiving life-affirming consequences, we are merely (within our constraints) unaware of contingent life-negating consequences.

I'm trying to think back on how Schopenhauer argued that some values have necessarily life-affirming consequences, and in such a case he would have been completely wrong.

Fja1 wrote: ↑Tue Aug 24, 2021 8:06 am Some values have no life-affirming consequences. Such are the "worlds beyond" which Nietzsche call nihilistic - which are nihilistic from Nietzsche's point of view.

Every value is potentially life-negating. In other words, the ultimate consequences of a value (as life-negating) become accessible only when we are exposed to its life-negating consequences. Insofar as Nietzsche claims that some values are necessarily life-affirming, he was wrong. We are not perceiving life-affirming consequences, we are merely (within our constraints) unaware of contingent life-negating consequences.

I'm trying to think back on how Schopenhauer argued that some values have necessarily life-affirming consequences, and in such a case he would have been completely wrong.

That promises to be an interesting claim and I hope you won't think I am unnecessarily pedantic. However few here I guess are so au fait with Schopenhauer and Nietzsche that they know what of these two theories of existence and their ethical conclusions you refer to. I'm struggling to understand anyway. I wish you would elucidate maybe illustrate what you mean, or at least define the theories to which you refer as briefly and clearly as possible.

For instance your

Nietzsche claims that some values are necessarily life-affirming,

is a usable fact as is

Schopenhauer argued that some values have necessarily life-affirming consequences

If the material you dispute is Nietzsche's ' worlds beyond' I think you need to explain further that Nietzsche did not approve of the idea of things in themselves. This little example will show that your message is no more than a short introduction to a very large topic.

Belinda wrote: ↑Tue Aug 24, 2021 9:36 am

Fja1 wrote: ↑Tue Aug 24, 2021 8:06 am Some values have no life-affirming consequences. Such are the "worlds beyond" which Nietzsche call nihilistic - which are nihilistic from Nietzsche's point of view.

Every value is potentially life-negating. In other words, the ultimate consequences of a value (as life-negating) become accessible only when we are exposed to its life-negating consequences. Insofar as Nietzsche claims that some values are necessarily life-affirming, he was wrong. We are not perceiving life-affirming consequences, we are merely (within our constraints) unaware of contingent life-negating consequences.

I'm trying to think back on how Schopenhauer argued that some values have necessarily life-affirming consequences, and in such a case he would have been completely wrong.

That promises to be an interesting claim and I hope you won't think I am unnecessarily pedantic. However few here I guess are so au fait with Schopenhauer and Nietzsche that they know what of these two theories of existence and their ethical conclusions you refer to. I'm struggling to understand anyway. I wish you would elucidate maybe illustrate what you mean, or at least define the theories to which you refer as briefly and clearly as possible.

For instance your

Nietzsche claims that some values are necessarily life-affirming,

is a usable fact as is

Schopenhauer argued that some values have necessarily life-affirming consequences

If the material you dispute is Nietzsche's ' worlds beyond' I think you need to explain further that Nietzsche did not approve of the idea of things in themselves. This little example will show that your message is no more than a short introduction to a very large topic.

It's clear that Nietzsche didn't approve of things in themselves, or platonic essences, which are tantamount to "worlds beyond" or religion. For instance:

"The world which appears to our senses is the only real one, and one should rehabilitate the senses, unjustly discredited by platonism or kantism, which see in them a source of error : the senses don't lie insofar as they show the future, disappearance, change. The world of appearances is the only real one : the "true world" is added solely by the lie."

"The weak" are not animated by affirmation of the will to powe. (They're animated by ressentiment, that is, the negation of others to affirm themselves. The superhuman is sometimes thought of as something you should aspire to be, but in the psychological framework of Nietzsche's slave morality, it's sufficient to say the "superhuman" is merely a projection created by the "the weak", or a representation of that which the forces they react against. From the superhuman's point of the view, the superhuman wouldn't exist except as a geneological explanation of this nihilism, this life-negating slave morality. The opposite of the nihilist is he who according to Nietzsche affirms life (whether such an individual exists independently, or just as a projection created by the "weak"). Since our motives are too manifold for us to be conscious of all of them, I find it impossible to be conscious of (potentially) life-affirming consequences of some value. It's only possible to be conscious of life-negating consequences of some value.

It appears to me that his "revaluation of values" does include the possibility of life-affirming consequences of some value. But in respect of my claim as usable fact I added Insofar as:
Insofar as Nietzsche claims that some values are necessarily life-affirming, he was wrong.

