Philosophy Now Forum

First, the classical view on inference of induction is very mistaken. We have this moment right now. What do we make from it? Nothing changes. Everything changes. We are born and we are going to die. Life doesn't change at all. They are variations around the laws of nature. Along with scientific discoveries come change. The atom bomb has changed everything. Now nothing is the same. The internet is being born and again nothing is the same. We are set between regularities and irregularities. This is only seemingly so, I say. If we are to be deadly serious about our experience of nature that experience only reflects laws of nature. Clearly, the laws of nature can't be suspended. So the very attack on the classical inference from induction is this. When we experience something we actually perceive properties of the laws of nature. Of course, the nature is complex and it is thus compelling us to be very thorough! To hypothesise, if we could see one law of nature in effect at one time, span of time. We don't see this in several spans of time, but we get only this one chance in this example. So my assertion is consequently that because of the complexity of reality, we are used to perceiving facets of nature rather laboriously. We want to isolate instances to reflect only this mechanism that we are suspecting is a law of nature. So the real experience is really yielding truth in its very first instant. To be exact, you only need one case. When we see this apple falling from a tree, we should infer in that instant that objects can fall. When we see a birth of a human being we can infer that every human being is given birth. We need only the one instant. The remaining instances are really only psychological assurances and refinements of this one, first instance. The difference of my view from Hume's view should be striking. Hume asserts we can never know anything, we continously infer from regularities. I think logic, for example, reflects lawfulness of nature and so I infer that if nature exists somewhere, it has to conform to logic as we perceive it. It can't be any different. Now we have this situation that each instant is sufficient in themselves very opposite to Hume's view. This is new to philosophy, isn't it?

What has been largely underdeterming our sense that everything remains the same, I suggest, have been scientific discoveries, be they the roundness of planet earth, black swans in Australia, the fantastic size of the universe, the minuteness of the smallest particles in nature, the common structure of DNA of living organisms, and power of fission and fusion, energy that is contained in matter. We see children sometime drawing purple dogs and objects rather alien in nature because they lack this notion of expectation or prediction. Their knowledge is not at our level, the complete in a sense. It's quite funny to think about the sci-fi writers wildness in exaggerating the changes of, let's say, the next 50 years. If there is something we can be certain of in this regard, it is that they exaggerate the future and that it will probably look more common and hospitable than what they write. It will nevertheless be different.

What do you think? Throw something at me!

who is Hume?

bus2bondi

There is this Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy that can be very useful where you can find more information, on Hume and a lot more. Cheers!

but that's not how i find things

Please continue, bus2bondi, how do you find things? I feel you're being a bit short!

hi Aetixintro,

Aetixintro wrote:...This is new to philosophy, isn't it?

Not sure, but it sounds something like Leibniz's Monadology.

Hi to you as well, Arising_uk!
Is there some part of Leibniz's Monadology you like to cite in this regard? To my knowledge, this Hume's notion of custom or habit has been standing there like a rock for ages! I'm currently unaware of anyone trying to clear it out of the way.

You may want to look up something:
Problem of induction on Wikipedia
The Problem of Induction on SEP

I have also made a thread about this over at Philosophyforums. Just throw some more, please! Cheers!

Hume says that the effect of any cause can be anything and that this means that we should be skeptical of induction, not unlike when you say:

'Now we have this situation that each instant is sufficient in themselves very opposite to Hume's view.'

What you are saying seems very similar to Hume actually. The sufficiency of each instant implies that the next instant is not connected to the previous one - the very essence of the skeptical issue.

Further there are numerous times when the first observation is the worst observation. If the first apple I saw fall from a tree went up because of a strong wind then I would be wrong to think apples 'fall' upwards.

Thanks, Wootah
When I write that each instant is sufficient in themselves very opposite to Hume's view, I mean that we are affected by a combination of natural laws that are necessarily continuous and coherent. This is exactly opposite to Hume and his notion that our experience of nature is just a habit or custom. Clearly, I argue differently. So be it, I don't have the time right now to make this whole. I'll be back. Cheers!

Edit: I think there is an example of a person putting a book in a drawer in Hume's writings. According to Hume then, we have no reason to believe that the book is in the drawer the next time we enter the office. This is counter to my views of the necessarily continuous and coherent because I believe that just this instance is enough to make us believe that the book is still there unless there are conditions that can make it otherwise. The history of our minds show that it's impossible to change as a person from one instant to another. The continuity of the mind is bound to move forwards in time. We reason through the seasons and the years and it can't be otherwise. The mind is forced to be that history. I think the nature follows in similar fashion. More later!