I picked all of this from multiple sources on Nietzsche. I wonder if I'll have time to crawl through the texts myself.

Fja1 wrote: ↑Tue Aug 24, 2021 2:45 pm

Belinda wrote: ↑Tue Aug 24, 2021 9:36 am

Fja1 wrote: ↑Tue Aug 24, 2021 8:06 am Some values have no life-affirming consequences. Such are the "worlds beyond" which Nietzsche call nihilistic - which are nihilistic from Nietzsche's point of view.

Every value is potentially life-negating. In other words, the ultimate consequences of a value (as life-negating) become accessible only when we are exposed to its life-negating consequences. Insofar as Nietzsche claims that some values are necessarily life-affirming, he was wrong. We are not perceiving life-affirming consequences, we are merely (within our constraints) unaware of contingent life-negating consequences.

I'm trying to think back on how Schopenhauer argued that some values have necessarily life-affirming consequences, and in such a case he would have been completely wrong.

That promises to be an interesting claim and I hope you won't think I am unnecessarily pedantic. However few here I guess are so au fait with Schopenhauer and Nietzsche that they know what of these two theories of existence and their ethical conclusions you refer to. I'm struggling to understand anyway. I wish you would elucidate maybe illustrate what you mean, or at least define the theories to which you refer as briefly and clearly as possible.

For instance your

Nietzsche claims that some values are necessarily life-affirming,

is a usable fact as is

Schopenhauer argued that some values have necessarily life-affirming consequences

If the material you dispute is Nietzsche's ' worlds beyond' I think you need to explain further that Nietzsche did not approve of the idea of things in themselves. This little example will show that your message is no more than a short introduction to a very large topic.

It's clear that Nietzsche didn't approve of things in themselves, or platonic essences, which are tantamount to "worlds beyond" or religion. For instance:

"The world which appears to our senses is the only real one, and one should rehabilitate the senses, unjustly discredited by platonism or kantism, which see in them a source of error : the senses don't lie insofar as they show the future, disappearance, change. The world of appearances is the only real one : the "true world" is added solely by the lie."

"The weak" are not animated by affirmation of the will to powe. (They're animated by ressentiment, that is, the negation of others to affirm themselves. The superhuman is sometimes thought of as something you should aspire to be, but in the psychological framework of Nietzsche's slave morality, it's sufficient to say the "superhuman" is merely a projection created by the "the weak", or a representation of that which the forces they react against. From the superhuman's point of the view, the superhuman wouldn't exist except as a geneological explanation of this nihilism, this life-negating slave morality. The opposite of the nihilist is he who according to Nietzsche affirms life (whether such an individual exists independently, or just as a projection created by the "weak"). Since our motives are too manifold for us to be conscious of all of them, I find it impossible to be conscious of (potentially) life-affirming consequences of some value. It's only possible to be conscious of life-negating consequences of some value.

It appears to me that his "revaluation of values" does include the possibility of life-affirming consequences of some value. But in respect of my claim as usable fact I added Insofar as:
Insofar as Nietzsche claims that some values are necessarily life-affirming, he was wrong.

I picked all of this from multiple sources on Nietzsche. I wonder if I'll have time to crawl through the texts myself.

Thank you.
I think of the superman as the authentic man who has broken free of moribund authorities and political persuaders. It is true that the slave mentality contrasts with the mentality of the superman and that is useful as I don't think we could understand the concept of superman unless we also understood the concept of slave mentality. Nietzsche's superman ethic I think aligns with muscular Xianity and efforts to help as many people as possible to cast off their ideological and religious chains.

So I agree that the weak are not animated by the will to power. However, did Nietzsche actually claim the weak resent the superman?
Are you not even conscious of aspiring to truth? Or beauty?

Belinda wrote: ↑Tue Aug 24, 2021 5:15 pm Thank you.
I think of the superman as the authentic man who has broken free of moribund authorities and political persuaders.

That's pretty close to the textbook definition. (I think the most common english translation is "to reject the authority of the slave morality", which is "life-negating" and also "a disinterested morality".) Some terms used by Nietzsche are "noble", "aristocratic" and he who "expresses his power". He is not the one who seeks to negate others, but to affirm himself. The superman is a more systemic concept than Aristotle's "Magnamious Man" which I think is mainly associated with the wealthy class.

Belinda wrote: ↑Tue Aug 24, 2021 5:15 pm It is true that the slave mentality contrasts with the mentality of the superman and that is useful as I don't think we could understand the concept of superman unless we also understood the concept of slave mentality. Nietzsche's superman ethic I think aligns with muscular Xianity and efforts to help as many people as possible to cast off their ideological and religious chains.

Muscular Xianity (Christianity)...? I have to read up on that.

Actually the will to power concept isn't incompatible with compassion or generosity, because everything depends on the type of energy (life-affirming or life-negating) which we put into our acts. (John Stuart Mill: making a sacrifice because I can vs. because I should.) The concept merely serves as an antithesis of sorts to culpabilisation, particularly self-culpabilisation. The superman concept is a perspective where the criteria for good and bad and for what is allowed or forbidden don't fall from the sky, but from the logic of interest. Everything is relative to the interest of man.

Belinda wrote: ↑Tue Aug 24, 2021 5:15 pm So I agree that the weak are not animated by the will to power. However, did Nietzsche actually claim the weak resent the superman?
Are you not even conscious of aspiring to truth? Or beauty?

That's "ressentiment", not "resentment". It's got a distinct Wikipedia article, it's according to Nietzsche the defense mechanism which serves the interests of "the weak" and undermines any necessity to become strong. The problem is culpabilisation, particularly self-culpabilisation (making us feel culpable and have a bad conscience) for pursuing our interests which are in contradiction with the "weak", resulting in a beatification of powerlessness as the highest value. Hence the concept of sin. Ressentiment is the anthithesis itself of the will to power ie. when an action is animated by animosity, envy, bitterness, grudge etc., someone who has need to negate others in order to affirm himself, and he is therefore always in a relation of comparison and frustration towards someone else. Source: Charles Robin, A.K.A. Le Précepteur, La morale d'esclave. (french)

Let me think about your last question.

I guessed what ressentiment means and got it wrong. I will have to look it up and think about it. Thanks for your explanation. My reading in Nietzsche is quite superficial actually.

I would like to withdraw the phrase I used "muscular Xianity". I know what I meant but I have just looked up muscular Christianity on Wikipedia , and it is not what I meant especially with its emphasis on physical training. I meant something more like Christians who take the traditional belief and actively use it as a basis or springboard for learning new and more effectual interpretations of the myth. For instance Jesus of Nazareth as social reformer. For instance the Christ as men's aspirations towards the transcendental virtues. (It is hard for me not to use anachronisms in these regards).

Belinda wrote: ↑Tue Aug 24, 2021 5:15 pmAre you not even conscious of aspiring to truth? Or beauty?

I don't think there's a central/intrinsic tendency towards truth or beauty in Nietzsche, there are only interests as I mentioned earlier which is the only tangent of your question to my thesis. (Ie. in Nietzschean thinking, how aspiring towards truth or beauty serves the logic of our interest. And I'm tempted to quote William James, soon.) I'm hopeful that even others will join in to destroy my line of reasoning. I guess we could say Nietzsche really proves my excellent point most simply in his quip from The Twilight of Idols: "What doesn't kill me, only makes me stronger." Does such and such action kill me or does it make me stronger? You won't ever really know if something isn't killing you before the moment when you die. Some things most positively will kill you. They are "life-negating". Any thing may kill you, we can't definitely exclude any thing from being life-negating.

try Birth of Tragedy...

-Imp

Fja1 wrote: ↑Wed Aug 25, 2021 7:42 pm

Belinda wrote: ↑Tue Aug 24, 2021 5:15 pmAre you not even conscious of aspiring to truth? Or beauty?

I don't think there's a central/intrinsic tendency towards truth or beauty in Nietzsche, there are only interests as I mentioned earlier which is the only tangent of your question to my thesis. (Ie. in Nietzschean thinking, how aspiring towards truth or beauty serves the logic of our interest. And I'm tempted to quote William James, soon.) I'm hopeful that even others will join in to destroy my line of reasoning. I guess we could say Nietzsche really proves my excellent point most simply in his quip from The Twilight of Idols: "What doesn't kill me, only makes me stronger." Does such and such action kill me or does it make me stronger? You won't ever really know if something isn't killing you before the moment when you die. Some things most positively will kill you. They are "life-negating". Any thing may kill you, we can't definitely exclude any thing from being life-negating.

Then Nietzsche adds motivating, active force to Schopenhauer's more inert "Will".

In the case of men as compared with other beings, men give a name to the end point of the power motive, as each man sees the end point to be. In other words men live forwards towards the future unlike other animals who live in the immediate 'present'. Finality is important to Nietzsche and he welcomes the fact of every man's death, his finality. Therefore Nietzsche would look ahead to final virtues.

A man of Nietzsche's intellectual stature would not try to squeeze truth and/or beauty into an ideological strait jacket like Nazism which by its nature is narrow and stultifying.