Here I am again (I don't bother to make a new post)!
Some more from Philosophyforums.
I want to make myself clear. (To mix me up with "Hume's Custom or Habit" in this thread is absolutely wrong!)

Factors
1. Consistency and coherency (deduced from Descartes' Meditations)
2. The sum of natural laws (the usual consideration of our beings in nature)
3. Logics and mathematics are necessary aspects of nature and our minds (I hold the view that logics and mathematics are for real in a variety of senses)

4. The factors of 1. through 3. bridge our experience from one instant to the next and so on. Forever?

5. Point beside: 1. through 4. refute, in my opinion, "Hume's Custom or Habit", the problem of induction.

I'm absolutely killing "Hume's Custom or Habit". As it says, I'm against Hume on this.

This schema can be used in every instance of the universe.

Examples (I'll provide two):
The book in the drawer example. We are in an office. We put a book in a drawer. We go out of the office. We go out of the house. We go out of the laboratory (a little bit unusual, a whole house in a laboratory). We wait 24 hrs (partying, binge drinking, whatever). We go back into the laboratory. We go into the house. We go into the office. We look into the drawer and there is our book. We can be absolutely certain of this in the first instance from my argument. In this example, we discount natural disasters, ie. big meteors landing on the laboratory and so on. We also discount any dishonest activity in this regard.

The sun rising the next morning example. We have a fabulous day and enjoy life. We go to bed in the evening and we expect the sun to rise the next morning. In this, we make the following inference. Our Sun in our solar system is not about to die, exploding and consuming earth, ceasing to support life on earth. We don't know of any threatening meteors on the verge to devastate life on earth. The earth keeps its path and tilting pattern because there is nothing there to prevent this. We live in relative safety as we are outside earthquake zones and dubious neighbourhoods. (Added: ) We are also not threatened by global nuclear war. We wake up in the morning to a clear, blue sky and a beautiful sunrise. This sunrise is absolutely certain this day, Sept. 18. 2009. We can be absolutely certain of this in the first instance from my argument.

Edit: Instead of making the direct predictions, I think it's worthwhile to ask oneself of what there is that can be different. Why should the nature be otherwise? Then you can make the predictions.

Aexintro,

It is circular to invoke laws of nature to defend induction. Take this simplified example. In the past event B has always followed event A. If this happens enough times then we may say that 'If A then B' is a law of nature. In other words, we are saying that there is a necessary connection between the two events. Now Hume questions our justification for thinking in this way. For no matter how many times you see B follow A it is always possible that on the next occasion, B will not follow A. To invoke laws of nature to defend induction thus assumes the very thing that Hume calls into question, namely that inductive inferences are justifiable.

Rortabend,
I don't defend induction. I try to nullify the notion, "Hume's Custom or Habit". Perhaps I can replace it with "necessity". So you claim that the laws of nature that the science community has worked out are conforming to "Hume's Custom or Habit"? I've been thinking that "Hume's Custom or Habit" is concerning our ordinary sense of events that follow in order.

If one is to be consistent on your view, there are no laws of nature! I find it hard to believe that the external world, nature, as a whole has no rules, laws, necessary connections, beside that we make up in our minds, namely "Hume's Custom or Habit". Is it the case that there is order in nature only because we are disposed to see this order? I find that incredibly implausible.

I mean one thing is the human nature, but I find that you are attacking every pattern of nature, whatever it is, and reduce it to "Hume's Custom or Habit" and human dispositions.

Bottom line: I think you aren't serious about natural laws. The question of causal relations may be up for grabs in metaphysics, but it's not questioned in philosophy of science. There are laws of nature. Finito. These are necessary in order for nature to work and they are beyond the lives of people on planet Earth.

By comparison, in epistemology it's generally accepted that knowledge can obtain. You should easily see the analogy to philosophy of science.

I interpret "Hume's Custom or Habit" to apply to people's possibility to grasp nature and accordingly imposing his skeptical argument regarding future events. I don't think Hume is attacking a possible notion of necessary connections in nature. Further then, this allows me to nevertheless posit "laws of nature", but you will have to interpret them as "necessary connections in nature". In grasping nature, we have come a long way and Hume is of course wrong if he has been thinking we'd be unable to get there. However, I have a few doubts as to the exactness of our findings and whether we'll achieve utter objectivity. In the meantime we'll be working hard.

I'll investigate this some more. I'll be back. Cheers!

Edit: Some small change:
"2. The sum of natural laws (the usual consideration of our beings in nature)"
of post Posted: Thu Sep 17, 2009 9:26 am, I alter to
"2. The sum of "natural laws" alternatively known as the "necessary connections of nature" or "necessary structures of nature" (the usual consideration of our beings in nature)"

I don't defend induction. I try to nullify the notion, "Hume's Custom or Habit". Perhaps I can replace it with "necessity".

You've lost me here. You can't just get rid of induction!

If one is to be consistent on your view, there are no laws of nature!

Correct. That is the Humean view on laws.

I find it hard to believe that the external world, nature, as a whole has no rules, laws, necessary connections, beside that we make up in our minds, namely "Hume's Custom or Habit". Is it the case that there is order in nature only because we are disposed to see this order? I find that incredibly implausible.

The fact that you find it implausible is nether here nor there. You need to produce cogent and convincing arguments to show why the Humean view is mistaken. So far you have not done this.

Bottom line: I think you aren't serious about natural laws. The question of causal relations may be up for grabs in metaphysics, but it's not questioned in philosophy of science. There are laws of nature. Finito. These are necessary in order for nature to work and they are beyond the lives of people on planet Earth.

You don't know what my views are on laws. I was presenting the Humean argument against induction. Also, I don't know what you mean when you say that causal relations are not questionned in philosophy of science. There are countless articles and books that debate the nature of causal relations. You can't just end this debate using ex cathedra pronouncements liek 'Finito'!

I don't think Hume is attacking a possible notion of necessary connections in nature.

That is precisely what he is doing. Have you been reading Hume or a secondary source?

You can't just get rid of induction!

I can criticise it. If it proves unreasonable after sustained attacks, I suggest the alternative view can be called "view of necessity" or whatever people find reasonable to put in its place.

You don't know what my views are on laws. I was presenting the Humean argument against induction. Also, I don't know what you mean when you say that causal relations are not questionned in philosophy of science. There are countless articles and books that debate the nature of causal relations. You can't just end this debate using ex cathedra pronouncements liek 'Finito'!

I don't know you're views on laws. I'm merely onto what you state. There is no intention to offend you. Also, it should read "the question of causal relations may be up for grabs in metaphysics, but laws of nature are not questioned in philosophy of science." I'm sorry about that.

That is precisely what he is doing. Have you been reading Hume or a secondary source?

I read Hume to assert a criticism of the abilities of consciousness to gain cognition of nature and nature's workings. As such, it's an internal view, bringing forward the fact that we are not intimate with nature to the degree that we can know what nature "is doing". So his view concentrates on the limitation of consciousness and doesn't say very much definitive about "laws of nature".
In Philosophyforums, I've made this quote:
From David Hume - AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING - SECTION V - SCEPTICAL SOLUTION OF THESE DOUBTS - PART I - http://18th.eserver.org/hume-enquiry.html

This principle is Custom or Habit. For wherever the repetition of any particular act or operation produces a propensity to renew the same act or operation, without being impelled by any reasoning or process of the understanding, we always say, that this propensity is the effect of Custom. By employing that word, we pretend not to have given the ultimate reason of such a propensity. We only point out a principle of human nature, which is universally acknowledged, and which is well known by its effects. Perhaps we can push our enquiries no farther, or pretend to give the cause of this cause; but must rest contented with it as the ultimate principle, which we can assign, of all our conclusions from experience. It is sufficient satisfaction, that we can go so far, without repining at the narrowness of our faculties because they will carry us no farther. And it is certain we here advance a very intelligible proposition at least, if not a true one, when we assert that, after the constant conjunction of two objects--heat and flame, for instance, weight and solidity-- we are determined by custom alone to expect the one from the appearance of the other. This hypothesis seems even the only one which explains the difficulty, why we draw, from a thousand instances, an inference which we are not able to draw from one instance, that is, in no respect, different from them. Reason is incapable of any such variation. The conclusions which it draws from considering one circle are the same which it would form upon surveying all the circles in the universe. But no man, having seen only one body move after being impelled by another, could infer that every other body will move after a like impulse. All inferences from experience, therefore, are effects of custom, not of reasoning.

Now it's your turn to make a quote!

I can criticise it. If it proves unreasonable after sustained attacks, I suggest the alternative view can be called "view of necessity" or whatever people find reasonable to put in its place.

I'm confused. Hume isn't saying that we need to get rid of inductive reasoning. He's just saying that it is based on 'custom and habit', not reason. The only person I've ever heard suggest that we get rid of induction is Popper and, for all sorts of reasons, this doesn't work.

There is absolutely no need to be confused. It is I who say we should get rid of induction, both because it's weak and because it's skeptical, a very problem.

What do you think of this, "1. Consistency and coherency (deduced from Descartes' Meditations)" then? By the way, where is that quote of yours?